HISTORY OF THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT IN INDIA

R. C. MAJUMDAR
M. A., Ph. D.

BOOK TRADERS

Professor R. C. Majumdar has approached the subject from a strictly historical point of view. He has written with complete freedom, untr-amelled by the vacillations and varying moods of the Board appointed by the Government of India.

He has dealt in this book only with the movement of freedom from British yoke. He has added a very brief summery of the events leading to the establishment of British rule and the condition of the people prevailing at the time, such as would be nece-ssary for a proper understanding of the freedom movement.

This book is not meant to be a history of the British rule in India, but only of the movement to put an end to it. He has viewed the struggle for independence in four distinct phases.

There are some obvious difficul-ties in writing a history of the freedom movement in India only after a few years it was achieved. He has however tried to present a detached view. He has tried to discuss Hindu-Muslim rel-ations in a historical perspective, a discussion which is indispensiable to offer a rational explanation of the Birth of Pakistan.

Studied alongwith the books on freedom movement written by Pakistani historians, R. C. Majumdar's HISTORY OF THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT IN INDIA would prove to be an interesting work.

Rs. 500/-
for 4 Vols.

HISTORY OF THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT IN INDIA

HISTORY OF THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT IN INDIA

HISTORY OF THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT IN INDIA

VOLUME IV

BY

R. C. MAJUMDAR, M.A., Ph. D.

Vice-President, International Commission for a History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind (UNESCO) ; Honorary Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland ; Honorary Fellow of the Asiatic Society of Bombay ; Fellow of the Asiatic Society, Calcutta ;

Formerly

Vice-Chancellor of the University of Dacca ; Principal, College of Indology, Hindu University, Varanasi ; Director, Board of Editors for the History of the Freedom Movement in India ; Professor, College of Indology, Nagpur University ; Visiting Professor of Indian History in the Universities of Chicago and Pennsylvania (U. S. A.).

BOOK TRADERS

P. O. BOX 1854

LAHORE

FIRST PAKISTANI EDITION
1979

***PUBLISHED BY :* MUSTAFA WAHEED**

***PRINTED AT :* MASOOD PRINTERS**
LAHORE.

DEDICATED
TO THE MEMORY OF THOSE
WHO LIVED AND DIED
FOR
THE FREEDOM OF INDIA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

BOOK V

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF FREEDOM

CHAPTER VII

REVIVAL OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

A. THE FIRST PHASE (1922-6)

I. BENGAL

The history of the revolutionary or the so-called 'terrorist' movement up to 1917 has been discussed above. There was a comparative lull in the activities of the terrorists for some time after that. Armed with the provisions of the Defence of India Act, the police seized a large number of people on mere suspicion, and the terrorist methods adopted by the Government told upon the morale of the small band of men who had been carrying on this unequal fight for more than a decade. The police ruthlessly hunted out the few terrorist leaders still at large. But some of them did not surrender without a good fight, and one such incident is worth recording.[2]

Nalini Ghosh, a leader of the Anusilan Samiti, with about six others, went in hiding in Gauhati (Assam), and lived in two separate houses in two batches. At the early hours of the morning on 9 January, 1918, the police surrounded one of the houses. The order by the Police to open the door was replied by a pistol shot and this was the signal for firing on both sides. The revolutionaries, however, managed to escape by a back door to a hill top where they were joined by the other batch. The police surrounded the hillock and a free fight ensued between the two. When the revolutionaries exhausted their ammunition, all except two were arrested. One of these two, with a few others, were arrested six months later after another

CHAPTER VII

REVIVAL OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

A. THE FIRST PHASE (1923-8).

I. BENGAL

The history of the revolutionary or the so-called 'terrorist' movement up to 1917 has been discussed above.[1] There was a comparative lull in the activities of the terrorists for some time after that. Armed with the provisions of the Defence of India Act, the police seized a large number of people on mere suspicion, and the terrorist methods adopted by the Government told upon the morale of the small band of men who had been carrying on this unequal fight for more than a decade. The police ruthlessly hunted out the few terrorist leaders still at large. But some of them did not surrender without a good fight, and one such incident is worth recording.[2]

Nalini Ghosh, a leader of the *Anusilan Samiti*, with about six others, went in hiding in Gauhati (Assam), and lived in two separate houses in two batches. At the early hours of the morning on 9 January, 1918, the police surrounded one of the houses. The order by the Police to open the door was replied by a pistol shot and it was the signal for firing on both sides. The revolutionaries, however, managed to escape by a back door to a hill top where they were joined by the other batch. The police surrounded the hillock and a free fight ensued between the two. When the revolutionaries exhausted their ammunition, all except two were arrested. One of these two, with a few others, were arrested six months later after another

free fight in Dacca. Several others were similarly traced and arrested during 1918, but not before they shot dead some of the police party.

These arrests and police measures did not stamp out the terrorist organizations, but the suspension of their activities, for the time being, generated a false sense of security. Encouraged by this the Government decided to release all the political prisoners on the eve of the introduction of new Reforms, in order to create a favourable atmosphere for their working. A Royal Proclamation was issued on 23 December, 1919,—the very day on which the Government of India Act got the Royal Assent—granting a general amnesty to all political prisoners.

The terrorists who had been interned under the Defence of India Act were all included in the general amnesty. Early in 1920 these were released and the amnesty was gradually extended to most of the leaders of the revolutionary movements.[3]

The return of the political prisoners—even from the Andamans—early in 1920 was shortly followed by the launching of the Non-co-operation movement by Gandhi. A number of old revolutionaries accepted his non-violent programme and joined the movement. There were, however, others who had no faith in the effectiveness of this programme, but at the intercession of leaders like C. R. Das, they agreed to give Gandhi a chance and suspend revolutionary activities.[4]

The suspension of Non-co-operation movement by Gandhi early in 1922 and his imprisonment, shortly after, were followed by the revival of revolutionary activities. The annual meeting of the Bengal Provincial Conference was held in Chittagong in April, 1922. The revolutionaries from different parts of Bengal took advantage of this to meet together and draw up a plan and programme in secret. The resurgence of revolutionary mentality in 1923

was indicated by the open and frank praise of revolutionaries in the various periodicals in Bengal. "The *Ananda Bazar Patrika* referred to them as selfless youths with indomitable resolution, who kindled the lamp of life by undergoing death. The *Prabartak* extolled Kanai Lall Dutt. Highly appreciative biographical notices of Jatindra Mukherji and his three[5] associates now appeared in many papers. It was explained, however, that this laudation did not necessarily imply adoption of their methods. The *Sarathi* set forth the following justification : We may not adopt their methods, but are we not on that account to respect their renunciation, their heroism, and their patriotism ?"[5a]

"At the end of July, 1923, 'Red Bengal' leaflets made their appearance. The first issue announced the initiation of a campaign of assassination of police officers, the second impressed on the political leaders of Bengal the necessity for the existence of an active violence party."[6]

The old *Anusilan* and *Yugantar Sâmitis* were revived and a new revolutionary organization was set up in Chittagong by a young man named Surya Sen. Before the end of 1923 he established a number of branches in different parts of the Chittagong District, and one of his early successful undertakings was the raid on the office of the Assam Bengal Railway in Chittagong. Four young men with revolvers entered the office in broad daylight, took out the sum of Rs. 77,000 from the treasurer, and managed to escape. Surya Sen and a few others were arrested, but were acquitted for want of evidence against them.

The *Yugantar* party also committed several dacoities including raids on two post-offices, in and near Calcutta. A persistent effort was made to kill Sir Charles Tegart, the Police Commissioner (C. I. D.), who was a terror to the terrorists. In January, 1924, Gopinath Saha, engaged for the purpose, shot dead a European, Mr. Day, whom

he mistook for Tegart. When capital punishment was awarded to him he declared, unmoved, that every drop of his blood would serve to spread revolutionary ideas in every household. He wrote to his mother not to lament but to be proud of a son like him, and expressed the hope that every mother might bear a fearless son like him. During the period of a month and a half that he was in jail, his weight increased by five pounds. The courage and self-sacrifice of Gopinath were highly appreciated by the Congress leaders and a resolution to this effect was passed by the Bengal Provincial Conference at Sirajgunge. A similar resolution moved by C. R. Das at the all-India Congress Committee created a tense atmosphere to which reference has been made above.[7]

In March, 1924, the Police discovered a big manufactory of bombs in Calcutta, and seized a large number of bombs full of explosives and shells for the same. Another large manufactory of bombs at Dakshineshwar, about 3 miles to the north of Calcutta, was raided by the Police on 10 November, 1925. They indicated that the revolutionaries had considerably improved their knowledge and skill in the preparation of bombs. There were other centres, too, for preparing bombs. Revolutionary leaflets were regularly distributed in the streets of Calcutta.

The Bengal Government took alarm at the revival of 'terrorist' activities on a large scale and passed a new Ordinance in 1924, arming the Executive with powers similar to those they had under the Defence of India Act. It was followed by arrests on a large scale, and about 187 persons, including Subhas Bose, were put behind the bars. A large number was kept in detention in villages, and movements of all suspects were under surveillance. A Bill was later introduced under which the special powers were to remain in force for five years. As the Legislative Council refused leave to introduce the Bill it was certified

by the Governor.

Attempts were made by the terrorists to kill a number of Police officers (C. I. D.) who took a leading part in tracing or arresting the revolutionaries. Most of these attempts failed, but there was one daring and successful instance in May, 1926, when a Special Superintendent visited some terrorist prisoners inside the Alipore Central jail. A fatal blow was dealt on his head with an iron bar by Pramode Choudhury, a member of the Hindusthan Republican Association in U. P., who was arrested in Dakhineshwar (bomb manufactory) along with several other members of the same association.

II. THE UNITED PROVINCES

As in Bengal, so in U. P., revolutionary activities were brought to a standstill after 1918, but were revived in 1923. In addition to Sachindra Sanyal,[8] three other Bengalis,—Jogesh Chandra Chatterji, Rajendra Nath Lahiri and Satis Chandra Sinha,—took the leading part in this re-organization which covered the whole Province with a network of revolutionary centres.

It has been stated by some that all this was part of an all-India revolutionary organization, with its headquarters in Calcutta. This view finds some support in the fact that a Conference of the revolutionaries, held at Kanpur in October, 1924, was attended by revolutionary leaders from different parts of India. In any case, it was at this Conference that a central all-India organization was set up under the name of Hindusthan Republican Association. All the powers of control were vested in a Central Committee consisting of representatives from each Province. This Committee was to supervise and guide the work in different Provinces, and to maintain contact with the outside world. Unanimity of all members was required to carry a proposal, but once accepted it must be given effect to without any question. The Conference also drew up a plan and

programme of work. The Association set up Provincial Committees with clear direction as to the programme of work and the method to be followed in a carrying it out.

The following brief account of this Association is included in a note on "Terrorism in India" prepared by the Government of India, which was submitted by the Secretary of State for India to the Joint Committee on Constitutional Reforms on 30 November, 1933.[9]

"Probably the most persistent terrorist organization outside Bengal is the Hindusthan Republican Association, subsequently styled the Hindusthan Socialist Republican Association or Army. This was originally started, after the failure of Gandhiji's first mass civil disobedience campaign, by two Bengalis In the U. P. The rules of the Association stated that 'the object of the Association shall be to establish a federated Republic of the United States of India by an organized and armed revolution.' Each Provincial organization was to have its various departments and each was to concentrate on crimes of violence with a view to collect money and arms ; for the enforcement of discipline assassination was made permissibe. This Association has since its inception been very loosely knit; at times it has almost ceased to exist, but it has frequently come to notice subsequently, and has even been established in Madras. It has functioned in Bihar, U. P., Punjab and Delhi."[9a]

It is further stated in this note that as early as 1925, if not before, Sachindra Sanyal was in touch with M. N. Roy, who was charged by Russia with the task of spreading Communism in India as has been related above.[10]

In accordance with the decision of the Kanpur Conference the revolutionary movement in U. P. was thoroughly organized by Ramprasad Bismil. The organization followed the same pattern as in Bengal, and the financial difficulties could only be met by committing dacoities. Ramprasad,

however, introduced a novelty. He decided that the object of the dacoity must be to secure the money belonging to Government, and not to any private individual. His most notable exploit was the dacoity on 9 August, 1925, in a railway train proceeding frnm Kakori towards Alamnagar, in the section Shaharanpur—Lucknow of the Northern Railway, Alamnagar being the last station before Lucknow. About 10 young men who had boarded the train stopped it by pulling alarm chain. The guard was held at the point of a revolver, and indiscriminate shots were fired to keep the passengers in their own compartments. A few entered the mail van, broke open the iron safe (in which money collected from the different stations was kept), and decamped with a large amount. The Government instituted a vigorous inquiry and after a great deal of searches and arrest of many suspects discovered the whole plot.[11] Altogether 44 persons were arrested of whom 15 were let off as there was no evidence against them. The remaining 29 were tried by a Special Magistrate, who found 27 of them guilty. These were tried by a Special Sessions Judge. The Kakori Conspiracy Case dragged on for about a year, in course of which the prisoners had to resort to fasting as a protest against cruel treatment to them in jail. Two leading figures were subsequently arrested and tried. Four were sentenced tc death, four were transported for life, and four, including two approvers, were acquitted. The rest were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, ranging from 14 to 5 years. There was a great public agitation against the capital punishment and a proposal to commute the sentence to inprisonment for life, moved in the Legislative Council of U. P., was supported by all the non-official members. A few leading citizens of U. P. made an appeal for mercy both to the Governor and the Viceroy, and the condemned accused having unsuccessfully filed an appeal to the Privy Council, sent

a petition for mercy to the Emperor. But nothing availed. On 18 December Ramprasad was hanged, his last words being, "I wish the downfall of the British empire." His colleague Roshanlal bravely went up to the gallows with a copy of the *'Gita'* in his hand and *'Bande Mataram'* on his lips. Ashfaqulla stepped to the gallows with a copy of the *Quran* tied round his neck. Just before the noose was put round his neck, he said, "I tried to make India free, and the attempt will not end with my life," and died with a smiling face.

B. THE SECOND PHASE (1928-34)

I. BENGAL

1. The Chittagong Armoury Raid and its Repercussion

There was a lull in the activities of the revolutionaries after 1927, and the Government felt justified in relaxing the rigours imposed upon them. By September, 1928, the Government released all the detenus who had been interned under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act and Ordinance of 1925, and the Act itself was allowed to lapse in 1930. But within a fortnight occurred the Chittagong Armoury Raid, perhaps the most daring of the revolutionary enterprises in India.

This raid was not an isolated incident, as is generally supposed, but formed part of a comprehensive plan. When the revolutionaries were set free in 1928 they received a hearty ovation all over the country and were for some time almost lionized by the public. Taking advantage of this popular sentiment the released revolutionaries founded different organizations under the patronage of younger leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose. On account of the failures of revolutionary movements in the past the younger ganerations had lost faith in the old leaders and formed themselves into what was known as Revolt Groups or Advance Groups. They wanted

complete independence of India, and it was as their spokesmen that both Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Bose fought against the Colonial Status recommended in the Motilal Nehru Report, as mentioned above.[12] Besides, the new groups did not attach much importance to murder of individual officials, but preferred an armed rising.' It may be noted that the two thousand volunteers in the Congress session in Calcutta in 1928, who were drilled in military uniform by Subhas Bose, the General Officer Commanding, were mostly recruited from these young revolutionaries.

The plan of armed rising was discussed on the occasion of the annual meeting of the Bengal Provincial Conference held at Rangpur, early in April, 1929. It was decided in a meeting at Calcutta in November, 1929, to launch simultaneous attacks on the armouries in Chittagong, Mymensingh and Barisal. It was in accordance with this plan that Surya Sen organized the raid at Chittagong.

Surya Sen, a resident of Chittagong, while studying in the B.A. Class in Berhampore College in 1916, was initiated into revolutionary ideas by a teacher there. On his return to Chittagong in 1918, he organized a revolutionary party, but joined the Non-co-operation movement in 1921 and became a teacher of the local national school. Hence he was known as Master-*da*.[13] After the suspension of Non-co-operation movement he revived the revolutionary organization, as mentioned above. He was imprisoned for two years and went in hiding after release. But he renewed his revolutionary activity after 1928 when members of the revolutionary groups in Chittagong were released along with other detenus.

He had able lieutenants like Ananta Singh and Ganesh Ghosh. They decided "to inspire self-confidence by demonstrating that even without outside help it was possible to fight the Government." They planned "to

raid the Government armoury and seize arms, cut off communications and raid the European club." For a week Chittagong would be free, and then when the Government brought in troops "they would fight without yielding and die fighting." This heroic action, they thought, would inspire new generations to fight for the freedom of their Motherland."[14]

In accordance with this plan Surya Sen, after having made regular military preparations, issued a manifesto in the name of the Indian Republican Army, Chittagong Branch. It was an open declaration of war against the British.[15] After giving a detailed account of the atrocities prepetrated by them in India, the Republican army appealed to every Indian to offer his support to its endeavour to destroy the British rule in India by an armed attack. This manifesto was widely circulated in the town of Chittagong on 18 April, 1930.

The same night, at about 10 p. m., "four batches of varying strength set out from the Congress office in Chittagong. One was to capture the Police Armoury, one to capture the Auxiliary Force Armoury, one to massacre the Europeans in the Club and the other to destroy the telephone exchange and telegraph office. The Club happened to be deserted and the party deputed to attack it joined the other groups. The Police Armoury party consisted of about 50 youths clad in khaki, led by Ananta Singh and Ganesh Ghosh, dressed in Officer's uniform. The Police sentry was shot down ; the party broke into the Armoury and Magazine and armed themselves with muskets, revolvers, and ammunition. Practically the same thing happened in the Auxiliary Force Armoury, and the sentry together with another sepoy and the Sergeant Major were shot dead. The place was then forced open and pistols, revolvers, rifles and a Lewis gun were taken away."[16]

But the raiders, in their hurry, forgot to take the cartridges kept in a separate locked room. This rendered useless the rifles and the Lewis gun which they had seized. While they were engaged in ransacking the Armoury they fired at the carriage of officials, killing a railway guard, two taxi-drivers, and a Constable in the Magistrate's car. After having carried off the arms the raiders soaked the building with petrol and set fire to it. They were repeatedly fired at from the barracks but managed to reach the Police lines. "The telegraph office party seized and chloroformed the telephone operator, hacked the telephone Board to pieces and set fire to it. The Telegraph Master was fired at when he came to the operator's assistance, but he returned with a gun and drove the raide off before they destroyed the telegraph office. This Party then went to the police lines and joined the main party."[17] There they all stood in a line, in right military style, and declared the Provisional Independent Government of India with Surya Sen as President. "A counter-attack under the Deputy-Inspector-General of Police was organized, and although few in number and poorly equipped, it succeeded in forcing the raiders to leave the town and retreat towards the hills. The raiders thus had to abandon their further project of raiding the Government treasury and massacring the Europeans in the town. Meanwhile another party cut all telegraph communications between Chittagong and the outside world, and attempted to interrupt railway communications by removing a rail and derailing a goods train; yet another party attempted, unsuccessfully, to derail the down mail train to Chittagong at a place 70 miles from Chittagong on the same night. Information of the raid was sent out by wireless from a ship in the harbour and reinforcements reached Chittagong on the 20th April."[18]

Fifty-seven revolutionaries, armed each with a revolver

(or pistol) and a musket, after wandering. through hills and dales for three days practically without any food, took position on the 22nd morning on a hillock, named Jalalabad hill, but were not attacked by the British force till 5 p. m. Then followed a regular pitched battle which continued till the British force retired about 8 p. m. In the first few volleys[19] from the British machine guns eleven revolutionaries fell. The casualties on the Government side were heavy, but exact figures are not available. It is said that Sir Charles Tegart, while assaulting the raiders, taken prisoners, cursed them and said, "you have killed 64 of our men."

The British forces made three attempts to climb the hill, but were repulsed each time. It was, however, clear to the revolutionaries that they could not carry on this unequal fight for long. So they decided to disperse in several groups and carry on guerilla warfare as long as possible. It is not possible to describe in detail the arrest of individuals or groups and their numerous clashes with the British forces. Only a few may be briefly noticed.

There was a free fight, for several hours, on 6 May, both in land and on the river Karnafuli near Chittagong, in which four out of six revolutionaries were killed and the remaining two surrendered. Another free fight took place at Chandernagore on 31 August, when the Police Commissioner, Sir Charles Tegart, surrounded a house in which a few of the Chittagong raiders were in hiding. One of them was killed and the others were arrested.

Surya Sen and a number of Chittagong revolutionaries were still at large. The British assembled a large force and ransacked the whole of the district, but could not capture the great leader. The Chittagong Armoury raid left a long trail of revolutionary incidents all over the district to which reference will be made later. In the meanwhile it had a great repercussion upon the revo-

lutionaries all over Bengal.

"The news of this coup, unprecedented in the annals of terrorism, gave a fillip to the younger section of the revolutionaries who were already fired with enthusiasm to drive out the British from India by the force of arms. The elderly leaders considered that an adequate supply of arms and man-power had not yet been collected and therefore counselled delay, but after the Chittagong raid the younger section could no longer be restrained. Recruits poured into the various terrorist groups in a steady stream and these included women and young girls who from this time onwards are found assisting the terrorists as housekeepers, messengers, custodians of arms, and sometimes as comrades.

"In May the leaders of the main Yugantar party in Calcutta drew up a programme of terrorism and made arrangements for the manufacture of bombs. The principal features of this programme were:

(1) The murder of Europeans in hotels, clubs, and cinemas, simultaneously in Calcutta and the districts by bombs.

(2) The burning of the aerodrome in Dum-Dum with petrol.

(3) The cutting off of the gas and electric supply of Calcutta, by destroying the gas works and the electric power stations.

(4) The cutting off of the petrol supply of Calcutta by destroying the depot at Budge-Budge.

(5) The disorganization of the tramway service in Calcutta by cutting overhead wires.

(6) The destruction of telegraphic communication between Calcutta and the districts in Bengal.

(7) The destruction of bridges and railway lines by dynamites and hand grenades."[20]

The result was that in 1930 there was an 'alarming

recrudescence of the terrorist movement in various parts of India, and notably in Bengal.' It continued during 1931 and 1932. The number of outrages committed during 1933 was considerably lower than in any of the three preceding years. There was a still more marked decline in terrorist crimes in 1934. The miserable collapse of Gandhi's Civil Disobedience movement synchronised with this decline. Both were largely due to legislation giving unrestricted autocratic powers to the Police and the Executive, and the terrible measures of repression adopted by the Government.

The Government had re-enacted the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Part Continuance) Act on 1 April, 1930, which continued for five years the sections relating to trial by special procedure. After the Chittagong raid, however, the lost powers of arrest and detention were immediately conferred by Ordinance and this was replaced by Act VI of 1930 on 16 October, 1930. Altogether 2,167 persons were dealt with under this Act, of whom 1,351 were in gaols and detention camps, and 288 in village and home domicil, making a total of 1639, on 30 November, 1933. There were, besides, 19 State prisoners under Regulation III of 1818.[21]

'By the middle of July, 1931, the Government found that the existing legislation was not sufficient to cope with the terrorist menace. On the 9th October, 1931, Act XXIII was passed to provide against publication of matter inciting or encouraging murder or violence. On 29 October the Government of India promulgated Ordinance IX of 1931 widening the scope of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930, so that action could be taken not only against persons actually concerned in the commission of terrorist associations, but also against those who are members or helpers of those associations. It also widened the schedule of offences. On 30 November, the Bengal Emergency Powers Ordinance XI of 1931 was issued. Chapter I of the

Ordinance provided for emergency powers which would apply immediately to the district of Chittagong. Military and Police were to combine in operations to round up terrorists and absconders in that district, and to render these operations effective the District Magistrate was given powers, among others, to commandeer property, limit access to certain places, regulate traffic and transport, and impose a collective fine upon recalcitrant inhabitants. Chapter II provided for special tribunals and special magistrates and a procedure designed to overcome delaying tactics. On the expiry of the Ordinances the powers conferred by them were embodied in the Bengal Suppression of Terrorist Outrages Act, 1932, and the Bengal Criminal Law (Arms and Explosives) Act, 1932, passed by the Legislative Council.'[22]

Early in 1934 was passed the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act which replaced without time limit various temporary Acts about to expire.

Reviewing the situation at the end of 1933 an official Report observes :

"Though the number of fresh arrests has declined in recent months, the present monthly average is still disquietingly high and indicates that considerable recruitment is still going on.

"One reason for this is that subversive propaganda and activities have been so rife in recent years that they have succeeded in creating a revolutionary mentality which has permeated almost every stratum of the literate Bhadralok society. To a certain extent the unemployment problem among the educated middle classes in Bengal has been a powerful accessory to those who have deliberately sought to bring about this result, but the factors which have been chiefly responsible for the propagation of revolutionary ideas are a subversive Press, and successive organised movements for defiance of the laws by the methods variously

known as non-co-operation and civil disobedience."

"Nothing is more noticeable in the history of the revolutionary movement than the connection between the recrudescence of violent propaganda in the Press and of terrorism. Contrary to the expectations of Gandhi his movements have, on many an occasion, broken out into violence, and even when they have, in fact, remained non-violent, succeeded in engendering a violent mentality towards the Government which made young men readily succumb to the arguments of the terrorist recruiters. It is a remarkable fact that a large percentage of the recruits to the terrorist movement are found to have made their political *debut* as civil resisters."[23]

"The net result of these facts has been greatly to widen the field of recruitment to the terrorist ranks. Gone are the days when elaborate ceremonies of initiation and administration of vows, before an image of the Goddess Kali, were necessary to ensure the devotion of recruits to the terrorist cause.[24] It is sufficient now-a-days to give a boy a few seditious books to read, and to supplement this by instructions from persons who have won his trust and confidence. Further, good moral character is no longer an essential in a recruit. Throughout the Province, students in schools and colleges are now far more deeply permeated by a spirit of unreasoning resentment against the Government, and of defiance of authority, and there are a large number of districts in which some or all of the educational institutions have terrorist groups connected with them under the control of the main leaders. The result is that murders are now committed by youths unknown to the police, at the bidding of their leaders."

Another recent development was the advent of the female terrorist. This was suggested by the Government to be due to the fact that the women took an active part in picketing during the Civil Disobedience movement

in 1930, for "the step from non-violence to violence is a short one. Of those detained under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act 15 are women."[25]

The same official Report refers to some other ancillary factors which helped the growth of terrorist movement :

"The subversive movements in general and terrorism in particular received encouragement from the Calcutta Corporation. It was captured by the Congress in 1924, and C. R. Das, as Mayor, offered employment to those who had suffered in the "country's cause" mostly as teachers in Corporation Primary schools which multiplied from 19 in 1923-4 to 225 by the end of December, 1931. The attention of the Corporation was drawn to the fact that Corporation teachers took part in the illegal movements and the Corporation Schools were being used for unlawful purposes. The Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation, in reply, brought counter-charges of ill-treatment to the teachers by the police. The Corporation passed resolutions expressing sorrow at the death of terrorists and even named streets after them.

"Such attitude of open sympathy to the terrorists by the Corporation and the Bengal Provincial Congress and the public tributes paid by them to persons convicted of terrorist crime have been a perpetual incitement to emotional youth to undertake fresh outrages. Factors such as these did not weight the scale against Government in their campaign af 1916-19."[26]

2. General Review of Revolutionary Activities.

Some idea of the revolutionary activities in Bengal, in accordance with the programme of the Yugantar party mentioned above, during the period 1930 to 1933, may be gained from the following table :[27]

I. Classified Statement of the Number of Cases of Outrages year by year.

	1930	1931	1932	1933
Murderous Outrages	7	5	5	3
Attempts at Outrages	4	6	14	3
Dacoities	10	23		
Attempted Dacoities	-	2	68	34
Robberies	6	18		
Attempted robberies	1	5		
Bomb-throwing	6	7	3	-
Bomb explosions	1	-	4	3
Armed raids	1	-	-	-
Total	36	66	94	43

II. List of Casualties due to Terrorist Outrages

Class	1930 killed	1930 injured	1931 killed	1931 injured	1932 killed	1932 injured	1933 killed	1933 injured
Officials	11	12	5	13	6	10	1	1
Non-Officials	10	14	4	3	6	27	-	-
Terrorists	26	4	-	1	5	3	2	-

i. Murder of Officials

A number of Indians were murdered as they were supposed to be police informers. Some of the most daring attempts to murder officials are noted below, year by year.

Year 1930

1. Reference has been made above to an unsuccessful attempt to kill the Police Commissioner Sir Charles Tegart in 1924. A fresh attempt was made on 25 August, 1930, when two revolutionaries threw bombs at the car of Tegart near Dalhousie Square, Calcutta. One of the bombs exploded behind Tegart's car, which was not damaged and escaped. As a result of the explosion one of the revolutionaries was killed and the other seriously injured. The Police discovered a bomb factory, and arrested quite a large number of members of the Yugantar Party who were tried in the "Dalhouse Square Conspiracy

Case" and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment varying between 20 and 5 years.

2. On 29 August, 1930, Mr. Lowman, Inspector-General of Police, Bengal, and Mr. Hodson, Superintendent of Police, Dacca, visited the Mitford Hospital in Dacca. A student of the attached Medical School shot at them with a revolver at a fairly long range. Both were seriously wounded. Lowman expired after a few days but Hodson recovered. Binay Bose, who fired the shot, was seized by a by-stander but threw him off and managed to escape.

3. The same Binay Bose with two others—all dressed as Europeans—entered the Writers' Buildings, Calcutta, at about 11 a. m. on 8 December, 1930. They rushed into the office room of Mr. Simpson, the Inspector-General of Prisons and shot him dead. As soon as Mr. Nelson, I.C.S., the Legal Remembrancer, attracted by the noise of the firing, came out of his room, he was shot in his thigh and fell down. The revolutionaries then went down the corridor, firing indiscriminately into the rooms of other European officials, one of whom alone, Mr. Townend, I.C.S., was wounded. The three revolutionaries then attempted to commit suicide as they knew that escape was impossible. One of them took Potassium Cyanide and died immediately. Binay and Dinesh shot at their own heads. Binoy died after a few days, but Dinesh recovered and was hanged.

Year 1931

1. On 7 April Mr. J. Peddie, District Magistrate of Midnapore, visited a local school. At about 7 p.m., while Mr. Peddie was attending an exhibition of manual work in the school, he was fatally shot from behind at close range by two young men who managed to escape.

2. Mr. Garlick, the Sessions Judge of 24 Parganas, had sentenced to death Dinesh, one of the murderers of

Mr. Simpson mentioned above. On 27 July, while sitting in Court, a young man shot him through the head and he immediately died. The murderer was shot by a Sergeant on duty and fell down severely wounded. But he committed suicide by taking Potassium Cyanide. A piece of paper was found on his body containing the words : "Down with the Court which unjustly sentenced Dinesh Gupta to capital punishment."

3. Inspector Ashanullah was held chiefly responsible for the horrors that were let loose upon the people of Chittagong after the Armoury raid. He was shot dead on 30 August.

4. On 14 December, Mr. C. G. B. Stevens, the Magistrate of Comilla, was in his Bungalow when two girls approached him with a petition. Mr. Stevens was reading the application when one of the girls shot at him and he immediately fell down dead.

5. Unsuccessful attempts were made to murder Mr. Cassells, Commissioner, Dacca Division (21 August), Mr. Durno, District Magistrate, Dacca (28 October) and Mr. Villiers, the President of the European Association (29 October). The last two were seriously wounded, and the assailants in each case managed to escape.

Year 1932

1. On 30 April, Mr. Douglas, the District Magistrate of Midnapore, while presiding over a meeting in the District Board office, was shot dead. The murderer was hanged.

2. Kamakhya Sen, a Sub-Deputy Magistrate at Munshiganj (Dacca District), had rendered himself notorious by his oppressions on the people. While he was on a visit to Dacca and sleeping in the house of a Deputy Magistrate, he was shot dead on 27 June.

3. On 29 July Mr. Ellison, Superintendent of Police, Tippera, was shot dead at Comilla.

4. A daring attempt was made to kill H.E. Sir John

Anderson, the Governor of Bengal, notorious for introducing the 'Black and Tan' in suppressing Irish terrorism. While, as Chancellor, he was delivering his address at the Convocation of the Calcutta University, a girl named Bina Das shot at him, but a note-book in his pocket diverted the shot and saved his life.

5. Unsuccessful attempts were made to murder Sir Alfred Watson, the Editor of the *Statesman* (5 August and 28 September), Mr. Grassby, Addl. Supdt. of Police, Dacca (22 August), and Mr. Luke, Supdt. Rajshahi Central Jail (18 november).

Year 1933

On 2 September, Mr. Burge, Magistrate of Midnapore, while about to join a a football game in the field, was shot dead by two young men (who were shot by the body-guards of the Magistrate) and died later.

Year 1934

A second attempt was made to kill Sir John Anderson, Governor of Bengal, mentioned above. On 8 March he attended the horse-race at Lebong (near Darjeeling) and was going to award a cup to the winner, when he was shot twice by a young man. The Governor remained unhurt and the assailant was wounded and seized. In the meanwhile a girl ran towards the Governor and fired at him at close range. But her first shot missed and she was captured before she could fire again.

ii. Chittagong Revolutionaries (1930-34).

For three years after the Chittagong Armoury Raid the group of revolutionaries under Surya Sen carried on their activities in spite of numerous arrests and amid a veritable reign of terror launched throughout the district.

First, in June 1931, there was a conspiracy to blow off the jail and other office-buildings by means of dynamite with a view to rescuing the revolutionaries—including the

leaders and rank and file of the Chittagong Armoury Raid—who were then confined within the Jail building, and then to immobilize the whole machinery of district administration. But the plot was revealed to the Police by a traitor in the party. Arms, electric wires, explosives, daggers, etc., were unearthed both inside and outside the Jail, while in the Court premises and other prominent places of the town dynamite was found buried underground.

The plot was nipped in the bud, but it is said that the Government were so much terrified that they made a compromise and let off the conspirators with a light punishment.

The trial of the accused in the Armoury Raid Case ended in 1932, and fourteen of them were transported for life to the Andamans. Some of the revolutionaries were in hiding at the village of Patiya, P.S. Dhalghat, which was surrounded on 14 June, 1932, by the Police and a military force under Capt. Cameron. About 10 p.m. Cameron raided the house of a widow named Savitri Devi who harboured Surya Sen and four of his trusted lieutenants who were still at large. Cameron was shot dead while ascending the staircase, and there was a prolonged fight. Two of the revolutionaries died, but so effective was their fight that Surya Sen and two young girls—Pritilata Waddedar and Kalpana Datta—managed to escape.

Three months later, on 22nd September, 1932, this Pritilata Waddedar led a group of revolutionaries to raid the Railway Institute at Pahartali, Chittagong, which was frequented by the Europeans and Anglo-Indians of the town. A large number of ladies and gentlemen, engaged in dance and other merriments, were startled by the sudden explosion of bombs and revolver shots. The Europeans and Anglo-Indians defended themselves with revolvers and crockeries. One, a lady, was killed and thirteen were seriously wounded. Pritilata, being struck by a revolver

shot, took Potassium Cyanide to evade arrest. The rest of her party escaped.

In February, 1933, when Surya Sen was in hiding in a village called Gairala near Chittagong with three others, a large Gurkha force surrounded the house and both sides opened fire. The owner of the house and his brother were killed but the revolutionaries escaped. While Surya Sen got down in a pond to hide himself he was seized by a Gurkha soldier. Thus was the great leader arrested at last. The villager, who had revealed the hiding place of Surya Sen to the police, was murdered in broad daylight.

Surya Sen suffered greatly in the hands of the Police, but the military officer who took him to Dacca is said to have treated him with great respect and consideration. He took off his handcuffs and dined with him at the same table on the steamer. Some British military officers made highly appreciative remarks about his courage and military skill as a general. There is a story current showing how the spirit of Surya Sen was sustained by the love and esteem in which he was held by the common people. Once, while flying before the police, he took shelter from rain under the eaves of a thatched house in a village. Standing there, he overheard the mistress of the house, while lighting the evening lamp under a Tulsi plant—a common custom with the Hindus—, pray to God that Surya Sen might be saved from all dangers. Surya Sen was hanged after trial but his career has shed a lustre on the revolutionary movement in India.

But the death of Surya Sen did not put an end to terrorist activities. On 7 January, 1934, four boys, all in their teens, made a murderous attack on the Europeans assembled to watch a cricket match in Chittagong. They threw bombs on the cricket ground and fired shots. Two of them died on the spot and the other two were hanged after trial.

iii. Clash between the Police and the Revolutionaries.

1. Many revolutionaries from Bengal took refuge in French Chandernagore. The French Mayor, at the instance of the British Government, went on 10 March, 1933, to seize a revolutionary and surrounded his hiding place. When the Mayor was about to enter the house the revolutionary fired and came out, and by indiscriminate shooting, escaped through the police net. The Mayor was seriously wounded.

2. On 22 May, 1933, there was a prolonged fight between the revolutionaries and the Police who surprised them while residing in a house in Cornwallis Street, Calcutta. The former included two leaders who had escaped from prison. They fought till their cartridges were exhausted and then got down by the rain-pipe of the house. But they were arrested.

3. Sir John Anderson, the Governor of Bengal, set up a number of 'village guaıds' to keep watch over the revolutionaries. There was an open clash, in 1933, between the Villge-guard of Deobhog in Dacca District and some armed revolutionaries, who killed one guard and wounded a few. All the revolutionaries escaped except one who was tried and hanged.

In addition to the above reference may be made to the clash between the unarmed revolutionary prisoners in the Hijli detention camp (in Bengal) and their sepoy sentries in 1931. Two of the revolutionaries were killed and twenty wounded, four of them seriously.[27a]

II. REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE BENGAL (1928-34)

1. Hindusthan Socialist Republican Association.

The Police terrorism that followed the train dacoity at Kakori—imprisonment of most of the leaders, general round-ups, searches and arrests, harassment of suspects—

had a very adverse effect on the revolutionaries. It is thus described by one of them. "Men who had professed sympathy with our cause would now avoid us. Boys who had talked tall began now to leave the gymnasium we had started in Kanpur for physical culture and as a recruiting centre. The whole province was in the grip of panic."[28] The sense of frustration caused by this state of things was heightened by the practical cessation of all political activities by the Congress.

An attempt was made by the revolutionaries still at large to break this stagnant calm. Chandra Sekhar Azad, the sole remaining absconder of the Kakori Conspiracy Case, took the leading part in re-organizing the revolutionary movement. The name of the Association was changed to "Hindusthan Socialist Republican Association" with a Socialist State in India as its objective. The party was reorganized with a Central Committee, and Provincial and District Committees under it. All decisions were to be taken in these Committees, and majority decisions were to be binding upon all. About this time they were also influenced by the events in Russia and the Labour-strikes in Bombay (under Girni Kamgar Union), Calcutta and Kanpur. But armed action was still regarded as the immediate task, specially the murder of the hateful officials, which would break the stagnant calm. When mass movement was unleashed the Association would "link themselves with that movement, act as its armed detachment and give it a Socialist Direction."[29]

The first over act of importance of the newly organized Association was the murder of Mr. Saunders, the Assistant Superintendent of Police, Lahore. When the Simon Commission arrived at Lahore Railway Station (30 October, 1928), Lala Lajpat Rai, the great Indian leader, was assaulted by the Police in the general *melee* against thousands of people, assembled there, who were showing black

flags to Simon Commission and shouting "Simon, go back". Lajpat Rai's death, shortly after on 17 November, 1928, was generally believed to have been caused by this assault. To avenge his death Bhagat Singh shot to death Mr. Saunders in broad daylight, but managed to escape.

2. Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Datta[30]

The next activity of the Association was not only more daring but a very significant one. When, after the murder of Mr. Saunders at Lahore, the people were suffering terribly at the hands of the Police, a feeling slowly gained ground that while the revolutionaries effect their escape and hide themselves, the people have to suffer the consequences of their crimes. In order to remove such a feeling the Association decided to send two members to commit a crime and then court arrest. It was also felt that the crime should have two objects in view; first, to create a great sensation all over India in order to remove the political lethargy from which the country had been suffering; and, secondly, to give wide publicity to the aims and objects of the Association and stimulate the revolutionary urge in the country.

Early in April, 1929, the Trade Disputes Bill, intended to curtail the rights of labourers to strike, was being discussed in the Legislative Assembly, Delhi. The Government also sought to introduce the Public Safety Bill, the object of which was to check the Communist movement in India by cutting it off from external influences. As the provisions of this Bill had direct bearing on the Meerut Conspiracy Case,[30a] then pending before the Court, Vithalbhai Patel, the President of the Assembly, requested the Government to withdraw either the Bill or the Conspiracy Case. As the Government refused to do either, Patel declared that he would give his ruling on the admissibility of the Bill as soon as the Trade Disputes Bill was voted upon.

The public attention was thus focussed on the proceedings of the Assembly, and it was mainly for this reason that the Hindusthan Association decided that Bhagat Singh and his friend Batukeshwar Datta should throw two bombs on the floor of the Assembly Chamber, New Delhi. Care was taken to prepare two such bombs as would not cause any fatal or even serious injury, and it was settled that they should be thrown only if the Trade Disputes Bill was carried, and then, immediately after the result of voting was declared.

Bhagat Singh and his comrade attended the Assembly for a few days in order to select a site where the explosion of the bomb was not likely to hurt anyone seriously. On 8 April, 1929, they took their seats, selected beforehand, in the visitors' gallery. Just when the fateful hour was approaching, Sir John Simon, anxious to hear the President's ruling on the Public Safety Bill, entered the Chamber and took his seat quite close to the place where Bhagat Singh and his friend were sitting. These two exchanged glances and were urged by an instinct to shoot Simon, the indirect cause of the death of Lajpat Rai. But they controlled themselves and decided to carry out the allotted task. As soon as the President declared that the Trade Disputes Bill was carried and proceeded to give his ruling on the Public Safety Bill, Bhagat Singh dropped a bomb on the floor, and within five seconds Batukeshwar threw another. They also fired a few revolver shots and dropped from above copies of the Red Pamphlet on the floor.

No one was killed, four or five persons were slightly hurt, and only one was more seriously injured. The chamber was enveloped in smoke and there was a regular stampede,—members, visitors and officials running helter skelter. Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar had a very reasonable chance of effecting their escape in the melee, but true

to their purpose, they remained standing in the empty hall, and as soon as a few sergeants entered, Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar threw away the revolver and offered themselves for arrest.

On 6 June they jointly made a long statement in the Court and six days later they were both sentenced to transportation for life. They greeted the sentence with loud shouts of *Inquilab Zindabad* (Long live the Revolution) —a slogan first uttered by them while throwing the bombs and destined to become henceforth a regular war-cry in India.

The Red Pamphlet as well as the Joint Statement got a wide circulation all over the country. These two documents, while serving admirably the purposes of propaganda, dessrve very close reading as they throw a good deal of light on the aims, objects and ideals of the revolutionary party.

The Red Pamphlet is a short document and we quote below the opening para and the concluding portion :

"It takes a loud voice to make the deaf hear'—with these immortal, words uttered on a similar occasion by Villant, a French Anarchist and martyr, do we strongly justify this act of ours.

"Let the Government know that while protesting against the Public Safety and the Trade Disputes Bills and the callous murder of Lala Lajpat Rai, on behalf of the helpless Indian masses, we want to emphasise the lesson often repeated by history that it is easy to kill individuals but you cannot kill ideas. Great empires crumbled while ideas survive. Bourbons and Czars fell while revolutionaries marched triumphantly ahead.

"We are sorry to admit that we, who attach so great a sanctity to human life, we, who dream of a very glorious future, when man will be enjoying perfect peace and full liberty, have been forced to shed human blood. But the sacrifice of individuals at the altar of a great

revolution that will bring freedom to all rendering exploitation of man by man impossible, is inevitable. Long Live Revolution."

In the Joint Statement, which is a fairly long document, Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Datta give an elaborate justification of their conduct. "Bearing in mind the words of the late Mr. S. R. Das, once Law Member of the Governor-General's Executive Council, which appeared in the famous letter he had addressed to his son to the effect that the bomb was necessary to awaken England from her dreams, we dropped the bombs on the floor of the Assembly Chamber to register our protest on behalf of those who had no other means left to give expression to their heart-rending agony. Our sole purpose was 'to make the deaf hear' and give the heedless a timely warning".

Why the Legislative Assembly Chamber was selected for bomb-throwing is thus explained:

"Our practical protest was against an institution which, since its birth, has eminently helped to display not only its worthlessness but its far-reaching power for mischief. ......It exists only to demonstrate to the world India's humiliation and helplessness and it symbolises the overriding domination of irresponsible and autocratic rule. Time and again the national demand has been pressed by the people's representatives, only to find the waste paper basket as its final destination....Resolutions regarding the repeal of repressive and arbitrary measures have been treated with sublime contempt and Government's measures and proposals rejected as unacceptable by elected members have been restored by a stroke of the pen.......Finally the insult of what we considered an inhuman and barbarous measure was hurled on the devoted heads of the representatives of the entire country and the starving and struggling millions were deprived of their primary right and sole means of improving their economic welfare."

The 'Statement' then emphasizes the fact that the bombs were deliberately prepared in such a manner as would not kill but only slightly injure a person, and this was what actually happened. After narrating how they surrendered of their own accord and were prepared for any penalty, Bhagat and Batukeshwar observed :

"By crushing two insignificant units, a nation cannot be crushed. We wanted to emphasise the historical lesson that *lettres de cachet* and Bastilles could not crush the revolutionary movement in France. Gallows and Siberian mines could not extinguish the Russian Revolution. Blood Sundays and Black and Tans failed to strangle the movement of Irish freedom. Can Ordinance and Safety Bills snuff out the flame of freedom in India ?"

3. The Lahore Conspiracy Case and the Hunger Strikes

The bomb-throwing in the Assembly was followed by the discovery of a huge bomb factory at Lahore with materials enough to prepare seven thousand bombs. Another big bomb factory was discovered at Saharanpur in May, 1929. Some active members of the Association, as soon as they were arrested, divulged all the secrets of the Association, and searches and arrests took place all over North India. Within a few weeks almost all the leaders of the Association and a large number of members were arrested and the Government instituted the Lahore Conspiracy Case against them in 1929. Bhagat Singh, who was sentenced in connection with the throwing of bombs in the Assembly Chamber, was also an accused in this case and brought to the Lahore jail.

The Lahore Conspiracy Case has been rendered famous by the hunger-strike of the undertrial prisoners in jail. The idea of the hunger-strike was originally conceived by Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Datta when they were confined in the Delhi jail after their trial in the Bomb-throwing Case mentioned above. The hunger-

strike was actually begun by them on 15 June when they were transferred to two other jails. Their object was twofold. The first was a political one to which reference will be made in the last section of this chapter. The second was a question of principle. The crime for which the revolutionaries were imprisoned was defined in law as waging war against the king, and they regarded their act as such. So they demanded the right to be treated as war-prisoners and not as ordinary criminals. In a written statement Batukeshwar Datta said that the hunger-strike was not aimed at wresting certain concessions and comforts for jail life, nor was it started simply as a protest against misbehaviour of officials, as was believed by many.[31]

In the course of the Lahore Conspiracy Case the other comrades of Bhagat Singh also began the hunger-strike. The Lahore Conspiracy Case, which began on 10 July, 1929, gave an opportunity to all the under-trial prisoners to meet, in Court, Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar who, being convicts, were kept in a separate jail. They all decided, after discussion, to resort to hunger-strike with effect from the 12th July.

The Government tried forced feeding, but refused the concessions demanded, viz. classification of revolutionaries as political prisoners ; better food and clothing ; supply of books, newspapers, and writing materials ; immunity from hard labour and humiliating work ; supply of oil, soap etc. ; and discontinuance of forcible feeding. The prolonged fast created great commotion among the public, and huge demonstrations were held all over India. The Government at first refused to yield, but after about two months they gave assurance of favourably considering the demands. The prisoners broke their fast save and except Jatin Das. He developed pneumonia, but refused to take food or medicine. He only uttered one sentence : "I shall

stick to the last". He did stick to the last and died, after 64 days' fast, on 13 September, 1929. A large crowd gathered outside the jail gate to pay respect to the dead body, and the scene was repeated at all principal railway stations when it was conveyed by train to Calcutta. Even the Police Superintendent of Lahore, Mr. Hardy, took off his hat and bowed to the dead body of one who, like the Irish revolutionary, Terence Mc. Swiney, triumphed over the might of British Imperialism by his heroic resolve to die. The family of Terence Mc. Swiney sent condolences on the death of Jatin Das, as mentioned above.[32]

The hunger-strike had serious effect on the trial of the Lahore Conspiracy Case. As the prisoners refused to attend the Court, the normal legal procedure could not be followed. Besides, the heroic fast of the prisoners had evidently produced a great moral effect. Two approvers retracted their confessions and a few prominent crown witnesses refused to give evidence against the accused. There was hardly any chance of proving the guilt of the accused. In this predicament the Government promulgated on 2 May, 1930, Lahore Conspiracy Case Ordinance which gave summary powers to a Special Tribunal to try the prisoners in the Lahore Conspiracy Case, untrammelled by any rule or legal procedure, and undisturbed by fear of any appeal against its decision. The accused were *lathi*-charged by the police even in the open Court.

The farce of the trial by the Special Tribunal went on for several months and its judgment was delivered on 7 October, 1930. Three,—Sukhdev, Rajguru and Bhagat Singh,—were awarded capital punishment ; seven were transported for life, and a large number was sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The repercussion of Bhagat Singh's death on the Congress session at Karachi which

commenced on 29 March, has been mentioned above.[33]

4. Revolutionary Activities after 1929

The Lahore Conspiracy Case gave a death-blow to the Hindusthan Socialist Republican Association. Almost all the prominent leaders were either dead or in confinement, with the exception of about half a dozen who had managed to evade arrest and were in hiding. One of these, Chandrasekhar Azad, now collected a few members and reorganized the Association. Its first activity was directed towards the murder of the Viceroy by way of revenge for the Lahore Conspiracy Case. A few bombs exploded under the Viceroy's Special train near Delhi in December, 1929. The train was damaged but the Viceroy was not hurt.

Chandrasekhar next planned an armed revolution and for this purpose secured more than Rs. 14,000 by an armed robbery on a firm in Delhi, on 6 July, 1930. In course of investigation in this case the police got information about the secret plot of Chandrasekhar. One of his trusted lieutenants was arrested a few days later with a large stock of arms, and the police discovered a bomb factory in Delhi, with a stock of chemicals enough to make explosives to fill about 6,000 bombs. Chandrasekhar fled to the Panjab, and his presence was signalized by the explosion of a series of bombs which killed and injured a few officials. The police made a vigorous but fruitless search for him in course of which they arrested a number of revolutionaries and discovered several depots of arms and small bomb factories. The Government instituted two cases, Second Lahore Conspiracy Case and the New Delhi Conspiracy Case. Although Chandrasekhar was the principal accused, he remained in hiding and the Government offered a reward of Rs. 10,000 to anyone who could seize Chandrasekhar Azad, dead or alive. He was constantly on the move, in an attempt to rally the few workers who were still at large. He arranged to

meet an old worker in the Alfred Park at Allahabad on 27 February, 1931. One of those who knew it communicated the news to the police. About a dozen police in plain clothes surrounded Chandrasekhar as soon as he entered the Park. Chandrasekhar fired at the police and seriously wounded two high officials. But he himself was riddled with bullets and fell dead. Thus ended the career of a great revolutionary in India.

The death of Chandrasekhar was a serious blow to the underground organization in North India. A number of revolutionaries were seized with despair, gave up terrorist activities, and joined the Congress or the Communists. A few even served as informers to the police.

But the revolutionary activities continued in U. P. and the Panjab, as in other parts of India, during 1930-34. The preparation of bombs, attempts, often unsuccessful, to murder officials and police informers, revolver fight between the police and the revolutionaries faced with unexpected and impending arrest, and armed robberies were the chief activities.

A few prominent incidents may be mentioned.

i. U. P.

On 1 April, 1932, five revolutionaries were arrested while trying to destroy the Dufferin Bridge over the Ganga near Banaras.

On 16 July, 1932, two bombs were thrown in the Bristol Hotel, Kanpur, where a number of Europeans were engaged in merriments. But the bombs did not explode.

ii. The Panjab.

On 22 February, 1930, a country-made bomb was thrown at the Principal of the Khalsa College, Amritsar, suspected of helping the police, when he was addressing a meeting of the students. One student was killed and eleven were wounded.

On 23 December, 1930, when the Governor of the Panjab was leaving the University Hall after the Convocation, he was fired at and injured in the arm and hip. Two English ladies, one Inspector of Police and one Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police were also wounded, and the last-named subsequently died. The assailant, Har Kishan, was arrested and hanged.

On 11 May, 1932, the wires on the Railway line were cut near Ludhiana.

iii. Delhi.

On 1 February, 1932, a bomb was placed on railway line near the Hardinge Bridge, Delhi, in order to wreck the Special Train carrying the English members of the Lothian Committee. The bomb exploded but there was no damage to the train.

iv. Bombay and Sindh.

In April, 1930, out of sympathy with the G. I. P. Railway Labour Strike, attempts were made unsuccessfully to destroy railway stations and railway bridges, but railway lines were damaged by bombs near Bombay.

On 22 July, an attempt was made on the life of the Acting Governor, Sir Ernest Hotson, during his visit to the Fergusson College, Poona. A student of the College fired pointblank at the Governor who had a miraculous escape, the bullet striking a metal button on his pocket book.

On 30 October, 1932, a passenger from Portuguese Goa was arrested on the S. S. *Hiravati* with four revolvers and a large number of cartridges.

A small bomb factory, set up by a new revolutionary group, called *Anandamandal,* was discovered in 1933. They twice threw bombs at Empire Theatre, Bombay. Another bomb factory was discovered at Ahmadabad. Many copies of a leaflet threatening death to dealers in cloths made in England were also seized.

Many bombs exploded in Sholapur. According to official reports they were thrown by the revolutionaries in sympathy with labour strike in textile mills.

v. Central Provinces.

On 21 August, 1931, a bomb was thrown at the Divisional Commissioner while he was visiting a scout rally at Burhanpur. But the bomb did not explode.

On 24 September, two English military officers, travelling in the Punjab Mail, were struck with knife near Dongargaon Railway station. One of them later succumbed to the injuries. Two revolutionary young men were arrested in this connection and transported for life.

vi. Madras.

A branch of the Hindusthan Socialist Republican Association was established in Madras. On 16 March, 1933, a revolver was found on the seat of the Governor in the Legislative Assembly Hall. It was left there as a symbol of the fate awaiting the British rulers. On 26 April, 1933, four revolutionaries in military dress raided the Travancore National Bank in the heart of the city and decamped with all the money in the treasury. The police arrested 22 persons in connection with these and other incidents and the Madras City Conspiracy Case was instituted against them.

vii. Rajputana and other Localities.

In November, 1934, a young man with a revolver was arrested at Ajmer. According to official reports a member of the Hindusthan Socialist Republican Association, an accused in the Delhi Conspiracy Case who had fled from justice, established a branch here, but almost all its members were arrested.

Some terrorist activities—explosion of bombs—were reported from Peshawar, but they were confined to Hindus. Some armed robberies took place in Assam and Burma,

and there were also attempts to murder officials in Burma. According to official reports the terrorist movement in these two Provinces was "practically confined to Bengalis."[34]

The official report further observes :

"To sum up, terrorism has its birth in Bengal, and where it has shown its head in other Provinces it can almost invariably be traced to Bengali influences. It is at all events true to say that in no Province but Bengal is there that widespread and deep-rooted terrorist mentality which is essential for its development."[35]

5. General Review

It would appear from what has been said above that the revolutionary movement, which became a potent force in Indian politics during the *Swadeshi* movement, continued, with checks and breaks, up to the end of the Civil Disobedience movement of Gandhi. The two movements—one violent and another non-violent—went on side by side, and it was almost inevitable that each should be influenced by the other. There was a temporary swing of the revolutionaries to Gandhian non-violence in 1920-21, but the suspension of the Non-co-operation movement brought it to an end. Many old revolutionaries, mellowed by age and experience, remained in Gandhi's camp, or retired from politics, but new recruits joined the revolutionary groups and revolutionary ideas got a firmer grip on the people.

With the passing of time the revolutionary ideas widened in scope and became more and more associated with the political currents of the time. The idea of an armed revolution still swayed the party, but there was a more conscious attempt to bring the organization in a line with the national movement and make revolutionary mentality more broadbased in the country by rousing the political consciousness of the people to the futility of Gandhian way of non-violence and negotiations with the British

Government. As noted above, the revolutionaries pressed the resolution for complete independence in the Calcutta Congress (1928), but Gandhi carried his compromise proposal against them. To counteract Gandhi's move was one of the objects of the hunger-strike conceived and resorted to by Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Datta in 1929 as mentioned above.[36] The general position is thus explained by the latter :

"The hunger-strike by the political prisoners in jail was never an isolated action, detatched from the political or national movement of the country. Revolutionary political prisoners always struggled and sacrificed their lives in prisons and exiles in order to awaken the nation and strengthen the national movement of the country. This hunger-strike by the Lahore prisoners and the martyrdom of Jatin Das did make definite contributions to this end. The decision for this hunger-strike was taken by myself and Bhagat Singh when our trial was going on in Delhi jail in connection with the Assembly Bomb Case. The Indian National Congress in 1928 under the presidentship of Pandit Motilal Nehru, declared 'Dominion Status' as the goal of the Congress. The extremist section within the Congress, though few in number, pressed for complete independence. Gandhiji effected a compromise between these two trends of thought and assured the country that complete independence would be declared as the goal of the Indian National Congress in the next session, if the British did not accede to the demand of 'Dominion Status' within a year's time. Such was then the political situation in the country. The leaders believed more in the efficacy of negotiation than "direct action". The question of complete independence and of "direct action" for its achievement was thus shelved off in the year 1928. The spirit of inaction prevailed everywhere in the country.

"Under such conditions I and Bhagat Singh thought of starting hunger-strike after our trial in Delhi Assembly Bomb case (June, 1929). We planned for this hunger-strike while we were in Delhi jail and we had this confidene that by taking to such a course, we would be able to arouse the nation from its slumber and infuse the spirit of self-sacrifice among the people of the country and strengthen the forces of direct action against the imperialist government."[37]

The idea of throwing bombs on the floor of the Legislative Assembly was also partly inspired by the same motive. That these expedients quickened the national consciousness of the people und indirectly helped to create a favourable atmosphere for the growth of revolutionary mentality among ever-increasing circles is abundantly proved by the country-wide enthusiasm evoked by the hunger-strike and martyrdom of Jatin Das well as of Bhagat Singh and his comrades. A spontaneous movement developed and centred round the hunger-strike. June 30, 1929, was observed as Bhagat-Datta memorial day, and meetings were held in many places, specially in the Panjab. The A. I. C. C. issued a circular to observe 18 August, 1929, as "Political Sufferers' Day". all over the country. The people held meetings and organised processions in defiance of section 144 and the *lathi*-charge and other oppressions of the police. The whole country seemed to have reverberated with the new revolutionary cry of *Inquilab Zindabad*.

The tumultuous enthusiasm for the revolutionary heroes particularly stirred the younger section, and even Gandhi had to bend before the new force in the Karachi Congress, as noted above. Gandhi fully realized the new situation and wrote in the *Young India* 'that the year 1929 remained as the period of great awakening among the youth of India.'[38]

A notable feature of the revolutionary movement

during the period under review is that the ideology of the revolutionaries was more clearly formulated and more widely promulgated. Some idea of it may be formed from the Joint Statement issued by Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Datta during their trial for the Assembly Bomb Case referred to above. After explaining the reasons for throwing bombs, as quoted above, they declared :

"Others have as keenly felt as we have done, and from under the seeming sereneness of the sea of Indian humanity, a veritable storm is about to break out. We have only marked the end of the era of utopian non-violence of whose futility the rising generation has been convinced beyond the shadow of a doubt."

They then proceeded to explain what was 'violence' and what was not :

"Force, when aggressively applied, is 'violence' and is therefore morally unjustifiable. But when it is used in furtherance of a legitimate cause it has its moral justification. Elimination of force at all costs is utopian and the new movement which has arisen in the country and of which we have given a warning is inspired by the ideals which guided Guru Govind Singh and Shivaji, Kemal Pasha and Riza Khan, Washington and Garibaldi, Lafayette and Lenin".

Far more interesting is the 'comprehensive ideal of revolution'. The revolutionaries had not only destructive but also constructive ideas. They not only wanted to replace British Imperialism by a republican form of Government in India, but they also wanted to place it on a socialistic foundation. This was already indicated by the addition of the word 'Socialist' to the original name of the Association. What they meant by socialist structure was fully explained in the Joint Statement :

"Revolution does not necessarily involve sanguinary strife, nor is there any place in it for individual vend-

etta. It is not the cult of the bomb and pistol. By 'Revolution' we mean that the present order of things which is based on manifest injustice must change....... Radical change, therefore, is necessary and it is the duty of those who realize this to reorganize society on a socialistic basis. Unless this is done and exploitation of man and of nations by nations, which goes masquerading as imperialism, is brought to an end, the suffering and carnage with which humanity is threatened today cannot be prevented and all talk of ending wars and ushering in an era of universal peace is undisguised hypocrisy."

The Joint Statement then goes on describing the final outcome of all this—the ultimate goal:

"This is our ideal...If (our warning) goes unheeded and the present system of Government continues....a grim struggle must ensue, involving the overthrow of all obstacles and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat to pave the way for the consummation of the ideal revolution."

The ideological development undoubtedly indicates a growing influence of Communism. But as yet this influence was fully subordinated to nationalism, and the revolutionaries did not allow themselves to sacrifice the national to the international or supra-national ideal as the Indian Communists did in 1942.

Another interesting characteristic of the revolutionary movement is a high degree of development in technical skill as displayed by the preparation of superior types of bombs, to which reference has been made above. This was accompanied by a higher efficiency in military skill and strategy of which a typical example was furnished by the Chittagong Armoury Raid in 1930. As mentioned above, it was conceived in the same spirit which animated Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Datta and gave a similar

fillip to the growth of revolutionary mentality. But the Chittagong revolution, carried under the guidance of Surya Sen, would also stand out for ever as a unique example of a regular military campaign, conducted with consummate skill by a master strategist and backed by heroic courage and sacrifice, which exercised a profound influence upon the people.

The revolutionary movement did not die out in 1934. The new Constitutional Reforms of 1935 took away the edge of both the violent and non-violent methods in Indian politics. But the revolutionary spirit, like that of Gandhi's *Satyagraha*, was not lost upon the people. When Gandhi sought to revive the Civil Disobedience movement in 1942, but was prevented from launching it by his sudden arrest, the revolutionary spirit raised its head and the cult of non-violence was submerged under that of violence. As we shall see, the wide-spread but shortlived outbreak of 1942 was the product of an admixture of the revolutionary violence and a spirit of non-violent resistance inculcated by Gandhi. The two streams joined together and gave a new form to this, the last battle for India's freedom fought on Indian soil.

CHAPTER VIII

INDIAN POLITICS (1934-37)

I. THE FRAMING OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION.

The third and last session of the Round Table Conference was held in London on 17 November, 1932. The members attending it were much less in number than those in the preceding session, and there was no representative of the Congress. The decisions taken by His Majesty's Government in the light of the Conference were published in a White Paper issued in March, 1933. It was condemned by leaders of all sections of Indian opinion. "One could not see in it any family resemblance to many of the recommendations of the Round Table Conference Committees." This was in flagrant contravention of the assurances given by Lord Irwin in July, 1930, when he said that any agreement "at which the Conference is able to arrive, will form the basis of the proposals which His Majesty's Government will later submit to Parliament." For all the regard that the British Government "paid to the opinions of the Indian members of successive Round Table Conferences, they might never have convened them."[1]

The proposals embodied in the White Paper were referred to a Joint Committee of the two Houses of British Parliament who consulted Indian delegates, nominated by the Government. But in spite of prolonged discussions and deliberations, the proposals were not materially changed. A Bill prepared on the basis of the White Paper was introduced in the Parliament on 19 December, 1934, and,

in spite of strenuous opposition of the die-hard section of the Conservatives led by Churchill, was passed on 2 August, 1935.

Every section of public opinion in India expressed dissatisfaction with the Government of India Act of 1935. The spokesman of the Moderate Party, C.Y. Chintamani, observed : 'Indian opinion was almost stunned by the result of years of agitation and cogitation, and many sections of it, including the Liberal, felt and said that it would have been far better if no reform had been attempted.'

The main features of the Act may be summarised as follows : "In the Provincial sphere, Burma was separated from India and two new Provinces, Orissa and Sind, for the formation of which there was a long-standing demand, were created. In view of the federal form of Government envisaged at the Centre, the Provinces were endowed for the first time with a legal personality. Dyarchy was abolished, and all the Provincial subjects were transferred to popular control. Certain 'special responsibilities' were, however, laid upon the Governors as before. Bicameral Legislatures were established in Madras, Bombay, Bengal, the United Provinces, Bihar and Assam, and the other Provinces continued to have only unicameral Legislatures. The official blocs vanished, and the nomination of persons to represent backward classes and other interests ceased. There was no change in principle in the allocation of seats among the different communities and special interests, the Communal Award, as modified by the Poona Pact, regulating the distribution of seats among the former. Property qualifications continued to be the main basis for enfranchisement, a very much higher standard being adopted for the Upper Houses. Franchise for the Lower Houses was fixed at a much lower level than before, and this resulted in more than a four-fold increase in the number of voters."

"As regards the Centre, the Federation of India

was to be inaugurated only after Rulers representing not less than half the aggregate population of the Indian States and entitled to one-half of the seats allotted to them collectively in the Federal Upper Chamber had executed Instruments of Accession."

"As the country was considered to be not yet ready for the transfer of full responsibility at the Centre, a dyarchic executive was provided for, as was hitherto prevalent in the Provinces."[2] It is not necessary to describe the Federal Government, as proposed in the Act, for it never came into operation, and there was no change in the Central Government, except the establishment of the Federal Court, Federal Public Service Commission and the Federal Railway Authority.

II. REVIVAL OF THE SWARAJYA PARTY

The year 1933 found the Congress straying in wilderness. The Civil Disobedience campaign was slowly dying a natural death, but there was nothing else to take its place. Gandhi had realized the futility of *Satyagraha* as a political weapon. He felt that "the masses have not received the full message of *Satyagraha* owing to its adulteration in the process of transmission." Therefore after "an intense introspection, searching of the heart, and waiting upon God", Gandhi decided that henceforth no one but himself should carry on Civil Disobedience, and the rest should devote themselves to the constructive programme. On April 2, 1934, he drafted a statement to this effect which may be looked upon as the funeral epitaph on *Satyagraha*.

Before this statement was actually issued a number of prominent Congressmen proposed to revive the Swarajya Party to fight the forthcoming elections to the Legislative Assembly on two main issues, namely, (1) repeal of all repressive laws, and (2) rejection of the Constitutional scheme outlined in the White Paper in favour of the National

Demand outlined by Gandhi at the Round Table Conference. Gandhi not only welcomed the revival of the Swarajya Party and its decision to fight the forthcoming elections, but also felt that it was 'not only the right but the duty of every Congressman' who believes in its utility, to do so.' The decision of 1923, reversed in 1929, was re-asserted in 1934. Gandhi issued his statement, with some modifications, on 7 April. The Working Committee and All-India Congress Committee met in Patna on 18-20 May, 1934, and, as recommended by Gandhi, suspended the Civil Disobedience movement and accepted the entry into Legislature as a part of the programme of the Congress. The Working Committee, in accordance with the resolutions of the A.I.C.C., called upon all Congressmen to give up Civil Disobedience and the movement was officially terminated on May 20, 1934.

The Government of India, being satisfied that the Civil Disobedience movement was really dead, lifted the ban on the Congress organizations, except in Bengal and N.W.F.P., on June 12, and announced a general policy of expediting the release of the Civil Disobedience prisoners.

A Parliamentary Board was set up in accordance with the decision of A.I.C.C. in its meeting at Patna on May 18-19, 1934. This Board naturally asked the Working Committee to formulate its policy with regard to the White Paper proposals and the Communal Award. The matter was considered by the Working Committee in its meeting at Bombay on June 17-18, 1934. The discussion revealed a fundamental difference of views between a section led by Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and M. S. Aney, on the one hand, and the majority of the members on the other, regarding the Communal Award. It made the separate electorate of minorities the general rule rather than an exception, and also allotted to every

community, other than the Hindu, number of seats far in excess of its numerical strength. The position of the Hindus in Bengal was specially deplorable. Out of the 250 seats in the new legislature only 80 were allotted to them as against 119 to the Muslims. It was natural that the Muslim opinion would favour the Award while the Hindus would be dead against it. Even the Muslim members of the Working Committee, who only a short while ago prevented Gandhi from accepting a separate electorate, now favoured the Award. To placate them the Hindu Congress members refrained from definitely condemning it. The resolution passed by the Working Committee condemned the White Paper and suggested that the constitution should be drawn up by a Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of adult suffrage or as near it as possible, with the power, if necessary, to the important minorities, to have their representatives elected exclusively by the electors belonging to such minorities.

The resolution then added :

"The White Paper lapsing, the Communal Award must lapse automatically. Among other things, it will be the duty of the Constituent Assembly to determine the method of representation of important minorities and make provision for otherwise safeguarding their interests."

As regards Communal Award it said : "The Congress claims to represent equally all the communities composing the Indian nation and, therefore, in view of the division of opinion, can neither accept nor reject the Communal Award as long as the division of opinion lasts. At the same time, it is necessary to re-declare the policy of the Congress on the communal question. No solution that is not purely national can be propounded by the Congres. But the Congress is pledged to accept any solution, falling short of the national, which is agreed to by all the parties concerned, and, conversely, to reject

any solution which is not agreed to by any of the said parties."

None could possibly interpret this as anything but a very thin veil to cover the full-fledged support to the Communal Electorate. This face-saving clause, however, could not deceive that very small section of political leaders who had not yet surrendered their conscience and judgement to the safe keeping of Gandhi.

Malaviya and Aney were opposed to the attitude of neither accepting nor rejecting the Communal Award, and proposed to definitely condemn it. After the passing of the resolution they tendered their resignations but were persuaded to withdraw them. The question was again taken up by the Working Committee at its Banaras meeting (July 27-30), but no compromise could be arrived at. Thereupon Malaviya resigned the Presidentship of the Congress Parliamentary Board, and Aney the membership of the Congress Working Committee and of the Parliamentary Board.

It soon appeared that the non-committal attitude in regard to the Communal Award was disapproved by a very large section of the Hindus. Not to reject the Award was indeed a negation of nationalism, so long advocated by the Congress, for which the countervailing 'non-acceptance' could hardly make amends. The Congress evidently still cherished the hope that they could arrive at an agreement with the Muslims. But in view of the growing communal spirit displayed by the Muslims, including good many leaders who were hitherto regarded as National, there was hardly any justification for such hope. It is somewhat strange that the Congress failed to realize what was patent to everybody that communalism swayed the entire Muslim community with the probable exception of a mere handful of leaders who had scarcely any following. Not only Jinnah, but many others had, one

by one, renounced the nationalist ideals and joined the rank of communalist Muslims. Even the Ali Brothers, on whom Gandhi pinned his faith, denounced his leadership. But Gandhi's optimism never faltered up to his dying day. This was the real tragedy of Congress politics under the leadership of Gandhi—a leadership which was not boldly disowned till it was too late to undo the mischief. Nothing indicates the absence of realism in Congress politics more clearly than the hope expressed in the concluding para of the Working Committee's resolution about an 'agreed solution'. Any man with a modicum of common sense should have known that it was nothing short of crying for the moon. On the other hand, the Congress leaders must have been remarkably short-sighted if they failed to realize that such pious platitudes, emphasized by repetition, could have only one possible effect, namely, increasing the intransigence of the Muslim die-hards. The greatest disservice done by Gandhi to the cause of Indian nationalism was his frank admission, in season and out of season, that no solution of communal problem would be acceptable to him or to the Congress which is not supported by the Muslims in general.3 This placed in the hands of the Muslim reactionaries the power to put a veto on the constitutional progress of India,—a power which they fully utilized in the Round Table Conference. It also proved to be the most formidable weapon which Jinnah wielded with admirable skill during the political negotiations of the forties. The resolution passed by the Working Committee on the Communal Award in June 1934, perhaps with the most laudable motive, proved fatal to the unity of India and paved the way to Pakistan.

The resignation of Malaviya and Aney led to a split in the Congress ranks. They summoned a Conference of Congressmen and others who were of their opinion,

which met in Calcutta on August 18-19, under the Presidentship of Malaviya. It led to the formation of a separate Party with the object of carrying on agitation against the Communal Award and the White Paper, in the Legislatures and outside, and of setting up candidates for election to the Legislative Assembly for the promotion of that object.

The Conference requested the Working Committee to call a meeting of the A. I. C. C. with a view to revising its resolution on the Communal Award. This was considered and rejected by the Working Committee in its meeting at Wardha held on 25 September. The Working Committee issued instructions to all Congress organizations to help the Congress Parliamentary Board in its election activities and farbade them to support any party or candidate opposed to the official policy of the Congress. The Working Committee rejected the proposal of releasing, on the grounds of conscience, candidates for election to the Assembly from the obligation to conform to the decision on the Communal Award.

Shortly before the meeting of the Working Committee at Wardha on 25 September, Gandhi had decided to retire from the Congress and made no secret of it. On 17 September, he issued a lengthy statement[4] to the press in which he reviewed the fundamental principles in which he believed, but to which scant regard was paid by most Congressmen including even those who always unhesitatingly followed his lead. Reference may be made to a few of them, as far as possible in Gandhi's words

(1) "I put the spinning wheel and khadi in the forefront. Hand-spinning by Congress intelligentsia has all but disappeared. The general body of them have no faith in it. ...The khadi clause of the Congress Constitution has been almost a dead letter from the beginning." I am

held "responsible for the hypocrisy and evasion about the working of the khadi clause."

(2). As regards prohibition of entry into legislature, many have supported it, against their own conviction, simply out of regard for me. "Many have despaired of resisting me. This is a humiliating revelation to a born democrat."

(3). I have fundamental differences with the Socialist Group in the Congress. "If they gain ascendancy in the Congress, as they well may, I cannot remain in the Congress. For to be in active opposition should be unthinkable."

(4). "The policy advocated by some in regard to the States is wholly in difference from what I have advised."

(5). "Even on untouchability my method of approach is perhaps different from that of many, if not of most Congressmen." Many think that it was a profound error for me to have disturbed the course of Civil Disobedience Movement on account of it.

(6). Non-violence "is a fundamental creed with me" but "after 14 years of trial, it still remains only a policy with the majority of Congressmen. It has not yet become an integral part of the lives of Congressmen."

(7). There is still more uncertainty about civil resistance. "It has been increasingly difficult for me to carry the reason of fellow Congressmen with me in all the resolutions recently passed on the subject, whilst they have generously voted for them. Even the memory of the sense of oppression which they experienced at the time of voting, without an intelligent belief in these resolutions, oppresses me just as much as they were oppressed."

(8). The growing corruption in the ranks of the Congress.

There cannot be two opinions on the lofty moral tone and sincerity displayed in every line of this long statement. By itself, it at once puts Gandhi on a high pedestal

of moral sensibility and saintly character. It is not every age, it is not every nation that can show a political leader publicly confessing his own failure and the shortcomings of his devoted followers and probing into the causes for the same, as Gandhi did. As a candid statement of the policy and programme of Gandhi, the leader, and a testimony to the wide gulf that separated him from his opponents and even his devoted followers, it is the most revealing document that we possess. Its value is enhanced by the fact that it fully sustains and supports those who have criticized the views and actions of Gandhi and his blind followers from a rational consideration of the political point of view.

It is, however, difficult to approve of his issuing the statement on the eve of the annual session of the Congress. Gandhi himself has left no doubt about his object in doing so. While some leaders endorsed his decision to retire from the Congress, others were opposed to it. In view of this, Gandhi says, he postponed the final decision till after the October session of the Congress. Then follows the most significant sentence: "One attractive idea behind the insistence on postponement was that it would enable me to test the accuracy of my impression that a very large body of the Congress intelligentsia were tired of my method and views, and programme based upon them, that I was a hindrance rather than a help to the natural growth of the Congress, that instead of remaining the most democratic and representative organisation, it was dominated by my personality, that in it there was no free play of reason." As one sure method "of testing the truth or otherwise of his impression", Gandhi not only mentioned the reasons of his retirement but also made some definite proposals to amend the Congress Constitution in order to remove the shortcomings complained of by him. Gandhi could only mean by this act that he was waiting to see if his proposals were accepted by the Congress, for this would

mean a vote of confidence in him and rejection, as untrue, of the contrary impressions hitherto entertained by him. In any case the Congress looked upon the proposals of Gandhi as a test of confidence in him and accepted them all without any substantial change. This was, of course, a foregone conclusion. But two important questions remain to be answered.

First, the question arises whether the proposals of Gandhi were calculated to remove the defects pointed out by him. To an ordinary mind they were not. In any case, subsequent events have proved that while the changes no doubt entrenched Gandhi in a secure position in the Congress by weakening the opposing elements, they had little effect on the inherent beliefs and practices, so strongly condemned by him. To take a typical example, did the franchise, based upon spinning and habitual wear of khaddar, serve to create a faith, almost overnight, in its efficacy among the Congress intelligentsia, the lack of which, during 14 years, was the first item complained of by Gandhi. The same thing may be said about non-violence.

Secondly, what was there to show that the approval of the proposals by the Congress was not *one more* instance, as it undoubtedly was, where the members supported Gandhi against their own conviction simply out of regard for him and without any "intelligent belief" in the proposals themselves ? Gandhi himself noted the general prevalence of this spirit of abject subservience among the Congress members and condemned it in the strongest possible language. Yet it should have been apparent to the meanest intellect that nothing was more calculated to bring that habitual, almost slavish, spirit into play than the threatened retirement of Gandhi from the Congress, if his proposals were not accepted.

If Gandhi had been a much lesser man than he really was, one would have been justified in regarding

his statement as a clever but ignoble device to rehabilitate his dwindling popularity and strengthen his position in the Congress by exploiting the blind faith of his devoted followers while there was yet time. But as it is, it is more reasonable to hold that while his moral stature was very high, his judgement of ordinary men and things was very poor. His robust faith in the sense of justice of the British people even after Amritsar tragedy, his strong belief in the national feelings of the Muslims in India, and his judgement of the views and personalities of Ali Brothers are of a piece with his childlike faith in the sincerity of Congress members who voted for his resolutions.

The annual session of the Congress was held at Bombay on October 26-28, 1934. The most important item was, of course, the consideration of the proposals made by Gandhi about the revision of the Constitution of the Congress. The proposed change in the creed ('truthful and non-violent' in place of 'legitimate and peaceful') was circulated to the Provinces for opinion. The rest were virtually adopted.

It is unnecessary to describe in detail the changes made in the Congress Constitution by Gandhi's proposals. Suffice it to say that spinning 500 yards of well-spun yarn per month (or some other form of labour accepted as its alternative) was made an essential qualification for membership of the Congress ; habitual wearing of wholly hand-spun and hand-woven khaddar was made a necessary qualification for holding any office; the number of Congress delegates was reduced to a maximum of 2000 (1489 rural and 511 urban); the A.I.C.C. was reduced to half its strength.

Shortly after the session Gandhi announced that he would not remain even a primary member of the Congress. But as the official history of the Congress says, he left with a vote of confidence and a standing invitation to

re-enter, which, as we shall see, he did ere long. But it is a moot point to decide to what extent the Congress was actually free from his influence even during this brief interval. The Bombay Congress set up an All-India Village Industries' Association, as part of the activities of the Congress. It was to work under the advice and guidance of Gandhi, as an autonomous body but apart from politics. In other words, Gandhi could maintain his effective leadership through this all-India organisation as well as the All-India Spinning Association without the least interference from the Congress.

As regards political programme and activities of the Congress Gandhi's influence remained as great as ever, as the new Working Committee was more submissive to him than the retiring one. So his exit from the Congress, for the time being, was more spectacular than real.

III. THE NEW LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (1935)

In the meantime the Government had decided to summon a new Legislative Assembly under the provisions of the Act of 1919. The elections for the Legislative Assembly took place shortly after the Congress session. The followers of Malaviya and Aney stood from the "Congress Nationalist," as distinguished from mere "Congress," Party. They secured all the general seats in Bengal. The Congress got only one seat in the Panjab, but swept the polls in other Provinces. The most outstanding success of the Congress was the defeat of R. K. Shanmukham Chetti, who had made the Ottawa Agreement on behalf of India and was later elected President of the Assembly. He was strongly backed up by the Government which virtually made it a test election for the Ottawa Agreement. But though he stood from the Commerce constituency in South India, he was defeated by the Congress candidate.

The strength of the different parties, as they emerged

from the polls, was as follows:

I. Congress..............44
II. Congress Nationalist......11
III. Europeans..............11
IV. Nominated officials...26
V. Nominated non-officials......13
VI. Independents.....................22

It will thus be seen that while the Government could normally command no more than 50 votes (III, IV, V), the Congress (I and II who voted together except on Communal Award) hed a majority of five over them. The Independents (VI), all but three of whom were Muslims led by M. A. Jinnah, thus held the balance. The Liberal Party was eliminated.

The Government suffered several defeats and the Budget was thrown out twice. But all this had no practical effect, as the Governor-General certified the Bills and measures rejected by the House against the Government opposition.

The Congress Party moved a resolution to the effect that the Government should not proceed with any legislation for reforms, based on the Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, to which Jinnah moved an amendment. Its second and third clauses strongly condemned the proposed scheme of Provincial and Central Government in such terms that the Government spokesman observed that it was as much a rejection of the proposals as the more direct rejection of the same by the Congress. But the real point in the amendment of Jinnah was the first clause which read as follows:

"That this Assembly accepts the Communal Award, so far as it goes, until a substitute is agreed upon by the various communities concerned."

The Congress group remained neutral as regards the first clause which was put separately to vote and carried.

The second and third clauses were supported by the Congress, and though opposed by the Government and nominated members, were carried by 74 against 58 votes.

Outside the Assembly the Congress continued to work for Hindu-Muslim unity. There was a prolonged negotiation on this subject between Rajendra Prasad, the President of the Congress, and Mr. Jinnah from 23 January to 1 March, 1935, but it produced no tangible result.

The Government proceeded with its usual programme of keeping down 'rebellious' activities. The detenus in Bnngal alone numbered about 2700, and such was the vindictive policy of the Bengal Government that they thwarted the endeavours of the Congress to raise money to relieve the distress of the helpless families of the detenus.[5]

IV. MUSLIM POLITICS (1930-35)

Mention has been made above how the Hindu-Muslim fraternity, artificially created by Gandhi at the behest of Muhammad Ali and other Pan-Islamists, tumbled down like a house of cards as soon as the Khilafat movement came to an ignoble end, and a bitter feud between the two communities, signalized by communal riots, marked the succeeding period. Most of the so-called Muslim nationalist leaders—who were really Pan-Islamists masquerading under this disguise—now appeared in their true colour.

Muhammad Ali, who was the principal lieutenant of Gandhi in his *Satyagraha* campaign in 1920-21, refused to join him in the second campaign in 1930. At a meeting of the All-India Muslim Conference at Bombay in April, 1930, attended by over 20,000 Muslims, he bluntly stated : "We refuse to join Mr. (no longer Mahatma ?) Gandhi, because his movement is not a movement for the complete independence of India but for making the seventy millions of Indian Musalmans dependants of the Hindu

Mahasabha."[6] He made no secret of the fact that the Muslims, as a whole, were guided by Pan-Islamism. He told the members of the Round Table Conference that Islam was not confined to India. "I belong," said he, "to two circles of equal size but which are not concentric. One is India and the other is the Muslim World....We are not nationalists but supernationalists."[6a] In his address as Congress President in 1923 he reminded the audience that "extra-territorial sympathies are part of the quintessence of Islam."

But the influence of the Ali Brothers and their group was on the wane, and Muslims under the leadership of Jinnah and others now concentrated their attention to the improvement of their political status at home. In this they were aided by two factors. The first was the clever move of the British Government to declare openly that no political concessions could be granted to India unless there was a fair measure of agreement between the two major communities, the Hindus and the Muslims. The second, a consequence of the first, was the oft-repeated open declaration on the part of Gandhi, supported not only by the Congress but also by the Moderate leaders, that there could be no solution of the constitutional problem of India so long as the two communities did not agree on a common plan. The Muslims fully exploited the situation and pitched their demands higher and higher.

In this clever manoeuvring for power, Muhammad Ali Jinnah stood head and shoulders over the other Muslim leaders. His early career has been described above. The acceptance of the Nehru Constitution by the Indian National Congress in 1928 and the ultimatum issued by it to the Government had a strong reaction on Jinnah. His failure to carry the Convention with him[7] had mortified him beyond measure, and he looked upon the resolution of the Congress as a determined move to

ignore the Muslim claims, and an indirect but unceremonious rejection of the claim of Muslim League to be heard upon such an all-important problem. Piqued at what he regarded as an insult to the Muslim community he first organized an All-Parties Muslim Conference and then summoned the adjourned meeting of the Muslim League in Delhi on 28 March, 1929. Here he repudiated the Nehru Constitution and laid down his famous "fourteen points" embodying the minimum demands of the Muslim community, which ran as follows:

(1). The form of the future Constitution should be federal with the residuary powers vested in the Provinces.

(2). A uniform measure of autonomy shall be granted to all Provinces.

(3) All Legislatures in the country and other elected bodies shall be constituted on the definite principle of adequate and effective representation of Minorities in every Province without reducing the majority in any Province to a minority or even equality.

(4) In the Central Legislature, Mussulman representation shall not be less than one-third.

(5) Representation of communal groups shall continue to be by means of separate electorates as at present; provided that it shall be open to any community, at any time, to abandon its separate electorate in favour of joint electorate.

(6) Any territorial redistribution that might at any time be necessary shall not in any way affect the Muslim majority in the Panjab, Bengal and the North-West Frontier Province.

(7) Full religious liberty, i. e. liberty of belief, worship and observance, propaganda, association and education, shall be guaranteed to all communities.

(8) No Bill or resolution or any part thereof shall

be passed in any Legislature or any other elected body if three-fourths of the members of any community in that particular body oppose such a Bill, resolution or part thereof on the ground that it would be injurious to the interests of that community or in the alternative, such other method is advised as may be found feasible and practicable to deal with such cases.

(9) Sindh should be separated from the Bombay Presidency.

(10) Reforms should be introduced in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan on the same footing as in other Provinces.

(11) Provision should be made in the Constitution giving Muslims an adequate share, along with the other Indians, in all the Services of the State and in local self-governing bodies having due regard to the requirements of efficiency.

(12) The Constitution should embody adequate safeguards for the protection of Muslim culture and for the protection and promotion of Muslim education, language, religion, personal laws and Muslim charitable institutions, and for their due share in the grants-in-aid given by the State and by local self-governing bodies.

(13) No Cabinet, either Central or Provincial, should be formed without there being a proportion of at least one-third Muslim Ministers.

(14) No change shall be made in the Constitution by the Central Legislature except with the concurrence of the States constituting the Indian Federation.

But though Jinnah was defeated at the Convention the lapse of the Nehru Report[8] was a great triumph for him. It also killed the Nationalist Muslim Party formed by Ansari in 1928 and left the field open for communal Muslims.

Henceforth the Muslims gradually drifted further and

further apart, as is evidenced by their attitude to the Round Table Conference. The All-India Muslim Conference demanded that the Muslims should be represented in the Round Table Conference only by men who truly represented the community and enjoyed its confidence. In other words, the R. T. Conference should not have the benefit of hearing nationalist Muslims like Ansari, but would consist of communalist Muslims alone. Nothing could be more gratifying to the British Government, and they acted upon this principle. When Gandhi agreed to attend the second session of the R. T. Conference, he got from Lord Irwin a definite undertaking that Ansari would be nominated by the Government a member of the R. T. C. "In answer to the demand for the fulfilment of Irwin's promise, Lord Willingdon pleaded that the Musalman delegates were opposed to Dr. Ansari's delegation."[9] The Muslims gained their points and wholeheartedly supported the Communal Award, but, as mentioned above, Jinnah otherwise supported the Congress and joined it in denouncing the Act of 1935.

There was a good prospect of settlement with the Muslims and a committee appointed in November, 1932, for the purpose by the Unity Conference, settled a number of outstanding issues between the Hindus and Muslims. There was an agreement also on the question of Muslim representation in the Central Legislature which was fixed at 32 per cent.[10] But before the work of the Committee was concluded Sir Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State, forestalled its decision. He announced that His Majesty's. Government had decided to allot 33-1/3 per cent. of British Indian seats in the Central Legislature to the Muslims, and not only to constitute Sindh into a separate Province but also to provide it with adequate funds as subvention from the Central Government. Thus the fruits of the labour of the Unity Conference which had sat for

weeks and after great efforts had succeeded in reaching an agreement on all points as between Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and other Indian communities, were cruelly snatched away by the very timely interference of Sir Samual Hoare. "It was not to be expected that an agreement could be reached between all parties when it was clear that some group or other could always be found to object to any agreement however just, and when the British Government were prepared to offer better terms than any that an agreed settlement could secure for a group willing to accept the highest bid."[11] A further attempt was made again early in 1933 for arriving at a settlement between the President of the Congress and the President of the Muslim League, but it proved unsuccessful. On the eve of the election campaign in 1936 there were, in addition to the Muslim League, led by Jinnah, various parties among the Muslims, each dominated by a strong personality. In the Panjab Mian Sir Fazl-i-Husain had set up a Unionist Party. In Bengal a Krishak Praja Party was established under Maulvi Fazlul Haq. In U. P. the Nationalist Agricultural Party was a creation of the leadership of Nawab of Chhatari. In Sindh Sir Abdulla Haroon and in Bihar Sayyid Abdul Aziz refused to join hands with the League. In the North-West Frontier Province Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, a follower of Gandhi, formed the Khudai-Khidmatgars or Red shirts, a party wedded to the policy of the Congress.[12]

The election manifesto of the Muslim League showed a close resemblance to that of the Congress, save and except the communal demands of Jinnah mentioned above. But an elaborate explanation was offered to show that it was not communalism and did not bar a hearty co-operation between the two communities. The 'Lakhnau Pact' of 1916 was hailed as 'one of the greatest beacon lights in the constitutional history of India.' If the

Muslims demanded that their minority position should be safeguarded in the structure of the constitution, that was not communalism. "Anyone conversant with world history would realise that this was a natural claim and that its acceptance was essential in order to obtain the whole-hearted and willing co-operation of the minorities who must be made to feel that they can rely upon the majority with a complete sense of confidence and security."[13] Indeed this part of the Muslim League manifesto might reasonably appear to some to be a bold bid for a second Lakhnau Pact, recalling the memory of old days when Jinnah was spoken of in Congress circles as the 'Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity.' But the sting was in the tail.

The second part of the manifesto chiefly concerned the Muslims. The League stood for the uplift of the Musalmans as a separate entity by promoting their religion, language, and cultural interests. The problem was not merely to educate the middle class Muslims, but also to bring about the entire social regeneration of the seventy million Muslims. This could only be achieved if the Musalmans stood united in a solid bloc as Musalmans, and refused to be exploited by others.

Henceforth Jinnah always stressed the need of maintaining the unity and solidarity of the Muslims as a separate political and social entity. This idea was fully shared by the other Muslim political parties.[14]

It was not long before Jinnah advanced one step further and regarded the interests of the solid bloc of Musalmans as a special concern of the Muslim League alone. He looked upon the Muslim community as forming an exclusive sphere for the Muslim League activities and would not brook interference with Muslim affairs by any other body. He warned the Congress not to interfere in Muslim affairs, and tacitly implied that no Muslim who was not a member of the Muslim League should

be regarded as a true representative of the Muslims. The Congress retorted by saying that it represented the whole of India and as such was concerned with the interests of both Hindus and Muslims.

The result of the elections held in 1937 belied the claims of both the Congress and the Muslim League. Of the 450 Muslim members in various legislatures, only 26 were Congressmen, most of whom were elected in the North-West Frontier Province. Whatver might be the excuses or explanations offered, it was a clear indication that the Congress organization had no contact with the Muslim masses and had very little influence over them. The Congress could not, therefore, advance any reasonable claim to represent the Muslims. An analysis of Muslim members elected to the various Provincial Legislatures as clearly indicated that the Muslim League also had no such claim. Of course, no other Muslim Party fared better as an all-India organization, but most of them had no pretence to any such claim.

It is not a little curious that the Muslim League had a specially bad record of election success in those Provinces like Bengal, the Panjab, Sindh and North-West Frontier Province where the Muslims formed the majority community, and fared much better in the Provinces which had a strong Hindu majority with a significant and vocal Muslim minority. The reason is that the Muslim League had no special positive programme which distingushed it from the other parties and had no local influence in any Province. It throve only on its assumed character as a bulwark of defence against Hindu attack. The Provinces with a Muslim majority had no genuine fear of such an attack, and were not therefore susceptible to the propaganda of the League. Is is only when the Muslim masses learnt to look upon the problem from an all-India perspective that the Muslim League emerged

as the most powerful Muslim organization, indeed the only organization that could save the interests of the Muslims who formed a perpetual minority in India.

The election results in 1937 clearly proved that there was no such mass-consciousness emong the Muslims, and consequently the Muslim League had as yet little influence in shaping Muslim politics. The credit of Jinnah lies in the fact that he succeeded in developing this political consciousness among the Muslims within an incredibly short time. This was achieved by a comprehensive programme of propaganda and activities—both fair and foul —, and the intransigence of the Congress high command helped its growth. They took their stand on the theory that the Congress represented the whole of India and made the same mistake as the British did in respect of the Congress. They ignored the Muslim League as having no influence over the masses and only representing a "microscopic minority" of the Muslims, to use Lord Dufferin's words with reference to the Congress. But they discounted the idea that there may be a national urge among the Muslims limited to their own community, and even though one may denounce it as rank communalism, its effect upon a political organization may be the same. The factors leading to the consciousness of a separate entity among the Muslims have been noted above,[14a] and though a nationalist may disapprove such a development, a statesman can ignore it only at his peril. Jawaharlal Nehru in particular, among the Cnngress leaders, must be held highly guilty in this recpect.[15] The Congress made an attempt to contact the Muslim masses, but failed. It did not learn the obvious lesson of coming to terms with the Muslim League till by its own folly the League had attained a position when it could dictate its own terms, and demanded Pakistan as the only basis of settlement.

As could be easily anticipated, the estrangement

between the Hindus and the Muslims manifested itself into communal riots. It would be a tedious task to give an account of all the riots that took place during the period under review. Reference has already been made above[16] to the very serious riot at Kanpur in 1931.

There was a horrible incident during the communal riot at Ferozabad early in 1935. It culminated in the burning alive of the whole family of a Hindu, Doctor Jivaram, including children and patients[17] On March 19, 1935, serious disturbances occurred in Karachi over taking in procession the body of Abdul Qaiyum, who was sentenced to death for murdering a Hindu alleged to have insulted Islam. On the 29th June a dispute between the Muslims and the Sikhs about a mosque, situated within the precincts of a Sikh temple known as the Shahidganj Gurudwara, led to serious troubles in Lahore. "In the spring of 1936, in two quarrels over processional music in the United Provinces, two people were killed and 159 injured. In the following autumn a dispute arising in Bombay from building operations at a Hindu temple, which were regarded as likely to result in disturbance to worshippers at a neighbouring mosque, developed into rioting which lasted from October 15 to 19, broke out again on November 2, and continued intermittently till the beginning of December. The hooligans of the city made the most of their chance ; there was much looting and arson ; the police had to open fire on several occasions, and troops in lorries paraded the lawless area. The casualties amounted to no less than 93 killed and 632 injured. In the spring of 1937 there was a minor outbreak in the United Provinces caused by a Moslem sacrifice of a bullock, and another, which lasted for three days, at Madras, arising from the celebration of a Hindu festival. Rioting also recurred at Bombay over Hindu processional music near a mosque : four people were killed and 65 injured."[18]

Indeed such riots had come to be looked upon as normal events in Indian life.

V. THE CONGRESS 1935-6.

1. The Socialist Programme of Jawaharlal Nehru

Although, as mentioned above, Gandhi retained his influence over the Congress, the failure of the Civil Disobedience movement led to an appreciable weakening of his leadership in the country. This was clearly indicated by the very outspoken condemnation of the policy of Gandhi by K. F. Nariman,[19] a member of the Working Committee of the Congress from 1930 to 1933, and the fact that neither the A.I.C.C. nor the Subjects Committee of the Congress in the Bombay session (October, 1934) agreed to substitute the words 'Truth and Non-violence' in the creed of the Congress for the expression 'peaceful and legitimate means.' Another cause operating in the same direction was the emergence of the new creeds of Socialism, particularly in its extreme form, Communism, in Europe. These new ideas, which convulsed Europe, had also great repercussion on India, particularly upon the younger generation.[20] The emergence of a Socialist left wing in the Congress, clearly noticeable in the Congress session of 1934, "was a sure indication of the resurgence of the radical or left-wing forces in the country. This was accompanied by a phenomenal awakening among the peasantry and the students, and to some extent, among the workers. For the first time, there emerged a centralised All India Peasants' Organisation, called the All India Kisan Sabha, the most prominent leader of which was Swami Sahajananda Saraswati. The students' movement also, which had gone through many ups and downs in the past, was centralised under the leadership of the All India Students' Federation. The All India Trade Union Congress, which had experienced two successive splits—in

1929 at Nagpur and again in 1931 at Calcutta—was once again unified under a joint leadership representing all shades of opinion, both Right and Left. In the literary world, too, there was an attempt to organise the progressive writers."[21] "The Congress Socialist Party began to rally the younger generation and also the more radical elements inside the Congress and among the Indian people in general. For the time being, both Satyagraha or Civil Disobedience and revolutionary terrorism had lost their charm and in the vacuum created thereby, the Congress Socialist Party naturally made headway. The Communist Party of India, a small group which had been declared illegal by the British Government, instructed its members to join the Congress Socialist Party and thereby use the public platform of the Congress Socialist Party, in order to push forward its own organisation and objective. It did succeed in extending its infiuence among a section of the students and factory workers."[22]

The Socialists had two notable leaders in Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose. In an article, entitled 'Whither India', Nehru 'pleaded for social and economic equality, for the ending of all special class-privileges and vested interests."[23] In a Press statement issued on 18 December, 1933, he said : "I do believe that fundamentally the choice before the world today is one between some form of Communism and some form of Fascism, and I am all for the former, that is Communism. I dislike Fascism intensely and indeed I do not think it is anything more than a crude and brutal effort of the present capitalist order to preserve itself at any cost. There is no middle road between Fascism and Communism. One has to choose between the two and I choose the Communist ideal. In regard to the methods and approach to this ideal, I may not agree with everything that the orthodox Communists have done.

I think that these methods will have to adapt themselves to changing conditions and may vary in different countries. But I do think that the basic ideology of Communism and its scientific interpretation of history is sound."[24]

Subhas Bose did not fully agree with Nehru. He thought that Nehru's views were fundamentally wrong as there was no reason to hold that our choice was restricted to the two alternatives. He believed that a synthesis between these two was possible, and hoped that India will discover it.[25]

But Nehru definitely veered round to Communism in his Presidential speech at Lakhnau Congress in April, 1936. As mentioned above, there was already a Socialist wing in the Congress, and the Communist ideals had also spread in India. But they had not yet become a force in the body politic. The special pleading for Communism by the President of the Congress was to give it an undue importance and divert national energy from its goal of attaining independence.

Further, Nehru's views created a somewhat awkward situation in the inner politics of the Congress. Gandhi wing, bitterly opposed to Communism, reigned supreme in the Congress, and though Nehru's views strengthened the Socialist left wing, he never wavered in his personal allegiance to Gandhi. He therefore drifted along, without joining either the Gandhi wing or any other radical party. The situation is described as follows in the official history of the Congress: "Jawaharlal came to India full of communistic and Marxian ideas. The achievements of the Conngress disappointed him. He found himself as one against the world.... He made the best of the situation by taking three ardent socialists into the Working Committee,—Sri Jayaprakash Narain, Narendra Deo, and Achyut Patwardhan."[26]

But the remaining ten members formed a solid Gandhi

bloc against Communism. Nehru realized his own position, viz, that he did not represent the majority view-point, though, as the President of the Congress, he was supposed to represent that organization. He offered his resignation but was persuaded to withdraw it. That the difference between Nehru and the Working Committee did not lead to such consequences as happened three years later was very largely due to the magnetic personality of Gandhi. The intellectual Nehru fought against his programme and theory, but the emotional Nehru always submitted to his authority. Nothing is more remarkable in the history of the next decade than the gradual conversion of Nehru, step by step and stage by stage, to the views and practices of Gandhi. One might well ponder how and why a dynamic personality like Jawaharlal Nehru made such an abject surrender to Gandhi—about whom he himself said that "ideologically he was sometimes amazingly backward",[27] and again, 'much that he says seems to fit in with a medieval Christian saint and not at all with modern psychological experience and method.'[28] Fortunately Nehru has himself answered this question on behalf of himself and many others who were insensibly drawn within the magnetic circle of Gandhi : "How came we to associate ourselves with Gandhiji politically and to become, in many instances, his devoted followers ? The question is hard to answer....Personality is an indefinable thing, a strange force that has power over the souls of men, and he possesses this in ample measure....He attracted people. They did not agree with his philosophy of life, or even with many of his ideals. Often they did not understand him. But the action that he proposed was something tangible. Any action would have been welcome after the long tradition of inaction which our spineless politics had nurtured ; brave and effective action with an ethical halo about it had an irresistible appeal....and we went

with him although we did not accept his philosophy....

"How he disciplined our lazy and demoralized people and made them work—not by force or any material inducement, but by a gentle look and a soft word, and, above all, by personal example! Umar Sobhani called him "beloved Slave-driver."[29]

It was not long before the truth underlying the confession of Nehru was practically demonstrated. He was re-elected President of the next Congress held at Faizpur in Maharashtra, in December, 1936. Just a month before that the new Communist constitution was introduced in Russia—U. S. S. R.—which claimed to usher in a new era of political, social, economic, and cultural progress. "Capitalism was wholly liquidated,... The merchants and speculators were completely driven out of the field and the entire commodity circulation passed into the hands of the co-operative and the collective farms." It was therefore quite natural that at "Faizpur the atmosphere should have been surcharged with socialist slogans, emphasising the rights of workers and peasants on the one hand and declaiming against the forces of Imperialism and Fascism on the other. Indeed the suggestion of the Socialist Party at the Subjects Committee of the Faizpur Congress urged that 'the Congress declares the solidarity of Indian people with the enslaved peoples of the world and with the people of the U. S. S. R."[30]

But in sharp contrast to all these the President, Jawaharlal Nehru, had considerably mellowed down in his enthusiasm for Communism. The official history of the Congress attributes this change to the "schooling that the President of Lucknow had had for well nigh a year in the University of life."[31] It would perhaps be more correct to say that the schooling really took place in the University of Sabarmati under its presiding genius, Gandhi. In any case the change was significant.

"The Congress," said the President, "to-day stands for full democracy in India and fights for a democratic state, not for socialism."[32]

2. The Congress Ministry

A general election under the new Act was held in 1937. It was significant from many points of view. It forced the Congress to come into close contact with the masses and this aroused political consciousness among them.

"The enfranchisement of 3 & 1/2 crores of voters, including the wives of men voters and those that could sign their names, gave an impetus to the awakening of women with their civic consciousness on the one hand, and the progress of literacy in one bound on the other. Thousands of women came forward to register their names as voters and thousands more of illiterate men who had just learnt to sign their names."[33]

Though the Congress condemned the new constitution introduced by the Act of 1935, it contested the election. The position of the Congress in the new Legislatures may be summed up as follows :

'The Congress had absolute majority in the Legislative Assembly in Madras, the United Provinces, the Central Provinces, Bihar, and Orissa. It was the biggest single Party in four Provinces, namely Bombay, Bengal, Assam and the N.W.F.P. In the Assemblies of Sindh and the Panjab it was in comparatively smaller minority. The total number of Muslim seats in the Assemblies of the 11 Provinces was 482. Out of this number the Congress contested 58 seats and won 26, i.e. 46 per cent. of the seats contested. The total number of Labour seats in the 11 Provinces was 38. Of these the Congress contested 20 and won 18 i.e. 90 per cent. of the seats contested. The total number of seats reserved for landholders in the Assemblies of the 11 Provinces was 37. Out of this number the

Congress contested 8 and secured 4. The total number of seats reserved for Commerce and Industries in the Assemblies of the 11 Provinces was 56. Out of these the Congress contested 8 and won only 3.'[34]

The all-important question of the acceptance of office was discussed by the A.I.C.C. in its meeting at Delhi on 17-18 March, 1937. After a debate of two days an amendment opposing acceptance of office was defeated and A.I.C.C. "authorised and permitted the acceptance of office in Provinces where the Congress commanded a majority in the Legislature, provided the Congress party in the Legislature was satisfied and was able to state publicly that the Governor would not use his special powers of interference or set aside the advice of ministers in regard to constitutional activities."

The Governors of the Provinces, in which the Congress obtained a clear or near majority of seats in the Legislature, were not prepared to give any assurance in the terms demanded by the Congress leaders regarding the exercise of their special powers, and the negotiations therefore failed. In a *Communique* of the United Provinces Government it was stated that the obligations laid upon the Governor by the Government of India Act and the Instrument of Instructions were clear and specific and that it was clearly not in the power of the Governor to meet such a demand.

The other Governments made similar declarations. Gandhi, who claimed to be the sole author of the office-acceptance resolution of A. I. C. C. (18 March), issued a statement on 30 March, 1937, in which he said :

"My desire was not to lay down any impossible condition......I felt that this object could not be secured unless there was a gentlemanly understanding between Governors and their Congress Ministers that they would not exercise their special powers of interference so long as

Ministers acted within the Constitution."

After a prolonged controversy the Viceroy made a long pronouncement promising "the utmost degree practicable of harmonious co-operation" between the Government and the people and 'to avoid in every way consistent with the special responsibilities for minorities and the like which the Act imposes, any such clash of opinion as would be calculated unnecessarily to break down the Ministry.' Although it did not materially differ from the pronouncements of the Governors, and certainly did not concede the original demands of the Congress, the Congress Working Committee decided to permit Congressmen to accept office (7 July, 1937). The Congress Ministries were therefore formed in the Provinces where the Congress members formed a majority in the Legislative Assembly.[35]

It is unnecessary to give a detailed account of the work done by the Ministries set up under the Act of 1935. Many useful and beneficent measures were passed in all the Provinces, and the Congress Ministries, in particular, tried to carry out the Congress programme of primary education, prohibition, and uplift of the Harijans, i. e., depressed classes, including untouchables. It must be mentioned that the non-Congress Ministries of Bengal and the Panjab also passed several salutary measures for improving the material condition of the masses.[36]

3. The Muslims and the Congress Ministry

It was taken for granted both in the Report of the Simon Commission and the discussions in the Round Table Conference that the main communities, particularly the Muslims, ought to be, and in fact would be, represented in the Provincial Ministries. But it was not made a statutory obligation, as was suggested by some Muslim leaders, for it was felt that "no single party would be strong enough to do without minority support. But this was belied by the result of the elections. In five Provinces

the Congress obtained clear majorities. In two others they only needed the support of one or two sympathetic groups. Broadly speaking, therefore, there was no necessity for the Congress to come to terms with minority parties, not even with the strongest of them, the Moslem League."[37]

When the Congress decided to accept office they proceeded on the general principle that in the Congress Provinces the Ministers should be selected solely from the Congress Party. In other words, the member of a minority organization was bluntly told that he must either repudiate his own organization (like the Muslim League) and join the Congress by accepting its creed, or must give up the hope of taking a share in the government of the country.

This question was brought to a head in U. P. where the Muslims, though numbering only 16 per cent. of the population, occupied a very high position not only in comparison with the Muslims in other parts of India, but also as compared with the Hindus in U. P. This was mainly due to the Aligarh University and the local traditions of the Mughul Age. There were eminent leaders and local magnates whose name and fame spread among the Muslims all over India.

The result of the election in 1937 was very significant so far as the Muslims were concerned. Out of the 228 seats in the Provincial Assembly 64 were reserved for Muslims chosen by separate Muslim electorates. At the polls in 1937, 26 of those seats were won by the Muslim League, 28 by the Independent Muslims, 9 by the National Agricultural Party, and only one by a Congress Muslim.

Between the League and the Congress, the only two organized political bodies in U. P. there was hardly any difference in ideas and programme save on the communal representation. The electoral programmes of

the two were also very nearly the same in all essential matters and the leaders of the two organizations fought the elections on a more or less common platform. But when the Congress decided to accept office there arose a strong difference between the two. There seems to have been a sort of understanding—tacit or explicit—before the election that in case of victory, two places in the joint Ministry would be allotted to the Muslims. But the Congress, in pursuance of their principle mentioned above, offered to include the members of the Muslim League only on certain conditions which practically meant dissolution of the Muslim League and the incorporation of its members in the Congress organization, sharing all its rights and privileges as well as duties, obligations, and responsibilities.[38] These detailed terms only translated into practice the pithy saying attributed to Nehru that 'there were only two parties in the country—the Congress and the British Government.' No wise statesman could seriously believe that the Muslim League would readily give up its own separate identity and merge itself in the Congress. The Muslim League refused to commit political *Harikiri* at the bidding of the Congress.[38a]

There is no doubt that the decision of the Congress leaders was extremely unwise and it was bound to have disastrous consequences. The Muslims now fully realized that as a separate community they had no political prospects in future. The Congress ultimatum was the signal for the parting of the ways which by inevitable stages led to the foundation of Pakistan.

Nehru, who was chiefly responsible for this ultimatum,[38b] had no realistic conception of the Hindu-Muslim problem. Thus he says :

"The Communal Problem, as it was called, was one of adjusting the claims of the minorities and giving them sufficient protection from majority action. Minorities in

India, it must be remembered, are not racial or national minorities as in Europe ; they are religious minorities. Religious barriers are obviously not permanent, as conversions can take place from one religion to another, and a person changing his religion does not thereby lose his racial background or his cultural and linguistic inheritance."[39]

The statement is almost ridiculous, as the whole history of the growth of Muslim community in India shows. It has already been sufficiently discussed in the preceding Volumes.[40] Nehru had no real idea of the powers and potentialities of the Muslim League. He describes it as a "small upper-class organization controlled by feudal elements" and remarks that 'it had no influence on the Moslem masses and was hardly known by them.'[41] Nehru here committed the same type of mistake as the Britishers did in respect of the Congress when they belittled its importance by describing it as the organization of the English-educated classes, constituting a microscopic minority. When Congress leaders, including Gandhi and Nehru, boasted that the Congress was the only political organization that counted, one could only say that wish was often the father of thought. For the fact remains that in 1945-6 when Nehru expressed these views, the Muslims had long since come to regard themselves not merely as a separate community but also as a separate nation. Nehru simply ignored any such idea.

Nehru seems to have lived in an ideal world of his own creation which had no relation to actual facts. His emphasis in 1945-6 on 'national unity' and 'democracy' as the two fundamental questions on which the Congress stood firm, and reference to the Congress as the "most democratic organization in the world"[41a] were very ill-timed. There was no more even any vestige of democracy left in the Congress since the acceptance of the resolution of Govind Vallabh Pant· in the Tripuri Congress in March, 1939, making

Gandhi, its dictator.[41b]

Similarly Nehru's emphasis on national unity ignores some patent facts; it was the Congress which in 1916 recognized the Muslims as a separate political entity with separate interests; it was Gandhi who by his action in respect of Khilafat movement endorsed the views of Muslim leaders that they were Muslims first and Indians afterwards, that their interests were more bound up with the fate of the Muslim World outside India than that of India herself. As mentioned above,[42] such a view is absolutely incompatible with Indian nationality, howsoever it might be defined or described. To sacrifice collaboration with Muslim League in the name of ideals which did not at all correspond with existing facts, was an extremely unwise—almost fatal—step for which India had to pay very dear.

It appears that not only Nehru, but evidently other Congress leaders also thought that the Muslim League had no great hold over the country. Instead of conciliating the League they considered it to be a safer and more feasible course to destroy even the little influence it still possessed. This end was sought to be achieved principally by bringing over the Muslim masses into the Congress fold and winning over members of the Muslim League by offers of ministry. Little success attended the second effort. The number of ministers was after all limited, and few had therefore any chance of swallowing the bait and turning a renegade. As to the first, Jawaharlal Nehru, as the President of the Congress, announced on 31 March, 1937, that a separate department would be started to organize Congress contacts with the Muslim masses of India. This activity was most noticeable in U. P. which was a stronghold of the Muslim League. To the rural masses the Congress appealed somewhat on the following lines: "Congress was non-communal, and under its aus-

pices the religious rights of the Moslems would be scrupulously protected. The real issue was social and economic, and the Congress, not the landlords and lawyers of the League, was the champion of the poor. Already it was hard at work at its new agrarian reforms, and there were more to come. They were intended for Moslem countryfolk as much as Hindu, but the former would be wise to make sure of their full share in the blessings of the new regime by joining the Congress party."[43]

The appeal to the upper classes was rather sordid in character, and its terms were implicit rather than explicit. In effect, though not in actual words, it amounted to an insidious propaganda of the following type: "Political power with all the patronage and influence it implied was now exclusively in Congress hands, and there it would remain. True to its principles, the Congress would not deny a fair share of its appointments from Minister's office downwards to the Moslem minority, but it could not be expected to bestow them on any but Congress Moslems. For a Moslem to stay in the League, therefore, was to condemn himself to a lifetime in the wilderness. Let him make the other choice, and make it at once while the door was still open. If he were unwilling to become an out and out Congressman, let him at least join one of the sectional Moslem parties, such as the Ahrars. which were at feud with the League and willing to work with the Congress."[44]

Jinnah took up the challenge, and his brilliancy as a leader never shone forth higher. He completely turned the table on the Congress by denouncing the anti-Muslim attitude of the Congress. In his Presidential Address at the Lakhnau sesssion of the Muslim League, he said :

"The present leadership of the Congress, specially

during the last ten years, has been responsible for alienating the Musalmans of India more and more by pursuing a policy which is exclusively Hindu, and since they have formed the Government in six provinces where they are in a majority they have by their words, deeds and programme shown more and more that the Musalmans cannot expect any justice or fair play at their hands. Wherever they are in a majority and wherever it suited them, they refused to co-operate with the Muslim Leagu Parties and demanded unconditional surrender and signing of their pledges.

"The Congress with all its boasts has done nothing in the past for the Musalmans. It has failed to inspire confidence and to create a sense of security amongst the Musalmans and other minorities. Congress attempt under the guise of establishing mass contact with the Musalmans is calculated to divide and weaken and break the Musalmans, and is an effort to detach them from their accredited leaders. It is a dangerous move, and it cannot mislead anyone.

"The path before the Musalmans is, therefore, plain. They must realise that the time has come when they should concentrate and devote their energies to self-organisation and full development of their power to the exclusion of every other consideration.

"Honourable settlement can only be achieved between equals, and unless the two parties learn to respect and fear each other, there is no solid ground for any settlement.

"Only one thing can save the Musalmans and energise them to regain their lost ground. They must first recapture their own souls and stand by their lofty position and principles which form the basis of their great unity and which bind them in one body-politic."[45]

Jinnah now frankly stood as the leader of the united Muslim community and an arch-enemy of the Hindu

Congress. But his clarion call to the Muslims went home and changed the Muslim political outlook almost overnight. He touched the chord of religious feelings of the Muslims which have always proved a potent factor in Muslim politics. "The *Mullahs* of the countryside were soon up in arms against the Congress propagandists : ...it was blasphemy, they told their flocks, to say that politics was a purely secular affair, and they reawakened in them all their old suspicions of Hindu intentions towards their faith." The Congress mass contact movement, which had made some headway, collapsed under the attack of the *Mullahs*. In order to conteract the effect of Jinnah's propaganda the A. I. C. C. made a frantic appeal to the Muslim masses.[46] But all these fell on deaf ears. Jinnah had played his trump-card by converting Indian politics into a struggle for power, nay even the very existence with honour, between the Muslim minority and the Hindu majority. As the Hindu majority had a stronghold in the Congress organization, bare logic and sheer instinct of self-preservation demnded a simiar citadel for the defenders—and there could be hardly any other choice than the Muslim League for this purpose. Thus Jinnah took advantage of the Congress propaganda to put himself and his Muslim League on a high pedestal in Muslim politics. The effect was so clear that even he who ran could read it.

Immediately after Jinnah's Presidential Address referred to above, the leaders of the Muslim parties in the Panjab, Bengal and Assam, who were outside the Muslim Leaaue, asked their members to join it. This did more than anything else to put new life into the League. Three successive bye-elections in U. P. were all won by the League. All the while the League "was fighting the 'mass-contact' campaign on its own ground, building up at last a rival organisation in the rural areas, hoisting its green flag over against the Congress tricolor in the village

street. Within two or three months after the Lakhnau Conference over 170 new branches of the League had been established, 90 of them in the United Proxinces and 40 in the Panjab. No less than 100,000 new members were said to have been enlisted in the United Provinces alone."[47]

Thus at one stroke Jinnah became the leader of the Muslims, and Muslim League became practically the only Muslim organization which could speak in the name of the Indian Muslims as a whole. The red wine of success intoxicated Jinnah as much as it did the Congress leaders a year before. This is best seen in the negotiations between Jinnah and the Congress leaders for a communal settlement.

On May 2, 1937, Jinnah had himself appealed to Gandhi to take up the question of Hindu-Muslim settlement. Negotiations also took place between Jinnah and Rajendra Prasad. But things changed altogether in 1938. Apart from making new demands and new complaints against the Congress, Jinnah took up the position that the condition precedent to all negotiations was a frank recognition of the Congress and the League as the only representative body, respectively, of the Hindus and Muslims of India.

The Executive Committee of the All-India Muslim League passed a resolution to the effect that 'it is not possible for the All-India Muslim League to treat and negotiate with the Congress the question of Hindu-Muslim settlement except on the basis that the Muslim League is the authoritative and representative organization of the Musalmans of India.' But this was not all. Jinnah made it clear in his letter to Subhas Bose, dated 2 August, 1938, that the Committee appointed by the Congress to discuss Hindu-Muslim questions should not include any Musalman. When Gandhi wanted to have Maulana Abul Kalam Azad with him in his talks with Jinnah, the latter said 'no' to it.[48]

It is easy to see that the Congress could not accept these demands without stultifying its whole history as a national organization of Indians of all faith and communities. The Congress demand in 1937 that the Muslims must liquidate the Muslim League if they wanted to share powers with the Congress was bad enough, but it was far worse to demand that the Indian National Congress, with its proud records of more than half a century's service as a national organization, should voluntarily degrade itself into a communal Hindu Organization only to serve as a counterpart to the Muslim League.

Apart from this general question which barred the door of formal negotiations, it was difficult for the Congress leaders to get a clear idea of the further demands of Jinnah after his fourteen points had been practically conceded by the British, or of the points which the Muslim League would have the Congress consider. Rajendra Prasad observes :

"Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru made many attempts in the course of conversations and long correspondence with Mr. Jinnah to ascertain the points which, the Muslim League considered, required discussion and settlement, but he failed....

"When the War broke out in September, 1939, another attempt was made by Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru but without any effect."[49]

In the meanwhile the activities of the Muslim League were directed towards leading a regular campaign of vilification against the Congress Governments for many alleged offences against the Muslim community.

On 20 March, 1938, the Council of the Muslim League appointed a Committee presided over by the Raja of Pirpur to collect detailed information on the subject. The report of the Committee, dated 15 November, 1938, contained a long list of charges against the Congress. Similar

reports were issued by other Muslim organizations, and soon after the Congress Ministries resigned, Fazlul Huq issued a pamphlet entitled *Muslim Sufferings under Congress Rule.* The Congress Ministries gave effective reply to these charges, both in the form of press notes and statements made in the Legislatures. In October, 1939, Rajendra Prasad, the President of the Congress, "wrote to Jinnah to have the complaints investigated by an impartial authority and suggested the name of Sir Maurice Gwyer, the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, for the purpose. Mr. Jinnah, however, refused to accept this suggestion.

"The Congress Prime Ministers, before their resignation, were asked by the Congress Parliamentary Board to invite the Governors of the Provinces to point out any policy or act of their Ministries which adversely affected minorities and particularly the Muslim minority. In not a single case was any Governor able to point out an instance."[50] Indeed, after retirement, Sir Harry Haig, the Governor of the United Provinces, wrote as follows at the end of 1939 :

"In dealing with communal issues the Ministers, in my judgment, normally acted with impartiality and a desire to do what was fair. Indeed, towards the end of their time they were being seriously criticised by the Hindu Mahasabha on the ground that they were not being fair to the Hindus, though there was in fact no justification for such a criticism."[51]

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad characterized as "absolutely false" the charges levelled by Jinnah and the Muslim League against the Congress with regard to injustice to Muslims and other minorities.[51a]

In view of all this, the charge of atrocities to the Muslims, levelled against the Congress Ministries, must be dismissed and regarded as either false or unproved allegations.

But true or false, the allegations inflamed the passions of the Muslims to such an extent that the view was entertained by some that the whole thing was conceived as an ingenious propaganda to rally the Muslim masses round the League.

Apart from the charges of oppression and injustice against the Hindu Congress the idea was slowly gaining ground among the Muslims that their social and political order was so organically related to the religious ideal of Islam that "the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian homelands." The high-priest of this new doctrine, Muhammad Iqbal, elaborated the idea in his Presidential Address at the Allahabad session of the Muslim League (December, 1930), and justified, on this ground, the "Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India." Iqbal gave a concrete illustration of what he meant in the following passage :

"I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State. Self-government within the British empire or without the British empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India."[52]

But the most important consequence of the doctrines preached by Iqbal was the gradual growth of the demand for a separate homeland for the Muslims in India.[53] This idea took a definite shape in the mind of a young man, Rahmat Ali, educated in Cambridge, and he communicated it to the Muslim members of the Round Table Conference, assembled in London. But nobody took it seriously. The feelings which animated Rahmat Ali may be gathered from an account of his interview with Madame Halide Edib.[54] His conception was that the Panjab, N. W. F. P. (also called Afghan Province), Kashmir, Sindh, and Baluchistan

comprised the national home of the Muslims, called by him Pakistan by taking the initials of the f st four and the last part of the fifth. This was not a part of India, for since 712 A. D. the Hindus were a minority there. The Muslims lived there as a nation for 1200 years whereas they came to Hindustan only as conquerors. To him Hindu-Muslim clash was not due to religious or economic grounds,—it was an international conflict between two national ambitions, Muslim for survival and Hindu for supremacy. His basic theory was that the Hindus and Muslims were fundamentally distinct nations. This he supported by the following statement : "Our religion, culture, history, tradition, literature, economic system, laws of inheritance, succession and marriage are fundamentally different from those of the Hindus. These differences are not confined to the broad basic principles. They extend to the minute details of our lives. We, Muslims and Hindus, do not interdine ; we do not intermarry. Our national customs and calendars, even our diet and dress, are different."

Having thus forestalled Jinnah's theory of two nations, he continued : "Therefore for us to seal our national doom in the interest of one Indian nationhood would be a treachery against our posterity, a betrayal of our history and a crime against humanity for which there would be no salvation."

Although these ideas did not carry much weight at the time, it must be admitted that all the subsequent arguments in support of Pakistan proceeded from the thesis of Rahmat Ali, and did not cover much new ground.

When the idea of an All-India Federation emerged out of the deliberations of the Round Table Conference, Rahmat regarded it as a tragedy for the Muslims who will be reduced to a minority community, belonging to the Hindu nation and under the supremacy of the Hindus.

He lost no time and founded the Pakistan National Movement in 1933, which, he said, had its propaganda centres all over Pakistan. A four-page leaflet, headed *Now or Never*, and signed by Rahmat Ali and three others, was privately circulated from Cambridge in January, 1933. They protested against the federal constitution favoured by the Round Table Conference, and repudiated the claim of the Indian Muslim Delegation to speak for their community. They also admitted that the scheme of Pakistan proposed by them was radically different from that of Iqbal. "While he proposed the amalgamation of these Provinces into a single State forming a unit of the All-India Federation, we propose that these Provinces should have a separate Federation of their own. There can be no peace and tranquillity in this land if we, the Muslims, are duped into a Hindu-dominated Federation where we cannot be the masters of our own destiny and captains of our own souls."

The Cambridge pamphlet attracted very little serious notice at the time, for the scheme of Pakistan was hardly regarded a practicable proposal. When the delegates of the All-India Muslim Conference and the Muslim League appeared before the Joint Select Committee in August, 1933, their spokesman was asked 'whether there is a scheme for a federation of Provinces under the name of Pakistan.' 'As far as I know,' was the reply, 'it is only a student's scheme'. 'So far as we have considered it,' said another member of the delegation, 'we have considered it chimerical and impracticable.'

Mr. C. Rahmat Ali, who claimed to be the 'founder of the Pakistan National Movement' and its President, circulated another four-page leaflet in July 1935, and summed up the position in a statement published in England in 1940. The old arguments were repeated, but a demand was made that Bengal and Hyderabad should

also be separated from India, and will be two additional independent 'nations' forming a triple alliance with Pakistan.

But though the project of one or more independent Muslim States separated from India did not as yet make any appeal to any section of Muslims, the idea was gaining ground that the Muslims constituted a separate nation and therefore the unitary federal form of Government as contemplated by the Congress would not meet with the requirements of the Muslims. As regards an alternative to this as well as to Pakistan, several schemes were proposed.

But whatever the differences between the several plans of federation proposed, it became quite clear that the Muslims would resist by force any settlement of the political issue, imposed upon them against their will, either by the Congress or by the British Government or even jointly by both. It was inevitable that the growth of such a feeling would promote the unity of Muslims all over India and make the Muslim League their central organization. The Prime Ministers of the Panjab, Bengal and Assam, and the leaders of the Muslim minorities in the Congress Provinces now rallied round the League and its permanent leader, Jinnah. There was hardly any doubt that Jinnah had become the most popular and powerful leader of the Muslims and he alone could speak with authority in the name of the Indian Muslims and deliver the goods.

The Muslim League now spoke in no uncertain voice and made the final choice of the most extreme proposal, namely, a separate State for the Muslims. The rapid gowth of this idea which was laughed at as chimerical by the Muslim leaders themselves, even seven years before, culminated in the following nesolution passed by the Muslim League in March, 1940, at its Lahore session attended by about 100,000 members.

"Resolved that it is the considered view of this

session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Moslems unless it is designed on the following basic principle, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Moslems are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute 'independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign..."

The same session of the Muslim League authorised its Working Committee "to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary."[54a] This was a definite demand for the partition of India on communal basis.

During this great metamorphosis of Muslim politics in India, neither the Congress nor the Hindu public men outside it seem to have devoted to it the serious attention it deserved. They angrily opposed the idea of vivisection of India in any form, and took their stand on the twin ideas of Indian nationality and Indian unity—the ideas which were repudiated by the Muslims, almost in one voice. The Congress consistently adhered to the one idea of a Constituent Assembly, as the only remedy for all political discord and discontent. From this high pedestal the Hindu leaders never came down to discuss, in detail, in a friendly spirit, even the more moderate suggestions of a loose federation. Gandhi condemned the Lahore resolution in a long article in the *Harijan* and the Hindu press attacked it, in varying degrees of bitterness. But there was no constructive suggestion or attempt of a

compromise, conciliation or even mutual understanding, till it was too late.

The Congress also continued the old policy of holding up the few Muslims within its fold as a counterpoise to the Muslim League. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad was elected President of the Congress and an all-India Indepe-ndent Muslim Conference was held in Delhi in April, 1940, a month after the memorable Lahore session of the Muslim League. Khan Bahadur Alla Baksh, an ex-Premier of Sindh, presided over the Conference but Azad was its guiding spirit. The Conference denounced the idea of a separate Muslim State in India and even repu-diated the claim of the Muslim League to represent the Muslims of India. But it was too late in the day. As mentioned above, the claim of the Muslim League to represent the Muslims of India in 1940 was far superior to any that the Congress ever had to represent India as a whole. The Delhi Conference was a very poor show in contrast with the Muslim League session at Lahore. There were no doubt still a few disgruntled Muslim political organizations, here and there, outside the League, but they had ceased to play any important part in Muslim politics in which the Muslim League unquestionably played the dominant role.

4. The Congress (1938-9)

There was no session of the Congress in 1937, evidently because the Congress high command was busy with the problems facing the administration of which they had taken responsibility in the Provinces. The problems indeed were almost baffling in character. The high hopes which popular government had raised were dashed to the ground. Thousands of detenus and convicts in Indian jails and Andamans, the continuance of the repressive laws, the unredressed sufferings and miseries of the culti-vators, and many things else were rude reminders that

the regime of the British imperialism had not undergone any change. The spirit of frustration caused great stir, particularly among the long-suffering *Kisans* (cultivators), who organized themselves in huge parties, and, unfurling the red flag of hammer and sickle, marched hundreds of miles through villages, uttering Communist slogans and creating new energy and enthusiasm. Though Gandhi had roused the mass spirit he could no longer control it, and "almost everywhere there were conflicts between Congressmen and *Kisans*." The organization of the peasants was mainly the work of the Communist Party in India.[55]

But more important was the reaction it produced upon the Congress itself. Socialism had already made its power felt in the Congress, but now it constituted a powerful left wing with distinct leaning towards Communist ideas. The younger section lost faith both in the non-violent programme which had made very slow progress and so far yielded only poor results, and in its leader Gandhi.

Gandhi occupied a very peculiar position. Since 1934 he not only held no office but had ceased to be even a primary member of the Congress ; yet he attended the meetings of the Working Committee and the A.I.C.C. and took part in their discussions. It was well-known that the Congress leaders took no decision in vital matters without consulting him and, in general, it may be said that his will was in the last resort the will of the Congress. The author of the official history of the Congress expressed the bare truth when he said that Gandhi, "though not a member of the Congress, was still the power behind the throne." Nehru conveyed the same idea when he described Gandhi as the "permanent super-President of the Congress," and remarked that the "Congress at present meant Gandhiji."[56]

The fifty-first session of the Congress met at Vithal Nagar, Haripura (Gujarat), on 19 February, 1938. The

unanimous election of Subhas Chandra Bose, the leader of the Radical party, as President of the Congress was a distinct pointer to the growing influence of the younger section whose socialist creed was not in tune with the orthodox Congress views of which Gandhi was the most typical representative.

As war-clouds were gathering on the western horizon, the Congress passed a long resolution explaining its attitude to the political situation in Europe and the impending World War. The concluding para of this resolution read as follows :

"India can be no party to such an imperialist war, and will not permit her man-power and resources to be exploited in the interests of British Imperialism. Nor can India join any war without the express consent of her people. The Congress, therefore, entirely disapproves of war preparations being made in India and large scale manoeuvres and air-raid precautions by which it has been sought to spread an atmosphere of approaching war in India. In the event of an attempt being made to involve India in a war, this will be resisted." As will be seen, this resolution had very grave consequences in near future.

The year 1938 saw the widening of the gulf between the two wings of the Congress Party. Subhas Bose offers the following explanation of the breach between him and Gandhi :

"As Congress President, the writer did his best to stiffen the opposition of the Congress Party to any compromise with Britain and this caused annoyance in Gandhian circles who were then looking forward to an understanding with the British Government. Later in the year 1938, he launched the National Planning Committee for drawing up a comprehensive plan of industrialization and of national development. This caused further annoyance to Mahatma Gandhi who was opposed to industrialization.

After the Munich Pact, in Septembr, 1938, the writer began an open propaganda throughout India in order to prepare the Indian people for a national struggle, which should synchronise with the coming war ln Europe. This move, though popular among the people in general, was resented by the Gandhiites who did not want to be disturbed in their ministerial and parliamentary work and who were at that time opposed to any national struggle."[57]

Whatever may be the real cause, the breach between Bose and Gandhi was now very wide, though not visible to the public. The next session of the Congress was to be held at Tripuri in C. P. in March, 1939. The first problem was the election of the President. Never since 1907 was there any serious conflict of views regarding the choice of President. But there were sharp differences of opinion in 1939. The names of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Subhas Chandra Bose and Pattabhi Sitaramayya were proposed. But the first having declined the honour, the next two alone remained in the field. Gandhi supported the candidature of Sitaramayya with the whole weight of his authority. This need not be set down to any question of personal like or dislike. For Gandhi's opposition to the election of Bose can be satisfactorily explained as due to difference in policy as explained by Bose himself. The policy advocated by the latter could not be reconciled with the views and policy of Gandhi. For example, under Bose's inspiration a resolution was passed in the District Conference at Jalpaiguri (Bengal) to the effect that six months' notice should be given to Britain and after that Mass Civil Disobedience should be embarked upon.[58] Gandhi's opposition to Bose may therefore be charitably interpreted as opposition to his militant programme rather than to any personal dislike to him. On the other hand, Bose had a volume of public opinion behind him and merely gave a lead to a strong

section which endorsed his views. This was clearly indicated when in spite of the strong support of Gandhi, Sitaramayya lost the election and Subhas Bose won it by a majority of 95 votes.

So far there was nothing to which any objection could be taken. But the result of the election was followed by a series of events which tore off the democratic mask of the Congress and showed it in its true colour—a totalitarian body under the dictatorship of Gandhi.

The first was the 'historic statement' of Gandhi that the 'defeat of Subhas's rival was his own defeat.'[59] Coming as it did from one of Gandhi's status, it had ominous significance. According to the official history of the Congress, the statement of Gandhi "created consternation in the country", and its effect was seen in the 'crossing of the floor by an appreciable number of those who had voted for Subhas.' The situation was rendered complex by the continued illness of the President-elect and the fast undertaken by Gandhi at Rajkot as a protest against the breach of faith by its ruling chief.

Even before the Congress met, an indication of the coming storm was given by the "resignation tendered by thirteen members of the Working Committee, leaving Subhas Bose and his elder brother Sarat Bose alone on its personnel."[60] This was followed by a formal notice given to the President by Govind Vallabh Pant and about 160 other members of the A. I. C. C. of their intention to move a resolution, the operative part of which read as follows :

"In view of the critical situation that may develop during the coming year and in view of the fact that Mahatma Gandhi alone can lead the Congress and the country to victory during such crisis, the Committee regards it as imperative that the Congress Executive should command his implicit confidence and requests the Pre-

sident to nominate Working Committee in accordance with the wishes of Gandhiji."

"The very competency of A. I. C. C. to consider such a resolution was questioned and the President gave his ruling that the resolution could not be discussed by the A. I. C. C. He, however, expressed readiness to have the matter considered by the Subjects Committee."[61]

The Tripuri session was held on March 10-12, 1939, and only 2285 out of 3319 delegates attended the meeting. The President, Subhas Bose, was too ill to join the usual Presidential procession (which provided a chariot drawn by 52 elephants to carry him).

Three important resolutions were adopted by the Congress. The first was a reiteration of the Congress objective, namely, achievement of independence, rejection of the Federal part of the Act of 1935, and a declaration to the following effect :

"The Congress declares afresh its solemn resolve to achieve independence for the nation and to have a Constitution framed for a free India through a Constituent Assembly, elected by the people on the basis of the adult franchise and without any interference by a foreign authority. No other Constitutions or attempted solutions of the problem can be accepted by the Indian people."

The Congress went out of its way in making a clear and comprehensive statement on foreign policy worded as follows :

"The Congress records its entire disapproval of British foreign policy culminating in the Munich Pact, the Anglo-Italian Agreement and the recognition of rebel Spain. This policy has been one of deliberate betrayal of democracy, repeated breach of pledges, the ending of the system of collective security and co-operation with governments which are avowed enemies of democracy and freedom. As a result of this policy, the world is being reduced to a state

of international anarchy where brutal violence triumphs and flourishes unchecked and decides the fate of nations, and in the name of peace stupendous preparations are being made for the most terrible of wars. International morality has sunk so low in Central and South-Western Europe that the world has witnessed with horror the organised terrorism of the Nazi Government against people of the Jewish race and the continuous bombing from the air by rebel forces of cities and civilian inhabitants and helpless refugees.

"The Congress dissociates itself entirely from British foreign policy which has consistently aided the Fascist powers and helped in the destruction of democratic ountries. The Congress is opposed to Imperialism and Fascism alike and is convinced that world peace and progress required the ending of both of these. In the opinion of the Congress it is urgently necessary for India to direct her own foreign policy as an independent nation, thereby keeping aloof from both Imperialism and Fascism, and pursuing her path of peace and freedom."

When the Congress took up the resolution of Govind Vallabh Pant to which reference has been made above, a proposal was made to refer it to A.I.C.C. This was the signal for a general uproar and tumultuous scenes in the Congress pandal which reminded one of Surat more than thirty years ago. "Speaker after speaker attempted to make himself heard, paralysing all proceedings for well-nigh an hour." The session had to be adjourned till next day when the visitors were refused admission in the meeting and the delegates alone discussed the momentous issue. The proposal to refer the resolution to the A.I.C.C. was withdrawn and it was discussed and passed in the open session.[62] It made Gandhi a dictator *de jure*, and though he had long been one *de facto*, still the resolution made a very serious difference. Henceforth the Congress

had not even any pretence of functioning as a democratic body; for Gandhi was officially installed in the position of its dictator. And this was done by the veteran leaders in the same session of the Congress in which they denounced the 'betrayal of democracy' in the West in a resolution quoted above. The last normal session of the Indian National Congress, by openly repudiating democracy, even as an ideal, in leadership, set a precedent which was bound to have repercussion on Indian politics for many years to come.

It is pertinent in this connection to refer to the views of some eminent Congress leaders less than three years before. When in 1936 Jawaharlal Nehru's name was suggested for the Presidentship of the Congress at Faizpur, he pointed out that he did not fully subscribe to the official views of the Congress. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel in withdrawing his own candidature in favour of Nehru, made the following observation :

"The Congress President has no dictatorial powers. He is the chairman of our well-built organisation. He regulates the proceedings and carries out the decisions of the Congress as they may be arrived at from time to time. The Congress does not part with its ample powers by electing any individual—no matter who he is."[63] The concession made in favour of Nehru, in spite of his well-known personal views, was denied to Subhas Bose, and both the Working Committee and Gandhi treated him most unceremoniously—not to put it more bluntly.

In accordance with the instructions of the Congress, President Bose carried on correspondence with Gandhi about the personnel of the Working Committee, but the latter refused to suggest any name. Thereupon Bose resigned at the meeting of the A.I.C.C. held on April 29, and next day Rajendra Prasad was elected President in his place. On May 1 Rajendra Prasad re-appointed the

12 members of the Working Committee who had resigned on Bose's election. Jawaharlal Nehru and Sarat Bose declined to serve on the Committee.

Subhas Bose now organized a new Party known as the Forward Bloc. He himself thus describes the genesis of the Party :

"In March, 1939, at the annual session of the Congress, the writer who presided made a clear proposal that the Indian National Congress should immediately send an ultimatum to the British Government demanding Independence within six months and should simultaneously prepare for a national struggle. This proposal was opposed by the Gandhi Wing and by Nehru and was thrown out. Thus a situation arose in which though the writer was the President of the Congress, his lead was not accepted by that body. Moreover, it was seen that on every conceivable occasion, the Gandhi Wing was opposing the President with a view to making it impossible for him to function. A complete deadlock within the Congress was the result. There were two ways of removing this deadlock—either the Gandhi Wing should give up its obstructionist policy. or the President should submit to the Gandhi Wing. With a view to finding a possible compromise direct negotiations between Mahatma Gandhi and the writer took place but they proved to be abortive....

"The Gandhi Wing was determined neither to accept the lead of the writer, nor to allow him to control the machinery of the Congress, and it would tolerate him only as a puppet President. The Gandhi Wing had, moreover, this tactical advantage that it was the only organised party within the Congress, acting under a centralised leadership. The Left Wing or radical elements in the Congress who were responsible for the writer's re-election as President in January, 1939, were numerically in a majority—but they were at a disadvantage, because they

were not organised under one leadership, as the Gandhi Wing was. There was, till then, no party or group commanding the confidence of the entire Left Wing. Though at that time the Congress Socialist Party was the most important party in the Left Wing, its influence was limited. Moreover, when the fight between the Gandhi Wing and the writer began, even the Congress Socialist Party began to vacillate. Thus, in the absence of an organised and disciplined Left Wing, it was impossible for the writer to fight the Gandhi Wing. Consequently, India's primary political need in 1939 was an organised and disciplined Left Wing Party in the Congress.

"The negotiations between Mahatma Gandhi and the writer revealed that on the one side, the Gandhi Wing would not follow the lead of the writer and that, on the other, the writer would not agree to be a puppet President. There was, consequently, no other alternative but to resign the Presidentship. This the writer did on the 29th April, 1939, and he immediately proceeded to form a radical and progressive party within the Congress, with a view to rallying the entire Left Wing under one banner. This Party was called the Forward Bloc. The first President of the Bloc was the writer and the Vice-President (now acting President) was Sardar Sardul Singh Cavesheer of Punjab."[64] The programme of the new party included *Satyagraha* in Bengal even on minor questions like Agrarian Relief. This was at variance with the policy of the Congress which had been running the administration in eight Provinces under the British rule. The A.I.C.C. accordingly passed a resolution towards the end of June, 1939, that "any movement of *Satyagraha* for any purpose should be run under the direction, control, and superintendence of the Provincial Congress Committee." The A.I.C.C. also laid down that "in administrative matters, the P.C.C. should not interfere with the discretion of the Ministry, but it

is always open to the Executive of the P.C.C. to draw the attention of the Government privately to any particular abuse or difficulty. "In matters of policy," the resolution said, "if there is a difference between the ministry and the P. C. C. reference should be made to the Parliamentary Board. Public discussion should be avoided."[65]

The dissident group led by Subhas Bose did not approve of these resolutions. They organized public meetings to condemn them, and 9 July was fixed for an all-India day of protest against them. Many public meetings were held in Bengal, U. P., and C. P., and a large number of prominent members of the Provincial Congress Committee attended some of these meetings. This was regarded as a breach of Congress discipline and the President asked Bose for an explanation of his conduct.

The spirited reply of Subhas Bose was couched in moderate language, and as the last flicker of the lamp of democracy in the Congress camp, may be quoted in full:

"I am exceedingly sorry for the delay in replying to your letter of the 18th July, from Ranchi. You have asked me for an explanation of my action in protesting against certain resolutions of the All India Congress Committee passed at Bombay.

"In the first place, one has to distinguish between protesting against a certain resolution and actually defying it or violating it. What has so far happened is that I have only protested against two resolutions of the A.I.C.C.

"It is my constitutional right to give expression to my opinion regarding any resolution passed by the A.I.C.C. You will perhaps admit that it is customary with a large number of Congressmen to express their views on resolutions passed by the A.I.C.C. when a particular session of that body comes to a close. If you grant Congressmen the right to express their views on resolutions passed by the A.I.C.C. you cannot draw a line and say that

only favourable opinions will be allowed expression and unfavourable opinions will be banned. If we have the constitutional right to express our views, then it does not matter if those views are favourable or unfavourable. Your letter seems to suggest that only expression of unfavourable views is to be banned.

"We have so long been fighting the British Government among other things for our Civil Liberty. Civil Liberty, I take it, includes freedom of speech. According to your point of view, we are not to claim freedom of speech when we do not see eye to eye with the majority in the A.I.C.C. or in the Congress. It would be a strange situation if we are to have the right of freedom of speech against the British Government, but not as against the Congress or any body subordinate to it. If we are denied the right to adversely criticise resolutions of the A.I.C.C. which in our view are harmful to the country's cause, then it would amount to denial of a democratic right. May I ask you in all seriousness if democratic rights are to be exercised only outside the Congress but not inside it?

"I hope you will agree that when a resolution is once passed by the A.I.C.C. it is open to us to have it reviewed or amended or altered or rescinded at a subsequent meeting of that body. I hope you will also agree that it is open to us to appeal against the A.I.C.C. to the higher court of appeal, namely, the open session of the Congress. You will agree further, I hope, that it is open to a minority to carry on a propaganda with a view to converting the majority to its point of view. Now how can we do this except by appealing to Congressmen through public meetings and through writings in the Press? The Congress to day is not an organisation of a handful of men. Its membership has, I believe, reached the neighbourhood of 45 lakhs. We can hope to appeal to the

rank and file of the Congress and to convert them to our point of view only if we are allowed to write to the press and also to hold meetings. If you maintain that once a resolution is passed in the A.I.C.C. it is sacrosanct and must hold good for ever, then you may have some justification for banning criticism of it. But if you grant us the right to review or amend or alter or rescind a particular resolution of the A.I.C.C. either through that body or through the open session of the Congress, then I do not see how you can gag criticism, as you have been trying to do.

"I am afraid you are giving an interpretation to the word 'discipline' which I cannot accept. I consider myself to be a stern disciplinarian and I am afraid that in the name of discipline you are trying to check healthy criticism. Discipline does not mean denying a person his constitutional and democratic right.

"Apart from the fact that it is our constitutional and democratic right to protest against resolutions which in our view are harmful to the country's cause, a consideration of the merits of the two resolutions, if given effect to, will serve to accentuate the drift towards constitutionalism, to increase the influence, power and authority of the Provincial Ministries at the cost of the Congress organisations, to isolate artificially the Congress from the general public as also the A.I.C.C. from the rank and file of the Congress. Moreover, they will serve to undermine the revolutionary spirit of the Congress. Consequently in the best interests of the country these two resolutions should be immediately held in abeyance and ultimately altered suitably or withdrawn.

"In this connection I cannot help drawing your attention to certain incidents at the time of the Gaya Congress in 1922 and after. Please do not forget what the Swaraj Party did in those days. Please do not forget either that

when the A.I.C.C. amended the resolution of the Gaya Congress, the Gujarat P.C.C. resolved to defy it.

"Lastly, please do not forget that Mahatma Gandhi wrote in the *Young India*, if my recollection is correct, that the minority has the right to rebel. We have not gone so far yet as to actually rebel against the decision of the majority. We have simply taken the liberty of criticising certain resolutions passed by the majority in the teeth of our opposition.

"I am really surprised that you have made so much of what we regard as our inherent right. I hope you will accept my explanation as satisfactory. But if you do not do so and if you decide to resort to disciplinary action, I shall gladly face it for the sake of what I regard as a just cause. In conclusion, I have to request that if any Congressman is penalised in connection with the events of the 9th July, then you will slso take action against me. If the observance of an all-India day of the 9th July is a crime then I confess, I am the arch-criminal."[66]

Bose's letter gives an admirable enunciation of the true democratic principle, to which it is difficult to advance any theoretical objection. The Working Committee, however, regarded the explanation as unsatisfactory. It took the view that it was Bose's duty to obey implicitly the instructions of the President, though it was open to him, if he felt aggrieved, to appeal to the Working Committee or A.I.C.C. The Working Committee also "combated Subhas Babu's contention that every member was free to interpret the Congress Constitution as he liked, as there would be perfect anarchy in the Congress in that case and it must break to pieces in no time."[67] It is as difficult to agree with the first part as to understand the meaning of the second. The Congress Working Committee passed a resolution by which Subhas Bose, twice elected as President of the Congress, "was declared disqualified as President of

the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee and to be a member of any elective Congress Committee for 3 years as from August, 1939."[68]

This momentous decision, with far-reaching consequences, was really inspired by more deep-seated causes. Subhas Bose has given his own version of it in his autobiography from which a few extracts are quoted:

"Long before 1939, the writer had been convinced that an international crisis in the form of a war would break out in the near future and that India should make the fullest use of that crisis in order to win her freedom. Since the Munich Pact—that is, since September, 1938—he had been trying to bring the Indian public round to this point of view and he had been endeavouring to induce the Congress to shape its own policy in conformity with the march of events abroad. In this task, he had been obstructed by the Gandhi Wing at every step—because the latter had no comprehension of coming internationl devolopments and was looking forward eagerly to a compromise with Britain without the necessity of a national struggle. Nevertheless, the writer knew that within the Congress and among the people in general, he had a very large measure of support and that all that he needed was an organised and disciplined Party behind him....

"Since September, 1938, Mahatma Gandhi had consistently urged that a national struggle was out of the question in the near future, while others, like the writer, who were not less patriotic than him, were equally convinced that the country was internally more ripe for a revolution than ever before and that the coming international crisis would give India an opportunity for achieving her emancipation, which is rare in human history. When all other attempts to influence Gandhi failed, the only way left was to organise the Forward Bloc and proceed to win over the mass of the people and thereby put

indirect pressure on the Mahatma. This method ultimately proved to be effective."[69]

The last sentence refers to the change in the attitude of Gandhi towards Britain after the outbreak of the Second World War to which reference will be made later.

Bose continues : "The writer still remembers clearly the long and interesting discussion which he had with Nehru in Calcutta, in April, 1939, when he announced his desire to resign the Presidentship of the Congress and organise a new party. Nehru argued that such a step would create a split within the Congress and would thereby weaken the national organisation at a critical moment. The writer urged, on the contrary, that one should distinguish between the unity which led to more effective action and the unity which resulted in inaction. Unity could be preserved superficially in the Congress only by surrendering to the Gandhi Wing—but since the Gandhi Wing was opposed to the idea of a national struggle, such unity, if maintained, would serve to stultify all dynamic activity on the part of the Congress in future. If, on the contrary, a party with a dynamic programme was organised within the Congress now, that party might one day move the Gandhi Wing and the entire Congress to militant action. Moreover, more critical times were ahead and a war was bound to break out in the near future. If one wanted to act in such an international crisis, then there should be a party ready to seize that opportunity. If the Gandhi Wing was unwilling to play that role, another party should be formed at once—when there was still time to organise such party. If that task was neglected or postponed, it could not be done later, when the international crisis actually overtook India. And without a well-organised party ready to utilize the coming international crisis for winning freedom, India would once again repeat her mistake of 1914.

This discussion did not, however, convince Nehru and he continued to support the Gandhi Wing. But the more he did so, the more was he isolated from the Left Wing."[70]

The statement of Bose makes it quite clear that the difference between his views and those of Gandhi and Nehru lay in the method of carrying on further struggle with Britain for the freedom of India. Bose was in favour of a national struggle, taking full advantage of the inevitable global war in which Britain would be involved, and he wanted to take immediate steps to prepare the country for such a struggle in anticipation of the World War. Gandhi and Nehru demurred to this proposal. The difference between Bose and Gandhi was thus a fundamental one, and this explains the parts played by them when the long-apprehended war actually broke out in 1939.

CHAPTER IX.

THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND INDIAN POLITICS.

I. THE LEADING EVENTS OF THE WAR (1939-45).

It is unnecessary for our present purpose to describe the course of events that led to the outbreak of the Second World War. Germany was chafing at the humiliating terms imposed upon her by the Allies in 1919, and her spirit of revenge and hope of revival were symbolized by the meteoric rise of Hitler, the leader of the Nazis, a political party of recent origin. From a common corporal he rose to be the absolute dictator of Germany, backed by an irresistible war machine, the like of which Europe had never known before. England, France and Poland entered into defensive alliance to meet the challenge of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy (under Mussolini), which were brought together by the common ideology of Government by Dictators and common grievances against England and France. Hitler strengthened his power by bringing Austria and Czechoslovakia under his sway, and then turned his attention to the recovery of German territories which were given to Poland by the Peace Treaty of 1919. For this purpose he signed in August, 1939, a non-aggression pact with Russia which also coveted territories she had lost to Poland. The dispute arose over the Polish corridor—a slice of territory in Germany given to Poland for direct access to the sea—and as negotiations failed, German forces invaded Poland on 1 September, 1939. Two days later England and France declared war against Germany. Polish

resistance collapsed in three weeks and then Hitler turned towards the West. In quick succession he overran Norway and Denmark, in April, 1940 ; Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg in May, 1940 ; and the Channel ports being threatened, the British Expeditionary Force made the famous evacuation from Dunkirk (May 28 to June 3, 1940). Then came the turn of France. The battle began on 5 June, 1940, and by the end of that month the whole of France was at the feet of Hitler. Though Britain was saved the horrors of a direct invasion, she suffered a great deal from air-bombing.

Both sides gained new allies. First Italy (11 June, 1940), and then Japan (7 December, 1941) joined Germany and formed the 'Axis' against France and Britain, the 'Allies'. On the other hand, the U.S.A. which had been actively helping the 'Allies' with men and arms since March, 1941, declared war against the 'Axis' Powers in December, 1941, as a result of Japan's action. The Italian invasion of Somaliland carried the war to Northern Africa while Germany invaded Greece, Yugoslavia and Crete. Everywhere the Axis Powers gained initial success. But Russia was growing nervous at the astounding success of Germany, and the alliance between these two showed visible signs of crack. Hitler never trusted Russia and suddenly invaded the country (22 June, 1941), presumably in order to finish a potential enemy at the back before the United States could materially strengthen the Allied forces in the West. German forces advanced far into Russia and threatened Leningrad and Moscow. A grim and stubborn fight went on for days in the streets of Stalingrad (August, 1942). But Russia, though yielding ground, firmly held out at Stalingrad. Then the tide of war turned against Germany, and the arrival of U.S.A. forces sealed her fate.

Japan, like Germany, began with astounding success. She practically declared war by destroying the U.S.A.

fleet at Pearl Harbour in the Pacific by a sudden attack on 7 December, 1941, and then overran Malaya, captured Singapore (15 February, 1942), invaded the Philippines and New Guinea, captured Hong Kong, conquered Thailand, and invaded Burma. Rangoon fell on 7 March, 1942, and Japan advanced towards the frontier of India. During the night on 6 April, 1942, the Japanese navy "sank all shipping between Madras and Calcutta and in the harbours thereof, estimated at 100,000 tons."[1] As will be related later, she crossed the frontier, but was forced to retreat, and was ultimately compelled to surrender on 15 August, 1945. This was mainly due to the use of Atomic Bombs by U.S.A. which completely devastated two of her cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki (August, 1945). In the west, Italy and Germany were overrun by the Allies and the War was brought to an end by the unconditional surrender of Germany on 7 May, 1945.

II. THE CONGRESS REACTION TO THE WAR.

The declaration of war by Britain against Germany automatically made India a belligerent, as in 1914. But the situation was different in 1939, for the popular Ministries were then in charge of Provincial Governments. Yet, to begin with, there was a considerable amount of sympathy and support for Britain. The non-Congress Ministries of the Panjab, Bengal and Sindh pledged their full support to Britain, and their action was upheld by the legislatures. The Indian States, of course, were solidly behind the Government. Among the political parties, the National Liberal Federation and Hindu Mahasabha offered unconditional support to the Government, while the Congress refused to co-operate with it in any way. Between these two extremes stood the Muslim League. While its High Command did not offer to support Britain, it had done nothing to prevent the Ministries of Bengal and the Panjab from doing so.

Though the Congress did not issue any statement of policy, Gandhi and Nehru expressed deep sympathy for Britain in her hours of trial. Gandhi wrote : "I am not just now thinking of India's deliverance. It will come, but what will it be worth if England and France fall, or if they come out victorious over Germany ruined and humbled ?".[1a]

Nehru went a step further and made it quite clear that in his view India should offer not only sympathy but unconditional support to Britain. On 8 September, after a hurried return from China, Nehru declared : "We do not approach the problem with a view to taking advantage of Britain's difficulties.........In a conflict between democracy and freedom on the one side and Fascism and aggression on the other, our sympathies must inevitably lie on the side of democracy......I should like India to play her full part and throw all her resources into the struggle for a new order."[2] This is all the more strange because the Congress passed resolutions at Haripura (February, 1938) and Tripuri (March, 1939), declaring British foreign policy as one of deliberate betrayal of democracy, and refusing to permit the man-power and resources of India to be exploited in the interests of British imperialism.[2a] But there was one leader, Subhas Bose, who stood up boldly in defence of the Congress policy. His party, the Forward Bloc, which was by now an All-India organization, commenced counter-propaganda on a large scale. "As against the Gandhi Wing, the Forward Bloc took the line that the Congress had since 1927 repeatedly declared that India should not co-operate in Britain's war and that the Congress should now put that policy into practice. The members of the Forward Bloc also declared openly that they did not want Britain to win the war because only after the defeat and break-up of the British Empire could

India hope to be free." Apart from the general propaganda carried on by the Forward Bloc, Subhas Bose "made a lecture tour throughout the country, in the course of which he must have addressed about a thousand meetings in the course of ten months,"[3]

Bose's bold stand had great influence over the Congress. The Working Committee refused to be led by the emotional approach of Gandhi and Nehru, and the latter fell in with their views. The lengthy resolution adopted by the Committee on 15 September, 1939, took the gravest view of the Viceroy's proclamation of war without the consent of the Indian people, protested against the exploitation of Indian resources for imperialist ends, and openly declared that 'India cannot associate herself with a War said to be for democratic freedom, when that very freedom is denied to her.' "The Working Committee", continued the resolution, "therefore invites the British Government to declare in unequivocal terms what their war aims are in regard to democracy and imperialism, and the new order that is envisaged, in particular how those aims are going to apply to India and to be given effect to in the present."[4] The A. I. C. C. endorsed this view on 10 October and demanded that "India must be declared an independent nation and present application must be given to this status to the largest possible extent."[5]

The Muslim League passed a resolution on 18 September, 1939, promising support on condition that no constitutional advance in India should be made without the approval of the Muslim League "which is the only organisation that can speak on behalf of Muslim India."[6]

The Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, issued a statement on 17 October, 1939. He reiterated that Dominion Status was the goal of British policy, but pointed out that for the present the Act of 1935 held the field. The only

hope he held out was that at the end of the war it would be open to modification in the light of Indian views, full weight being given to the opinions and interests of the minorities. In order to associate Indian public opinion with the prosecution of the war he proposed "the establishment of a consultative group, representative of all major political parties in British India and of the Indian Princes, over which the Governor-General would himself preside.'"[7]

The Congress Working Committee regarded the Viceroy's statement as "an unequivocal reiteration of the old imperialist policy" and therefore declared itself unable to give any support to Great Britain, for it would amount to an endorsement of the imperialist policy, which it has always sought to end. *As a first step in this direction* the Committee called upon the Congress Ministers to resign.[8] All the Congress Ministries accordingly resigned between 27 October and 15 November, 1939.

Both the Secretary of State, Sir Samuel Hoare, and the Viceroy tried to win over the Congress leaders by granting more powers to Indians in the administration. But the Congress "declined to consider any steps to further co-operation" unless the British Government clearly declared its policy in favour of Indian independence, and demanded the appointment of a Constituent Assembly. Further futile negotiations followed on the basis of Sir Samuel Hoare's suggestion, on 26 October, to include more Indians in the Governor-General's Executive Council.

Jinnah definitely rejected the idea of any Constituent Assembly as it would be dominated by the Congress. The Viceroy felt relieved by the resignation of Congress Ministries, for they controlled eight out of the eleven Provinces and so had power to impair the war-efforts of the Government. As the eight Provinces were now being ruled by the Governors, there was no longer any need to placate the Congress, and the Viceroy canvassed the support

of the Muslim League. This considerably strengthened the position of the League and it was joined by the waverers among the Muslims. In March, 1940, the Muslim League, at its Lahore Session, made a formal demand for a separate independent State.

III. RESUMPTION OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

Subhas Bose observed : "It was generally expected that after the Congress Ministers resigned office, the campaign of passive resistance would begin. But this expectation was not fulfilled. Many people are of opinion that British intrigue was responsible for this. The British Government sent out to India some British Liberals and Democrats in order to influence Congress leaders. For instance, in October, 1939, the well-known writer, Mr. Edward Thompson, visited India and he was followed by Sir Stafford Cripps who came in December."[9] Subhas Bose and his Forward Bloc, however, did not sit idle all the while. "Besides carrying on a continuous propaganda against co-operation in the war and in favour of commencing a national struggle for independence, the Forward Bloc organised periodic demonstrations for focussing public attention on these issues. For instance, in October, 1939, an Anti-Imperialist Conference was held at Nagpur which was a great success... And at the end of six months, the Bloc's propaganda culminated in a huge demonstration at Ramgarh in March, 1940, where the annual session of the Congress was being held at the time. The demonstration was called the All-India Anti-Compromise Conference. It was convened by the Forward Bloc and the Kisan Sabha (Peasants' Organisation) and it was a greater success than the Congress meeting at Ramgarh which was presided over by Moulana Abul Kalam Azad."[10]

The Congress reiterated its objective in even clearer and stronger terms in the Ramgarh session in March, 1940. The resolution adopted by it declared that "nothing

short of complete independence can be accepted by the people of India," and they "alone can properly shape their own constitution." The resolution also held out the threat of resorting to Civil Disobedience, but no positive war-policy was laid down and no definite line of action was determined. On the other hand, the Anti-Compromise Conference at Ramgarh decided to immediately launch a fight over the issue of the war and of India's demand for independence. During the National Week in April (6th to 13th), 1940, the Forward Bloc commenced, all over the country, its campaign of civil disobedience. Prominent members of the Bloc were gradually removed to jail. Early in July Subhas Bose along with hundreds of his co-workers were put in prison. A few days before his arrest, in June, 1940, Bose had made a passionate appeal to Gandhi "to come forward and launch his campaign of passive resistance—since it was now clear that the British Empire would be overthrown and it was high time for India to play her part in the war. But the Mahatma was still non-committal and he repeated that, in his view, the country was not prepared for a fight and any attempt to precipitate it, would do more harm than good to India."[11]

"On May 20, 1940, Pandit Nehru made an astounding statement in which he said : 'Launching a civil disobedience campaign at a time when Britain is engaged in life and death struggle would be an act derogatory to India's honour.' Similarly, the Mahatma said, 'We do not seek our independence out of Britain's ruin. That is not the way of non-violence.'"[12] It was the definite opinion of Subhas Bose that the Gandhi Wing was doing everything possible in order to arrive at a compromise with Britain.[13] There was probably a great deal of truth in his view. In any case a perceptible change was noticed in the attitude of this Wing when the war situation in Europe took a grave turn against the Allies

and Hitler overran Western Europe (May-June, 1940). It was now in favour of co-operating in war-efforts if the British gave reasonable guarantees to their demand for freedom. This led to a serious split in the Congress rank. Gandhi, true to his creed of non-violence, was against India's participation in war in any case. To him "the issue was one of pacifism, and not of India's freedom."[14] To a majority of his colleagues, however, non-violence was not a creed but a policy, and Abul Kalam Azad, the President of the Congress, echoed the sentiments of most of them when he declared openly "that the Indian National Congress was not a pacifist organization but one for achieving India's freedom," and that the Indians had the "right" to take to the sword if they had no other alternative."[15]

The Working Committee which met at Wardha on 17-20 June, 1940, was definitely opposed to the view of Gandhi. "Mahatma Gandhi, a resolution ran, 'at this critical phase in the history of man,' desires the Congress to be true to the creed of non-violence and to declare its unwillingness 'that India should maintain armed forces to defend her freedom against external aggression or internal disorder.' The Committee 'are unable to go the full length with Gandhiji ; but they recognise that he should be free to pursue his great ideal in his own way and therefore absolve him from responsibility for the programme and activity which the Congress has to pursue', namely, the 'parallel' organisation of self-defence and the maintenance of public security throughout the country by Congressmen on their own account." There were other causes of differences between the Working Committee and Gandhi. Gandhi was opposed to the restoration of ministerial Government in the Congress Provinces and the entry of Congressmen into the Central Council. The Working Committee did not accept this view, and expressed their

willingness to ask Congressmen to accept the Ministry on certain conditions. Meeting again in Delhi from July 3 to 7, they renewed their demand for an immediate and unequivocal declaration of the 'full independence of India', and proposed that "as an immediate step to giving effect to it, a provisional National Government should be constituted at the Centre which, though formed as a transitory measure, should be such as to command the confidence of all the elected elements in the Central Lagislature and secure the closest co-operation of the responsible Governments in the Provinces." "The Working Committee", so the resolution ran, "are of opinion, that unless the aforesaid declaration is made and a National Government accordingly formed at the Centre without delay, all efforts at organising the material and moral resources of the country for defence cannot in any sense be voluntary or as from a free country, and will therefore be ineffective. The Working Committee declare that, if these measures are adopted, it will enable the Congress to throw its full weight into the efforts for the effective organisation of the defence ot the country."[16] The resolutions were duly adopted by the A.I.C.C. at Poona on 27-28 July.[17]

But to differ from Gandhi was a novel thing in Congress politics. So within a month several members recanted, and a group headed by Rajendra Prasad told the President that if the British Government accepted the terms of the Congress and India's participation in the war became a live issue, they would have no option but to resign. As there was no likelihood of such a contingency, no seriousness was attached to the threat of resignation.[18]

In the meantime Gandhi's childlike simplicity and deep-rooted faith in the creed of non-violence len him to devote his thought and energy to the single issue that counted in his eyes, namely, to stop the carnage in Euroye. On 22 July, 1939 he had written to Hitler making an

humble appeal to him to desist from war.[19] He wrote two open letters to the British people appealing to them that they should not fight Hitler but oppose him by spiritual force. When Gandhi interviewed the Viceroy and placed this suggestion before him, Lord Linlithgow was so much taken aback by this extraordinary suggestion that he even forgot to show the normal courtesy to Gandhi, and sat 'silent and bewildered'.[20]

Curiously enough, Gandhi's attitude towards the Muslims underwent a radical change about this time. In an article in the *Harijan*, on 15 June, he candidly wrote : "The Congress which professes to speak for India and wants unadulterated Independence, cannot strike a common measure of agreement with those who do not. ......The British Government would not ask for a common agreement if they recognised any one party to be strong enough to take delivery. The Congress, it must be admitted, has not that strength today. It has come to its present position in the face of opposition. If it does not weaken and has enough patience, it will develop sufficient strength to take delivery. It is an illusion created by ourselves that we must come to an agreement with all parties before we can make any progress."[21] One would rub one's eyes in wonder and ask in all seriousness, "is it the same Gandhi who was unwilling to attend the Second session of the Round Table Conference without a previous agreement with the Muslims, and constantly gave out that no real progress was possible without a Hindu-Muslim agreement"?[22] What a *volte-face* for Gandhi !

Gandhi proceeded even further. "The Muslim League", said he, "is frankly communal and wants to divide India into two parts....Thus for the present purpose there are only two parties—the Congress and those who side with the Congress, and the parties who do not. Between the two there is no meeting ground without the

one or the other surrendering its purpose."[23] Though at long last Gandhi, for once, got rid of the phantom which he had been pursuing since he entered Indian politics, here again his idealism got the better of realism. The last sentence, quoted above, may give expression to an excellent national ideal but was certainly not in conformity with facts which a statesman could ignore only at his peril.

Gandhi, who, to the outside world represented the Congress, threw a direct challenge to the Muslim League which Jinnah was not slow in taking up. Gandhi's article enabled him to convince the Muslims that as a separate nation they had no place in the totalitarian idea of the Congress which demands their absolute surrender to the Congress. He now boldly emphasized the two-nation doctrine and demanded its logical fulfilment by the creation of Pakistan. In short, Gandhi's article only served to put Jinnah on a high pedestal and for all practical purposes he now occupied the same position among the Muslims as Gandhi himself did in the Congress Circle. Jinnah took advantage of his position and authority to demand from the Viceroy that in all war-time arrangements the Muslims must be treated on an equal footing with the Hindus, and that no constitutional changes, transitory or permanent, should be made without the previous approval of 'Muslim India'.

By way of response to the Congress offer of co-operation the Viceroy issued a new statement on 8 August, 1940. After reiterating the October statement about Dominion Status it proposed an immediate expansion of the Governor-General's Executive Council, and the establishment of a War Advisory Council. It conceded the Congress demand for a Constituent Assembly to frame the Indian constitution, though it was to meet after the war was over. At the same time it accepted Jinnah's

demand by saying that the British would not accept any system of Indian Government "whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life."[24]

The "August Offer", however, failed to satisfy either the Congress or the Muslim League. The former justly regarded the guarantee to minority as practically placing in the hands of Jinnah a power to veto all constitutional progress. The latter was definitely opposed to any Constituent Assembly in which the Muslims were bound to be in a hopeless minority. As a matter of fact, as things then stood, the two concessions practically cancelled each other.

The British Government missed the last chance of winning over the Congress to war-efforts—when the majority of the Working Committee even threw Gandhi overboard and extended a helping hand[25]. As Azad pointed out, there was no common ground between the Congress demand for independence and the Viceroy's offer of an enlarged Executive Council. "The whole conception of Dominion Status for India", said Jawaharlal Nehru, "was as dead as a doornail"[26]. The Congress Working Committee rejected the offer and declared that the Working Committee's resolution at Delhi, confirmed by the A. I. C. C. at Poona, no longer applied. The Muslim League neither accepted nor rejected it, but its full co-operation as a party in the conduct of the war was made conditional on the Viceroy's acceptance of the fifty-fifty principle.

While the Congress was negotiating with the Government, the Civil Disobedience campaign launched by the Forward Bloc of Bose continued with increasing vigour and many among the rank and file of the Congress, specially the volunteers, joined the campaign. This, as well as the rebuff to the Congress offers of co-operation, undoubtedly lowered the prestige of the Congress. To retrieve the posi-

tion the Congress felt it necessary to start the Civil Disobedience campaign as contemplated in the Ramgarh resolution. This, according to the majority of the Congress leaders, could only be carried on under the leadership of Gandhi. So Gandhi once more regained his supremacy in the Congress. But, as was his wont, he side-tracked the main issue. The left wing "of the Cougress, backed by more revolutionary elements outside the party, wanted the Civil Disobedience movement to be organized on the largest possible scale in the hope that it might develop into something like a national revolt. But Gandhi would have none of it."[27] He did not make the independence of India the main issue or even a side issue. "India can become independent", said he, "only if she can hold her own when the British go out." So the immediate issue, declared Gandhi, was not 'freedom of India', but 'freedom of speech,' by which he meant 'the right to state freely what we feel about the war.' Elucidating this point still further he said : "I claim the liberty of going through the streets of Bombay and saying that I shall have nothing to do with this war, because I do not believe in this war and in the fratricide that is going on in Europe."[27a]

Gandhi interviewed the Viceroy on 27 and 30 September, but the latter refused to allow Gandhi and his men "to call upon the people throughout the country to refrain from assisting India's war-effort". So Gandhi began the campaign on 17 October, 1940, by selecting one individual at a time to go out in the street shouting anti-war slogans, and get arrested. On 17 November the individual *Satyagraha* was replaced by what Gandhi called representative *Satyagraha*. The *Satyagrahis* were selected from groups such as the members of the Working Committee, the A. I. C. C., the Central and Provincial legislatures, and eminent Congress politicians, including most of the former Ministers. They appeared in the streets, uttered the slogan and were

arrested and sent to prison mostly for twelve months. Among the imprisoned *Satyagrahis* numbering about 6C0 were Abul Kalam Azad and Rajagopalachari.

On 17 December Gandhi suspended the Camapaign. It had created little interest and less excitement among the masses.

On 5 January, 1941, the Campaign was resumed. Lists of *Satyagrahis* were prepared by local Congress Committees and about 2,250 were convicted by the end of the month. Then in April ordinary 'four anna' members of the Congress were enrolled. Immediately there was a sharp rise in the number of *Satyagrahis*. More than 20,C00 were convicted.

The futility of such a campaign was recognized by most people, and even Congressmen who had suffered imprisonment for it joined with them in an appeal to call off the movement. But Gandhi would never withdraw it, nor convert it into a mass movement as a large section desired, for he feared that the mass action during the war would embarrass the Government.

The political situation arising from Gandhi's activity—or rather inactivity—has been described by Subhas Bose as follows :

"During the year 1941, the Civil Disobedience Movement continued—but without much enthusiasm on the part of Gandhi and his followers. The Mahatma had calculated that by following a mild policy, he would ultimately open the door towards a compromise—but in this, he was disappointed. His goodness was mistaken for weakness and the British Government went on exploiting India for war-purposes to the best of its ability. The Government also exploited to the fullest extent such agents as the erstwhile Communist leader, M. N. Roy, who were prepared to sell themselves to Britain." 'When towards the end of 1941, war clouds appeard in the Far Eastern horizon, the British

set free the Congress leaders belonging to the Gandhi Wing, but put in prison those belonging to the Left Wing.' "The Government probably thought that by this dual policy of arresting Leftists and releasing the Gandhiites, it would come to a settlement with the Congress.

"The desire of the British Government for a compromise with the Congress was reciprocated by the Gandhi Wing. The Congress Working Committee, meeting at Wardha on the 16th January, 1942, passed a resolution offering co-operation in the war-effort once again. Soon after—that is, in February, 1942—at the instance of the British Government, Marshal Chiang Kai Shek visited India with a view to inducing the Congress leaders to come to an understanding with the British Government. A month later—in March, 1942,—an American Technical Mission, some American diplomats and journalists and several American military units arrived in India."[28]

Even making due allowance for the fact that Bose was the leader of a rival group, holding very different views, his survey of the situation appears to be a fairly accurate one.

IV. BRITISH POLICY (1940-41).

The 'August Offer' seems to have been the pivot round which the British policy revolved for more than a year. Mr. Amery, the Secretary of State, took pains to expound its underlying principles in a number of speeches. In two respects he struck a fresh note. He asserted that the 'political unity of India,' Britain's greatest gift to her, must not be destroyed. Secondly, he made an appeal to the young idealists, intellectuals, practical men of affairs, and public spirited men of all communities, *outside the two recalcitrant major parties*, to get together and devise the principles of a future constitution suitable to the peculiar condition of India—a constitution that need not necessarily be of English type but of Swiss or American model for example.[29]

Amery was assailed from all quarters in India, though, as usual, for different reasons. But there was one common factor. There was a general disbelief among Indians regarding the British promises, and they naturally argued that if India was really to be granted full self-government after the war, surely, she could be trusted at once with more than a few extra seats on the Executive Council. Even this reform was long delayed. The Viceroy had to carry on prolonged negotiations with Mr. Jinnah and other leaders for several months, and it was not till July 22, 1941, that the composition of the new Council was announced.[30] Although eight out of the thirteen members were Indians, they were neither responsible to the Legislature nor to any political party. The old belief therefore "persisted in nationalist minds that the function of the Council was to register the opinions of the Viceroy, and the function of the Viceroy to do what he was told by Whitehall."[31] The Defence Council, which was established at the same time, being merely an advisory body, did not make any impression on the Indians. There was therefore hardly any thing tangible which could convince the Indians of the bonafide of the British offers and promises to give a real Dominion Status to the Indians. All this distrust and suspicion were converted into a definite belief in the insincerity and double-dealing of the British by an unfortunate speech of Churchill.

The 'Atlantic Charter', issued jointly in August, 1941, by U. K. and U. S. A. as a statement of their war policy, declared, among other things, that "they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." This clause was heartily welcomed by all sections of Indians. But Churchill hastened to dispel all hope and enthusiasm by announcing

(9 September, 1941) in the House of Commons that the 'Atlantic Charter' had no application to India though, in his opinion, it was in full accord with British policy in India, as embodied in August Offer.'[32] If it were so, one might well ask, then why this disclaimer that India was not covered by the Atlantic Charter ?

If Britain had made a deliberate resolve to antagonize all sections of public opinion in India, she could not devise anything more suited to the purpose than this speech of Churchill. The large majority of Indians merely found in it a formal corroboration of what they had all along believed, namely, that the British never meant to make any real concession to India. British dishonesty, said Congressmen, had now been nakedly exposed. The Liberals, including Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan, who was the greatest champion of unconditional aid to British war efforts, felt shocked. There were still a few who either could not or did not believe that the British Government had all along been playing a double game, bribing India to do her utmost to help in winning the war with a promise which they intended to repudiate as soon as the war was won. They now consoled themselves with the thought that they had put too favourable an interpretation on the words and promises made by the British rulers, who never intended to grant the type of freedom which India had in view. But none the less they were thoroughly disappointed. The subsequent attitude of the Indians is to be viewed in the perspective of the situation created by Churchill's speech. Henceforth India would never trust or put any faith in the promises of perfidious Albion. Everything must be paid in cash, and no credit was to be allowed. This was the real cause of the failure of Cripps Mission to which we now turn.

V. THE JAPANESE MENACE AND ITS REACTION ON INDIAN POLITICS.

The war suddenly took an alarming turn, so far as India was concerned, by the entry of the Japanese into the war on the side of the Axis powers against Britain. The rapidity with which they captured Singapore, hitherto regarded as almost impregnable, overran Malaya and entered Burma raised their prestige as a military power and brought India within the vortex of the war. For it was quite clear that the Japanese intended to invade India from the east through Burma and Manipur. No doubt was left on this point by the propaganda through Radio that the Japanese were coming to deliver India from the yoke of the British. The Indians had too much knowledge of their own past history and of Japan's treatment of China to believe in Japanese propaganda. They were not, with probably a few exceptions, pro-Japanese. But they were not drawn closer to the British either. To the old causes of anti-British sentiments the Japanese invasion added more. In the first place they could not but feel that the present predicament was entirely due to the British, who dragged them into the war against their will. For, it was argued, the Japanese would never have invaded India if she were not a part of the British empire, and even then could remain neutral like Eire and not forced to become a belligerent. The Indians could not but feel that in their present state of dependence they were only destined to share the evils and sorrows of the British Empire and not its benefits and blessings. Secondly, in spite of the many shortcomings and evils of British rule the Indians balanced them against one inestimable advantage it had offered, namely security from foreign invasions. The fortunes of the war clearly indicated the hollowness of this claim in immediate, and possibly remote, future. Thirdly, the

Japanese victories had considerably lowered the British prestige and destroyed the myth of their invincibility. Many had come also to believe that the days of the British Empire were numbered. Thus the impending threat of the Japanese invasion did not produce the effect of reconciling the Indians with the British. This was clearly reflected in the attitude of the different political parties.

Just before the Japanese had entered into the war, the Government of India had released, on 3 December, 1941, the *satyagrahi* prisoners together with Azad and Nehru—probably the first fruits of the expansion of the Governor-General's Executive Council. Shortly after the Japanese entry into the war (7 December, 1941) the Viceroy made a public appeal for a united national front. But it fell on deaf ears. Events soon showed that the Japanese danger had not in any way favourably changed the attitude of the political parties towards British rule in India.

As regards the Congress, though the Japanese invasion did not change its attitude, it certainly changed its leadership. Once more, as in June 1940, Gandhi feared that the war-conditions would force Britain to offer independence to India on condition of participation in the war, and that the majority of Congressmen would accept it. But he was not prepared to abjure the creed of non-violence even for achieving the independence of India. Accordingly the Working Committee of the Congress, which met at Bardoli on 23 Dcember, 1941, relieved Gandhi of the responsibility of leading the *Satyagraha* movement. It passed a long resolution, reiterating the policy enunciated by A.I.C.C. in Bombay on 16 September, 1940, and expressed as follows the reaction of the Congress to the approach of war to the Indian border :

"The sympathies of the Congress must inevitably lie

with the peoples who are the subject of aggression and who are fighting for their freedom, but only a free and independent India can be in a position to undertake the defence of the country on a national basis and be of help in the furtherance of the larger causes that are emerging from the storm of war."

The Working Committee issued a series of instructions in anticipation of the Japanese attack. The general trend of these instructions was to set up under the Congress an independent organization, outside the Government, throughout the country, in order to help and serve the people in any contingency arising out of the threatened Japanese invasion.

On 5 January, 1942, Gandhi explained his own position *vis-á-vis* the Bardoli resolution:

"I am a servant of the Congress and I want to serve the Congress in consonance with the principles of truth and non-violence. The Working Committee has decided to co-operate with the Government in the war, if Britain grants Swaraj to India. It is not a fact that the Congress has violated the principle of non-violence, but it has only made a small opening just with a view to shake hands with Britain. Rajaji thinks that all of us should go to war fully armed, but it may not be the opinion of all."[33]

The net position was that although the Congress shook off the pacifism of Gandhi, it reiterated its old policy of non-co-operation with the war-efforts of the Government so long as the independence of India was not guaranteed.

In Britain the die-hard section took a complacent view of the political situation in India, and hoped to counteract the influence of the Congress by that of the Muslim League. The Duke of Devonshire, Amery's Deputy in the House of Lords, observed; "The Muslim

League seems definitely to be growing in power and influence and at the moment the power of the Congress Party is diminishing. The claim of the Congress Party is contested and always will be contested by the great Muslim community."[34]

Amery also declared that "in the absence of agreement we can no more impose a constitution on India and expect it to survive than we could impose a constitution on Europe."

The attitude of the Muslim League was stiffened by the enlargement of the Executive Council of the Governor-General without its approval. It passed the following resolution :

"The Working Committee, therefore, consider it necessary to warn the British public and Government that any departure from the policy and the solemn declaration of August 8, 1940, and the pledges given therein to the Mussulmans, would constitute a gross breach of faith with Muslim India, and that any revision of policy or any fresh declaration which adversely affects the demand for Pakistan or proceeds on the basis of a Central Government with India as one single unit and Mussulmans as an all-India minority, shall be strongly resented by the Muslims who will be compelled to resist it with all the forces at their command, which would, at this critical juncture, among other things, necessarily result in a serious impediment of the country's war-effort."[35] The Muslim press rang with such cries as 'Pakistan is our deliverance, defence, destiny'; 'Pakistan is our only demand...and by God we will have it'. It has been aptly remarked by an Englishman that the League, it seemed, "was more concerned with the future partition of India than with its immediate salvation from Japanese conquest."

The Hindu Mahasabha accepted the challenge of its Muslim counterpart. Savarkar said at Lakhnau on 1 March,

six days before the fall of Rangoon :

"Why hold your threat in abeyance, why not come out with it to-day? Hindus have an ancient culture and have withstood numerous revolts. They are four times the Muslims numerically and have the same arms and penal codes to defend themselves which Muslims have." The Mahasabha, like the Congress, demanded full independence, but unlike it, was ready to co-operate with the Government in making preparations for defence.[36]

No marked change was noticeable in the policy of the Liberals, either in the annual session of the National Liberal Federation held at Madras on 26-28 February, or in the third session of the non-Party Conference at Delhi on 22-23 February. But the Liberals were fully impressed with the gravity of the Japanese menace and took a more realistic view of the situation than the other political parties in India and the British Government. "On January 3, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, still the acknowledged spokesman of Liberal opinion, dispatched a lengthy cable to Mr. Churchill, signed by fifteen non-Party leaders, insisting that "the heart of India must be touched to rouse her on a nation-wide scale to the call for service," and "urging the acceptance of the Liberal programme—a national all-Indian Government responsible to the Crown, and a higher national status for India in international and inter-imperial relations."[37] As could be foreseen, Churchill would be the last man to accept any such programme. He slept over Sapru's cable for more than two months until he was rudely awakened by the booming of Japanese guns. On March 11, 1942, "four days after the fall of Rangoon, Mr. Churchill announced that the War Cabinet had come to a unanimous decision on Indian policy and that, in order to explain it and 'to satisfy himself upon the spot, by personal consultation, that the conclusions, upon which we all agreed and which we believe represent a just and

final solution, will achieve their purpose,' Sir Stafford Cripps, who had recently joined the Government as Lord Privy Seal and become a member of the War Cabinet and leader of the House of Commons, would proceed as soon as possible to India."[38] Churchill did not leave anyone in doubt as to the genesis of this new policy. He said at the very outset of his announcement : "The crisis in the affairs of India arising out of the Japanese advance has made Britain wish to rally all the forces of Indian life to guard their land from the menace of the invader."[39] But this was only a half-truth. The Japanese invasion began more than two months before, and the fall of Singapore on 15 February brought home to everyone the danger to India. Churchill, however, did not move an inch. Roosevelt, the President of U.S.A., took a more realistic view of the situation and urged upon Chruchill to settle matters with India. The help of U. S. A. was then the only hope for the safety of Britain, and Churchill could ignore Roosevelt's advice only at his country's peril. Still he wavered until the fall of Rangoon revealed to him, for the first time, the desperate situation which faced Britain in the east.

That the despatch of the Cripps Mission was largely, if not wholly, due to the pressure of Roosevelt, was merely a conjecture at the time, but it has been proved beyond all doubt by the publication of the secret documents of the Foreign Office, U. S. A.[39a] The information supplied by these may be briefly referred to below :

As far back as 7 May, 1941, if not before, Mr. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, U. S. A., took up with "the British Government the possibility of a prompt recognition of India's aspiration to a freer existence and a full membership in the British family of nations." The President also "indicated his sympathy with this general

line." But although Hull took up the matter twice with the British Government, nothing was done on account of "wide division in the British Cabinet".[39b]

On 17 February, 1942, two days after the fall of Singapore, the Assistant Secretary of State prepared a long memorandum on the subject,[39c] the main drift of which would be apparent from the following extracts :

"It seems to me that the State Department must immediately get to work on the changed situation in the Far East arising out of the fall of Singapore. The first item on the list ought to be to tackle the Indian problem in a large way. Pursuant to the President's directive there is now being organized an economic and war supply mission to India....looking towards completion of the Indian program to put a million men into the field by the end of 1942. But, under existing conditions, any such program is not likely to get very far unless the political situation is handled with extreme vigour.......I suggest, accordingly, that we once more take up with the British...the necessity of making a statement of policy with respect to India ; and I suggest that the United States associate herself with Great Britain in stating that policy. It would seem that the logical thing to do was to have Churchill announce in London that the British plans contemplated the introduction of India as a full partner in the United Nations, and that by prearrangement, the United States—perhaps through the President—promptly and vigorously welcome the step....At the same time, the Viceroy could be directed to hold a constitutional conference of some kind in New Delhi looking towards the evolution of ways and means of recognizing the growing political importance of Indian sentiment as such."

On 25 February, 1942, Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo of China, who visited India shortly before, communicated to Roosevelt that he was personally shocked by the military

and political situation in India. "The danger is extreme", said he, and "if the British Government does not fundamentally change their policy toward India, it would be like presenting India to the enemy and inviting them to quickly occupy India."[39d]

On 25 February, 1942, the Foreign Relations Committee of the U. S. A. Senate discussed Indian affairs.[39e] They were impressed by the man-power of India as sources of military strength, but fully realized that "the Indians would not have the desire to fight just in order to prolong England's mastery over them." The Assistant Secretary of State, who attended the meeting, noticed "a serious undercurrent of anti-British feeling" and observed :

"Concerning India, the argument was that we are participating on such a large scale and had done so much for England in Lend-Lease that we had now arrived at a position of importance to justify our participation in Empire Councils and such as to authorize us to require England to make adjustments of a political nature within the framework of her Empire. We should demand that India be given a status of autonomy. The only way to get the people of India to fight was to get them to fight for India...... They [members] ascribed to the authority and position of the United States a power to dictate to England what she should do in arranging her Empire not only in India......coupled with the statements to the effect that otherwise the United States would be just fighting to preserve the British Empire and that the American people would expect this Government to do everything within its power to obtain military participation by India......even though we had to go to the extent of dictating to England what she should do with regards to India...."

Evidently as a result of this report Roosevelt sent a cable to W. A. Harriman, his Special Representative in

London with the rank of Minister, the same day, i. e., on 25 February, midnight. Unfortuately, the text of this cable "inquiring about India" is not included in the published documents, but we have the reply of Harriman who saw Churchill the next morning. A few passages from it are quoted below :[39f] "I have seen the Prime Minister this morning. He told me of the status of the political discussions now going on in London and in India for immediate action and for future....... It will be discussed in the Cabinet today and additional advice will be obtained from India. In the meantime you may be interested to have the following information which he gave me.

1. Approximately 75% of the Indian troops and volunteers are Moslems. Of the balance less than half, or perhaps only 12% of the total are sympathetic with the Congress group. The Moslem population exceeds 100 millions. The fighting people of India are from the northern provinces largely antagonistic to the Congress movement. The big populations of the low-lying center and south have not the vigour to fight anybody. The Prime Minister will not therefore take any political step which would alienate the Moslems.

2. There is ample manpower in India willing to fight. The problem is training and equipping."

Obviously Churchill sought to meet the arguments of the anti-British members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committc referred to above.

On 4 March Churchill cabled his promised reply to Roosevelt's cable of 25 February. The text of the first para is quoted below : [39g] "We are earnestly considering whether a declaration of Dominion status after the war carrying with it if desired the right to secede should be made at this critical juncture. We must not on any account break with the Moslems who represent a hundred

million people and the main army elements on which we must rely for the immediate fighting. We have also to consider our duty towards 30 to 40 million untouchables and our treaties with the Princes states (sic.) of India, perhaps 80 millions. Naturally we do not want to throw India into chaos on the eve of invasion."

Presumably in reply to this Roosevelt cabled a long message to Churchill on 10 March.[39h] On the analogy of the growth of the mighty Republic of the U.S.A. out of the loosely united thirteen independent States (which is treated in detail) Roosevelt suggested "the setting up of what might be called a temporary government in India, headed by a small representative group......to be recognized as a temporary Dominion Government......It would be charged with setting up a body to consider a more permanent Government for the whole country". "Some such method", Roosevelt hoped, "might give a new slant in India itself, and it might cause the people there to forget hard feelings, to become more loyal to the British Empire, and to stress the danger, of Japanese domination, together with the advantage of peaceful evolution as against chaotic revolution."

The message concluded as follows in continuation with the above : "Such a move is strictly in line with the world changes of the past half century and with the democratic processes of all who are fighting Nazism.

"I hope that whatever you do the move will be made from London and that there should be no criticism in India that it is being made grudgingly or by compulsion.

"For the love of Heaven don't bring me into this, though I want to be of help. It is, strictly speaking, none of my business, except in so far as it is a part and parcel of the successful fight that you and I are making."

Roosevelt's mesage was received on 10 March, and the very next day Churchill announced the Cripps Mission

in the Parliament, as stated above. It is a reasonable inference that Churchill accepted the advice or suggestion of Roosevelt, though perhaps not ungrudgingly. He certainly did not welcome it at heart, as the sequel will show. One may be sure that Churchill found himself in full accord with only one half-sentence at the end of this long message of Roosevelt, namely, "It is, strictly speaking, none of my business."

In spite of this modest denial of his part in the whole undertaking, there can be little doubt that though the hand was that of Churchill the voice was that of Roosevelt. As we shall see, the latter took a keen interest in the negotiations of Cripps in India from the beginning up to the very end. The very day on which Churchill announced the Cripps Mission, Roosevelt appointed Louis A. Johnson, formerly Assistant Secretary of War, U.S.A., to be his Personal Representative at New Delhi.[39i] Further, the following instruction was sent to the U.S. Commissioner at New Delhi (who was replaced by Louis Johnson) on 14 March :

"The Department is of course extremely interested in the purpose of Sir Stafford Cripps' proposed visit to India and in the reception accorded his offer. You are requested therefore to transmit by telegraph with the least possible delay all information which you may be in a position to obtain regarding the proposed formula and the Hindu and Moslem reaction thereto."[39j]

VI. THE CRIPPS MISSION

Sir Stafford Cripps arrived at Delhi on 23 March, 1942. The proposals which he brought with him were embodied in a Draft Declaration which may be summarised as follows :

(1). In order to achieve 'the earliest possible realisation of self-government in India', the British Government proposes that steps should be taken to create a new Indian

Union which will have the full status of a Dominion.

(2). Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, a constitution-making body shall be set up. Unless the leaders of the principal communities shall have previously agreed on some other method, this body shall be elected, under the system of proportional representation, by an electoral college consisting of the members of the lower houses of all the Provincial legislatures for which new elections would have been held. The Indian States will be invited to appoint reprsentatives—the proportion between British Indian and States' representatives to correspond with the proportion between their total populations.

(3). The British Government 'undertake to accept and implement forthwith the constitution so framed' on two conditions. First, any Province or Provinces which are not prepared to accept the new constitution will be entitled to frame by a similar process a constitution of their own, giving them 'the same full status as the Indian Union.' Indian States will be similarly free to adhere to the new constitution or not. In either case a revision of their treaty arrangements will have to be negotiated.

(4). The second condition is the signing of a treaty to be negotiated between the British Government and the constitution-making body to cover all 'matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands', particularly the protection of racial and religious minorities in accordance with the British Government's past undertakings.

(5). Untill the new constitution can be framed, the British Government must retain control of the defence of India 'as part of their world war-effort, but the task of organising to the full the military, moral and material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Government of India in co-operation with the peoples of India.' To that end the British Government 'desire and invite

the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations'.

There is no doubt that these proposals virtually conceded all the reasonable demands of both the Congress and the Muslim League, as far as it was possible to do so under war conditions. As Sir Stafford unequivocally declared in one of his Press Conferences, the proposals meant 'complete and absolute self-determination and self-government for India'. The demands of the Muslim League were also met by the first proviso in para (3) of the above summary.

The Cripps proposals, however, did not appeal to the Congress. Apart from the virtual partition of India which the long-term proposals involved, they were open to another serious objection, namely that the rulers, not the peoples of the Indian States, would determine their future. Cripps offered a reasonable defence for both. The British Government, he said, had no control over the States and had no desire to coerce the Muslims if they did not choose to live in the same dominion with the Hindus. The first was a question of fact which none could dispute. As regards the second, the resolution of the Working Committee, which rejected the proposals on 2 April, contained the following: "Nevertheless the Committee cannot think in terms of compelling the people in any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will."[40] Yet this part of Cripps proposals was the main target of attack from all sides.

The Hindu Mahasabha declared that 'India is one and indivisible' and refused to be party to any proposal which involved the political partition of India in any shape or form.[41] The Liberal Party also opposed the scheme of partitioning India.

Curiously enough, the proposals which alienated the

rest of India failed to satisfy even the Muslims whom they were intended to conciliate. "The Moslems", said the resolution of the Working Committee of the Muslim League, "demand a definite pronouncement in favour of Partition. Though 'Pakistan is recognised by implication' in the Draft Declaration, its primary object is to create one Indian Union, 'the creation of more than one Union being relegated only to the realm of remote possibility.' Nor in any case can the Moslems participate in a constitution-making body which is not elected by separate electorates and in which decisions—the Committee assumes—are to be taken by a bare majority."[42]

Apart from the question of partition, the long-term proposals were opposed on other grounds. "The firmest stand was taken by the representatives of the Depressed Classes who denounced the scheme for its failure to provide the necessary safeguards for their interests."

They declared : "The proposals are calculated to do the greatest harm to the Depressed Classes and are sure to place them under an unmitigated system of Hindu rule. Any such result which takes us back to the black days of the ancient past will never be tolerated by us, and we are all determined to resist any such catastrophe befalling our people with all the means at our command."[43]

The Sikhs, the Anglo-Indians, the Indian Christians and the labour-leaders all demanded sufficient safeguards.

"The only clear acceptance of the British proposals came from Mr. M. N. Roy, whose active, but not very powerful, Radical Democratic Party had been preaching for some time past that the only thing that mattered was to fight the Axis."[44]

As a matter of fact the long-term proposals of Cripps for the future constitution of India received but scant attention of the Congress and other sections of the public. The general feeling was expressed by a pithy saying

attributed to Gandhi, that they were a "post-dated cheque on a crashing bank", implying a growing belief that Britain will be worsted in the battle. As the Congress resolution put it, "in today's grave crisis it is the present that counts, and even proposals for the future are important in so far as they affect the present."[45]

So in the prolonged discussions which Sir Stafford Cripps had with the leaders of the different parties, the attention was mainly concentrated on the interim proposals. Cripps knew very well that he would have to reckon mainly with the Congress and the Muslim League. "As actually happened, the negotiations were held almost exclusively with the Congress, represented by Azad and Nehru, while the Muslim League stood by and awaited developments."[46]

The chief difficulty in arriving at an agreement on the interim proposals was to fix the power and responsibility to be entrusted to Indian members of the Governor-General's Council, for the administration in general, and for defence in particular.

"It was clear enough that there was to be an Indian Defence Member, in addition to the Commander-in-Chief who would continue to be the Supreme Commander of the armed forces in India; but the point on which the leaders were anxious to secure an assurance was that an Indian Defence Member would have reasonable status and be able to function effectively."[47] There were prolonged discussions and exchanges of notes on this point. About this time Colonel Louis Johnson, the personal Representative of President Roosevelt, mentioned above, arrived in Delhi. With Sir Stafford Cripps' permission he took an active part in the negotiations on the defence formula. A new formula, sometimes referred to as the 'Johnson formula', was presented to the Congress."[48]

The Congress accepted this formula with some amend-

ments which did not make any substantial change. But it "differed materially from the earlier approach to the problem by His Majesty's Government. In stead of reserving defence as the responsibility of His Majesty's Government and asking the Indian Defence Member to accept certain relatively unimportant subjects, the Working Committee's proposal was to consider the National Government responsible for the whole field of administration, including defence, but to reserve to the Commander-in-Chief, for the duration of the war, certain functions essential for the discharge of his responsibilities and the carrying out of military operations."[48a]

There were further pourparlers between Johnson and the Congress on the one hand, and Sir Stafford Cripps, the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief on the other. Aa a result of all this, on the afternoon of 8 April Sir Stafford Cripps finalized his formula and discussed it with the Viceroy. "The latter did not agree generally with Sir Stafford Cripps' approach to the problem, nor was he in favour of the proposed allocation of subjects between the Commander-in-Chief and the Indian Defence Member. Nevertheless, Sir Stafford Cripps telegraphed the revised formula to His Majesty's Government as the basis on which negotiations were proceeding and with a strong recommendation for its acceptance He urged that without it there was no prospect of success, but on this basis there was considerable chance of securing the aggreement of the Congress. Simultaneously, the Viceroy communicated his own views to His Majesty's Government, who decided that it could not agree, especially during the period of war, to lessening in any material respect the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. Sir Stafford Cripps felt that he was unable to proceed further, and the negotiations came to an abrupt end."[49]

Although the arrangement for defence proved to be

the most vexed problem that was principally responsible for the failure of Cripps Mission, there were acute differences on some other questions, too.

"When Sir Stafford Cripps had first come out, he had used phrases at his meetings with the Press which had been taken as promising a wholly Indian National Cabinet and in conversation with political leaders he had said that the relations of the Indian Government to the Viceroy were similar to those of the British Cabinet to the King."[50] But later when questioned on the subject by Azad and Nehru, Cripps frankly admitted that there would be no essential difference between the existing Executive Council of the Governor-General and the proposed new Government. On 10 April Azad wrote a long letter to Cripps which concluded as follows:

"While we cannot accept the proposals you have made, we want to inform you that we are yet prepared to assume responsibility, provided a truly National Government is formed. We are prepared to put aside for the present all questions about the future, though, as we have indicated, we hold definite views about it. But in the present, the National Government must be a cabinet government with full power and must not merely be a continuation of the Viceroy's Executive Council."

Cripps was unable to accept this demand and, after a further exchange of notes, accepted Azad's letter of the 10th April as a clear rejection of the British Cabinet's proposals. On 11 April, when it was known that the Congress would not accept them the Working Committee of the Muslim League also passed a resolution rejecting them. It was Jinnah's complaint that "the talks had been carried on with the Congress leaders over the heads of the Muslims, and other parties had been utterly ignored."[51]

There was a general impression at the time that the failure of Cripp's Mission was due to the reactionary

attitude of Churchill who stayed the hands of Cripps at a moment when success was within sight.

This impression is fully substantiated by the secret documents[52] of the Foreign Office, U.S.A., to which reference has been made above. It now appears that after the rejection of 'Johnson's formula' by the Viceroy and Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief, Johnson saw the latter and had a long discussion. Johnson writes : 'After he got off his high horse Wavell's approval and co-operation were complete. He phoned Viceroy for appointment and went with me to see him. On Wavell's recommendation, Viceroy approved and sent for Cripps. Cripps met with three of us and of course heartily approved." On the same day, i. e. the 9th, it was informally agreed to at a conference between Cripps, Nehru and the Congress President, though by that time difference had grown between Cripps and the other two over the nature and functions of the National Government to which reference has been made above. What followed is thus described by Johnson : "Cripps is sincere, knows this matter should be solved. He and Nehru could solve it in 5 minutes if Cripps had any freedom or authority. To my amazement when satisfactory solution seemed certain, with unimportant concession, Cripps with embarrassment told me that he could not change original draft declaration without Churchill's approval and that Churchill has cabled him that he will give no approval unless Wavell and Viceroy separately send their own code cables unqualifiedly endorsing any change Cripps wants. I never lost confidence until then. London wanted a Congress refusal."

On 11 April Churchill sent Roosevelt a copy of Cripps' cable communicating the reasons for the failure of the negotiations, and enclosed a copy of his reply heartily congratulating Cripps on his achievements which "have proved how great was the British desire to reach a

settlement." Churchill added : "The effect throughout Britain and in the United States has been wholly beneficial. The fact that the break comes on the broadest issues and not on tangled formulas about defence is a great advantage."

Roosevelt was not, however, taken in by this hypocritical outburst. He immediately (11 April) cabled a long message to Churchill from which a few extracts are quoted :

"I most earnestly hope that you may find it possible to postpone Cripps's departure from India until one more final effort has been made to prevent a breakdown in the negotiations.

"I am sorry to say that I cannot agree with the point of view set forth in your message to me that public opinion in the United States believes that the negotiations have failed on broad general issues. The general impression here is quite the contrary. The feeling is almost universally held that the deadlock has been caused by the unwillingness of the British Government to concede to the Indians the right of self-government, notwithstanding the willingness of the Indians to entrust technical, military and naval defense control to the competent British authorities. American public opinion cannot understand why, if the British Government is willing to permit the component parts of India to secede from the British Empire after the war, it is not willing to permit them to enjoy what is tantamount to self-government during the war.......I read that an agreement seemed very near last Thursday night (9th April). If he (Cripps) could be authorised by you to state that he was empowered by you personally to resume negotiations as at that point with the understanding that minor concessions would be made by both sides, it seems to me that an agreement might yet be found."

Roosevelt again suggested that a nationalist Government should be immediately set up (in India) on the model of the Government of the original 13 Colonies in U. S. A.

under the Articles of Confederation, on the understanding that they would ultimately settle their own future. He then concluded as follows: "If you made such an effort and Cripps were then still unable to find an agreement, you would at least on that issue have public opinion in the United States satisfied that a real effort and a fair offer had been made by the British Government to the peoples of India and that the responsibility for such failure must clearly be placed upon the Indian people and not upon the British Government."[53]

Thus even at that late hour Roosevelt tried his best to prevent the breakdown of the Cripps negotiations. But Churchill was adamant. In his reply to Roosevelt he even offered 'to retire to private life if that would be any good in assuaging American public opinion'.[54] He said in defence of his policy that he did not trust the Indian Congress. But the negotiations could not be reopened in any case because Cripps had left India.

One of the most intimate associates of Churchill justly remarked: 'The President might have known that India was the one subject on which Winston would never move a yard'. Perhaps 'an inch would be more like it'. Harry Hopkins, who carried on the negotiations with Churchill on behalf of Roosevelt, also felt that 'India was one area where the minds of Roosevelt and Churchill would never meet'.[55]

The British official view was that it was the pacifism of Gandhi that brought about the failure of Cripps Mission. As a matter of fact, Gandhi left Delhi at an early stage of the negotiations and took no further part in them. But some Englishmen asserted that Gandhi telephoned from Sevagram instructing Congress to reject the Cripps offer, and even said they had a record of that conversation. When told about this, Gandhi said, "it is all a tissue of lies. If they have a record of the telephone conversation

let them produce it."[55a] It is hardly necessary to discuss the British official view after this denial of Gandhi.

Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, Indian Agent General in U. S. A., in course of a conversation with Mr. Murray, the Adviser on Political Relations, at Washington, on 24 April, 1942, laid the entire responsibility for the failure of the negotiations at the door of the Congress Working Committee, though he had no doubt that Nehru and Rajagopalachari were sincere in their efforts for a successful settlement. He said he was certain that the idea in the back of the minds of the members of the Working Committee was the following: "With the Cripps proposals on record they can never be withdrawn by the British Government. Therefore why accept them now in the present grave situation of India and run the risk of failure which ought to rest on the shoulders of the British rulers. If Britain wins, the offer can always be taken up and tried out, with better chances of success....If Britain loses and the Japanese succeed in occupying India the Indians would be in a better position to negotiate a satisfactory settlement with the Japanese than they would have been if they had fallen in with the British proposals."[55b]

The basis for the above view is not known, and a high official like Sir Girija cannot be credited with an intimate knowledge of the Congress members unless there is some positive evidence about it, which is lacking.

On the other hand, the indian intelligentsia—at least an important section of it—doubted the sincerity of the British Cabinet and held that the Cripps Mission was designed merely to placate American opinion. Even Harold Lasky observed that the "take it or leave it" mood of Cripps was "bound to make it look as though our real thought was less the achievement of Indian freedom than of a *coup de main* in the propagandist's art among our allies who contrasted American relation with

the Philippines against British relations with India."[55c] There is hardly any doubt that the available evidence lends the strongest support to this view, though we must revise the current Indian opinion that Cripps was the villain of the piece. He was merely an agent of Churchill who pulled the wires from behind.

VII. QUIT INDIA MOVEMENT

1. The Genesis

As mentioned above, owing to the difference in the attitude towards the War Gandhi lost his influence and leadership in the Congress in June, 1940. Although Gandhi recovered his position and was asked by the Congress to lead the *Satyagraha* campaign in 1940-41, he was again relieved of this responsibility by the Working Committee on 23 December, 1941. This explains why Gandhi took no active part in the negotiations with Cripps and left Delhi when they were only half way through, as stated above.

But there was a marked change in Gandhi's attitude after the failure of the Cripps Mission. We get the first inkling of this in an article published in the *Harijan* on 19 April, 1942, in which he suggested that the safety and interest of both Britain and India "lie in orderly and timely British withdrawal from India." For, in that case Japan would probably leave India alone. In other words, Gandhi, for the first time, openly declared that there was an end of all ideas of co-operation or friendly understanding between Britain and India. Subhas Bose had persistently tried to make the Congress adopt this policy, but failed. Now it was the general view of the Congress leaders also with the exception of Jawaharlal, who held very strongly that in any case India must fight with Britain against Fascism. The two views clashed in the meetings of the A. I. C. C. and the

Working Committee (W. C.) at Allahabad (29 April to 2 May, 1942). The W.C. adopted the draft prepared by Jawaharlal Nehru and rejected that of Gandhi, but the resolution finally adopted by the A.I.C.C. was a compromise between the two. The relevant passage runs as follows :

"The present crisis as well as the negotiations with Sir Stafford Cripps make it impossible for the Congress to consider any schemes or proposals which retain, even in partial measure, British control and authority in India. Not only the interests of India, but also Britain's safety and world peace and freedom demand that Britain must abandon her hold on India. It is on the basis of independence alone that India can deal with Britain or other nations.

"The Committee repudiates the idea that freedom can come to India through interference or invasion by any foreign nation, whatever the professions of that nation may be. In case an invasion takes place, it must be resisted. Such resistance can only take the form of non-violent non-co-operation as the British Government has prevented the organisation of national defence by the people in any other way. The Committee would therefore expect the people of India to offer complete non-violent non-co-operation to the invading forces and not to render any assistance to them."[56]

These two paras show that Nehru had surrendered, for they repudiated Nehru's view of unconditional support to Britain and violent resistance to the Japanese invaders. It is true that the resolution contained no reference to the following passage in Gandhi's draft : "Britain is incapable of defending India. Japan's quarrel is not with India. If India were freed, her first step would probably be to negotiate with Japan". But these were not very essential points like those on which Nehru had to surrender.

There was now no doubt that Gandhi had again

recovered his undisputed supremacy over the Congress. In spite of the compromise and almost non-committal resolution of the A. I. C. C., he wrote a series of articles elaborating his idea which was soon to crystallise into the 'Quit India' Movement. On May 3, and again on May 10, he wrote : "The time has come during the war, not after it, for the British and the Indians to be reconciled to complete separation from each other......I must devote the whole of my energy to the realisation of this supreme act. ......The presence of the British in India is an invitation to Japan to invade India. Their withdrawal removes the bait. Assume, however, it does not; free India will be better able to cope with the invasion. Unadulterated non-co-operation will then have full sway."

"Leave India in God's hands," he said on 24 May, "in modern parlance, to anarchy, and that anarchy may lead to internecine warfare for a time or to unrestrained dacoities. From these a true India will rise in place of the false one we see."[57] Gandhi said : "I have not asked the British to hand over India to the Congress or to the Hindus. Let them entrust India to God or in modern parlance to anarchy. Then all the parties will fight one another like dogs, or will, when real responsibility faces them, come to a reasonable agreement. I shall expect non-violence to arise out of that chaos."[58]

No sober statesman would perhaps endorse these idealistic views of Gandhi who, as usual, ignored the realities of the situation and was ready to play with a nation's fate as a child plays with his doll. But the strong reaction of his views on the American journalists, and perhaps also the influence of Nehru and criticism of Rajagopalachari and other Indian leaders induced Gandhi to modify his views a little. "It was not till May 24 that Gandhi first admitted the possibility of Japan still invading India despite the withdrawal of the British and he advised the

settlement." Churchill added : "The effect throughout Britain and in the United States has been wholly beneficial. The fact that the break comes on the broadest issues and not on tangled formulas about defence is a great advantage."

Roosevelt was not, however, taken in by this hypocritical outburst. He immediately (11 April) cabled a long message to Churchill from which a few extracts are quoted :

"I most earnestly hope that you may find it possible to postpone Cripps's departure from India until one more final effort has been made to prevent a breakdown in the negotiations.

"I am sorry to say that I cannot agree with the point of view set forth in your message to me that public opinion in the United States believes that the negotiations have failed on broad general issues. The general impression here is quite the contrary. The feeling is almost universally held that the deadlock has been caused by the unwillingness of the British Government to concede to the Indians the right of self-government, notwithstanding the willingness of the Indians to entrust technical, military and naval defense control to the competent British authorities. American public opinion cannot understand why, if the British Government is willing to permit the component parts of India to secede from the British Empire after the war, it is not willing to permit them to enjoy what is tantamount to self-government during the war......I read that an agreement seemed very near last Thursday night (9th April). If he (Cripps) could be authorised by you to state that he was empowered by you personally to resume negotiations as at that point with the understanding that minor concessions would be made by both sides, it seems to me that an agreement might yet be found."

Roosevelt again suggested that a nationalist Government should be immediately set up (in India) on the model of the Government of the original 13 Colonies in U. S. A.

the slavery."[63]

There was a meeting of the Working Committee at Wardha on 6 July, 1942. The memoirs of Maulana Azad, the President of the Congress, throw light on the part played by Gandhi in leading the Congress to his 'Quit India' policy. Azad says :

"I reached Wardha on 5 July and Gandhiji spoke to me for the first time about the 'Quit India' Movement. I could not easily adjust my mind to this new idea. I felt that we were facing an extraordinary dilemma. Our sympathies were with the Allied powers but the British Government had taken up an attitude which made it impossible for us to co-operate with them. We could side with the British only as a free country, but the British wanted us as mere camp-followers. On the other hand, the Japanese had occupied Burma and were advancing towards Assam. I felt that we must refrain from any word or action which could offer encouragement to the Japanese. It seemed to me that the only thing we could do was to wait upon the course of events and watch how the war situation developed. Gandhiji did not agree. He insisted that the British must leave India. If the British agreed, we could then tell the Japanese they should not advance any further. If in spite of this they advanced, it would be an attack on India and not on the British. If such a situation developed we must oppose Japan with all our might.

"I have already said that I had been in favour of organized opposition to the British at the outbreak of the war. Gandhiji had not then agreed with me. Now that he had changed, I found myself in a peculiar position. I could not believe that with the enemy on the Indian frontier, the British would tolerate an organized movement of resistance. Gandhiji seemed to have a strange belief that they would. He held that the British would

allow him to develop his movement in his own way. When I pressed him to tell us what exactly would be the programme of resistance, he had no clear idea. The only thing he mentioned during our discussions was that unlike previous occasions, this time the people would not court imprisonment voluntarily. They should resist arrest and submit to Government only if physically forced to do so....

"Gandhiji held that the British would regard his move for an organized mass movement as a warning and not take any precipitate action. He would therefore have time to work out the details of the movement and develop its tempo according to his plans. I was convinced that this would not be the case....

"When the Working Committee began its discussions, I elaborated these points in detail. Among members of the Working Committee only Jawaharlal supported me and then only up to a point. The other members would not oppose Gandhiji even when they were not fully convinced. This was not a new experience for me. Apart from Jawaharlal, who often agreed with me, the other members were generally content to follow Gandhiji's lead. Sardār Patel, Dr. Rajendra Prasad and Acharya Kripalani had no clear idea about the war. They rarely tried to judge things on their own, and in any case they were accustomed to subordinate their judgment to Gandhiji. As such, discussion with them was almost useless. After all our discussions, the only thing they could say was that we must have faith in Gandhiji. They held that if we trusted him he would find some way out.

"Gandhiji's idea seemed to be that since the war was on the Indian frontier, the British would come to terms with the Congress as soon as the movement was launched. Even if this did not take place, he believed that the British would hesitate to take any drastic steps

with the Japanese knocking at India's doors. He thought that this would give the Congress the time and the opportunity to organize an effective movement. My own reading was completely different....

"Our discussions started on 5 July and continued for several days. I had on earlier occasions also differed from Gandhiji on some points but never before had our difference been so complete. Things reached a climax when he sent me a letter to the effect that my stand was so different from his that we could not work together. If Congress wanted Gandhiji to lead the movement, I must resign from the Presidentship and also withdraw from the Working Committee. Jawaharlal must do the same."

After stating how Gandhi withdrew this letter at the instance of Patel, Azad continues :

"We began to discuss in greater detail the various elements of the proposed movement. Gandhiji made it clear that like other movements, this would also be on the basis of non-violence. All methods short of violence would however be permissible. During the discussions, Jawaharlal said that what Gandhiji had in view was in fact an open rebellion even if the rebellion was non-violent. Gandhi liked the phrase and spoke of an open non-violent revolution several times."[64]

2. "Quit India" Resolution

On 14 July, 1942, the Working Committee passed a long resolution, generally referred to as the 'Quit India' resolution. It renewed the demand that "British rule in India must end immediately" and reiterated the view that the freedom of India was "necessary not only in the interest of India but also for the safety of the world and for the ending of Nazism, Fascism, Militarism and other forms of imperialism, and the aggression of one nation over another....

"On the withdrawal of British Rule in India, respon-

sible men and women of the country will come together to form a Provisional Government, representative of all important sections of the people of India, which will later evolve a scheme whereby a Constituent Assembly can be convened in order to prepare a constitution for the government of India acceptable to all sections of the people. Representatives of Free India and representatives of Great Britain will confer together for the adjustment of future relations and for the co-operation of the two countries as allies in the common task of meeting aggression. It is the earnest desire of the Congress to enable India to resist aggression effectively with the people's united will and strength behind it.

"In making the proposal for the withdrawal of British Rule from India, the Congress has no desire whatsoever to embarrass Great Britain or the Allied Powers in their prosecution of the war, or in any way to encourage aggression on India or increased pressure on China by the Japanese or any other Power associated with the Axis group. Nor does the Congress intend to jeopardise the defensive capacity of the Allied Powers. The Congress is therefore agreeable to the stationing of the armed forces of the Allies in India, should they so desire, in order to ward off and resist Japanese or other aggression, and to protect and help China....

"The Congress would plead with the British Power to accept the very reasonable and just proposal herein made, not only in the interest of India but also that of Britain and of the cause of freedom to which the United Nations proclaim their adherence.

"Should, however, this appeal fail, the Congress cannot view without the gravest apprehension the continuation of the present state of affairs, involving a progressive deterioration in the situation and weakening of India's will and power to resist aggression. The Cong-

ress will then be reluctantly compelled to utilise all the non-violent strength it might have gathered since 1920, when it adopted Non-violence as part of its policy for the vindication of political rights and liberty. Such a widespread struggle would inevitably be under the leadership of Gandhiji. As the issues raised are of the most vital and far-reaching importance to the people of India as well as to the peoples of the United Nations, the Working Committee refer them to the All-India Congress Committee for final decision. For this purpose the A. I. C. C. will meet in Bombay on the seventh of August, 1942."[65]

Referring to this resolution Subhas Bose comments: "There is no doubt that the Congress resolution came nearest in expressing the wish of the vast majority of the Indian people. It also brought the Congress fundamentally near the stand always taken by the writer, namely, that the destruction of British power in India was the *sine qua non* for the solution of all India's problems, and that the Indian people would have to fight for the achievement of this goal.

"Although the resolution passed by the Congress at Wardha was interpreted by Gandhi as 'open rebellion', it did not entirely bridge the gulf that separated the Congress leadership as a whole from the policy of immediate, uncompromising and all-out fight against the British rule in India advocated by the writer. The idea of the desirability of an understanding with Britain was still in the minds of some Congress leaders.

"However, these people constituted a very tiny minority. Even Nehru, who most ardently wished an unerstanding with Britain, answered in the negative when asked by foreign correspondents after the Wardha meeting 'if an American guarantee of the British promise to give India complete independence after the war would meet

the case.' What Congress was interested in, said Nehru, was 'independence here and now'. No doubt this was also the mood of the country."[66]

No one outside Gandhi's immediate circle of devotees could have the least doubt about the attitude of the Government towards the new move of the Congress. Among Gandhi's 'staunch' disciples was Miss Slade, popularly known as Mira Ben, the daughter of a British admiral. She went to Delhi, at the suggestion of Mahadev Desai, the Secretary of Gandhi, to apprise the Viceroy of the purport of the Working Committee's resolution and the nature of the movement proposed by it. The Viceroy refused to interview her as Gandhi was thinking in terms of rebellion. "He made it clear that the Government would not tolerate any rebellion during the war, whether it was violent or non-violent. Nor was the Government prepared to meet or discuss with any representative of an organization which spoke in such terms."[67]

"The refusal of the Viceroy even to receive Mira Ben made Gandhiji realize that the Government would not easily yield. The confidence he had in this regard was shaken, but he still clung to the belief that Government would not take any drastic action. He thought that he would have enough time after the A. I. C. C. meeting to prepare a programme of work and gradually build up the tempo of the movement."[68]

The A. I. C. C. met in Bombay on 7 August, 1942, and considered the resolution drafted by the Working Committee. After two days' discussion it was passed by an overwhelming majority; only a few Communists were against it. The more important parts of the resolution are quoted below (with slight verbal alterations).

"The Committee approves of and endorses the Wardha resolution and is of opinion that events subse-

quent to it have given it further justification, and have made it clear that the immediate ending of British Rule in India is an urgent necessity, both for the sake of India and for the success of the cause of the United Nations. A free India will assure this success by throwing all her great resources in the struggle for freedom and against the aggression of Nazism, Fascism and Imperialism.

"The peril of today necessitates the independence of India and the ending of British domination. No future promise or guarantees can affect the present situation or meet that peril. They cannot produce needed psychological effect on the mind of the masses. Only the glow of freedom now can release that energy and enthusiasm of millions of people which will immediately transform the nature of the war. The A. I. C. C. therefore repeats with all emphasis the demand for the withdrawal of the British Power from India."

The A. I. C. C. resolution also sanctioned "the starting of a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest possible scale under the leadership of Gandhi," and provided for future contingency in the following words:

"A time may come when it may not be possible to issue instructions or for instructions to reach our people, and when no Congress Committee can function. When this happens, every man and woman, who is participating in this movement must function for himself or herself within the four corners of the general instructions issued. Every Indian who desires freedom and strives for it must be his own guide urging him on along the hard road where there is no resting place and which leads ultimately to the independence and deliverance of India."[69]

No one except Gandhi, with his childlike faith, and his devotees, blindly attached to him, could have seriously believed that the Government would sit idle while the

A. I. C. C. had proclaimed open rebellion. It is true that Gandhi conceived it to be a kind of non-violent revolt —unarmed revolt as he called it. But everybody knew or should have known that the revolt once begun would not, or rather could not, retain its non-violent character. Gandhi's utterances might easily create the impression that he meant it to be a fight to the finish, whether violent or non-violent. "After the Working Committee passed the resolution at Wardha on July 14, Gandhi said : "There is no room left in the proposal for withdrawal or negotiation. There is no question of one more chance. After all it is an open rebellion." Again Gandhi is reported to have said : "I shall take every precaution I can to handle the movement gently, but I would not hesitate to go the extremest limit, if I find that no impression is produced on the British Government or the Allied Powers." Reference may also be made to Gandhi's speech after the A. I. C. C. had passed the 'Quit India' resolution at Bombay. "Every one of you should from this moment onwards consider yourself a free man or woman and act as if you are free...., I am not going to be satisfied with anything short of complete freedom...We shall do or die. We shall either free India or die in the attempt."

No Government, faced with an impending foreign invasion from outside, would tolerate the growth of Such a rebellion inside, which was sure to hamper the efforts for defence against Japanese aggressions. The Government were closely following the activities of the Congress and made elaborate preparations to nip any active rebellion in the bud. They were presumably waiting till the Congress put itself clearly in the wrong by an open declaration of revolt. As soon as the A. I. C. C. resolution was passed, they struck hard. The A. I. C. C. meeting terminated late at night on 8 August, 1942. Before the next day dawned the police arrested Gandhi, Azad, and

all the other eminent leaders of the Congress. Within a week almost everyone who mattered in the Congress organization was in jail. The A. I. C. C. and all the Provincial Congress Committees except in N. W. F. P. were declared unlawful organizations. The Congress headquarters at Allahabad were seized by the police and the Government confiscated the Congress funds. Rigorous control was imposed over the publication of news and comments to such an extent that several newspapers, including the *Harijan* of Gandhi, had to suspend publication.

The Government of India issued a *communique* justifying their action. "The Central Government," said the official *communique*, "had been aware for some days of the preparations being made by Congressmen for a campaign of lawlessness, including attempts to interrupt communications, to foment strikes, to tamper with the loyalty of Government servants and to interfere with recruitment.

"The Government of India have waited patiently in the hope that wiser counsels might prevail. They have been disappointed in that hope. To a challenge such as the present there can only be one answer. The Government of India would regard it as wholly incompatible with their responsibilities to the people of India and their obligations to the Allies that a demand should be discussed, the acceptance of which would plunge India into confusion and anarchy internally and would paralyse her efforts in the common cause of human freedom.

"The *communique* went on to remind the people of India of the British Government's guarantee of self-determination directly after the war and to deny the capacity of the Congress to override the realities of Indian politics and establish the freedom of India at a stroke. The action, it was added, which the Government was

bound to take to uphold law and order and safeguard the war-effort would be 'preventive' rather than 'punitive'.

It was afterwards made known that the Central Government's decision had been unanimous. The Executive Council, it will be remembered, had recently been expanded, and, as it happened, the three official Members (apart from the Viceroy) were absent. Thus the decision was taken by the Viceroy and the twelve unofficial Members, all of whom, except Sir E. C. Benthall, were Indians."[70]

The sudden removal of all types of leaders,—all-India, Provincial, District, and even Taluk—left no responsible men to guide the mass movement announced by the A. I. C. C. But if the Government had thought or hoped that by this means they would be able to crush the movement they soon found out their mistake. They had made a profound miscalculation about the state of popular feeling and the hold of the Congress on Indian public. The news of the arrest of Gandhi and other Congress leaders led to a violent popular demonstration which soon spread over nearly the whole of India.

VIII. THE VIOLENT OUTBREAK OF 1942

A. THE NATURE OF THE OUTBREAK

As soon as Gandhi and his followers were removed to prison, the cult of non-violence, as understood and preached by them, came to an end, never more to figure as a potent force in India's struggle for freedom. Jawaharlal Nehru noted with regret that "the people forgot the lessons of non-violence which had been dinned into their ears for more than twenty years."[71] He forgot or ignored the fact, obvious to many, that though the lesson entered the ears of the people it never entered their hearts. On occasions —and they are not few in number—under the magic spell of Gandhi or out of frenzied devotion to him as to a religious *Guru*, people behaved in a manner which misled

many to believe that their personality and character had undergone a radical transformation, and Gandhi's spirit of non-violence possessed their soul. But this impression received a rude shock when the exit of Gandhi practically synchronised with the exit of almost all restraints to violence. How transient was the apparent conversion even of only a small class of people to the Gandhian cult of non-violence may be judged by the fact that after the year 1942, the cult has never played any active role either in the Congress dominated Indian politics or in the life of the Indian people. It is now a sacred memory at the best, and a catching slogan at the worst.

The arrest of Gandhi and other leaders was immediately followed by peaceful and non-violent popular demonstrations in the shape of *hartals* and processions over nearly the whole of India. The Government adopted stern measures to put them down. The close of shops and restaurants was forbidden by the rules passed under the Defence of India Act, and not only the usual *lathi*-charge but firing was also resorted to in order to disperse processions. This led to violence on the part of the people and the Government had to face a revolt which was unarmed but most violent in character.

There was no regular inquiry by a responsible committee into the disturbances of 1942. The Government refused to accept the public demand for such an inquiry and neither the Congress nor any other body took any steps for it. But we possess both official and popular versions, and there seems to be no doubt or uncertainty about the general trend of events, though details, particularly figures, cannot be always regarded as reliable.

The official version may be summed up as follows :

'Gandhi and other leaders were arrested on the morning of 9 August. On that day there were disturbances in Bombay, Ahmadabad and Poona, but the rest of the country

remained quiet. On 10 August disturbances occurred also in Delhi and a few towns in the U. P. ; but still no serious repercussions were reported from elsewhere. It was from August 11 that the situation began to deteriorate rapidly. From then onwards, apart from the *hartals*, protest meetings and similar demonstrations that were to be expected, concerted outbreaks of mob violence, arson, murder, and sabotage took place ; and in almost all cases these were directed either against communications of all kinds (including railways, posts and telegraphs), or against the police. Moreover, these outbreaks started almost simultaneously in widely separated areas in the provinces of Madras, Bombay, and Bihar, and also in the Central and United Provinces. Finally the damage done was so extensive as to make it incredible that it could have been perpetrated on the spur of the moment without special implements and previous preparation ; and in many instances the manner in which it was done displayed a great deal of technical knowledge. Block instruments and control rooms in Railway stations were singled out for destruction ; and the same technical skill appeared over and over again both in the selection of objects for attack—on the railways, in P & T offices and lines, and on electric power lines and installations—and also in the manner in which the damage was carried out. On the other hand—and this is a significant fact—industrial plant and machinery, even when it was fully employed on Government work, escaped any serious injury.

'The position was at one time extremely serious in the whole of Bihar except its most southern districts, and in the eastern part of the U.P. In these areas the trouble soon spread from the big towns to the outlying areas ; thousands of rioters gave themselves up to an orgy of destruction of communications and certain classes of Government property ; whole districts, with their small

defending forces of Government officials and police, were isolated for days on end ; a very large part of the E. I. Railway and practically the whole of the B. & N. W. Railway systems were put out of action. For a considerable period, Bengal was almost completely cut off from Northern India, while communications with Madras were also interrupted by the damage done to the Railways in the Guntur district and around Bezwada......On the other hand Assam, Orissa, the Punjab and the N. W. F. P. remained free from serious trouble throughout the first week after the arrests, and there was comparatively little disorder in Sind.

'In all the affected provinces, students, invariably Hindu students, were in the forefront of the initial disorders. Everywhere the Congress creed of non-violence was ignored and mobs were recklessly incited to extremes of fury. Apart from attacks on communications and various forms of transport such as trams, buses, and motor vehicles. the violence of the mob was directed against certain classes of Government buildings....Municipal, and even private property also suffered, and there was some looting.'[72]

As regards sabotage activity in U.P. "there was widespread destruction of the property of the Railways and Posts and Telegraphs. One hundred and four railway stations were attacked and damaged, 15 being burnt down, 16 derailments were caused, about 100 instances of sabotage to railway tracks were reported.

"Over 425 cases of sabotage to telephone and telegraph wires were recorded. A hundred and nineteen post offices were destroyed or severely damaged, and 32 employees of the Posts and Telegraph Department were attacked. Damage was caused to a large number of Government buildings, records, seed stores and some A. R. P. equipment. Attacks on Government servants resulted in the murder of 16 members of the police force and 332

were injured. Arrests, totalling 16,089 were made in connection with the disturbances throughout the province." The "total amount of collective fine imposed was Rs. 28, 32, 000, the bulk of which was promptly realised. Recoveries by the close of the financial year amounted to slightly over Rs. 25,00,000."[72a]

'The all-India figures for the sabotages of this kind are given as follows :[72b]

Railway Stations damaged or destroyed	...250
Post Offices attacked	...550
Post Offices burnt	...50
Post Offices damaged	...200
Telegram and Telephoae wires cut at	3,500 places
Police Stations burnt	70
Other Government buildings	85

'There was no general strike and work was soon resumed in mills and factories, with the one important exception of Ahmadabad mills. These were subjected to special political pressure, backed by ample funds.

'During the first two weeks following the arrests the disturbances continued with varying intensity mainly in C. P., Bihar, and U. P......By the fourth week firm action had largely succeeded in suppressing mass lawlessness, except in Assam, where disorders began to appear similar in nature to those which had occurred earlier elsewhere. Indiscipline in jails was a part of the Congress programme and jail mutinies duly occurred in two provinces. By the sixth week normal conditions had been restored throughout most of the country except in the eastern Provinces.

'With the close of the first phase of violent mass disorders three new tendencies became apparent, viz. (1) orthodox non-violent Civil Disobedience movement ; (2) development of serious crimes, and (3) drift towards terrorism......Cases of arson, sabotage and of murderous assault on public servants continued. Bombs made their

appearance in C. P., Bombay and the United Provinces. These were at first crude and ineffective, but technical improvement was rapid, and by the twelfth week of the movement bombs and other explosive mechanisms, some of a highly dangerous type, were in use on a fairly extensive scale, particularly in the Bombay Province.'[72c]

So far about the official account. The following extracts from the official history of the Congress give the non-official version.

"The people grew insensate and were maddened with fury, when the slightest acts of disobedience of orders prohibiting meetings, processions and demonstrations, freedom of association and of opinion were put down, not with a mere *lathi* but with the rifle and the revolver, with the machine-gun and the aerial firing. Within less than twelve hours of the arrests, the old story of brickbats and bullets got abroad......The mob on their part began to stone running Railways and stop trains and cars, damage Railway stations and set fire to them or property therein, loot grain shops, cut Telegraph wires, rip open the tyres of cars, harass Victoria, bullock carts and tongas. Besides these excesses initiated by the people at large, there were hartals throughout India despite the Ordinance prohibiting them, in which the school and college students took a big hand in picketing. Educational Institutions and Universities very soon emptied and closed from one end of the country to another,—from Dacca to Delhi excepting Aligarh and from Lahore to Madras. The Benares University, however, was taken possession of by the military at an early stage in the movement. Instances of paralysing Railway traffic by removal of fishplates of rails or the rails themselves early figured on the field of Civil Disobedience, the Madras Mail being unable to proceed for a number of days and thereafter unable to proceed at nights for some time. A whole length

of 130 miles from Bitragunta to Bezwada was disorganized. In Behar, Monghyr was isolated from all external contact for nearly two weeks. The Railway disorganization was in the extreme in Bihar. The Ahmedabad Mills were all closed while in Bombay only three or four ceased work. Numerous Electric Municipal lamps, Fire brigade signal posts and Municipal carts were shattered and smashed to pieces. Near the Dadar B. B. & C. I. station on Sunday, the 9th August, a car was set fire to. There was a complete cessation for an hour of all Suburban Train Traffic both on the B. B. C. I. and G. I. P. lines on the 9th August....Railway stations, Income-tax offices, school and college buildings, Post offices, Railway godowns became the common objects of mischief by arson. In Behar a mob attempted to storm the Secretariat....

"The traffic was held up in the city of Bombay. Even private cars were not allowed to proceed unless there was a Gandhi cap on the head of at least one of the passengers. The tracks for the tram car wheels were filled with finely ground stone which it was not easy to remove. Chains hung at road junctions were released and tied across tramway and the path was further barred by heavy doors brought from somewhere and fixed across. It has been reported that rails of Railways were fully greased with oil so as to prevent the action of brakes suddenly applied."[73]

The general picture that emerges from these accounts may be described as a widespread revolutionary upsurge of the people, almost throughout India, that manifested itself mainly in destructive activities. The chief targets of attack were the means of communication—Post and Telegraph offices, Telegraph wire, railway line, etc.—and Government establishments, specially Police Stations and other Office buildings. Though unarmed, the masses, by

sheer weight of number, broke through the cordon and seized the buildings. They were generally successful in rural areas where the Government force was not strong enough to resist them, but failed and suffered heavy casualties in urban areas where they were pitted against the Police and the Military. Ten to twenty thousand people, if not more, marched to small Police Stations and were mercilessly shot down by the Police till they exhausted their ammunitions and were forced to surrender. The triumphant mob, naturally excited to fury by the death of their comrades, sometimes committed excesses; not only were the buildings burned, but, according to official version, Police officials were also killed, sometimes in a most cruel manner. On the other hand, according to reliable records, many captured officials received humane treatment. The records of these popular outbreaks are replete with individual instances of heroism, courage, patriotism and self-sacrifice on the part of the people.

Although the destructive activities figured most prominently in the movement, there were also comprehensive plans to establish *Swaraj* or self-rule in certain areas. These plans sometimes succeeded, for short or long periods, particularly in localities in which the Police were forced to withdraw or surrender to the mob. A few typical specimens may be quoted below.[74]

1. Midnapore (Bengal)[75]

The people of Midnapore played a very important and heroic role in the movement. A National Government was formed in Tamluk Sub-division with a Dictator, aided by several Ministers. It was a sort of parallel Government, dispensing justice, maintaining peace and security, and helping the poor and the distressed. Volunteers were formed into an army which had a fighting branch, Intelligence Branch and Ambulance Corps (with well-trained doctors and nurses). This National Govern-

ment nominally functioned from 17 December, 1942, to 8 August, 1944. It was dissolved in obedience to the direction of Gandhi.

The activities of the people were both violent and non-violent in character. In Tamluk Sub-division, on 29 September, 'thirty culverts were broken, 27 miles of telegraph and telephone lines were cut out and 194 telegraph posts were broken. Three police stations of Tamluk Sub-division were simultaneously attacked."[76] During the next few days a number of post offices, dakbungalows, and Police Stations in Contai were raided in quick succession. The records and furniture were burnt along with the thatched rooms. It is, however, to be noted that these were done by several thousands of unarmed men and women marching in a procession. One remarkable instance may be cited. Five big processions approached the town of Tamluk from different directions. As they neared the Police Station the Police made a *lathi* charge. As this could not deter the processionists from proceeding to capture the Police building they were indiscriminately fired at. The crowd dispersed, but a few revolutionaries, ignoring the bullets, marched towards the Police Station.

Another procession was led by a venerable old lady, Matangini Hazra, aged 73. The Government troops opened fire and continued showering bullets for a long time. Matangini held the national flag firmly in her hands and advanced. "The Government troops first hit her on both hands ; her hands dropped but not the national flag which she held tightly ; she advanced, requesting Indian troops to cease firing, give up their jobs and join the freedom movement. Only a bullet she received in reply which ran right through her forehead and she fell dead. As she lay in the dust sanctified by her blood, the national flag was still in her grip, yet flying unsullied. A soldier ran

and kicked the flag to the ground."[77] It has been calculated that about 20,000 people, all unarmed, braved the Government forces.

Needless to add that the Government took a terrible vengeance. Outrages on women *en masse* formed its special feature. According to reliable evidence seventy-four women of Mahisadal Sub-division, including a pregnant one, were raped, and one of them died in consequence. Among other allegations mention is made of tortures—"inhuman, filthy and obscene in various ways." We are told of hundreds of villages plundered and pillaged and their people kept without food, dipped in cold water in winter nights, and beaten till they fell down senseless. Even some small children were cruelly beaten. Decency forbids the mention of other details. The 'popular' Ministers of Bengal saw with their own eyes the burnt villages and heard the story of rape and assault from the victims. The Chief Minister, Fazl-ul-Huq, promised an inquiry, but nothing came out of it, presumably because the Governor was against it. There was, however, one Minister, Shyama Prasad Mookerji, who resigned by way of protest and wrote a long letter to the Governor on 16 November, 1942, from which an extract is quoted below :

"The political movement took a grave turn in some parts of Midnapore and none can say anything in respect of any legitimate measures taken to deal with persons guilty of serious offences against the law. But in Midnapore repression has been carried on in a manner which resembles the activities of Germans in occupied territories as advertised by British agencies. Hundreds of houses have been burnt down by the police and the armed forces. Reports of outrages on women have reached us. Moslems have been instigated to loot and plunder Hindu houses; or the protectors of law and order have themselves carried on similar operations. Orders were issued from Calcutta

that it was not the policy of Government that houses should be burnt by persons in charge of law and order. I have ample evidence to show that this order was not carried into effect and even after the unprecedented havoc caused by the cyclone on the 16th October and our visit to the affected areas a fortnight later, the burning of houses and looting were continued in some parts of the district. Apart from the manner in which people were fired at and killed these acts of outrage committed by Government agencies are abominable in character."

2. Ballia

The people of Ballia in U. P. successfully carried into effect a regular programme of cutting off communications and captured the administration. Processions and *hartals* were accompanied by cutting telegraph wires, removing railway lines and destroying bridges. These were done with such thoroughness that by the midnight of 18 August the district authorities found themselves completely cut off from the Provincial administration, and without adequate force to control the popular upsurge. Next day reports reached them that the revolutionary mobs were coming to capture the Collectorate and the Treasury and were determined to break open the jail and release the Congressmen. The Magistrate thereupon visited the Congress leaders in jail and asked for their help in saving the situation. They agreed, and Chitoo Pandey, the Congress leader, with 100 of his followers came out of jail. A great ovation was paid to them in a public meeting at the Town Hall, and the independence of Ballia was declared on 20 August. Chitoo formed an administration, arrested the officers of the British Government, seized the Treasury and Armoury, and took suitable steps to maintain law and order.

But the peoples' triumph was shortlived. The British military forces entered Ballia during the night between

22 and 23 August, and the popular Government was overthrown. Then the horrors of the British Police and Military *raj* were let loose upon the people of Ballia, signalised by an orgy of loot and plunder, rape and ravage, beating and shooting, firing and burning.

Independent peoples' Governments were also established in North Bhagalpur (Bihar) and many other localities. Generally speaking, they did not last for more than a few days. But in some places a parallel Government was carried on for months.[78]

B. THE REPRESSIVE MEASURES BY THE GOVERNMENT

We get a fair idea of the nature and extent of the repressive measures adopted by the Government from the official and non-official statements in the Legislative Assembly. Everything indicates that the Government did not shrink from the atrocities perpetrated by them in suppressing the Civil Disobedience movement of 1930-32, of which an authentic and impartial account has been given above in Chapter VI, Section E. *Lathi* charge, whipping, shooting, imprisonment, pillage, arson, rape, barbarous physical torture of individuals in a variety of ways, and collective fines (imposed mostly on the Hindus) were the order of the day, apart from the special measures of vengeance reserved for localities like Ballia and Midnapore, mentioned above.

A statement issued by A. I. C. C. in November, 1942, refers to "looting and burning of villages, rape and rapine on a mass scale, machine gunning and even aerial attacks."

The Civil Defence Secretary gave details of the time, date and number of air-raids on Calcutta, Chittagong and Feni areas from 16 September, 1942, to 10 February, 1943. The total casualties in air-raids on India since April, 1942, were 348 killed and 459 wounded.

According to an official statement made in the Central

Assembly on 19 February, 1943, firing had been resorted to 538 times up to about the end of the year 1942, as a result of which 940 were killed and 1,830 were injured. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru comments:

"Official estimates of the number of people killed and wounded by police or military firing in the 1942 disturbances are: 1,028 killed and 3,200 wounded. These figures are certainly gross under-estimates for it has been officially stated that such firing took place on at least 538 occasions, and besides this people were frequently shot at by the police or the military from moving lorries. It is very difficult to arrive at even an approximately correct figure. Popular estimates place the number of deaths at 25,000, but probably this is an exaggeration. Perhaps 10,000 may be nearer the mark."[79]

The official figures for persons arrested, convicted and detained without trial during the period from 9 August to the end of the year 1942, were, respectively, 60,229, and approximately 26,000 and 18,000. The military casualties were 11 killed and 7 wounded.

The number of Police Stations, Offices and houses belonging to Government and private persons burnt by the people in Contai and Tamluk Sub-divisions of the Midnapur District in Bengal were respectively 43 and 38, while 193 Congress camps and houses were burnt by the Government forces in the same region.

Men, rightly or wrongly supposed to be saboteurs at work on the railway lines, were machine-gunned from air at five different places. In at least one case the Government admitted that the coollies were mistaken for saboteurs.[80]

Allegations were made by the Government of specially brutal cruelties perpetrated by the mob. It is a difficult task to find out the exact truth, but a few specific instances may be cited.

1. Jaglal Chaudhury, a minister in Bihar from 1937 to 1939, "personally instigated the burning of a police station in the Saran District and during the attack urged the crowd to tie up the Sub-Inspector in a sack and throw him into the river. He was imprisoned for ten years on this charge.

2. An Australian missionary in Bihar who had done educational and medical work for 25 years was mobbed and he escaped with difficulty.

3. In course of an attack on the police station of Minapur in the Muzaffarpur District (Bihar), the Sub-Inspector was burnt alive.

4. The murder of the Sub-Inspector and four constables at Ashti (C. P.) (after the Police had opened fire, killing five men).

5. Cold-blooded murder of the Circle Inspector of Police, the Sub-divisional Magistrate, the Naib Tahsildar and a Constable at Chimur (C.P.) on their refusal to join the Congress and resign.[80a]

On the other hand, there were serious allegations of torture of the Indians, participating in the movement of 1942, after they were imprisoned. As a specimen we may quote the following extract from a letter written by the Socialist leader Rammanohar Lohia, to Prof. Harold Laski on 3 January, 1946.

"I was ill-treated in one way or other for over four months ; I was kept awake day after day, night after night, the longest single stretch running into ten days ; when I resisted the police in their efforts to make me stand, they wheeled me round on my manacled hands on the matted floor......... If beating and bastinadoing to death or near about it and forcing the human mouth to the uses of a sewer were alone to be considered atrocities, these and worse have taken place. I will give you one or two instances, as readily come to my mind. One man swallowed poison

in a Police outpost of the Bombay Province, another threw himself down a well in a U.P. jail, and of those who died through beating or ill-treatment after their arrest, there is no checking up except that in one Orissa jail out of over 300 in the country, the number of deaths among political prisoners rose to around 29 or 39, I cannot exactly recollect."[80b]

In view of the authenticated accounts of the brutality perpetrated by the Government in 1932, as described above, one need not hesitate to accept the charges made against them in 1942. For the same reason it is unnecessary to give further details. If we recall to our mind that Churchill, the Prime Minister of Britain, declared triumphantly in the House of Commons that "the disturbances were crushed with all the weight of the Government" and that large military reinforcements were sent to India. we can easily imagine that there was no limit to the barbarous atrocities perpetrated by the Government in those terrible months of 1942.[81] Up to the beginning of October, 1942, the British "used 112 battalions in putting down recent uprisings."[81a]

The terrorist methods of the Government produced a violent reaction even upon the minds of those who did not participate in the popular upsurge and were opposed to it. The industrial workers in many important centres spontaneously declared strikes in protest against Government action in arresting national leaders. The steel factory of the Tatas at Jamshedpur furnishes a notable instance. There the skilled workers, drawn from all over India, stopped work for a fortnight and returned to work only when the management promised to try their best to get the Congress leaders released and a National Government formed. The complete strike in all the Ahmadabad mills continued for three months in spite of all attempts to break it and without any special call from the Trade Union.

There were strikes at other centres, too, though of shorter duration.[82]

C. CHARACTER AND ORGANIZATION

As mentioned above, Gandhi did not formulate any definite programme of action before he was arrested on 9 August. This is quite clear from a statement of Azad quoted above,[83] and is fully supported by Nehru when he says : "Neither in public nor in private at the meetings of the Congress Working Committee did he hint at the nature of action he had in mind, except in one particular. He had suggested privately that in the event of failure of all negotiations, he would appeal for some kind of non-co-operation and a one-day protest *hardal*, or cessation of all work symbolic of a nation's protest. Even this was a vague suggestion which he did not particularize for he did not want to make any further plans till he had made his attempt at a settlement. So neither he nor the Congress Working Committee issued any kind of directions, public or private, except that people should be prepared for all developments and should in any event adhere to the policy of peaceful and non-violent action."[84] It is somewhat surprising, therefore that Gandhi is stated even by his biographer Tendulkar not only to have drafted a set of confidential instructions but to have placed them before the Working Committee.[84a] Gandhi's general attitude is, however, clear from his speeches and Nehru's statements quoted above. He asked the people "to do or die", but strictly within the limits of non-violence. He also deprecated not only underground activities but all kinds of aecret movements.

The question therefore arises whether the actual occurrences which certainly did not follow the line laid down by Gandhi or adopted in 1930-32, were the result of different instructions issued by other individuals or bodies. It is a fact that instructions were actually issued

by different Congress Committees, but they widely differed from one another, indicating that the Committees had no general instructions before them but followed their own instincts. The Bihar Congress Committee, for example, issued a programme more or less on Gandhian lines.[85] On the other hand, a circular issued in Andhra contained a detailed programme which had a close agreement with the violent activities that specially characterized the 1942 movement. "It outlined a plan of campaign to be developed in successive stages, the fifth of which was to include the cutting of telephone and telegraph wires, the removal of rails and the demolition of bridges. Other items in the programme were 'to impede the war efforts of the Government' and 'to run parallel Government in competition with the British Government.'"[86]

Such circulars and specific instructions of local Congress Committees must have been many in number and probably varied in the emphasis they laid on violence. Besides, there were statements of important Congress leaders which stressed the gravity of the coming struggle. The Government of India collected and published them in order to fasten the responsibility of the occurrences of 1942 on the Congress.[87] Some of these are quoted below.

"Gandhi himself started with the declaration : "Do or Die. We shall either free India or die in the attempt."

"Gandhi also made it quite clear that even if violence and rioting occurred during the movement this would not deter him, that he was prepared to go to the extremest limit.[87a] Gandhi's interpretation of non-violence is also worth noting : "If a man fights with his sword single-handed against a horde of dacoits, armed to the teeth, I should say he is fighting non-violently......In the same way for the Poles to stand bravely against the German hordes

vastly superior in numbers, military equipment and strength, was almost non-violence." Thus "violence when employed against superior odds automatically becomes non-violence. Surely a very convenient theory for the rebels in 'an unarmed revolt.'

"During the period between the W. C.'s resolution on July 14 and the Bombay meeting of the A. I. C. C. almost all Congress leaders indicated in public speeches the nature of the struggle envisaged by Gandhi. Two things stand out prominently : 'The first is the insistence with which almost all speakers urged that every man should be prepared and willing to act on his own initiative ; the second is the extraordinary attention paid to the student community.' Nehru told the peasants in a mass meeting on July 27 that there would be a mass movement in the country within a very short time and it was the duty of every *kisan* to understand the movement properly and to respond to the call......There was no question of congressmen deliberately going to jail.........The Congress had now burnt its boats and was to embark on a desperate campaign. ...This will be our final struggle.

"Rajendra Prasad said : 'According to Gandhiji's view the movement would kindle a fire all over the country and would only be extinguished after either obtaining the independence of the country or wiping out Congress organisation altogether.'

"Vallabhbhai Patel, addressing a students' meeting in Ahmadabad, is reported to have asked them to pick any item from the struggles that had been fought so far, since 1919, and also to tell every Britisher to quit India immediately. Congress would not come any more to tell them what to do and what not to do and they must take the initiative and do what seemed proper under the circumstances ; they should consider themselves free men and disobey all Government's orders."

These statements certainly do not prove that either Gandhi or prominent Congress leaders, either individually or collectively, planned the campaign of 1942, as the Government maintained. But it cannot be denied that the statements were calculated to excite the people and, in a way, asked each individual and each local group to choose any programme they liked in order to make the British to 'quit India.' The revolutionary instinct, so natural to the masses, was not only invoked but also, at least indirectly, sanctioned. This might not have been unpalatable to many Congress leaders outside the intimate circle of Gandhi. It may be quite true, as Gandhi contended, that there is no evidence to support the Government view that "the August resolution of the Congress is responsible for the popular violence that broke out" immediately after. But on the whole one has to admit that the Congress leaders cannot be altogether absolved from all responsibility for the outbreak of 1942, which they probably neither planned nor guided. It is true that Gandhi would never have contemplated nor lent his support to any kind of violence. But the same thing cannot be said of all Congressmen or even Congress leaders.

The utterances of the Congress leaders also largely negative the view that the outbreak was a sudden and spontaneous popular reaction to the arrest of Gandhi and other leaders and not a premeditated course of rebellion. In reply to such a suggestion "the Government spokesman in the Central Assembly pointed out that the disorders had begun simultaneously at widely separated points, that the worst trouble had been located in a vital strategic area, that expert technical knowledge had been displayed and special tools used in the assault on communications, and that discrimination had been shown in the conduct of sabotage from which, for instance, the plant and machinery of private industrialists were exempted—all of

which seemed to be evidence of design and preparation."[88] Special attention may be drawn in this connection to the circular issued by the Andhra Provincial Congress Committee, mentioned above.[89]

These, however, do not constitute sufficient evidence for the view that the movement of 1942 was planned beforehand and directed by the Congress. There is not even any reasonable ground for such an assumption in view of the well-known views of Gandhi against secret organisation and violence of any kind. For it is difficult to believe that at the moment when Gandhi was again placed at the helm of affairs, any leader of the Congress, whatever may be his personal views, would dare conceive, far less carry out, any such plan as would openly flout non-violence, behind his back. The facts and circumstances, cited by the Government to prove it, easily lend themselves to other interpretations. The following seems to be a more reasonable and probable one.

As we have seen above, the old revolutionary—the so-called terrorist—party continued to play an important part throughout the period when non-violence of Gandhi dominated Congress politics, and had its underground organizations and Associations which repudiated Gandhi's leadership and his methods. As noted above, a number of revolutionaries had joined the Non-co-operation movement of Gandhi, but were disillusioned after its suspension. Many of them had rejoined the revolutionary groups whose main object was to keep alive the spirit of violence leading to armed rebellion against the British for achieving independence. Reference has been made above[90] to the Hindusthan Socialist Republican Association and its great heroes, specially Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Datta, who threw bombs at the floor of the Assembly Hall, New Delhi. They publicly stated that they repudiated non-violence of Gandhi and their chief object in throwing

the bombs was to rouse the nation from the lethargy and inactivity in the national struggle for freedom brought about by the policy of Gandhi. How great was the success of their revolutionary propaganda may be judged from the violent agitation all over India on behalf of Bhagat Singh. It has been admitted by the author of the official history of the Congress, an ardent admiring devotee of Gandhi, that at the time of the Karachi Congress in 1931, it was doubtful whether Gandhi or Bhagat Singh occupied the chief attention of India.[91] There were black flag demonstrations against Gandhi and he had to be taken away from the train before it reached the Railway Station where the demonstrators were waiting to receive him. Indeed Gandhi had to bend his head before the storm and supported the resolution about Bhagat Singh though he opposed a similar resolution a few years before even at the risk of losing his two such staunch supporters as Motilal Nehru and C. R. Das. As a matter of fact, Gandhi fully realized the growing influence of revolutionary ideas over young men, and it is not without good reason that the revolutionaries claimed that they practically, though indirectly, forced Gandhi to renew the struggle for freedom, in 1930 and again in 1942; for he feared that otherwise he would lose the leadership of the country and the initiative would pass into the hands of the revolutionary young men. Gandhi himself admitted that one of his motives in undertaking non-violent *Satyagraha* or Civil Disobedience was to ward off the evils he apprehended from the growing strength of the revolutionary ideas. In other words, he regarded his movement as a safety-valve for youthful energy and patriotic ardour which would otherwise flow through a different channel of a violent kind. It may be safely presumed that the professional revolutionaries had a large volume of support from the masses whose natural instinct of sympathy with them

and their programme was merely checked and restrained, to some extent, by their great veneration for Gandhi. How strong was this revolutionary feeling may be gathered from the fact that shortly after the arrest of Gandhi in 1942, the Socialist wing of the Congress under the leadership of Jayaprakash Narain, who was loved and esteemed by Gandhi, repudiated the Gandhian non-violence and spoke the language of violence and adopted a revolutionary programme, as will be described later.

Such being the situation, it is not difficult to imagine that resentment at the arrest of Gandhi and the absence of his restraining hand violently reacted on the amorphous groups of people who had no specific instructions to follow but were urged to pursue their individual inclinations. The revolutionaries must have taken full advantage of the situation. They had their own organizations and a ready technique of violence to be carried through different stages according to circumstances. We have it on the authority of Horace Alexander that "a section of younger Congressmen, some of whom were impatient with Gandhi's delays and hesitations', tried to procure arms and actually set bomb factories in several places.[92] It was alleged by the Government that the wife of a member of the Working Committee of the Congress was actively engaged in planning "the bomb outrages and other acts of terrorism."[93] This shows how narrow was the gap between the mentality of the professed revolutionaries and that of even important members of the Congress. The same thing is proved by the following instructions issued by Jayaprakash Narain when he took up the leadership of the 1942 movement after escaping from prison, as will be related later.

"Dislocation is an infallible weapon for people under slavery and subjection and with which he has all along fought against the ruling power. To efface all such

instruments as have been devised and adopted by rulers for keepig people in bondage and fleecing them, to dismantle all tools and machineries, to render ineffective all means of communications, to reduce buildings and godowns to ashes,—all these come under dislocation. So cutting wires, removing of railway lines, blowing up of bridges, stoppage of Factory work, setting fire to oil tanks as also to *thanas*, destruction of Government papers and files—all such activities come under dislocation and it is perfectly right for people to carry out these...."[94]

This type of mentality in the Congress camp did not originate with Jayaprakash, for we find it also in the Andhra circular, mentioned above. Its genesis need not be traced to any central organization of the Congress, but its adoption may be more readily explained by the well-known revolutionary ideology and tactics familiar throughout India.

The view propounded above readily explains in a rational manner the most peculiar characteristic of the 1942 Movement, namely an indissoluble and indistinguishable admixture of the Gandhian spirit of non-violent mass resistance and the revolutionary programme based on violence.

But whatever we may think of the revolutionary party's influence on the campaign of 1942 at the beginning, there is no doubt that when it was sternly put down within three or four months by the ruthless measures of the Government, it was driven underground, and a definitely revolutionary programme was deliberately adopted. In the second half of October the Police arrested 14 persons at Daltonganj on the charge of organizing "terrorist" plans and seized from one of them a bundle containing two loaded revolvers, 23 rounds of ammunition and five electric torches. During the same month, in Bihar alone, there was a bomb explosion in a village, and the Police seized a country-made pistol' with 380 cartridges in a house, 17 boxes

of Mills-grenades in a jungle, and a live bomb with ingredients for the manufacture of explosives. Political absconders, mostly from Bihar, went to Nepal and collected arms and ammunitions.[95]

These were revolutionary activities, pure and simple. Perhaps encouraged by these news and with a view to guiding the activities properly, six political prisoners escaped from the Hazaribagh Central Jail on 9 November, 1942. The most prominent among them was Jayaprakash Narain, the leader of the Socialist group in the Congress, to whom reference has been made above. He secretly visited different parts of India with a view to organizing a Central Action Committee. But the policy and programme he laid down were radically different from those of Gandhi. He openly repudiated Gandhi's policy of non-violence in a letter addressed "To All Fighters for Freedom" and dated "Somewhere in India, December, 1942."[96] "My own interpretation", said he, "of the Congress position —not Gandhiji's—is clear and definite. Congress is prepared to fight aggression violently if the country became independent. Well, we have declared ourselves independent, and also named Britain as an aggressive power; we are, therefore, justified within the terms of the Bombay resolution itself, to fight Britain with arms. If this does not accord with Gandhiji's principles that is not my fault."

He further observed, in the same letter: "I should add that I have no hesitation in admitting that non-violence of the brave, if practised on a sufficiently large scale, would make violence unnecessary, but where such non-violence is absent, I should not allow cowardice, clothed in Shastric subtleties, to block the development of this revolution and lead to its failure."

It is thus obvious that Jayaprakash and his associates moved far away from Gandhi and veered towards the policy and principle of the revolutionary party. That

the practical programme chalked out by them was in full agreement with this policy would appear from the instructions issued by Jayaprakash, quoted above, which were in right revolutionary style. But that the Congress Socialist group was full-fledged revolutionary in spirit and action was further proved when "a prominent absconding Socialist was arrested at Gaya on 14 November, 1942, and the Police got six live cartridges from him."[97]

Jayaprakash organized a "Central Action Committee" which met in Delhi and approved of his programme. About the genesis and nature of this programme Jayaprakash writes in September, 1943 :

"It is well known that the Working Committee had not prepared a plan of action but merely requested Gandhiji to assume command of the struggle. Gandhiji, in his turn, had also no plan of action. He had sketched the merest outlines in his address to the A. I. C. C. That outline and his articles in the *Harijan* were all that the people had before them and they formed the basis of that detailed programme which was prepared by those Congressmen who were left behind, and who hastily met in Bombay to lay the foundations of that "illegal" Congress organization which has functioned since then. That programme still is the framework of the National Struggle....the conscious basis of the programme which Congress organizations have followed since August, 1942, has been non-violence, as interpreted by the people in authority during this period."[97a] Although the orthodox followers of Gandhi, like Sucheta Kripalani did not approve of the programme, Jayaprakash stuck to it, visited Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, established a network of secret organizations to carry out his programme of the 'Peoples' Revolution', and finally fixed his headquarters in Nepal, where he trained the *Azad Dasta* or guerilla bands to carry on works of dislocation and paralyze alien administration.[98]

Jayaprakash was joined in Nepal by a number of revolutionaries and they carried on their activities for two months. He was, however, arrested with many of his associates in May, 1943, and put in Hanumannagar jail. But one night a band of revolutionaries, numbering 50 according to Government Report, raided the jail and rescued Jayaprakash with six others. He left for Calcutta and tried to establish contact with the Azad Hind Fauz, whose history will be told in the next Chapter. But he was arrested again on 18 December, 1943.[99]

Some revolutionary groups in Bihar continued the work of paralyzing British administration. One of these, under the leadership of Siaram Singh, performed many remarkable feats till 1944.[100] Similar isolated organizations were also formed in many other Provinces. But the movement launched in 1942 lost its vigour even before the end of the year, and no trace of it remained after 1944.

That the movement was practically crushed by force by the Government within two or three months, and failed to achieve any solid or tangible result, not to speak of the end for which it was launched, admits of no doubt. It was clearly recognised by the Congress itself as would appear from an appeal issued by the A. I. C. C. towards the end of November, 1942.

It is admitted at the very outset that it was not an easy task to paralyze the administration in urban areas and therefore, though "the towns were first to flare up into flames, it was inevitable that they should be overpowered with superior military force." Even in rural areas only for one or two months the apparatus of civil administration was brought to a standstill, but after that the popular movement was crushed by brutal military force. It is frankly admitted that "our ranks have been depleted ; our resources, in the form of local assistance in rural areas, and active enthusiastic support from village young men have

been reduced by repression."

The A. I. C. C. therefore proposed a last ditch fight on the basis of the following programme :

1. The peasantry should refuse to pay the land-tax and obstruct the revenue and police officers to collect the tax. Even a military invasion should be rendered ineffective by flight into the jungles.

2. Non-sale of food-crops and cattle.

3. Non-acceptance of paper money.

4. Emphasising upon the people the danger of food and cloth famine.

5. Organisation of *Swaraj Panchayat* and boycotting of revenue or police officers.

6. Roads, telegraphs and railways to be destroyed to defeat the British military.

But this appeal fell flat on the people. The movement had lost its momentum. The Congress had misfired its last shot and the battle was lost. Valour, courage and heroic self-sacrifice could not make up for the lack of leadership and necessary equipment.

D. GENERAL REVIEW

Gandhi himself deplored the violent character of the outbreak of 1942,[101] and both Jawaharlal Nehru[102] and Abul Kalam Azad[103] publicly expressed the same view. But some orthodox Gandhiites out-Heroded Herod himself. Thus Diwakar described the struggle of 1942 as predominantly non-violent and "incomparable with anything in past history.[104] He thus places it above the Civil Disobedience movement of Gandhi launched in 1930. He presumably forgets that Gandhi absolved himself from all responsibility for the struggle of 1942, and unless one is prepared to accuse him of deliberate falsehood, no credit—or discredit —for what actually happened in 1942 really belongs to him. This point must be clearly understood in any assessment of the struggle of 1942 or of the part played

by Gandhi in India's battle for freedom. Gandhi had fired his last shot (of course figuratively) in 1932 and missed. For ten years he remained a non-combatant. On 8 August, 1942, he again pulled his trigger but there was no shot because he forgot to put any cartridge in the chamber. Then he retired, finally, from direct and active participation in India's struggle for freedom.

Far from claiming any credit for the unique achievement of 1942—as Diwakar put it—both Gandhi and the Congress offered apology and explanation for the 'madness' which seized the people participating in it. The resolution of the Working Committee of the Congress, dated 11 December, 1945, referred to the events during 1942-45 "as a series of impulsive and heroic, albeit undirected, aberrations."[104a] Jayaprakash Narain most emphatically asserts that "to fasten the August programme on Gandhiji is a piece of perjury of which only the British ruling class can be capable."[104b]

It was repeatedly urged both by Gandhi and on behalf of the Congress that the violent items of the campaign would not have come into operation but for the terrorism of the Government. In support of this view it is pointed out that the popular reaction to the arrest of Gandhi and other leaders was very mild on the 9th and 10th and assumed a violent character only on the 11th after the Government had broken up peaceful processions by *lathi*-charge and firing. This view has been clearly expressed by Nehru[105] and also in the official history of the Congress.[106] But it was by no means confined to the Congressmen or even to the Indians. Horace Alexander, a well-known British journalist, who toured India during the period, also says that it was the "repression let loose by the police that goaded to violent fury crowds that intended to act quite peacefully."[107] Gandhi himself wrote to Lord Linlithgow, that it was

the 'leonine violence' which goaded the people to acts of violence—even to the point of madness. He held "the drastic and unwarranted action of the Government responsible for the reported violence." Indeed the point was emphasized again and again by Gandhi in his prolonged correspondence with the Viceroy from 14 August, 1942, to 7 February. 1943.[108]

The followers of Gandhi honestly believed that the failure of 1942 movement was due to the absence of Gandhi. This may be legitimately doubted unless we have good grounds to believe that Gandhi had some brand new weapons in his armoury the potency of which was not tested before. As there is no evidence of this we can only surmise that Gandhi would have adopted some form of non-violent *Satyagraha.*

If the movement had remained strictly non-violent and under the leadership of Gandhi, there is no reason to suppose that it would have been more successful than those of 1921 and 1930 which had such an ignoble end. The non-violent *Satyagraha,* tried under the best auspices, had proved a failure, and it is futile to expect that the British who were not prepared to make any grant of freedom to India while the Japanese were knocking at the door of India would have cared much for the non-violent *Satyagraha* of Gandhi. They had indeed more reasons to be afraid of the violent outbreak of 1942, as by disrupting communications and in various other ways it impeded the war efforts to a very considerable extent. But even then they chose to fight rather than yield. The underlying principle of *Satyagraha,* namely the soul-force and the conversion of the enemy by silent sufferings, would probably have as much or as little influence upon Churchill, as it had upon Willingdon and Jinnah.

But apart from the speculation of what Gandhi's leadership might have accomplished, everyone must fully grasp

the all-important truth that Gandhi and the Congress leaders must, or at least should, have been fully aware of the possibility, if not certainty, of the arrest of Gandhi as soon as the "Quit India" movement took a practical shape or was even resolved upon. That such a contingency was actually foreseen by the Congress leaders is clear from their speeches quoted above, urging upon everybody to act on his own initiative if the leaders were clapped into prison. The absence of Gandhi cannot therefore be accepted as a valid excuse for failure. Far more damaging to the Congress is the plea that the arrangements for the campaign were not completed when the leaders were arrested. It would be perhaps more correct to say that the arrangements were not even begun. But by offering such an excuse the Congress stands self-condemned. It would be universally considered as the height of folly on the part of a Government to declare war before preparing the plan of campaign and making all necessary arrangements for the same. What would be the legitimate verdict of the public on the Congress if on its own admission—what was undeniably true—the A. I. C. C. passed a resolution sanctioning Civil Disobedience on a mass scale, and the leaders publicly urged the people to fight to a finish and "Do or Die", and yet even the *general plan* of the 'unarmed revolt' was not ready, not to speak of the *detailed programme*? Nothing but an almost insane credulity would make one seriously believe that the British Government would allow the Congress leaders, after they have declared open rebellion and asked the British to quit India, to go on making preparations on an elaborate scale to give effect to the formal resolution passed to that effect, without making the most desperate effort to nip it in the bud and crush it with all the force that they could command, particularly at a moment when they themselves were faced with one of the gravest crises in

their history. The Congress leaders must, or should, have known all this before they staked everything on this final campaign, as they put it, with a grim resolve to do or die. They neither did nor died, but cannot absolve themselves from responsibility for the death and sufferings caused to the rank and file during the outbreak of 1942.

It is not unlikely that Gandhi himself, in the solitude of his prison, fully realized this responsibility on his part, and it may be regarded as one of the reasons, if not the main reason, for his undertaking a fast for 21 days for self-purification. At least Azad, one of his closest associates, seems to take this view. After referring to the miscalculations of Gandhi, as shown above, in respect of the campaign of 1942, Azad observes: "He accepted the responsibility for what had happened and as was usual with him, he was planning to undergo the fast as an expiation for the situation. I could not see any sense in his fast on any other hypothesis."[109]

The revolt of 1942 threw up one prominent all-India leader, namely, Jayaprakash Narain, mentioned above. His appeal to "All Fighters for Freedom", referred to above, is a revealing document of first rate importance, throwing light on the gradual passing away of Gandhian non-violence which had hitherto dominated the Congress politics. He assigns two causes for the failure of the outbreak of 1942, namely, "lack of efficient organization and of a complete programme of National Revolution." As regards the first, he observes: "The lack of organization was so considerable that even important Congressmen were not aware of the progress of the Revolt, and till late in the course of the rising it remained a matter of debate in many Congress quarters whether what the people were doing was really in accordance with the Congress programme". As to the second, he points out that "*after the first phase* of the Rising was over *there was*

no further programme placed before the people. After they had completely destroyed the British Raj in their areas, the people considered their task fulfilled, and went back to their homes not knowing what more to do. Nor was it their fault. The failure was ours; we should have supplied them with a programme for the next phase."[110]

Jayaprakash no doubt hit at the two really weak points, but, as has been pointed out above, these two defects were inherent in the campaign itself as conceived by Gandhi. Incredible as it may seem to a layman, the great saint-cum-political leader, in the year 1942 A.D., launched a *dharma-yuddha* (Righteous War) of the Epic Age in which the adversary was trusted not to attack the enemy until he had time to fully prepare himself for it. The British, however, were only politicians and not saints, and their military tactics were not derived from the *Mahabharata* and the *Manusamhita*. They struck hard and mercilessly, without caring for laws and morality, ancient or modern. The people responded to the cry of "Do or Die", and flung themselves into the last battle for India's freedom as the Congress leaders themselves put it. But left to themselves, without any leadership or plan, programme and organization, they became victims to sufferings and outrages which beggar description, though their courage and sacrifices won them undying fame. The campaign of 1942 would go down in history as an instance of hopeless incompetence and utter mismanagement on the part of the Congress leaders.

But there is also a bright side of what may be termed the last fight for freedom in India against the British. The great revolt of 1942 was really a soldiers' battle. The General bungled, but all glory to the Soldiers who gave a good account of themselves and laid down their lives as martyrs to the cause of their country's freedom. The following tribute paid by Sardar Patel would find an

echo in many hearts : "Never before had such widespread uprisings happened in India in the history of the British Raj, as they did during the last three years. We are proud of the spirit in which the people reacted. ... The leaders were all of a sudden kidnapped from the midst of the people and people acted on the spur of the moment... ... Gandhiji may not be there to guide the next struggle. Non-violence had taken no doubt deep roots, but one had to face the reality that violence was the order of the day in the whole world. It would be like the Devil quoting the scriptures, if the world outside criticised India if she switched over from non-violent to violent attempt to regain independence."

IX. NON-CONGRESS POLITICS, 1943-45

1. THE MUSLIM LEAGUE

The 'Quit India' movement of Gandhi ended in failure and he was not destined to play any further active part in the struggle for India's freedom. Gandhi also miserably failed in the chief object of his political life, namely, the establishment of Hindu-Muslim unity. It was probably beyond the capacity of any political leader to achieve it, and Gandhi's failure need not cause any great surprise. The real surprise is the frequent change in the attitude of Gandhi in this respect in later years. From the very beginning of his political career in India he was the greatest champion of the cause of Muslims, both in and outside India, among the Hindus. As mentioned above, he was even prepared to sacrifice vital interests of India in order to placate the Muslims, and always held that the Hindu-Muslim unity was a *sine qua non* for the achievement of India's freedom.[110a] But suddenly, on 15 June, 1940, he made a public statement, quoted above,[111] in which he practically ignored the Muslims as an important political factor in India and even denied the necessity of Hindu-Muslim agreement for political

progress in India. Again, on 18 April, 1942, a few days after the departure of Cripps from India, he wrote in the *Harijan* that the "attainment of independence is an impossibility till we have solved the communal tangle." Curiously enough, in the same article he suggests that the communal differences will disappear "in the very process of securing independence", and if not, "it will *then* only be the time to quarrel if we must." Further, in that very article he wrote : "If the vast majority of Muslims regard themselves as a separate nation...and want to partition India on that basis, they must have the partition."[112] Yet within a fortnight a proposal of Rajagopalachari to negotiate with the Muslims on that basis was turned down by the A. I. C. C. by an overwhelming majority of 120 votes to 15.[113] As we shall see, before a year had passed the same proposal of Rajagopalachari received the blessings of Gandhi who himself carried on direct negotiations with Jinnah on the basis of Pakistan. In the meantime he astounded the whole of India by his declaration on 2 August, 1942, that 'he had no objection to Britain handing over power to the Muslim League or any other party provided it was real independence.'[114] But Gandhi did not wait even for a week to learn Jinnah's reaction to his over-generous offer before he launched his 'Quit India' movement.

As could be easily anticipated, the Muslims, generally speaking, kept themselves aloof from the movement. Khaliquzzaman Choudhury, who was justly regarded as one of the few genuine nationalist Muslims, at least at the beginning, writes : "I happened to be at Bhopal about the end of July when Mr. Jinnah also came there and we discussed the 'Quit India' movement and its possible effect on Muslims and our attitude towards it in case the Congress should ultimately decide to launch the campaign. We were in the throes of a dilemma : if we allowed the

campaign to succeed, so enabling Congress to coerce the British Government to yield to its demand to concede independence without any settlement of the Pakistan issue, the Muslim cause would go under for ever : but on the other hand if we opposed the movement there was a great risk of communal riots and widespread violence. After great cogitation we came to the conclusion that complete neutrality in the fight should be observed by the Muslims and no attempt should be made from their side to disturb the peace of the country."[115] Accordingly the Muslim League directed the Muslims to remain completely peaceful and not to indulge in any anti-Congress activities during the whole campaign.

In his big book, *Pathway to Pakistan*, Khaliquzzaman devotes only a single para to the outbreak of 1942 and refers to it as "a very poor show" which "petered out in a very short time."[116] The Muslim attitude was sought to be exploited by the British. Shortly before the outbreak the Inspector General of Police, U.P., asked Khaliquzzaman : "What help will the Muslim League offer to us in this "Quit India" campaign ?" The latter replied : "Would it not involve grave disturbances in the country if the Muslims openly came out to oppose the movement and surely in that case you would not guarantee that they would not be run in under criminal law for arson and murder ?" The Inspector General raising both hands exclaimed 'how could we do it' !"[117]

The Muslim point of view has been very frankly and clearly put forth by Khaliquzzaman as follows : "From the outbreak of war ... Gandhiji on several occasions had said, 'Without a workable arrangement with the Muslims, civil resistance will be resistance against the Muslims'. He was aware that such a workable arrangement had not been arrived at and that the relations between the two communities had become more strained after the visit of

Sir Stafford Cripps. But in spite of that knowledge and in spite of the fact that the Muslims were aware that Rajaji's proposals in the Congress to negotiate with the Muslims on the basis of Pakistan had been rejected, Gandhiji had decided to launch such a campaign, particulary dangerous when the country was threatened by Japanese attack and the fortunes of war were hanging in the balance."[118]

Immediately after the arrest of the Congress leaders Jinnah issued "a statement deeply regretting that the Congress had declared war on the Government, regardless of all interests other than its own, and appealing to Moslems to keep completely aloof from the movement."[119]

The League Working Committee met at Bombay on 20 August and passed a lengthy resolution endorsing these views. It was a scathing criticism of the policy pursued throughout by the Congress. The Committee interpreted the action of the Congress as a move to coerce the Government as well as the Muslims to submit to the demands of the Congress whose sole objective had been to secure power for itself and establish the Hindu Raj. The League Working Conmittee also made an appeal to the United Nations : "Having regard to the oft-repeated declarations of the United Nations to secure and guarantee the freedom and independence of the smaller nations of the world, the Working Committee invite the immediate attention of the United Nations to the demand of 100 millions of Muslims of India to establish sovereign States in the zones which are their homelands and where they are in a majority."[120]

The Hindu Mahasabha, which now dominated Hindu politics in the absence of the Congress, opposed the scheme of Pakistan as strongly as ever. In its annual meeting held in December at Kanpur, the President, Mr. Savarkar, spoke in bitter and provocative language : "The Moslem's duty," he said, "was allegiance to the nation. Their rights and responsibilities were

the same as those of other minorities, and they would be similarly represented on a democratic basis at the Centre. But the 'outrageous and treacherous' demand for Pakistan would not be tolerated."[121] It set up a committee headed by Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, 'to make a final effort for an Indo-British settlement on honourable terms.' Mookerjee also carried on talks with Jinnah. But both were fruitless.[122] The empty outburst of the Hindu Mahasabha only served to strengthen the power and influence of the Muslim League. One important evidence of this was the establishment of the Muslim League Ministry in Bengal, Assam, Sindh, and N. W. F. P. Although the Panjab Ministry had not yet gone definitely into the hands of the League, the sudden death of its Premier, Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan, on 26 December, 1942, considerably strengthened the influence of Jinnah even in that Province. Thus he exercised supreme authority over nearly the whole of the region constituting Pakistan, as conceived by him.

Jinnah was not perturbed by the almost unanimous opposition of the Hindus to the idea of Pakistan, for he very rightly concluded that the ultimate decision lay with the British and not with the Hindus. But some public utterances of two successive Viceroys made him somewhat nervous in this respect. In his speech at the annual meeting of the Associated Chambers of Commerce on 17 December, 1942, Lord Linlithgow went out of his way to stress the geographical unity of India, adding that a divided India could not carry the weight that it ought to carry, nor could make its way in the world with a confident expectation of success.[123] This statement roused great indignation among the followers of Muslim League, and spurred them to fresh activity.

At the session of the All-India Muslim League held in Karachi in December, 1943, was heard a new

slogan, 'Divide and Quit,' presumably as a counterpart of Gandhi's 'Quit India'. The League resolved to "establish a 'Committee of Action' to organize Muslims all over India to resist the imposition of a unitary constitution and to prepare for the coming struggle for the achievement of Pākistan." But undaunted by any such threat Lord Wavell, who succeeded Linlithgow as Viceroy, repeated the latter's view in his first political speech, namely, his address to the joint session of the Central Legislature on 17 February, 1944. He observed: "You cannot alter geography. From the point of view of defence, of many internal and external economic problems, India is a natural unit. That two communities and even two nations can make arrangements to live together in spite of differing cultures or religions, history provides many examples." "This provoked the Muslim League's official organ to remark: "This drawing in of geography, without reference to history and psychology, is a poor compliment to Lord Wavell's gift of statesmanship."[124]

2. THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Next to the Muslim League, the Communist Party of India (CPI) was fast growing to be the most powerful political organization outside the Congress. Its origin and history up to the Meerut Conspiracy Case has been discussed above.[125] The effect of this Case upon CPI was twofold. On the one hand, the prolonged trial of the Communist leaders from 1929 to 1933 gained for them wide sympathy of the Indian nationalists. Jawaharlal Nehru and Ansari joined the committee set up to arrange for the defence of the Communists under trial; even Gandhi visited them in jail and offered encouragements. More important still was the publicity and propaganda value of the long-drawn trial which the Communists fully exploited.

On the other hand, the CPI suffered a heavy blow,

at least for the time being, by the sudden removal of almost all its prominent leaders. It not only crippled the nascent organization and its activity, but made it difficult for the Communists to face new dangers and difficulties. The chief of these was the new ultra-leftist policy laid down for India by the Comintern. "The CPI's course was now clearly and authoritatively mapped out; it was to dissolve any remnants of the Workers and Peasants Party (WPP), sever connections with all elements of the bourgeoisie, and launch a full-scale attack on Gandhi, Nehru, and the Indian National Congress."[126] This new policy, pursued during 1928-34, was revealed in the "Draft Platform of Action of the C. P. of India" published in December, 1930. It described the Congress as a "class organization of the capitalists working against the fundamental interests of the toiling masses of our country." It called for "ruthless war on the 'Left' national reformists." "The road to victory", it declared, "is not the method of individual terror but the struggle and the revolutionary armed insurrection of the widest possible masses of the working class, the peasantry, the poor of the towns and the Indian soldiers, around the banner and under the leadership of the Communist Party of India.". So far as the present stage of revolution was concerned, its main objects according to the Platform were : "The confiscation without compensation of all the lands, forests and other property of the landlords, ruling princes, churches, the British Government, officials and money-lenders, and handing over for use to the toiling peasantry; cancellation of slave agreements and all the indebtedness of the peasantry to money-lenders and banks." Such a policy was sure to alienate the sympathy of all politically active elements in Indian society. "The Draft Platform was a bill of divorcement from the main nationalist movement."[127]

Thus, during the period 1930-33, when the Civil

Disobedience movement swept the country and the nationalist movement reached the highest peak, the CPI, instead of joining the fight for freedom, did its best to weaken and sabotage the greatest mass campaign India had ever seen.

The CPI established its influence over the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), and in 1931 organized its own Labour Front called the Red Trades Union Congress. But the genuine Trade Unions representing the majority of organized Labour seceded from them. After the Communist leaders convicted in the Meerut Conspiracy case were released, they tried to organize the party and strengthen the Red Trades Union Congress. They called for a wide strike of all textile workers on 23 April, 1934, and it received overwhelming response all over the country. The Government of India took alarm and the Communist Party, along with some dozen Trade Unions under its control, was declared illegal. The Communist Party thereupon went completely underground.[128]

The Communist Party soon realized that the extreme left and anti-Congress views entertained by them had practically isolated them from the political life in India which was gathering tremendous force under the leadership of Gandhi. The Communist High Commands also realized the position and adopted an altogether new plan. It may be described as a policy of infiltration into the Indian National Congress with a view to wrecking it from within. The first step in this direction was to make an alliance with the recently formed Congress Socialist Party dominated by Jayaprakash Narain. The task was not a difficult one. For many Indians, particularly those with a leaning to socialism, felt wide sympathy for Communist principles in general without any attachment to the party itself, and sought from Russia inspiration without active control or direction. The Congress Socialist Party, without any suspicion of the 'Trojan horse' policy on the part of

the Communists, welcomed their proposal and formed a United Front. Rules were laid down for joint action by the All-India Congress Socialist Party, the All-India Trade Union Congress, National Trade Union Federation and the Red Trades Union Congress. This United Front was not only a body for joint action on Party basis ; it also permitted individual Communist to become member of the Congress Socialist Party, and, therefore, also of the Indian National Congress. Thus while the Communist Party, being declared an illegal organization by the Government of India, could not function in its own name, it established its influence in the left wing of the Congress, and used the Congress organization itself for its own propaganda. Several Communists occupied high official positions in the Congress Social Party and some of them became members of the All-India Congress Committee. At about the beginning of 1937 the two Parties concluded the so-called "Lucknow Agreement" which, according to the Socialist interpretation, signified that they would eventually merge in a single organization. Unfortunately, secret documents of the Communist Party came to light which clearly showed that the United Front was being used only as a platform to serve its own ends. It opened the eyes of the Congress Socialists, and matters came to a head in 1938 over the election of the new Executive of the Congress Socialist Party. Jayaprakash Narain made a proposal in which the Communists were given one-third seats. The Communists produced their own list which gave the Communists a clear majority in the Executive. Under the open threat of secession by Jayaprakash and his party in case the Communist list was accepted, the Conference adopted, by a narrow majority, the composite list proposed by him. Two years later, in 1940, the Communists were expelled from the Congress Socialist Party and the United Front was dissolved. But the Communists carried with them the

branches of the Socialist Party in Andhra, Tamilnad and Kerala.[129]

The Communists also infiltrated heavily into students' organizations. The All India Students' Federation was hitherto dominated by nationalist ideas, but a Communist faction soon made its influence felt and the Students' Federation was clearly divided into two groups,—Communist and non-Communist.[130]

The split was complete and the two groups held rival Conferences. The Conference of the Communist students, in December, 1940, led by Hiren Mukherji and K. M. Ashraf, challenged the right of the Indian National Congress to speak for the whole of India and passed a resolution declaring "that the future India should be a voluntary federation of regional States based on mutual confidence." Thus instead of a single nation comprising the people of India as a whole, the Communists upheld the ideal of India as a multi-national State. This resolution was a clear bid to enlist the support of the Muslims by conceding the claim of Pakistan. In various other ways, too, the CPI conciliated the Muslims in an attempt to win them over to Communism. But it did not prove very successful.[131]

The Communists had also infiltrated into the Forward Bloc, founded by Subhas Bose, but he, too, like Jayaprakash Narain, soon grew wiser, and rid his party of the influence of the Communists.[132]

The CPI declared an open war against the Congress leadership. They wanted to "free the national front from the influence of bourgeois reformism and develop the political strength of the proletariat."[133] At the Ramgarh session of the Congress (1940) the CPI issued a new statement of policy entitled 'Proletarian Path.'

As a first instalment of the policy chalked out in the 'Proletarian Path' the CPI organized a general strike in the textile industry of Bombay in March, 1941. It

immobilized the majority of the textile mills in the Bombay area, and 150,000 workers were involved at its peak. These pronouncements and activities led the Government to take drastic action against the CPI. They arrested and detained under the Defence of India Rules 480 persons who were "acknowledged Communists or else active supporters of the Communist programme of violent mass revolution." The CPI was disorganized and seriously crippled.[134]

The Communists, all over the world, outside Russia, were puzzled by the Stalin-Hitler Pact in August, 1939. But they had to obey instructions from Moscow. So Hitler ceased to be a Fascist menace, and became a friend of peace, while England and France were the imperialist war-mongers. The Indian Communists were in a more happy position than their comrades in Britain and France. For Indian National Congress, as noted above, declared itself against the war, and the Communists could easily fall in with the popular opposition to the War and pose as genuine revolutionaries and anti-imperialists. As noted above, the CPI zealously played this role.

As a matter of fact the Policy of Proletarian Path,' adopted by them, called for a relentless war against the British in India, by a "political general strike in the major industries together with country-wide no-rent and no-tax action," followed by the "storming of military and police stations by armed bands of national militia in rural as well as urban areas, destruction of Government institutions, and actual offensive against the armed forces of the Government on the most extensive scale."[135]

But as soon as Germany invaded Russia on 22 June, 1941, all these were changed as if by the wand of a magician. The authorities of the International Communism demanded that the CPI must support the British war

efforts as they contributed to the defence of the Soviet Union, the Fatherland of Communism. The arrested CPI leaders, who were detained in Deoli camp, accepted this view or 'command', and issued instructions accordingly to the rank and file who were still hiding underground. These protested against this sudden *volte face*, but in vain. After all, blood is thicker than water, and Communism was higher than Nationalism; and so the scattered Communists ultimately fell in with the view of the leaders,[136] and on 15 December, 1941, passed the following resolution : "We are a practical Party, and in a new situation it is our task not only to evolve a new form of struggle for it, but also to advance new slogans. ......The key-slogan of our Party (now) is 'make the Indian people play a people's role in the people's war.'[137] The Imperial War became overnight a People's War by the magic wand of Communism.

The official attitude towards the CPI also underwent a complete change. The Communist leaders were set free, and on 24 July, 1942, the ban against the Communist Party was lifted. Henceforth the CPI functioned as a legal Party and enjoyed the favours of the Government of India. Persons kept in detention on account of Communist activities were employed in high offices, both civil and military, and the Communists were used by the Government as a counterpoise to the Congress. The strange spectacle was thus witnessed in India—the leftist Communist Party being anti-national and pro-imperial, and eating up the very words by which they had so long incited the people against the imperial and war-monger British.

During the great national upsurge of 1942, the Communists acted as stooges and spies of the British Government, and helped them against their own countrymen fighting for freedom. The part played by the Communists can be best understood from confidential correspondence

during the years 1942, 1943 and 1944 between P. C. Joshi, the General Secretary of the Communist Party in India and Sir Reginald Maxwell, Home Member of the Government of India. This file was seen by S. S. Batlivala, a former member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, who referred to its contents in an interview given to the press on 22 February, 1946. According to him, it is quite clear fron that correspondence that "an alliance existed between the Politbureau of the Communist Party and the Home Department of the Government of India, by which Mr Joshi was placing at the disposal of the Government of India the services of his Party members;" that "the various political drives undertaken by the Party in the name of anti-Fascist campaigns were a part of the arrangement which helped the Government of India to tide over certain crises;" that P. C. Joshi had "detailed certain Party members without the knowledge of the Central Committee or the rank and file of the Party to be in touch with the Army Intelligence Department and supplied the CID chiefs with such information as they would require against nationlist workers who were connected with the 1942 struggle or against persons who had come to India on behalf of the Azad Hind Government of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose."[138]

In a letter published in the *Bombay Chronicle* on 17 March, 1946, Batlivala added further that Joshi had, as General Secretary of the Party, written a letter in which he offered 'unconditional help' to the then Government of India and the Army GHQ to fight the 1942 underground workers and the *Azad Hind Fauz* (Indian National Army) of Subhas Chandra Bose, even to the point of getting them arrested. These men were characterised by Joshi in his letter as 'traitors' and 'fifth columnists."[139] Joshi's letter also revealed that the CPI was receiving financial aid from the Government, had a

secret pact with the Muslim League, and was undermining Congress activity in various ways.[140]

On the industrial front, the Communists, using the control they exercised over the AITUC, similarly exerted their utmost to keep the workers out of the national unrest. The Party which had called for strikes, strikes and more strikes, now demanded work, work and no strikes.[141]

The Communists did not rest satisfied with sabotaging the national movement for freedom. They sought to destroy the unity of India. "Not only did the Communists support the demand for Pakistan but went much further by saying that every linguistic group in India had a distinct nationality and was therefore entitled, as they claimed was the case in the USSR, to the right to secede."[142]

As most of the nationalist leaders were in jail or in hiding, the Communists had the field left to themselves, and were able to capture many organizations of the labour, students and peasants. They even infiltrated into the All-India Women's Conference and many members in non-party capacity set up literary and cultural organizations which might serve as centres of propaganda.[143] But this success was shortlived. After the war was over the Communist Party was thoroughly discredited and lost the good faith and esteem of the people for the anti-national part it had played in the recent struggle for freedom. So when, in 1945, the Congress began to function again, the Communist Party tried to curry favour with Gandhi and the Congress. But Gandhi was not impressed and the Communists were excluded from the Congress.[144]

The almost overnight transformation of the Communist attitude towards the War at the bidding of Moscow showed the Communist Party of India in its true colour,

and it failed to win a single seat at the general election to the Central Legislative Assembly in 1945. It lost the influence it had acquired in the Women's Conference and the various cultural organizations. The control over the working class also passed from their hands. For both the Nationalists and Socialists formed their own trade union centres (National Trade Union Congress and the Hind Mazdoor Sabha) which soon outstripped the All India Trade Union Congress in membership and importance.

X. BRITISH ATTITUDE AFTER 1942

When the year 1942 drew towards its close the political condition in India showed an outward calm after the storm. An interesting episode during the period immediately following the outbreak of 1942 was a prolonged correspondence[145] between Gandhi and the Viceroy, beginning on 14 August, 1942, each accusing the other as responsible for the violent disturbances in 1942 which both equally deplored. Gandhi failed to convince Linlithgow of his guilt and was profoundly moved by the "privations of the poor millions due to India-wide scarcity" and the 'tale of woe caused by the repressive measures of the Government' which, according to him, "displaces the Mosaic law of tooth for tooth by that of ten thousand for one". So on 29 January, 1943, he wrote : "If then I cannot get soothing balm for my pain, I must resort to the law prescribed for *Satyagrahis*, namely a fast according to capacity," stating the period to be from 9 February to 2 March, 1943.[146]

The Government offered to release Gandhi during the fast—a concession which the latter refused—but declined to set him free. There was a great commotion all over India and prominent Indian leaders appealed to the Viceroy and Prime Minister of Britain ; three members of the Governor-General's Executive Council resigned

in protest. But the Government stood firm and Gandhi survived the fast.

Lord Linlithgow retired from his Viceroyalty on 20 October, 1943, after holding that office for 7 1/2 years, longer than any other Viceroy. He left India in the grips of a dreadful famine for which the Government's scorched-earth policy was mainly responsible. There was an all-round economic distress caused by high prices and shortage of essential commodities. As Sapru remarked, Linlithgow left India much more divided than it was when he came here. As against all these there was hardly any positive achievement to his credit. He established peace after the violent outbreak, but it was the peace of the grave. Lord Wavell, who succeeded Linlithgow as Viceroy, was the Commander-in-Chief of India during the August disturbances in 1942.

The Great War was not yet over but the Allies had turned the corner and a victorious end was in sight. This had evidently a great reaction on the Congress. It had boycotted the legislatures, but now those members who were outside jail attended the Central Legislative Assembly and, in alliance with the Muslim League members, defeated a series of Government measures, including the Finance Bill. Even Gandhi's attitude changed. He gave up the demand for 'Quit India', and on 9 July, 1944, granted an interview to Stewart Gelder, a correspondent of the *News Chronicle*, London, in order to convey his new policy to the Viceroy. "It was his purpose", said he, "to help and not hinder the Allied war effort. He had no intention of offering civil disobedience. History could never be repeated ; he could not take the country back to 1942. The world had moved on during the last two years and the whole situation had to be reviewed *de novo*. Today he would be satisfied with a national Government in full control of civil administration and would advise

the Congress to participate in such a government if formed."[147]

"On 27 July (1944) Gandhiji wrote to Lord Wavell to the effect that he was prepared to advise the Working Committee to renounce mass civil disobedience and to give full co-operation in the war effort, if a declaration of immediate Indian independence were made and a national government responsible to the Central Assembly were formed, subject to the proviso that during the pendency of the war, military operations should continue as at present, but without any financial burden upon India."[148]

The very next day, 28 July, the Secretary of State for India told the British House of Commons that Gandhi's proposals "obviously did not form even the starting-point for a profitable discussion."[149] After this rude rebuff Gandhi probably realized that the only hope lay in an agreement with the Muslim League. During his fast in February, 1943, Rajagopalachari saw him in jail and got his blessings to his plan of negotiating with Jinnah on the basis of Pakistan, though it was rejected by the A.I.C.C. in May, 1942, as mentioned above. Rajagopalachari thereupon had been carrying on negotiations with Jinnah. This prepared the ground and so great was the change[150] wrought upon Gandhi that he himself now suggested to Jinnah that they should meet and talk over the matter. Gandhi's letter was most pathetic in tone and shows the importance which the Congress High Command now attached to the Muslim League. It was a striking contrast to the high and mighty attitude displayed by Nehru in rejecting Jinnah's offer of Coalition Ministry in 1937.[151] Six years had wrought a marvellous change in the balance of power in Indian politics. Gandhi wrote to Jinnah on 17 July, 1944 : "I have *always* been a *servant* and friend to you. Do not disappoint me."[152] Jinnah turned down

Rajagopalachari's proposal[153] as offering "a shadow and a husk, a maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten Pakistan,"[154] but he agreed to discuss the matter with Gandhi.

Gandhi's offer to negotiate with Jinnah on the basis of partitioning India created a sensation and particularly provoked the indignation of the Hindu and Sikh minorities in the Panjab and of the Hindus of Bengal. As could be expected, the most bitter criticism was made by the Hindu Mahasabha. Savarkar echoed the sentiments of the Hindus all over India when he asserted that 'the Indian provinces were not the private properties of Gandhiji and Rajaji so that they could make a gift of them to any one they liked.'[155]

The Gandhi-Jinnah talks commenced on 9 September, 1944, and continued till the 27th, but the two failed to arrive at an agreement. The concrete offer made by Gandhi was a partition of India into Hindusthan and Pakistan on a basis which did not materially differ from the Plan finally accepted in 1947. The main point of difference was the refusal of Gandhi to accept Jinnah's view that the Muslims formed a separate nation in India with the right to self-determination. The Gandhi-Jinnah talks had only two definite results. In the first place, both Jinnah and his League had an inordinate accession of strength at a time when they needed it most. "The League ministries in Bengal, Sind and the North-West Frontier Province were in none too stable a position. Moreover, the refusal of Khizr Hyat Khan, the premier of the Punjab, to change the 'Unionist Ministry' in the Punjab into a 'Muslim League Coalition Ministry', had not enhanced Jinnah's prestige."[156] But Gandhi's discussion with Jinnah on the basis of the partition of India put the latter on a high pedestal and gave him a position of vantage in Muslim politics. Secondly, the Viceroy, convinced more than ever that an agreement between the Congress and Muslim League was beyond the range of practical politics, took

the initiative to set the stage for the post-war settlement promised by the British. He formulated the plan of a transitional Government at the Centre, which, within the existing framework, would be representative of the political parties and vested with large powers and responsibilities. As it did not meet with the approval of the authorities at home Wavell decided to visit them personally in London. His departure was, however, delayed by two attempts made, respectively, by Sapru and Bhulabhai Desai to frame an agreed constitution for India. Both Jinnah and Ambedkar refused to co-operate with Sapru. The recommendations of the Sapru Committee were opposed by the Muslims for the rejection of Pakistan and recommendation of joint electorates with reservation of seats, and by the Hindus for granting parity to Caste-Hindus and Muslims in the membership of the Constitution-making body and the Central Legislative Assembly.

Bhulabhai Desai, the leader of the Congress Party, and Liaquat Ali Khan, the *de facto* leader of the Muslim League Party, in the Legislative Assembly, reached full agreement on a plan, the basis of which was that Desai and Jinnah should form an Interim Government at the Centre within the present constitutional framework, and appoint all the members of the Executive Council, all of whom, except the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief, should be Indians, but not necessarily members of the Legislative Assembly. Desai agreed to the parity of the Caste-Hindus and Muslims in the Executive Council. As Desai claimed that both Gandhi and Jinnah had approved of the plan, Wavell recommended it to the Secretary of State. But while the matter was under discussion between them, Jinnah publicly denied any knowledge of the Desai-Liaquat Pact. Gandhi admitted later that the Pact had received his blessings, but other Congress leaders repudiated it at the time. Desai, like Raja-

gopalachari, had to make an exit from the political stage.[156a]

Wavell then proceeded to London (23 March, 1945), in order to discuss his plan with the Cabinet. After discussions a general plan was agreed upon. It was also decided to summon a Conference of the leaders of all the parties, and for this purpose to release unconditionally all the members of the Congress Working Committee who were still in prison. Lord Wavell returned to Delhi on 4 June and broadcast his proposals on 14 June. Its main features may be summed up as follows :

A political conference of 21 leaders representing all Parties, would meet at Simla on 25 June to discuss the composition of a new Executive Council of the Governor-General. "It was intended that the new Council would represent the main communities and would include 'equal proportions of Caste Hindus and Muslims.' Except for the Viceroy and for the Commander-in-Chief, who would hold charge of the war portfolio, it would be an entirely Indian Council. The subject of external affairs, which had hitherto been administered by the Viceroy, would be 'in charge of an Indian Member of Council, so far as the interests of British India are concerned.' The new Council would work under the existing constitution ;.…It was also proposed to appoint a British High Commissioner in India, as in the Dominions, to represent Great Britain's commercial and other interests in India. Lord Wavell made it clear that the formation of this interim Government would in no way prejudice the final constitutional settlement ;…The main tasks of the new Executive Council would be first, to prosecute the war against Japan ; secondly, to carry on the government of British India (with its manifold tasks of post-war development) until a new permanent constitution could be agreed upon and come into force ; and thirdly, to consider (when the members of the Government thought it possible) the

means by which such agreement could be achieved."[157]

The Press and the public welcomed the proposals, but Gandhi on the one side and Jinnah on the other raised various issues in connection with them. Gandhi took objection to the classification, 'Caste-Hindus', whom the Congress was supposed to represent. Jinnah demanded that the Muslim half of of the Executive Council must all be members of the Muslim League. The Hindu Mahasabha felt aggrieved, both on account of its exclusion from the Conference, and of the idea of parity between Caste-Hindus and Muslims in the proposed Executive Council.

The members of the Congress Working Committee were released on 15 June and it met in Bombay about a week later. In spite of the misgivings of Gandhi on several points, on which he failed to obtain satisfaction from the Viceroy, the Working Committee decided that the Congress should participate in the Conference.

It is unnecessary to give a detailed account of the discussions in the Conference as it failed to come to an agreement. It will suffice to say that the Conference came to a deadlock over Jinnah's demand that all the Muslim members of the Executive Council of the Governor-General must be members of the Muslim League. The Congress claimed the right to include in its quota members of all communities. The Congress claim to nominate representatives of the Scheduled Caste was challenged by its representative, Sivaraj, who also demanded that the number of Scheduled Caste members should bear the same ratio to their population as the Muslim members bore to theirs. Jinnah further insisted that some effective safeguards, other than the Viceroy's veto, should be provided to protect Muslim interest from majority decisions of the Executive Council. It was, of course, impossible to reconcile all these claims. As the Viceroy expressed his inability to accept the demands of Jinnah, the Muslim

League refused to co-operate. On 14 July, 1945, the Conference met for the fifth and last time when the Viceroy announced that the Conference had failed. Thus ended the last effort of settlement by negotiations before the end of the Second World War, and, perhaps also, the last opportunity of preserving the integrity of India.

The failure of the Conference, however, immensely strengthened the position of the Muslim League. It was now quite clear that the Muslim League could make or mar the constitutional progress of India, as the Government gave it the power to veto any constitutional proposal which was not to its liking. It was also hoped and feared by many that its extravagant claim that it alone represented the Muslims of India would, in near future, be conceded, at least in fact if not in theory. No Muslim outside the League had, therefore, any chance of a political career in future. The Muslim League loomed large as the only door through which the Indian Muslims could enter into positions of power and profit. No wonder, therefore, that the "wavering and middle-of-the-road Muslim politicians tended to gravitate to the Muslim League." This was particularly welcome to Jinnah as the supremacy of the League was not yet securely established at the time, as mentioned above.

CHAPTER X

SUBHAS BOSE AND THE INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY (I. N. A.)

I. SUBHAS BOSE IN EUROPE

While Cripps was carrying on futile negotiations with the Congress leaders in India, Subhas Bose was engaged in negotiations of a different kind with Germany and Italy which had a far greater influence on shaping India's future destiny. His unwearied activities culminated in one the of most important episodes of the Freedom Movement in India, namely, the formation of the *Azad Hind Fauz* or the Indian National Army, generally referred to as I. N. A.

Reference has been made above to the political activities of Subhas Bose and we have seen how, after being twice elected President of the Indian National Congress, his fundamental differences with Gandhi, in respect of both policy and tactics, forced him to quit the Congress and form a new party known as the Forward Bloc.

When the war-clouds were gathering in Europe, Bose correctly read the signs of the time and looked upon the impending war between England and Germany as a great opportunity to strike a blow for the freedom of India. He believed in the wisdom of the old Irish cry—'England's necessity is Ireland's opportunity'—and tried to convert Gandhi and other Congress leaders to his poliey of securing the aid of England's enemies to fight against her. But Gandhi's strict adherence to non-

violence, and perhaps, to a certain extent, his sympathy for England in dire distress, stood in the way of accepting Bose's advice, even after war had actually broken out as Bose had foreseen.

The British Government naturally looked upon Bose as a dangerous revolutionary, and arrested him on 2 July, 19+0, under Section 129 of the Defence of India Rules. Even while he was in detention in the Presidency Jail, Calcutta, he was undergoing trials in two criminal suits brought against him by the Government. He decided to go on hunger-strike and on 26 November, 1940, addressed a long letter to the Governor of Bengal and his Ministers, two sentences of which read as follows : "The individual must die, so that the nation may live. Today I must die, so that India may win freedom and glory."[1] He commenced his fast on 29 November, 1940, but as he developed alarming symptoms, the Government released him on 5 December.

After his release Bose remained quietly in his own house in Elgin Road, Calcutta, which was under strict surveillance by the Police. He was last seen there on 16 January, 1941, but ten days later it was reported that he was not to be found in the house. His sudden disappearance long remained a mystery but his movements are now fairly well-known.

Bose left his house on 17 January, 1941, at about 1-25 A. M. and proceeded by car to Gomoh. Thence he went by Railway train to Peshawar, and then passing through Jamrud and by-passing the Landikotal Fort reached Garhi. He crossed the Indian border on foot, and motored down to Kabul. He then proceeded to Russia with an Italian passport, and on 28 March, 1941, flew from Moscow to Berlin. Bose's journey from Calcutta to Berlin, full of thrilling details, was a historic one, and its nearest parallel is the escape of Shivaji from the clutches of Aurangzeb.

Bose was well received by Ribbentrop, the right hand man of Hitler, and proposed that (1) he would broadcast anti-British propaganda from Berlin, and (2) raise 'Free Indian' units from Indian prisoners of war in Germany, while (3) the three Axis Powers would jointly make a Declaration of Indian Independence.

Neither Germany nor Italy agreed to the third proposal, but the other two were accepted. The idea of forming Indian military units got an impetus when Germany declared war against Russia on 22 June, 1941. Bose proposed to raise an Indian legion of three Infantry Battalions and a Company of Irregulars which would form part of the German Fifth Column Organization. He was confident of German victory and visualised the triumphal progress of German army across Russia to Central Asia, when his own legions accompanying it would invade India; he hoped that the Indian soldiers of the British Government would fraternise with them and turn against their own masters. Buoyed up with these ideas Bose asked for all Indian prisoners of war in North Africa to be brought to Germany at once. But at first disappointment awaited him. Although British officers and other loyalist influences among the prisoners had been removed, the Indian soldiers showed marked hostility to Bose when he visited their camp, and his speech was interrupted. Bose persisted in his endeavour, but changed his plan. He privately interviewed individual prisoners and made such a good impression upon them that recruits began to pour in steadily and two units were formed in January, 1942.

Bose's presence in Germany was not at first officially admitted, but it became well-known by the beginning of 1942. He attended parties and the Indian community acclaimed him as its leader—*Netaji*—and greeted him with *'Jai Hind'*,—a title and a greeting which have

found a permanent place in Indian vocabulary of the Freedom Movement. Many young men also volunteered for the legion.

The recruitment for Indian legion and its training were rendered possible by the whole-hearted sympathy and support of the German Government. Hitler's earlier non-committal attitude regarding declaration of Indian independence was probably due to the fact that in the secret negotiations between Germany and Russia at the end of 1940, India was included in the Russian sphere of influence when the British power collapsed. The declaration of war against Russia having freed Hitler from his obligation, he now received Bose with honours and treated him as an equal in German Government's dealings with him. Bose and his associates were permitted to use Berlin Radio for broadcasting to India without any censorship.

Bose had also founded Free India Centres in Rome and Paris and raised the legion to its full strength of 3000. But further activities in Germany were suddenly stopped when Bose heard of the phenomenal success of the Japanese against the British, culminating in the fall of Singapore on 15 February, 1942. He instinctively felt that the Far East would provide a more advantageous base for fight against the British, and his presence was needed there.

II. INDIANS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA.

The outbreak of war in the East in 1941 caused a great stirring among the Indians in these regions. Those living in territories freed from European domination organized themselves into associations with the main objects of contributing their quota to the liberation of India from the British yoke and serving the interests of the overseas Indians during the critical period of transition. Such associations were established in a large number of towns

as well as in villages, and attained great popularity. Out of these associations was born the idea of an Indian Independence League, of which they regarded themselves as branches. A definite shape was given to this idea by the great Indian revolutionary, Rash Bihari Bose, whose early activities in India and flight to Japan have been referred to above.[2] Rash Bihari settled in Japan, married a Japanese girl and became a Japanese citizen. But he never ceased to work for his motherland and it was mainly due to his inspiration and efforts that a Conference was held at Tokyo on 28-30 March, 1942, for the discussion of political issues.

The Tokyo Conference passed a resolution to form an Indian National Army under the direct command of Indian Officers who would conduct the campaign for the liberation of India. An Indian Independence League of overseas Indians was provisionally established throughout Japanese Asia, and it was decided to hold a fully representative Conference of Indians at Bangkok in June.

This Conference was held in Bangkok from 15th to 23rd June, 1942. It was attended by about 100 delegates from Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Indo-China, Philippines, Japan, China, Borneo, Java, Sumatra, Hong Kong and Andamans. Rash Bihari Bose was elected Chairman.

The Tricolour Flag of India was raised by Rash Bihari Bose and the Conference formally inaugurated the Indian Independence League (I. I. L) with a definite constitution. The object of the League was defined to be the attainment of complete and immediate independence of India. The Conference passed altogether 35 resolutions, including one inviting Subhas Bose to East Asia. The delegates, after returning from the Conference held mass meetings in their respective localities and explained the discussions and decisions of the Conference. This created tremendous enthusiasm among the Indians, who started local branches of the Indian

Independence League. There were ultimately over two hundred members of the League in Malaya alone.

The Conference at Bangkok was also attended by the representatives of the Indian soldiers who were captured by the Japanese but had renounced their allegiance to the British and espoused the cause of their motherland. This movement requires a more detailed explanation.

In December, 1941, when the Japanese invaded North Malaya, and defeated the British forces there, Captain Mohan Singh of the First Battalion, 14th Punjab Regiment, together with another Indian officer, a British Colonel and a number of soldiers, escaped, but after vainly trying to find their way out of the jungle to the safety zone, surrendered to the Japanese. The two Indian officers were taken to Bangkok by Giani Pritam Singh, a holy man who had set up an association there for the independence of India, of the type described above.

Both Giani Pritam Singh and Major Fuzihara, a Japanese military officer, tried to induce Mohan Singh to work for the independence of India. After a great deal of discussion Mohan Singh yielded to their persuasions. After the fall of Singapore on 15 February, 1942, Col. Hunt, on behalf of the British Government, handed over 40,000[3] Indian prisoners of war to Major Fujihara, representative of the Japanese Government, who, in his turn, handed them over to Capt. Mohan Singh. Mohan Singh now asked for volunteers from among the prisoners to join the Indian National Army (I. N. A.) or *Azad Hind Fauz* to be organized by him to fight, along with the Japanese army, against the British, in order to drive the latter from India. Many of them joined the I. N. A., but many refused to do so. It has been alleged that not only undue pressure was put upon the recalcitrant sepoys, but they were subjected to physical torture in varying degrees, in order to force them to join the I. N. A. Specific instances

of such oppression were given by the British Government during the trial of I. N. A. Officers after the War. There is hardly any reliable evidence in support of these allegations, and it is difficult to ascertain the extent, if any, to which this unjustifiable, nay criminal, course was resorted to by the organizers of the I. N. A. The allegation is stoutly denied by Shahnawaz Khan, who was himself, at first, unwilling to join the I. N. A. formed by Mohan Singh.[4] The net result of Mohan Singh's efforts was that about 25,000 volunteers offered their services before the Bangkok Conference, and by the end of August, 1942, forty thousand prisoners of war signed a pledge to join the Indian National Army under Mohan Singh. A number of young men, without any previous military training, also volunteered their services, and a Military Camp was opened for training them.

Captain Mohan Singh, after his return from the Tokyo Conference, called a conference of Indian military officers in April, 1942. It was at this conference that he first proposed the formation of the Indian National Army as a part and parcel of the Indian Independence Movement. It was a serious problem asking for a momentous decision on the part of the officers, and after a great deal of discussion and clarification the meeting dispersed without coming to any decision.[5]

In the Bangkok Conference Mohan Singh spoke for several hours, describing in detail "how he got in touch with the Japanese military authorities in Malaya and was able to form a small nucleus of the Indian National Army while the campaign was still going on and actually fought against the British while they were retreating from the north to Singapore."[6] The Conference adopted the following resolutions, among others :

"1. That an Indian National Army be formed comprising the Indian troops and civilians of East Asia.

Capt. Mohan Singh would be the Commander-in-Chief of this Army of Liberation for India. The Indian Independence League would make arrangements for the supply of men, material, and money required by the Indian National Army, and would request the Japanese Government to supply the necessary arms and equipment, ships and aeroplanes required by the Indian National Army which would be commanded entirely by Indian officers and would fight only for the liberation of India.

"2. That a Council of Action be established for carrying ont all necessary actions in connection with the Independence Movement and prosecution of the War of Independence."[7]

It was decided that this Council would consist of a President and four members. Rash Bihari Bose was elected the President and Mohan Singh, one of the four members, took up the portfolio of the Army as well as the position of the Commander-in-Chief. On the 1st September, 1942, the Indian National Army (I.N.A.) was formally established. The Military Department was organized with almost all its Branches. Arrangements were also made for an intensive training of the men of I.N.A. To the normal physical training of soldiers was added a type of mental training in order to rouse their national spirit and patriotism. For this purpose arrangement was made for lectures on national history with special reference to the condition of India under British rule. The trainees were urged to free their motherland from the foreign yoke and exhorted to adopt the three principles laid down by the Indian Independence League, viz. unity, faith and sacrifice.[8]

Unfortunately the progress of work was considerably hampered by several factors. In the first place, there was a considerable number of Indian Officers who were against the formation of I.N.A. ; some of them ultimately

turned traitor and deserted to the British.[9] Secondly, there was difference of opinion among the members of the Council of Action. This was accentuated by the inability or unwillingness of the Japanese Government to announce their decision regarding the maximum strength of the I.N.A. and publicly declare their policy towards India in unequivocal terms. Mohan Singh, impatient at the delay, sent in a note to the Japanese Government, "demanding a reply by the 23rd of December, failing which they would take independent action." Rash Bihari Bose and others tried to persuade Mohan Singh not to insist on a reply by a specified date, but Mohan Singh did not yield. Matters were brought to a head by some indiscreet and unfortunate remarks by the Head of the Japanese Liaison Office in Burma to the local Chairman of the Indian Independence League. "Mohan Singh wrote a most unfortunate letter to the President of the Council of Action, and issued an order to the Army which he left in a sealed cover. In this order he wrote that if he was arrested the officers should dissolve the Army (I.N.A.) and destroy all documents. He also enjoined on the Officers and men to take an oath not to join any Indian National Army if it were formed again."[10]

The President took a serious view of his action which, he considered, was beyond his powers and was against the discipline of the army, and had him arrested. Two other members of the Council of Action resigned, and thus there remained the President and only one member in the Council of Action.[11]

There were other troubles also during the succeeding period of six months. The young men were impatient and thousands wanted to be trained; when they were refused either for their unfitness or for want of accommodation, they abused the leaders and decided to form a Youth League with a view to controlling the whole movement. Rash Bihari Bose

had a tough job to reconcile the army and the young men and make them work in unison under the Constitution devised by the Bangkok Conference. "So a second Conference of the representatives of the Indian Independence League Territorial Committees was held in the month of April, 1943. After due deliberations, the Constitution was altered in such a manner as to introduce an administrative system, effecting improvements and despatch in the work."[12] But in spite of his unwearied efforts Rash Bihari Bose proved unsuccessful and he must have heaved a sigh of relief when Subhas Bose appeared on the scene. He voluntarily surrendered his position, power and responsibilities to the young leader, and himself retired from active life. But he never recovered from the great strain of these days, and died after a protracted illness on 21 January, 1945. It is only fair to remember that Rash Bihari Bose had laid the foundations of the organization on which Subhas Bose built up a huge structure.

III. SUBHAS BOSE IN THE EAST.

Subhas Bose sent a Radio message from Germany to the members of the Bangkok Conference accepting their invitation to join them. This did not, however, prove an easy job. The sea was guarded by the British ships and the only possible way was to risk a submarine voyage. For a long time the German Government hesitated, and nearly eight months passed before Bose could leave Germany. His departure was kept a profound secret. He talked frequently of his desire to visit the Russian front and had even recorded two speeches to be broadcast after he left. At last on 8 February, 1943, Bose, accompanied by Abid Hassan (founder of the Indian legion at Frankenburg) left Kiel in a German U-boat. The boat made a wide detour in the Atlantic to avoid the British ships, and met the Japanese submarine, 129, which,

by previous arrangement, was waiting at a place four hundred miles S. S. W. of Madagascar. On 28 April Bose and his colleague were transferred by the rubber dinghy to the Japanese submarine which took them across the Indian Ocean to Sumatra. They were met by a Japanese Officer and arrived at Tokyo on 13 June, 1943.

Subhas Bose was received by the Japanese Premier Tojo on the day after his arrival. Tojo was frank and said that whether India was invaded or not, she would come under Japanese control on the defeat of the British. But, he added, Japan had no demands to make on her beyond the necessities of war, and intended to make her independent. He encouraged Bose's project of forming a Provisional Government which would take control of Indian territory as the Japanese forces moved on. As a result of this discussion Tojo made a declaration about India in the Japanese Diet to the following effect:

"Japan is firmly resolved to extend all means in order to help to expel and eliminate from India the Anglo-Saxon influences which are the enemy of the Indian people, and enable India to achieve full independence in the true sense of the term."[13]

Subhas Bose spoke from Tokyo, over the Radio, of his determination to launch an armed fight against the British from India's eastern borders. The overseas Indians were thrilled with delight at the prospect of participating in this great venture. When Bose arrived at Singapore on 2 July, 1943, he was welcomed with tumultuous enthusiasm by an immense surging crowd who instinctively felt that at last the Man of Destiny had come to lead them on as victors to liberate their own motherland. On 4 July Rash Bihari Bose handed over the leadership of the Indian Independence Movement in East Asia to Subhas Bose and the latter took over the Presidentship of the Indian Independence League in the presence of

five thousand Indians who represented thirty lakhs of Indian nationals spread all over East Asia. He was hailed as *Netaji*—the supreme leader—as in Germany, and henceforth he was always referred to by this honorific title. Netaji revealed to the gathering his decision to form a Provisional Government of Free India and to lead the Indian National Army towards India. Next day, the formation of the *Azad Hind Fauz* was announced to the world; Netaji reviewed all the forces of the *Fauz*—the Indian National Army (I. N. A.)—and gave it the rousing war cry of "*CHALO DELHI*" (On to Delhi) and "TOTAL MOBILIZATION." On 25 August Netaji formally assumed direct command of the I.N.A. Immediately after taking over the leadership of the movement Netaji put through a comprehensive plan of reogranisation and expansion of the I. N. A. with a view to achieving these two goals.

The Recruitment and Training Departments were hard put to it to give practical effect to these ideas. Training Camps were opened for men as well as women. Commands, orders and instructions were given in Hindusthani. After about six months of intensive training the recruits were absorbed into the I. N. A. Part-time training was also given to a number of young men in various branches and sub-branches—and it acted as a safety-valve to the impulses of youthful energy. Women volunteered in large numbers and formed the Rani of Jhansi Regiment.[13a]

The civil side of the Provisional Government also engaged his attention. Netaji re-organized the civil departments that were already functioning at the headquarters, viz. General, Finance, Publicity and Propaganda, Intelligence, Recruitment and Training. He not only strengthened these departments, but also added the following new ones : (1) Health and Social Welfare ; (2) Women's Affairs ; (3) National Education and Culture ; (4) Reconstruction ; (5) Supply ; (6) Overseas ; (7) Housing and Transport.

Instructions were issued to improve and expand the League organizations throughout East Asia on the above lines. The total mobilization of Indian man-power, money and material was carried in this way throughout Malaya and other countries. Netaji also addressed a series of public meetings all over Malaya and made regular Radio broadcasts addressed to Indians at home.

Having thus made a good start, Netaji thought of inaugurating the Provisional Government. Delegates from all over E. Asia were summoned to Singapore. After discussing the matter with them Netaji held a public meeting at Cathay Hall on 21 October, 1943. There, before an almost hysteric crowd who stormed the precincts of the Cathay Hall and presented indescribable scenes of overpowering feelings and emotions, Netaji read his famous Proclamation setting up the Provisional Government of Free India at Singapore.

The duty of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind (Free India) was thus described in the Proclamation :

"It will be the task of the Provisional Government to launch and to conduct the struggle that will bring about the expulsion of the British and of their allies from the soil of India. It will then be the task of the Provisional Government to bring about the establishment of a permanent National Government of Azad Hind constituted in accordance with the will of the Indian people and enjoying their confidence. After the British and their allies are overthrown and until a Permanent National Government of Azad Hind is set up on Indian soil, the Provisional Government will administer the affairs of the country in trust for the Indian people."

The Proclamation ended with a passionate appeal : "In the name of God...we call upon the Indian people to rally round our banner and to strike for India's freedom. We call upon them to launch the final struggle

against the British and all their allies in India and to prosecute that struggle with valour and perseverance and with full faith in final victory until the enemy is expelled from Indian soil and the Indian people are once again a free nation."[14]

On 23 October the Provisional Government decided at a Cabinet meeting to declare war on Britain and U. S. A. The declaration was broadcast over Radio by Bose himself and San Francisco Radio communicated it to the world.

"In a few days, nine world powers—Japan, Germany, Italy, Croatia, Burma, Thailand, Nationalist China, the Philippines and Manchuria—accorded their recognition to the Provisional Government of Azad Hind.

"On the 28th of October, Netaji flew to Tokyo where he attended the Greater East Asia Conference in the first week of November, and was received by the Japanese Emperor with all honours due to the Head of the State and the Provisional Government of Free India.

"At the Greater East Asia Conference, Premier Tojo announced on the 6th November, 1943, that Japan had decided to hand over the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to the Provisional Government of Azad Hind. Thus the Provisional Government acquired its first stretch of territory in Free India.

"Returning to Singapore towards the end of December, after visiting China and the Philippines *en route*, Netaji left for the Andamans where he set foot on the first Free India territory on the 31st December, 1943."[15] It was decided to rename the Andaman and Nicobar, 'Shahid' and 'Swaraj' Islands, respectively.

As the activities of the Provisional Governmenr grew, and particularly arrangements had to be made for the ensuing military campaign of the I. N. A. against the British, the need of money grew very acute. It is certain

that the Provisional Government, at no stage, had to circumscribe its activity for lack of funds. But how these funds were raised is a moot point to decide as there are diametrically opposite views. One view has been set forth as follows. "Now, as always, money was the greatest single problem. Thus Netaji was always demanding money from his audiences. At first donations flowed in freely from rich and poor, but the early eager generosity did not last and his persuasion gave way to threats. 'I shall wait for one or two more weeks, and I shall see.' he said on October 17th, 'and after that all the steps that I have to take in the name of India, I shall take.' On October 25th, he addressed the merchants of Malaya with severity: 'Legally speaking there is no private property when a country is in a state of war...if you think that your wealth and possessions are your own, you are living in delusion;.........Your lives and your properties do not now belong to you; they belong to India and India alone......' But it was no good: Bose required more than petty cash and recognized that he must make a systematic levy on Indian property. This (Lt. Col. A. C.) Chatterji (who later become Chief Administrator of Occupied Territory") was told to devise: there resulted the 'Boards of Management for Raising Funds.' to which from the beginning of 1944 Indians had to declare their assets. Levies of from ten to twenty-five per cent were imposed and collected with progressive vigour."[16]

The more favourable view is thus modestly set forth :

"In the sphere of 'Total Mobilization' of money and materials, Indian Independence League Fund Committees were set up in the Branches and Sub-Branches, with a Central Board of Management to control and direct them, and to issue final receipts to contributors. As in Man-power, so also in Money and Materials, contributions were voluntary. In order to maintain a sense of equity, a

form of assessment was adopted which was a sliding scale of percentage on total wealth. The Board of Management, as also the Committees in the Districts, was composed of leading citizens of the propertied and monied classes and office-bearers of the League. At the Board meetings, rules and regulations were passed, in accordance with the policy of the Movement and the representations that were made from time to time. The basis of valuation of properties, both movable and immovable, were fixed by the Board. However, there were people who contributed much more than their share, and still others who gave up all that they possessed. A few cases there were of people who evaded payments."[17]

The truth probably lies midway between the two. In any case it is now very difficult to ascertain the truth, though we have authentie records of magnificent donations.

IV. THE STATUS OF I. N. A.

There was no doubt in the mind of Netaji and his followers that the main task of the Provisional Government was to take part in the Japanese offensive campaign against British India. Steps were accordingly taken to equip the I.N.A. properly for this purpose. But an unexpected difficulty presented itself at the very beginning. When Netaji first raised the question of I.N.A. participating in the proposed Japanese campaign against Imphal (in Manipur, India), Field-Marshal Count Terauchi, Commander-in-Chief of all the Japanese forces in South-East Asia, was not very willing to accept the proposal. The soldiers composing the I.N.A., said he, would not be able to fight as well as Japanese soldiers as they had been defeated in the battle of Malaya and consequently were demoralised. Further, being accustomed to the ease and luxury of the British army they would not be able to stand up to the rigours of a Japanese campaign. Lastly, they were after all, once British merce-

naries and would find it difficult to resist the temptation of deserting to the British where there were better prospects of pay, food and an early chance of meeting with their families. Terauchi therefore proposed that the Japanese Army should do all that was necessary to liberate India, that Bose himself should assist by enlisting the goodwill and sympathy of the Indian people, that the main part of the I. N. A. should be left in Singapore, and that only espionage and propaganda groups should be used in the field.

This proposal, which virtually meant that Netaji should merely play the role of a fifth columnist, gave a rude shock to him. He made a proud and dignified reply. "Any liberation of India secured through Japanese sacrifices," said he, "is worse than slavery." He talked about the national honour of India, insisted that Indians must make the maximum contribution of blood and sacrifice themselves, and urged that the I. N. A. be allowed to form the spearhead of the coming offensive. Terauchi at last consented to the employment of one regiment as a test case. 'If this regiment came up to the Japanese standard', said he, 'the rest of the army would be sent into action.'[18] It was further understood that some I.N.A. troops should remain attached to the different units of the Japanese army as Irregulars. These included the following :

I. Field Force.

II. Armoured Vehicles Battalion. It consisted of troops and armoured vehicles.

III. Bahadur Group. This consisted of picked men who would be detailed in batches for making raids and doing sabotage work behind enemy lines and bringing back as much information and as many prisoners as possible.

IV. Intelligence Group. These men were specially trained for infiltrating deep behind the enemy

lines for collecting information, spreading propaganda amongst the British Indian troops and the civil population, contacting revolutionary workers in India wherever possible, and for bringing back information.

V. Reinforcement Group. It consisted of men who had volunteered to enlist in the National Army but were not directly absorbed in the units that were formed. They were sent out to the different units, as reinforcements were required.[19]

V. THE I.N.A. CAMPAIGN IN INDO-BURMESE FRONTIER.

1. General Plan

After the main issue was thus settled Netaji decided, in consultation with the military officers, that a new Brigade, known as No. I Guerilla Regiment, should be raised by selecting the soldiers from the other three Brigades, called after Gandhi, Azad, and Nehru, and that this Brigade should go into action first. The Regiment was raised at Taiping in Malaya, in September, 1943, and Shahnawaz Khan was appointed its commander. The soldiers themselves gave it the name, Subhas Brigade, in spite of the objections of Netaji who repeatedly issued instructions against this nomenclature. The Brigade was properly reorganized and an intensive spiritual and military training was given to the soldiers. Netaji frankly told the troops, both of their high mission to liberate their motherland as well as of the extreme wants, privations, and hardships which they would have to suffer. He advised all those who were not prepared for all these to stay behind, but the soldiers with one voice exclaimed : "Netaji, give us a chance and we will prove to the whole world that the so-called Indian mercenary soldiers can fight as gallantly for the liberation

of their country as any other soldier in the world."[20] Netaji also told the soldiers that they should feel proud that they were Indians and that "never at any time were they to accept any orders, racial superiority, or any other form of domination by the Japanese."[21]

The first batch of the Subhas Brigade left Taiping on 9 November, 1943, and the last batch on the 24th. The departure of the troops was the first occasion for a unique scene which was repeated later. "All the sick and physically unfit soldiers whom the doctors ordered to be left behind at Taiping came to the station and lay down on rails in front of the railway engine and refused to allow the train to start unless they too were allowed to go to the front. They said, 'We have given a pledge to Netaji that we will sacrifice ourselves for the sake of our motherland. How then could anyone leave us behind and deny us the privilege?' It was only after a great deal of persuasion and on an assurance being given that they would be sent up to join the Regiment as soon as they recovered, that they allowed the train to proceed."[22]

The main body of the Subhas Brigade arrived in Rangoon early in January, 1944. The soldiers had to cover at least 400 miles on foot, marching on an average 25 miles a day, with about 80 lbs of load carried on their backs. "In their eagerness to reach the front as soon as possible, they generally covered in two days the distance which the Japanese soldiers took five days to travel."[23]

Netaji arrived in Rangoon on 4 January, 1944, on a Japanese plane, and established his advance Head Quarters there. Three days later he discussed with General Kawabe, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Burma, the plan of co-operation between the I.N.A. and the Japanese army. Kawabe proposed that the 'I.N.A. forces should

be split up into small groups and attached to all the larger Japanese formations.' This was not agreed to by Netaji and ultimately the following was adopted as the basis of co-operation between the I.N.A. and the Japanese forces :

1. No I.N.A. formation should be split into smaller formations than a Battalion.

2. The command of all I.N.A. units should remain entirely in the hands of Indian officers.

3. The Japanese and I.N.A units would follow a common strategy, after it has been previously discussed and agreed to by Netaji and the Japanese Commander-in-Chief.

4. The I.N.A. was to be allotted an independent sector of the front.

5. Every inch of Indian territory liberated would be handed over to the I.N.A. for administration.

6. The only flag that would fly over Indian territory would be the Indian Tricolour.[24]

On 24 January, 1944, General Katakura; Chief of the Japanese General Staff in Burma, met Netaji and Shahnawaj and discussed, behind closed doors, the general strategy of the impending campaign against India, and the role that had been assigned in it to the I.N.A. Among other things, "Katakura revealed that it was a part of the Japanese plan to launch a heavy air attack on Calcutta simultaneously with the advance of land forces. Netaji expressed himself against this. He told the Japanese General that there should be no indiscriminate bombing of Indian civilians as it would lead to much panic and suffering, and would probably shake the confidence of the Indian people in him."[25] The idea was accordingly abandoned.

2. Subhas Brigade


After the general plan was finally settled at this

secret meeting, the Subhas Brigade was placed under the direct command, for purpose of operations only, of the Japanese General Head Quarters in Burma. Its commander, Shahnawaz Khan, saw the Japanese Commander-in-Chief who apprised him fully, of the military situation at the Indo-Burma border. Shahnawaz writes :

"He told me that the main concentration of British and American forces was at Sadiya-Imphal-Tamu and Tiddim and that they were preparing to attack the Japanese forces with the object of recapturing Burma. He told me that there were powerful British forces at Aijal (probably one Brigade) and Lungleh (one Brigade) which were threatening the left flanks of the Japanese forces, and were in a position to advance to Kalewa and cut off the main supply line of the Japanese forces, and that the intention of the Japanese army was to attack and capture Tiddim-Tamu and Imphal."[26]

The role allotted to the Subhas Brigade was as follows : The Battalion No. 1 was to proceed via Prome to the Kaladan valley in Arakan. The Battalions Nos. 2 and 3 were to proceed via Mandalay and Kalewa to the Chin Hill area of Haka and Falam.

On 3 February, 1944, on the eve of the departure of these Battalions from Rangoon, Netaji delivered his farewell speech to the three thousand soldiers who "in full military kit stood rigidly to attention for an hour and a half and listened to every word he said with rapt attention." He told them that they would be put to the severest test by the Japanese authorities, and the future of I.N.A.'s role in the battle for India's freedom would depend upon them. He made a stirring appeal to them in the following words : "Blood is calling to blood ! Arise ! We have no time to lose. Take up your arms...We shall carve our way through the enemy's ranks, or, if God wills, we shall die a martyr's death....The road to


CAMPAIGN OF THE
AZAD HIND FAUZ
MILES
0 20 40 80
92°
94°
96°
28°
26°
24°
22°
20°
Brahmaputra R.
NAGA
TRIBES
NAGA
HILLS
Kohima
Barak R.
Surma R.
CACHAR
Imphal
Ukhrul
MANIPUR
Manipur R.
Palel
Tammu
Dhaleswari R.
Aijal
LUSHAI
HILLS
Lungleh
Tiddim
Kalewa
Fort White
CHIN
Falam
Haka
HILLS
Kyattaung
Myittha R.
Chindwin R.
Chindwin R.
Irrawaddy R.
CHITTAGONG
Chittagong
HILLTRACTS
Mowdak
Daletme
Kaladan R.
Paletwa
Kaladan
Buthidang
Tetma
Kyauktaw
MANDALAY
BAY
OF
BENGAL
Akyab
Irrawaddy R.
Atul Roy.

Delhi is the road to freedom. On to Delhi." The soldiers assured him that they would never bring shame on India's fair name by turning their backs to the front or retreating before the enemy.[27]

On 4 February, 1944, the Battalion No. 1 of the Subhas Brigade left Rangoon by train for Prome. From Prome they marched on foot via Taungup and Myo Haing and arrived at Kyauktaw (in Akyab) on the Kaladan river, suffering casualties on the way from aerial bombing of the enemy. Here they formed the base in the middle of March, 1924, and inflicted a defeat upon the much-praised Negro troops from West Africa in the British army, while engaged in constructing a bridge over the Kaladan in order to join the two parallel roads running along the eastern and the western banks of the river. The enemy was driven from the eastern bank, leaving 250 dead in the field and large amount of stores. Sixteen of their boats were also sunk. The casualties of the I.N.A. were 14 killed and 22 wounded.

The Indian Battalion, reinforced by Japanese troops, then advanced along both the banks of the Kaladan for about fifty miles north to Paletwa. After a severe fight they captured it and also another place, Daletme in the neighbourhood. From Daletme they could see the frontier of India forty miles to the west and were very eager to reach it. The nearest British post on the Indian side was Mowdok about fifty miles to the east of Cox Bazar. It was captured by a surprise attack during night (May, 1944) and the enemy fled in panic leaving large quantities of arms, ammunitions and rations. "The entry of the I.N.A. on Indian territory was a most touching scene. Soldiers laid themselves flat on the ground and passionately kissed the sacred soil of their motherland which they had set out to liberate. A regular flag-hoisting ceremony was held amidst great rejoicing and singing

of the *Azad Hind Fauz* National Anthem."[28]

On account of the difficulty of supply as well as the impending counter-attack by the British forces, the Japanese forces decided to withdraw from Mowdok and advised the I.N.A. Commander to do the same. The I.N.A. officers with one voice refused to do so. "No, sir," they told their Commander, "the Japanese can retreat because Tokyo lies that way ; our goal—the Red Fort, Delhi—lies ahead of us. We have orders to get to Delhi. There is no going back for us."[29]

The Commanding Officer of the I. N. A. thereupon decided to leave one Company under the command of Capt. Suraj Mal at Mowdok to guard the flag and withdraw the remainder. The Japanese, admiring the spirit—almost a suicidal role—of the I. N. A. men, left one Platoon of their own troops to share the fate of the Indians. These Japanese troops were put under direct command of Capt. Suraj Mal. "It was probably the first time in the history of the Japanese army that their troops had been placed under command of a foreign officer."[30] Evidently moved by this heroic sacrifice and the brilliant record of the I. N. A. men, "the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Burma went to Netaji and bowing before him said : "Your Excellency, we were wrong. We misjudged the soldiers of the I. N. A. We know now that they are no mercenaries, but real patriots."[31]

Capt. Suraj Mal and his band of heroic fighters stayed at Mowdok from May to September, 1944. During this period they were constantly attacked by the British forces but always succeeded in repulsing them. On one occasion a small post of 20 men was attacked successively three times during the same day by the enemy, about 150 strong with heavy artillery and mortars, and the last one was preceded by aerial bombardment. All the attacks were repulsed, and when Suraj Mal hurried to the

post with a reinforcement of 50 men, he attacked the British base three miles away at dusk. It was so unexpected that the enemy ran helter-skelter in all directions.

The Battalions Nos. II and III left Rangoon on 4 and 5 February and reached Kalewa via Mandalay. They were instructed by the Japanese General to take over charge of the Haka-Falam front—two Japanese posts in Chin Hills—and their main task was to defend this sector against two British Brigades and thus prevent them from cutting the main supply line of the Japanese forces from Kalewa to Tamu and Fort White. They were also to carry out offensive operations on the Haka-Falam front. The I. N. A. was sorely disappointed that instead of being placed on the vanguard of the main Japanese army invading India—as it was mutually agreed upon—it was side-tracked to a comparatively minor task. The Japanese General plainly gave out that the I. N. A. was put in sole charge of a sector in order to test its efficiency, and if it passed the test it would be placed in front of the main Japanese army invading India.

The I. N. A. took over the charge of Falam and Haka from the Japanese. The area was infested by British Guerilla forces, and the I. N. A. by sudden attacks inflicted severe defeats upon them. Some of their exploits were highly creditable. Special mention may be made of the rout of Major Manning's forces at Klankhua, the successful defence of the post on the Klang Klang Road by 20 men of the I. N. A. against 100, and the capture of the British stronghold at Klang Klang.

The Japanese were satisfied of the military skill and efficiency of the I. N. A. and issued instructions "that the main body of the Brigade would proceed to Kohima and would be prepared, on the fall of Imphal, to advance rapidly and cross the Brahmaputra into the heart of Bengal."[32] Accordingly about 150 and 300 men of the

I. N. A. were left, respectively, at Haka and Falam, and the rest marched towards Kohima, the capital of the Naga Hills in Assam, where they arrived towards the last week of May, 1944.

Early in March, 1944, I. N. A. troops of the Bahadur Group and the *Azad Hind Dal* (Free India Party) accompanied the Japanese Manchurian Division to the Kohima sector and the combined forces took Ukhrul and Kohima.[32a] The *Azad Hind Dal* were intended to take charge of the conquered territory and do everything necessary till a regular Government was established, such as the feeding of the people, restoration of essential public services, the maintenance of law and order, and the reconciliation of the Indian population. As new areas were liberated the *Azad Hind Dal* took charge of them in the name of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind and did good work on the above lines. The Tricolour flag was hoisted on the lofty mountain tops around Kohima.

But by the end of May, when the regular I. N. A. troops arrived at Kohima, the military position of the Japanese forces in this area had changed for the worse. The Japanese air force having been transferred to the Pacific area to fight the Americans, considerable number of troops were sent by air to the besieged city of Imphal by the British. While the Japanese failed to capture Imphal, a powerful force of the British was counter-attacking from the direction of Dimapore and Kohima. The I. N. A. men at Kohima held their post most gallantly and beat back attack after attack. To make matters worse, the monsoon had broken out and it was impossible for the supply services to supply rations to troops in that area. So the Japanese forces retired to Tamu and the I. N. A., much against its will, had to withdraw to the same place (June, 1944). This they did with the greatest difficulty as the tracks were washed away by torrential

rains and the soldiers had to walk several hundred miles through knee-deep mud. A few days later the Japanese forces, and the I. N. A. with them, had to withdraw to the east bank of the Chindwin river. Thus ended the liberating campaign of the Subhas Brigade.

3. Gandhi and Azad Brigades

Of the two other Brigades the Gandhi Brigade started first for the front. It moved to Burma early in March, 1944, and after a short rest at Rangoon proceeded towards Imphal, early in April. Being told by the Japanese that the fall of Imphal was impending and they were perhaps too late for taking part in its capture, the I. N. A. men rushed forward by forced marches. But on arriving at Tamu they learnt that Imphal had not yet fallen and that severe fighting was going on in the vicinity of Palel, lying about half-way between Imphal and Tamu. The Brigade was put in charge of an independent sector to the south of the main Tamu-Palel road and instructed to carry out the Guerilla activity against the enemy forces on the Tamu front. A Japanese Brigade operated on the main road to the east. The first major incident was an attack on the Palel aerodrome by the I. N. A. in co-operation with the Japanese forces. After a heroic fight against heavy odds a section of the I. N. A. captured the aerodrome, but found no trace of the Japanese there. Not being strong enough to hold the aerodrome by themselves they withdrew after destroying all the aeroplanes they found there. The casualties were very heavy and the I. N. A. lost 250 men.

After this the British launched several heavy attacks against the I. N. A. At the sight of the white troops, whom they met for the first time, the I. N. A. men threw challenge to them and they did the same. "A grim battle at close quarters ensued. The British soldiers came almost up to the trenches (occupied by the I. N. A.),

but time and again they were beaten back with heavy losses."[33] The British fell back, but soon attacked again, this time supported by artillery and aeroplanes. The I, N. A. Platoon held firm and the enemy withdrew to their defences. But Lt. Ajaib Singh, the Commander of the I. N. A. Platoon, advanced and having approached the nearest British defence post shouted out challenge to them to come out and fight and not hide behind their defences and barbed wire fences. The British accepted the challenge and another grim battle started which continued till darkness fell.

By the middle of June the I. N. A. troops suffered much for lack of proper food and medicine and had become terribly weak. On the other hand, the British forces, being reinforced, took the offensive. Their first move was to capture the height occupied by the Gandhi Brigade around Mythun Khunou. A whole British Brigade, 3,000 strong, supported by heavy artillery and aeroplanes led the attack against 600 I. N. A. men. The situation became ext mely grave as all the commanding heights and strategic points were in the hands of the British. The Commander of the I. N. A. Brigade issued orders to capture the heights at any cost. Lt. Mansukh Lall, commanding a Platoon of 30 men, showed unparalleled heroism in capturing one of these heights. "While leading his small and semi-starved force up the steep ridge, he was wounded 13 times; through exhaustion and loss of blood, he staggered and fell to the ground." His men wavered, but "making a last supreme effort, with 13 bullet wounds on his body, he rose to his feet and personally led the final assault on the height which was to decide the fate of Gandhi Brigade that day."[34] The British forces retreated leaving the height in possession of the I. N. A.

Lt. Ajaib Singh also distinguished himself in the

fight. 'His Company advanced and by a very clever manoeuvre encircled the British troops who were besieging the Brigade Headquarters and a Company of the I. N. A. The British troops were caught between two rings of fire and suffered heavy casualties—about 250 killed or severely wounded. The battle had lasted the whole day and when evening came the British broke off their engagement and retired.'[35]

But though the I. N. A. warded off the British attacks, they had to face a more terrible enemy. Extremely heavy monsoon washed away the Tamu-Palel road, and the only supply line for the supply of rations and ammunitions, was cut off. The Commander of the I. N. A. Brigade, who "was at that time occupying approximately 200 square miles of Indian territory" and administered it through the *Azad Hind Dal* unit sent up by Netaji, refused to withdraw from this liberated area, and explained the whole situation to a Conference of the local Naga Chiefs. The Nagas implored the I. N. A. Commander not to retreat and said : "You are the army of India's liberation. You must not go back. We are extremely short of food ourselves, but we will collect whatever we can for you. We will live or starve to death together."[36] The Nagas were bitter against the British as well as the Japanese. They said : "We do not want the British, neither do we want the Japanese in our area. All that we would like to have is our own Raja, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose."[37]

Early in July, 1944, due to battle casualties, disease and starvation the front line strength of the Gandhi Brigade had diminished from 2,000 to 1,000 men, and these too were in very indifferent health. The British, fully informed of the condition, launched a fierce attack and encircled the entire Gandhi Brigade. Major Abid Hussain managed to break through the encirclement with one Company and, after a fierce battle, extricated the Gandhi

Brigade from a very dangerous and critical situation. In the evening the Gandhi Brigade counter-attacked the enemy. Abid Hussain and two other officers were awarded the much prized medals of *Sardar-e-Jang* for displaying outstanding gallantry in the day's fight.

Shortly after this the war situation changed for the worse, so far as the Japanese and the I. N. A. were concerned, as mentioned above. After the retreat of their forces from Kohima the full weight of the British offensive on a large scale fell on Gandhi Brigade which was eventually ordered to retreat to Kalewa.

The Azad Brigade which left Malaya shortly after the Gandhi Brigade arrived in Rangoon late in April, 1944, and reached Tamu, via Kalewa, about the middle of May. The task allotted to it was that of carrying out intensive Guerilla activity against the British forces around Palel, the area assigned being to the north of the Tamu-Palel road. But before the Brigade could launch any large-scale offensive it had to withdraw along with the Gandhi Brigade under circumstances which we may now proceed to relate.

4. IMPHAL

The main objective of the Jnpanese offensive in 1944 was the capture of Imphal, the capital city of Manipur. It is situated in a plain surrounded by mountain ranges, narrow roads through which were the only means of entrance into and exit from this area. The Japanese succeeded in blocking these roads and advancing within two miles of Imphal. The British made several attempts to evacuate Imphal, and but for the blockade of all the roads they would have certainly done so. The plan agreed to by the Japanese and Netaji was to capture all the British forces and war material intact at Imphal. "Netaji's own idea was that the I. N. A., as it was then, was not powerful enough to undertake a full-scale invasion of India,

and at the same time fight successfully against a possible Japanese betrayal. He was, therefore, of the opinion that the five British Divisions, composed of nearly one and a half lakhs of Indians, must be captured intact so that they could be persuaded to join the I. N. A. to fight for India's liberation, and that with the captured material all the deficiencics of the I. N. A. in artillery and other essential war material could be made up."[38]

Three special. Auxiliary Units of the I. N. A. were attached to the Japanese force attacking Imphal. Each of these Units had elements from the Bahadur, Intelligence and Reinforcement Groups. Troops of the I. N. A. crossed the Indo-Burma frontier and planted the National Tricolour flag for the first time on the liberated Indian soil on the 19th of March, 1944. There was tremendous enthusiasm and rejoicing and the men, before reaching the frontier, raced and vied with one another to be the first to set foot on the free Indian soil. The enemy retreated largely to Manipur through the Tiddim-Manipur Road. On 21 March Subhas Bose "proclaimed to the whole world that the *Azad Hind Fauz* had crossed the eastern frontier of India and was fighting on the sacred soil of India." On the same day Tojo, the Prime Minister of Japan, stated in the Diet that the Provisional Government would administer the occupied territory.[38a]

As mentioned above, the Japanese were somewhat over-sanguine about the capture of Imphal at an early date. Possibly the idea was due to the easy capture of Singapore, and would most probably have been realized, but for the entanglements of the Japanese with the Americans in the Pacific Ocean. The Japanese had to withdraw their aeroplanes from the Indo-Burma border to the Pacific zone and this enabled the British to bring full one Division by air from the Arakans. The Japanese calculation was that they would capture Imphal by the

middle of May at the latest and then the advent of monsoon would make British counter-attack impossible, enabling the Japanese to consolidate their position and, if possible, to cross the Brahmaputra into Bengal and Bihar. But the monsoon started before the fall of Imphal and by the end of June, 1944, it became almost impossible to supply rations and ammunition to the forces besieging Imphal. This, together with the constantly increasing pressure of the British reinforcements—rendered easy by the absence of Japanese aeroplanes—forced the Japanese, and the I. N. A. along with them, to withdraw to the east bank of the Chindwin.

Summing up the whole situation Shahnawaz Khan, the Commander of the Subhas Brigade, writes :

"Thus ended the main I. N. A. and Japanese offensive which had been started in March, 1944. During this period the I. N. A., with much inferior equipments and an extremely poor supply system, was able to advance as much as 150 miles into Indian territory. While the I. N. A. was on the offensive, there was not a single occasion on which our forces were defeated on the battle-field, and there was never an occasion when the enemy, despite their overwhelming superiority in men and material, was able to capture any post held by the I. N. A. On the other hand, there were very few cases where the I.N.A. attacked British posts and failed to capture them. In these operations the I. N. A. lost nearly 4,000 men as killed alone."[39]

5. General Review of the Campaign

The I.N.A. troops had to undergo incredible sufferings almost throughout their campaign. This was mainly due to insufficiency of transport and consequently of supplies. For example, when the I.N.A. took charge of Falam and Haka, the rations were not available there and had to be brought from the Regimental Headqu-

arters at a distance, respectively, of 50 and 85 miles from these places. The Japanese garrison was supplied by animal transport and coolies, but neither was available for the I.N.A. Haka-Falam is a mountainous area more than 6,000 ft. high. The I.N.A. men had to clamber up these heights, on an average 16 miles every day, to carry food to their comrades on the front line. The ration consisted of merely salt and rice and even these were not available on certain occasions. Sugar, milk, tea and meat were luxuries which the I. N. A. men hardly ever saw."[39a] The condition of the Indian troops at Falam has been described as follows by their commander, Shahnawaz Khan :

"It was bitterly cold and our men had only one warm shirt and one thin cotton blanket. They spent whole nights sitting around the fire as it was impossible to sleep on account of intense cold. Many of our sentries ......collapsed at their post...There was also an acute shortage of medicine and medical staff. The Company had one Naik and two nursing sepoys as the only medical staff....The men's boots were in a poor state, and some men had no boots at all. Their clothes were in tatters."[40]

In Myitha Haka men had no mosquito nets and 60 per cent. of them were in the hospital suffering from Malaria. It was not an unusual thing for the I. N. A. men to go without proper food for days together, living on a type of mountain grass known as Lingra.

The climax was reached when the I.N.A. arrived at Kohima, the capital city of the Naga Hills. Rations were exhausted. Small quantities of paddy collected from abandoned Naga villages boiled with jungle grass served as their food for several weeks. They had not even a little salt to mix with this food of paddy cum grass. All the medicines were finished. Men were attacked by huge flies of which there were millions in the jungles,

and as soon as they had the slightest wounds there were hundreds of maggots in their wounds in half an hour, "and in most cases there was no other alternative for the men than say *Jai Hind* and shoot themselves."[41]

The retreat from Kohima was disastrous from every point of view. Shahnawaz says: "Torrential rain had washed away all tracks. The men made fresh tracks which soon became almost a knee-deep mass of mud, in which many of the men got stuck and died there. At that time there was no transport of any type with us. Almost every man was suffering from dysentery and malaria. No one had any strength left in him to help any one else....I saw men eating horses which had been dead four days ago. There were hundreds of dead human bodies of Japanese and Indian soldiers lying on either side of the road."[42] The British took advantage of the situation and dropped leaflets from the aeroplane holding out all kinds of temptations to the weary I.N.A. men if they rejoined the British army. But they produced no effect,[43] and the I.N.A. men walked several hundred miles through knee-deep mud and slush under constant shell and machine-gun fire till they reached Tamu. Even then they were inspired by the hope that they would be sent up to the Palel front to fight for the liberation of their country. But they learnt at Tamu that the Japanese forces and I.N.A. were to withdraw to the east bank of the Chindwin, as stated above. This news broke men's hearts. Shahnawaz, the Commander of the forces, thus describes what followed:

"A strong deputation of officers and men came to me and suggested that the only honourable course left open to them was that all those who were still fit enough to walk a few miles should attack the enemy and perish fighting. The sick, they all realized, would die anyhow. I agreed to their plan, but the Japanese

Liaison officer came to know of it, and sent a frantic message to Netaji who issued strict and final orders to me to come back. As soldier there was no other alternative for me but to obey these orders and return to Kalewa."[44]

The incident is fully in keeping with the conduct of the I.N.A. soldiers throughout the campaign. Anyone who reads the history of this campaign is bound to be struck with one characteristic feature of the soldiers who dedicated their lives for the liberation of India. They were ready to risk everything, dare everything, and suffer and sacrifice to any extent in order to take part in liberating India. More than once the sick sepoys refused to be left behind when their comrades marched to the forward area lest they be deprived of the great honour and privilege of entering their motherland as her liberator. They sat on the railway tracks to prevent the trains from starting without them, and nothing but the promise to send them to the front as soon as they recovered would move them.[45]

The patriotic feelings of the I.N.A. may also be judged by the remarkable scene that followed the capture of Mowdok within the frontier of India, as described by Captain Shahnawaj.[46] The emotion of the I.N.A. men, when they first set foot on Indian soil, was thus described by Thivy, a member of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind, in October, 1945 :

"The uncontrollable urge to press forward and plant the Tricolour Flag of Free India on the soil of India was so great, that by the early hours of the morning of the 19th March, our valiant troops were rushing down the hillside, racing with one another to be the first to cross the border and fall prostrate to kiss Mother India. Who can describe the ecstatic joy with which that band of India's Freedom Fighters hoisted the National Flag

to the strains of the National Anthem ?" The writer continues : "This longed-for news was flashed to all the Territorial Branches of the League, and on the 21st of that month, which was exactly the fifth month of the formation of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind, this great occasion was celebrated with eclat by Indians all over East Asia. On this same day, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose issued the historic proclamation particularly directed to our countrymen in India. It informed them that the Army of India's Liberation was now fighting in Indian soil, and it called upon all Indians to give every assistance to, and fully co-operate with, the Army, so that British Imperialism in India is overthrown."[47]

These words indicate the spirit which inspired the Indian Independence Movement in South-East Asia.

Before concluding this topic a brief reference must be made to two other points. First, as to the moral basis of the formation of the I. N. A. Opinions might differ on the conduct of the Indian soldiers who had betrayed the British sovereign to whom they swore allegiance. It was undoubtedly the greatest crime of which a soldier can be guilty. But in the light of what has been stated above it is impossible to deny that in doing so they were inspired by the highest degree of patriotism which, by common consent, is regarded as one of the noblest passions of mankind. Both these facts have to be borne in mind in judging of the I. N. A. men.

Secondly, Shahnawaz Khan has accused the Japanese High Command that they deliberately withheld the regular supply of rations in order to break the morale of the I. N. A. so that they could offer to Netaji a good excuse for not taking the I. N. A. men with them in actual fighting as was their policy from the very beginning.[48] But he proceeds even further as the following observations will show :

"Lastly, and with a clear conscience I can say that the Japanese did not give full aid and assistance to the Azad Hind Fauz (I. N. A.) during their assault on Imphal. In fact I am right in saying that they let us down badly and had it not been for their betrayal of the I. N. A. the history of the Imphal campaign might have been a different one. My own impression is that the Japanese did not trust the I. N. A. They had found out through their Liaison officers that the I. N. A. would not accept Japanese domination in any way, and that they would fight the Japanese in case they attempted to replace the British. The Japanese were frightened of making the I. N. A. too powerful. They were too confident of themselves and thought that they would be able to capture Imphal without assistance and without much difficulty."[49]

While due consideration must be given to the fact that Shahnawaz was in a position to know all the facts relating to the subject, it is only fair to remember that the Japanese defence against this accusation is not available to us, and even Shahnawaz was not in a position to know or fully grasp the meaning of all the factors which the Japanese had to take into consideration in deciding their policy or which determined their action. It is difficult to entertain such serious and ungenerous charges against a friendly power, which certainly helped and highly honoured Netaji, without the most convincing evidence. For the present we do not possess any such evidence. For, obviously, Shahnawaz Khan, the victim of the so-called treachery of the Japanese, cannot be looked upon as an impartial witness.

6. The Last Phase.

The British began their counter-offensive in the cold season of 1944-45. Arakan was cleared of enemy troops and the British advanced towards Burma. The Japanese retreated. Rangoon, which was left in the hands of the I. N. A. after its evacuation by the Japanese, was occupied

by the British early in May, 1945. The I. N. A. men were disarmed and made prisoners. The Indian Independence Movement in South-East Asia collapsed.

Netaji left Burma in the hope of renewing the fight—a hope that was never to be realized. It is unnecessary to describe in detail his "historic twenty-one-day trek—a mere three hundred miles—from Rangoon to Bangkok, his flight to Singapore to carry on non-stop broadcasting campaign addressed to India against the Wavell offer in June-July (1945), the Japanese surrender of mid-August, and finally his last flight from Saigon."[50] After that there is a blank.

Netaji left Saigon with a single companion in a twin-engined Japanese Bomber carrying senior Japanese officers to Tokyo via Dairen in Manchuria. It arrived safely at Taihoku in Formosa at about 2 P. M. on August 18. After lunch it left Taihoku. This is all that is definitely known. What happened after this is uncertain. The Japanese official version, issued at the time, was that almost immediately after the plane had taken off, it caught fire. Netaji, badly burnt, somehow came out of the plane, and was removed to a hospital where he died that very night, between 8 and 9 P. M. This story was discredited in India from the very beginning. The Government of Free India evidently shared the suspicions of the public and appointed a Committee of Inquiry. The majority of the members held that the official version was substantially correct, but one member—the elder brother of Netaji—disagreed and pointed out many serious flaws in the method of inquiry.[51] There the matter rests and the end of this valiant fighter for freedom is shrouded in mystery. A number of Indians believe that he is still alive.

In spite of failure, the I. N. A. occupies an important place in the history of India's struggle for freedom. The formation of this force and its heroic exploits 'proved

beyond doubt that the British could no longer rely upon the Indian sepoys to maintain their hold on India. The universal sympathy expressed all over India for the I.N.A. Officers, who were tried for treason in the Red Fort at Delhi, gave a rude shock to the British, inasmuch as it clearly demonstrated that the Indians of all shades of opinion put a premium on the disloyalty of the Indian troops to their foreign masters and looked upon it as a true and welcome sign of nationalism. The honour and esteem with which every Indian regarded the members of the I. N. A. offered a striking contrast to the ill-concealed disgust and contempt for those sepoys who refused to join the I. N. A. and remained true to their salt. Incredible though it may seem, it is none the less true, that even the stories of oppression and torture suffered by the latter for their loyalty evoked no sympathy for them in the hearts of the Indians who remained absolutely unmoved. The British were also not unaware of the fact that after the re-occupation of Burma by the British troops there was widespread fraternisation between them and the I.N.A. and "its result was a political consciousness which the Indian Serviceman had never before possessed."[52] All these opened the eyes of the British to their perilous situation in India. They realized that they were sitting on the brink of a volcano which may erupt at any moment. It is highly probale that this consideration played an important role in their final decision to quit India. So the members of the I. N. A. did not die or suffer in vain, and their leader, Netaji Subhas Bose, has secured a place of honour in the history of India's struggle for freedom.

beyond doubt that the British could no longer rely upon the Indian sepoys to maintain their hold on India. The universal sympathy expressed all over India for the I.N.A. Officers who were tried for treason in the Red Fort at Delhi, gave a rude shock to the British, inasmuch as it clearly demonstrated that the Indians of all shades of opinion put a premium on the disloyalty of the Indian troops to their foreign masters and looked upon it as a true and welcome sign of nationalism. The honour and esteem with which every Indian regarded the members of the I.N.A. offered a striking contrast to the ill-concealed disgust and contempt for those sepoys who refused to join the I.N.A. and remained true to their salt. Incredible though it may seem, it is none the less true, that even the stories of oppression and torture suffered by the latter for their loyalty evoked no sympathy for them in the hearts of the Indians who remained absolutely unmoved. The British were also not unaware of the fact that after the re-occupation of Burma by the British troops there was widespread fraternisation between them and the I.N.A. and its result was a political consciousness which the Indian Serviceman had never before possessed."[8] All these opened the eyes of the British to their perilous situation in India. They realised that they were sitting on the brink of a volcano which may erupt at any moment. It is highly probable that this consideration played an important role in their final decision to quit India. So the members of the I. N. A. did not die or suffer in vain, and their leader, Netaji Subhas Bose, has secured a place of honour in the history of India's struggle for freedom.

BOOK V

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF FREEDOM

CHAPTER I

NEGOTIATIONS FOR SETTLEMENT

I. THE BRITISH DECISION TO QUIT INDIA

The end of the Second World War in 1945 also marked the end of India's struggle for freedom which had commenced just about a quarter of a century before. The Non-violent Non-co-operation and Civil Disobedience movements had practically come to an end in 1933. The violent revolutionary movement which had started early in the twentieth century spent its force by 1935. A combination of the above two movements in August, 1942, was ruthlessly crushed by the Government before the year was over. Lastly, the efforts of Subhas Bose to fight the battle for India's freedom with the help of foreign powers, culminating in the campaign of *Azad Hind Fauz* or Indian National Army on the eastern frontier of India, came to an end with their retreat along with the Japanese forces in July, 1944.

So, in the early months of 1945, when the end of the War was within sight, the prospect of India's achieving freedom from the British yoke looked very gloomy indeed. The power which refused to grant freedom to India in the darkest hours of its national peril was not likely to concede it in the days of its triumph and glory. Such misgivings must have haunted the minds of Indians in general. But the future of India was being shaped by unforeseen factors.

It did not take Britain long to realize that she had after all won a Pyrrhic victory. She saved herself and her empire by inflicting a crushing defeat upon Germany and Japan, but this fight to a finish exhausted her man-power and economic resources to such an extent that she

could never hope to recover her old power and prestige. Nobody could fail to perceive at the end of the War how the power-politics in Europe had suffered a radical change, and Britain lost her position as a first-rate world power. That positicn was transferred to U. S. A. and Russia, and both Britain and France sank to the position of a second-rate power, with the menace of Communist Russia gradually lengthening like a shadow over Western Europe. The British imperialism was chastened by these stark realities, and though the die-hard Premier, Churchill, might still refuse to preside at the liquidation of the British empire,[1] the British people and their more sober leaders thought otherwise. The great change that the War had brought over the outlook of the Britsh people was first manifested by the result of the General Election held in Britain in 1945. The world-wide reputation justly earned by Churchill by his magnificent contributions to the Allied victory naturally gave rise to the expectation that the Conservative Party led by him would easily retain its power. But this hope was dashed to the ground by the resounding victory of the Labour Party in the General Election. For the first time in its history the Labour Party secured a clear majority over all other parties combined in the British House of Commons. Accordingly Churchill's Government was replaced by the Labour Government with Clement Attlee as Prime Minister and Lord Pethick Lawrence as Secretary of State for India.

The Labour Government were now in a position to pursue an independent policy. The past attitude of the Labour Party towards India and the changed condition of Britain, referred to above, made it very likely that they would perhaps be inclined to grant freedom to India in fulfilment of the pledges given by the British Government during the War. This was also a fair deduction from

the Election speeches of the Party. In his speech at the Blackpool Conference on 23 May, 1945, Attlee clearly said that 'they would strive earnestly to enable India to get full self-government'.[2] The following observations of Leonard Mosley fairly reflect the general view of the British public :

"From the moment, in 1945, when the war was over and the post-war world began to reshape itself, no one of clear mind had any doubt that the Indian people would achieve thc independence from British rule...Even the Government of Winston Churchill had grumblingly and reluctantly conceded—not, it is true, without some goading from the United States—the need to accord to India the same hopes of freedom as those which British and Indian soldiers fought to achieve in Europe and Asia. With the advent in Britain in 1945 of a Socialist Government under Clement Attlee, the question of India's freedom was never in doubt....It was a policy with which the bulk of the electorate at the time agreed ; and from a purely practical point of view, even the diehards at home and the imperialist British in India could do little to stop it.......The British troops, which might hold the country against rebellion and insurrection, were clamouring, after years of fighting, to go home. And, above all, British power and prestige, in spite of victory, had been diminished by the war. The campaigns in Asia had shown up Britain's weaknesses. After Singapore, Burma and the sinking of her finest ships by the Japanese, Britain would never again be able to demonstrate in Asia the background of strength and influence—the *macht-politic*—which had for so long enabled her to rule a million people with one man-on-the-spot."[3]

Mosley has made a fair analysis—brief though it is —of the practical reasons or factors which induced Britain to concede independence to India. But he has not suffi-

ciently stressed one important factor. He has referred to the unavoidable absence of British troops 'which might hold the country against rebellion', but has carefully avoided all mention of the Indian sepoys which formed the major part of the British-Indian army and hitherto formed the chief instrument of quelling rebellion in India. The home-sickness of the British troops in India, to which he refers, was only a passing phase and could not be reckoned as a determining factor in formulating a permanent policy. It is likely, therefore, that what Mosley had in mind was that the formation of I.N.A. by Subhas Bose, to whose tremendous popularity in India he refers later, had shattered all hopes for using Indian sepoys in future against Indian rebels, and hence the paramount need of permanently locating such a powerful British army in India as the British could no longer afford to do. But whatever Mosley might have intended to convey, the fact was obvious that if the British could not count on the loyalty or allegiance of the sepoys and had to rely solely or even mainly on Brtish troops, they might as well give up all hope of ruling India ; for they had not the resources, either in men or money, to fight against the resurgent masses of India. The history of the preceding half a century had shown how the gradual awakening of the national consciousness of the Indians had finally developed into a rising of the masses. The Government had a foretaste of what such rising meant and of the damage done to the tradition... loyalty of the people both by Gandhi's policy of non-violence and by the violent acts of the revolutionaries in addition to the utmost strain on their resources caused by both. There was almost universal discontent against British rule and the Government had really no friends in the country, barring a few sycophants. The events of 1942 showed what troubles might be caused by the people themselves even though bereft of their

recognized leaders and their guidance. The peoples' war in 1942, overstepping the limits of non-violence put by Gandhi, must have opened the eyes of the British to the terrible dangers lurking ahead. It was sternly put down with the help of the sepoys, but then in 1945 it was quite clear to the British, that though the popular outbreaks were bound to recur from time to time, the sepoys might not be available, in future, to put them down and, what was worse still, the sepoys might even turn against the British as they did in 1944. In the meantime the hammering blows of Japan had shattered beyond recovery not only the British army and navy in the east, but also all the political and military prestige which, even more than material resources, formed the solid foundation of the British rule in India.

Thoughts like these must have been passing through the minds of the majority of the politically minded people in Britain interested in Indian affairs, and the broad practical commonsense, which is a characteristic trait of British character, must have suggested to them that the best course was to quit India with good grace rather than wait to be driven out with ignominy.

But whether this analysis is correct or not, the fact remains that in 1945 the opinion of the British public, except perhaps a microscopic minority of die-hards belonging to the school of Churchill, was ready for the final showdown. The Labour Party had pledged itself to Indian independence more than once, and the task of the Labour Government was rendered easier by the solid support of public opinion behind it.

So a spectacle, somewhat strange in recent Indian politics, presented itself during the period of two years that followed the end of the Second World War in August, 1945. The real struggle for freedom was over. and the battle for India's freedom was henceforth to be fought round the Council table, the principal combatants being

the Hindus and the Muslims and not the Indians and the British. The British were now sincerely anxious to grant freedom to India, but the Indians were slow to take it, for they could not decide among themselves what form it should exactly assume. The role of the British was that of a mediator between two disputants, sometimes degenerating into that of a judge in a boxing bout between two prize-fighters.

II. SETTING THE STAGE

The Labour Party did not let the grass grow under their feet. His Majesty announced in his gracious speech from the throne 'that his Government are determined to do their utmost to promote in conjunction with the leaders of Indian opinion the early realisation of full self-government for India.' The first practical step in this direction was the announcement, on 21 August, 1945, that the elections to the various Indian Legislatures would be held in the cold weather and that the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, would proceed to London for consultation with His Majesty's Government.

Wavell left for London on 24 August and returned on 16 September. Three days later he made an announcement on behalf of His Majesty's Government from which the following passage is quoted :

"It is the intention of His Majesty's Government to convene as soon as possible a constitution-making body, and as a preliminary step they have authorised me to undertake, immediately after the elections, discussions with the representatives of the Legislative Assemblies in the provinces, to ascertain whether the proposals contained in the 1942 declaration are acceptable or whether some alternative or modified scheme is preferable. Discussions will also be undertaken with the representatives of the Indian States with a view to ascertaining in what way they can best take their part in the constitution-making body.

"His Majesty's Government are proceeding to the consideration of the content of the treaty which will require to be concluded between Great Britain and India.

"During these preparatory stages, the Government of India must be carried on, and urgent economic and social problems must be dealt with. Furthermore, India has to play her full part in working out the new World Order. His Majesty's Government have therefore further authorised me, as soon as the results of the provincial elections are published, to take steps to bring into being an Executive Council which will have the support of the main Indian parties."[4]

Sumultaneously Lord Wavell issued a personal message emphasizing the fact that His Majesty's Government were determined to go ahead. They were well aware of the difficulties, but were determined to overcome them. On the same day Prime Minister Attlee broadcast an appeal to the Indians to make a united effort to evolve a Constitution which would be accepted as fair by all parties and interests in India.[5]

The impending elections served, in a sense, to clear the political sky in India. The Muslims outside the Muslim League could clearly feel which way the wind was blowing and flocked to the standard of the League. The number of Nationalist Muslims who still adhered to the Congress was almost negligible. Thus, on the eve of the election, the two rival Parties—the Congress and the Muslim League—stood face to face, representing, broadly speaking, the Hindu and Muslim elements of the population in India. Both the Parties made elaborate preparations for contesting the election. The Muslim League fought on the single issue of Pakistan. The Congress announced that it would contest the elections on the issue of the immediate transfer of power. The Working Committee of the Congress which met in September, 1945, reiterated

the Congress ideal of Indian unity, together with the proviso that it does not imply 'compelling the people in any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will.' The Congress leaders, however, were strongly against conceding the right of secession. They declared that henceforth they would not negotiate with the Muslim League but would make direct contact with the Muslim masses and would try to win them over by assurances contained in their election manifesto.[6]

The Congress had grave difficulties in fighting the elections. It had been in wilderness for more than three years, its orgrnizations had broken down as many leaders and members were still in prison, and its party funds had been sequestrated by the Government. But, as on more than one occasion in the past, the blunders committed by the Government came to its rescue just at the psychological moment when its fortunes were at a very low ebb. It was the trial of the Indian soldiers who had joined the Indian National Army (I.N.A.) organized by Subhas Bose in Singapore, whose exploits have been mentioned above. About twenty-five thousand Indian soldiers —prisoners of war in the hands of the Japanese—, who had joined the I.N.A., were rounded up after the collapse of the Japanese army in Burma. The military authorities, on the basis of evidence in their possession, brought charges against some of the Officers not only of waging war against the King but also of committing gross brutality on the members of the I.N.A. accused of desertion. Accordingly a Military Tribunal was constituted by an Ordinance and the first batch of three accused officers—a Hindu, a Muslim, and a Sikh—were put on public trial in the historic Red Fort at Delhi. The Indian public did not, so long, know anything of the I.N.A., but now came to regard them as a band of patriotic heroes fighting for the liberation

of their motherland, and a wave of sympathy for them swept the whole of India. There was an I.N.A Defence Fund; also I.N.A. Flag Days. The Congress took up the case of the accused and set up a panel of defence lawyers which included Bhulabhai Desai, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Nehru. The fame of Subhas Bose's I.N.A. and the fact that the Congress had taken up the cause of the accused excited great interest in the trial throughout India. The official evidence, given in course of the trial, brought home to the Indians, *for the first time*, the magnitude of the I.N.A. organization set up by Subhas Bose and the heroic feats performed by I.N.A. men. Popular enthusiasm now rose to the highest pitch. When the Muslim League associated itself with the defence of the accused, the agitation became all-India in character. There was great resentment at the persecution of the 'patriots' and wild popular demonstrations were held over a wide area, from Calcutta to Lahore and Bombay, and from Lakhnau to Madura, occasionally accompanied by popular outburst of violence and the firing of the police. The Government quailed before the storm. The accused were convicted but ultimately the sentence of transportation for life was remitted and they were simply cashiered.

There are some grounds to believe that the Government decision to put the I. N. A. men on trial "met with gratified approval, even from the Congress leaders."[8] It is difficult to explain their sudden change, for there was no love lost between Subhas Bose and the Congress leaders who were bitterly opposed to his alliance with the Japanese and threatened to fight them if they entered India. It was, therefore, not unnaturally suspected by many at the time that the Congress deliberately used the I.N.A. as an election stunt. Whether this is true or not, there is not the least doubt that the Congress swept the polls at the crest of the wave of enthusiasm created by the I. N. A. trial.

There is little doubt that "the widespread disturbances arising out of the trial of the I. N. A. prisoners, created so dangerous and tense a situation" in India that the British Government decided to take some fresh action.[8a] On 4 December, the Secretary of State announced in the House of Lords that a Parliamentary Delegation, drawn from all the Parties, under the auspices of the Empire Parliamentary Association, would shortly visit India. They would meet "leading political Indian personalities to learn their views at first hand, as also to convey in person the general desire of the people of England that India should speedily attain her full and rightful position as an independent partner State in the British Commonwealth."[9] For the first time the British Government officially declared the independence of India as their immediate goal, and there was a wide appreciation of His Majesty's present Government for pronouncing it and making an earnest endeavour to settle the constitutional problem in India as urgently as possible. Nobody, of course, thought much of the Parliamentary Delegation, or expected that any tangible result would follow its visit, which was really exploratory in character.

The Parliamentary Delegation of ten members, led by Professor Robert Richards, arrived in India on 5 January, 1946. It spent about a month in this country and met almost all the important political leaders. Jinnah insisted on two constitution-making bodies, and conceded that he did not want predominantly non-Muslim areas like the Ambala Division of the Panjab to be included in Pakistan. He also assured the Delegation that Pakistan would remain within the British empire with a British Governor-General.

"Nehru in his talks with the Delegation conceded that the British Government might have to declare for Pakistan, but that there would have to be a plebiscite in border districts to confirm it."[10]

In the meantime elections to the Central Legislative

Assembly were held, and the results were known towards the end of December, 1945. "The Congress won an overwhelming success in the General constituencies, the Hindu Mahasabha and other opposing candidates preferring in most cases to withdraw rather than risk defeat. The Muslim League won every Muslim seat, the Nationalist Muslims forfeiting their deposits in many instances. The Congress secured 91.3 per cent. of the votes cast in non-Muhammadan constituencies and the Muslim League 86.6 per cent. of the total votes cast in Muhammadan Constituencies. The final figures were, Congress 57 ; Muslim League 30 ; Independents 5 ; Akali Sikhs 2 ; and Europeans 8, making a total of 102 elected seats. In the previous Assembly the figures at the time of dissolution were, Congress 36 ; Muslim League 25 ; Independents 21 ; Nationalist Party 10, and Europeans 8.[11]

"Both parties were jubilant over the victories. The Central Election Board of the Congress in a bulletin issued on 6 January, 1946, declared that the Congress stood vindicated ; it was the biggest, strongest and most representative organization in the country. The Muslim League celebrated 11 January as its day of victory, and Jinnah's message for the occasion congratulated the League on winning all the Muslim seats in the Central Assembly."[12]

The results of elections in the Provinces confirmed the deductions made on the basis of the election to the Central Legislative Assembly. They proved that the Congress and the Muslim League were the only two Parties that counted in the country and, generally speaking, dominated, respectively, the Hindu and Muslim communities, except in the N.W.F.P. and Sindh. But it is noticeable that of the four Indian Provinces which were to constitute Pakistan, the sparate sovereign Muslim State, the Muslim League had not absolute majority in any, and could form Ministry in only two, Bengal and

Sindh, though in the latter it was more a matter of grace on the part of the Government than a claim of right. Another noticeable result of the elections was the fact that a large section of the Scheduled Castes supported the Congress.

The Viceroy announced on 28 January, 1946, that he would establish a new Executive Council formed by political leaders and also set up a Constitution-making body as soon as possible. But before further steps could be taken, a great sensation was created all over India by the revolt of a section of Indians serving in the Royal Indian Navy, followed by grave disturbances in the city of Bombay. "It started on 18 February, when ratings of the Signal School in Bombay went on a hunger-strike in protest against what their Central Strike Committee described as 'untold hardships regarding pay and food and the most outrageous racial discrimination,' and in particular against their Commander's derogatory references to their national character. They were joined later by ratings from other naval establishments. These persons got compltely out of hand. They took possession of some of the ships, mounted the guns and prepared to open fire on the military guards. A very ugly situation developed. Admiral Godfrey, Flag Officer-Commanding, Royal Indian Navy, broadcast to the ratings calling upon them to surrender. At the same time efforts were made to secure guns and planes and to rush reinforcements to the scene. There were even some who tried to fish in the troubled waters. It was due largely to efforts of Vallabhbhai Patel that, on 23 February, the ratings surrendered. In the meantime, contrary to the advice of Congress and Muslim League, strikes and *hartals* were organized in Bombay and unruly crowds went about looting and setting fire to banks, shops, post offices, police posts and grain shops. The police had to open fire several times and the military had to be called in

to assist before order could be restored. Over 200 persons were killed as a result of these disturbances, which had their repercussions in other centres such as Karachi, Madras and Calcutta.

"The Army and the Air Force were not altogether unaffected. There was trouble in several places, though not of a serious character."[13]

The troubles in the Navy began on 18 February, 1946. On the very next day, 19 February, 1946, "Lord Pethick-Lawrence in the House of Lords and Prime Minister Attlee in the House of Commons made a simultaneous announcement that in view of the paramount importance, not only to India and to the British Commonwealth, but to the peace of the world, of a successful outcome of discussions with leaders of Indian opinion, His Majesty's Government had decided to send out to India a special mission consisting of three Cabinet ministers to seek, in association with the Viceroy, an agreement with those leaders on the principles and procedure relating to the constitutional issue. The members of the Mission would be Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade, and A.V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty."[14] Whether the decision of despatching a Cabinet Mission was hastened by the revolt of the naval ratings it is difficult to say. It is, however, significant that the mission of Sir Stafford Cripps was also announced just four days after the fall of Rangoon in Japanese hands.

In any case the announcement about the Cabinet Mission was well received throughout India. It was felt that the grant of independence to India was now a certainty and would not be delayed beyond a period that was absolutely necessary to complete the preliminary arrangements.

III. THE CABINET MISSION

The Cabinet Mission arrived at New Delhi on .24 March, 1946. It is unnecessary to give a detailed account of the numerous interviews and meetings held by the Mission. It would suffice to give a summary of the views of the two principal political parties.

"The Congress case was presented on 3 April by its President, Abul Kalam Azad. It proceeded on the basis of independence and on the assumption that the future constitution would be determined by a constitution-making body. It was obvious from the Congress point of view that in the intervening period there should be an Interim Government at the Centre which would be responsible for all subsequent stages, including the setting up of the constitution-making body. With regard to the composition of the Central Government, elections having taken place everywhere, the wishes of the Provincial Governments should be ascertained. In an Interim Government, of say fifteen members, there might be eleven Provincial representatives, and four places might go to representatives of the minorities. This did not necessarily mean that there should be one member from each province; members would be chosen by the provincial governments, but they need not come from within the province nor need they be members of the legislatures.

"Regarding the future constitution, what the Congress had in mind was a federal government with a limited number of compulsory federal subjects such as defence, communications and foreign affairs, and autonomous provinces in which would vest the residuary powers. There should be a list of optional subjects, so that it would be open to any province to decide for itself the extent to which it would be federated over and above the subjects in the compulsory list. The Congress plan was that on the completion of the work of the constitution-making

body, a province should have three choices: (1) to stand out of the constitution, (2) to enter the constitution by federating for the compulsory subjects only, and (3) to federate for the compulsory as well as for the optional subjects."[15]

In course of discussion Azad admitted that under his proposal the Muslims would not get more than two or three seats in the Executive Council, but observed that arrangements could be made to give them more. He also suggested that the constitution-making body might be elected by the provincial legislatures voting together as one federal college, rather than elected on the widest possible franchise, as originally proposed by the Congress.

Gandhi, who was interviewed immediately after Azad, gave only his personal views. He denounced Jinnah's two-nation theory as most dangerous, for, in his view the Indian Muslims, save a microscopic minority, were all descended from Indians. He was also opposed to two constitution-making bodies. For the interim period Gandhi suggested that Jinnah should be asked to form the first Government with the ministers chosen from amongst the elected members of the legislature. If he refused, the offer should be made to the Congress.[16]

Jinnah argued the case for Pakistan somewhat as follows:

"The differences in India were far greater than those between European countries and were of a vital and fundamental character. Even Ireland provided no parallel. The Muslims had a different conception of life from the Hindus. They admired different qualities in their heroes; they had a different culture based on Arabic and Persian instead of Sanskrit origins. Their social customs were entirely different. Hindu society and philosophy were the most exclusive in the world. Muslims and Hindus had been living side by side in India for a thousand years, but if one

went into any Indian city one would see separate Hindu and Muslim quarters. It was not possible to make a nation unless there were essential uniting factors.

"How would His Majesty's Government put 100 millions of Muslims together with 250 millions whose whole way of life was so different ? No government could survive unless there was a dominant element which could provide a 'steel frame.' This frame had hitherto been provided by the British, who had always retained the key posts in the Civil Service, the Police and the Army. It was nécessary to have a 'steel frame' for an independent India, but Jinnah could see none. He had therefore come to the conclusion, after years of experience, that there was no other solution but the division of India. There were in India two totally different and deeply rooted civilizations side by side and the only solution was to have two 'steel frames', one in Hindustan and one in Pakistan. He agreed that it would be convenient to have common railways,, customs and so forth, but the question was, by what government would those services be controlled ? He certainly contemplated treaties and agreements governing such matters, which could be settled once the fundamentals of Pakistan were agreed."[17]

It is impossible to deny that there was a great deal of truth in Jinnah's assessment of Hindu-Muslim relationship, as has already been pointed out more than once in this and the two preceding volumes of this History. In any case, Jinnah's view was more realistic than that of Gandhi or Nehru.[18] The only point at issue which Jinnah always cleverly and carefully avoided was whether in view of India's geographical unity, and the fact that even if Pakistan were formed large numbers of Hindus and Muslims would have to live together in the same State as at present, an earnest attempt should not be made for the two nations to live under the same Govern-

ment under a constitution mutually agreed upon. If Canada with its two warring nations, the English and the French, and Switzerland, an artificial combination of three different nations, could evolve a formula of political integration was that inherently impossible in the case of Muslims and Hindus of India who had lived together within the natural limits of the same country for wellnigh seven hundred years? This question was not squarely faced by either Jinnah or the top-ranking Congress leaders like Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. It was not to the interest of Jinnah to raise this issue, and the Congress leaders were precluded from raising it because they never admitted the validity of the two-nation theory. This is the principal reason why all the past (and future) attempts for the solution of Hindu-Muslim problem proved a failure.

Among the other minorities the two most powerful and vocal ones were the Scheduled Castes and the Sikhs, but they were divided among themselves and neither could present a common demand except that they desired special provisions for safeguarding their rights and interests. The two extremists were Ambedkar who was opposed to any Constituent Assembly as it would be dominated by the Caste Hindus, and Giani Kartar Singh, who demanded a separate sovereign State where the Sikhs would be in a dominant position.

Jinnah assumed a truculent attitude. "On or about 10 April and while these interviews were still in progress, Jinnah called together in Delhi a convention of over four hundred members of the various legislatures recently elected on the Muslim League ticket. A lengthy resolution was passed which demanded a sovereign and independent State of Pakistan, comprising the six provinces of Bengal and Assam in the north-east, and the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan in the north-west of India; the setting up of two separate

constitution-making bodies by the peoples of Pakistan and Hindustan for the purpose of framing their respective constitutions, and the provision of safeguards for the minorities. The acceptance of the Muslim League demand for Pakistan, and its implementation without delay, were declared to be the sine qua non for Muslim League co-operation and participation in the formation of an interim Government at the Centre. Any attempt to impose a constitution or to force on them an interim Government contrary to their demand would leave the Muslims no alternative but to resist such imposition by all the means possible for their survival and national existence."[19]

Undeterred by these threats the Cabinet Mission calmly thought of various possible alternatives which would secure the essence of the Muslim League demand and at the same time be acceptable to the Congress. Ultimately they decided to offer Jinnah the two following alternatives to choose from.

(1) Pakistan as a sovereign State with the exclusion of those Districts where the non-Muslims formed a majority.

(2) Pakistan, comprising the areas demanded by Jinnah, but only as a separate federation forming a part of Indian Union.

But Jinnah decided against the idea of Indian Union. He declared that the domination of the Muslims by the Hindus could not be prevented in any scheme in which they were kept together, for "no amount of equality provided on paper would work. Equality could not exist between the majority and a minority within the same Governmental system." Further negotiations followed, but no agreement between the Congress and the Muslim League was found possible. So on 16 May, 1946, the Cabinet Mission issued a Statement containing its own proposals which had received the approval of His Majesty's Government.

It began with the announcement that "immediate arrangements should be made 'whereby Indians may decide the future Constitution of India and an Interim Government may be set up at once to carry on the administration of British India until such time as a new Constitution can be brought into being."

The Cabinet Mission then examined the question of a fully sovereign State of Pakistan as demanded by the Muslim League and pointed out that "the size of the non-Muslim minorities in a Pakistan comprising the whole of the six Provinces enumerated above would be very considerable as the following figures show :

North-western Area	Muslim	Non-Muslim.
Punjab	16, 217, 242	12, 201, 577
N. W. F. P.	2, 788, 797	249, 270
Sind	3, 208, 325	1, 326, 683
Br. Baluchistan	438, 930	62, 701
	22, 653, 294	13, 840, 231
	62·07 per cent.	37·93 per cent.
North-Eastern area		
Bengal	33, 005, 434	27, 301, 091
Assam	3, 442, 479	6, 762, 254
	36, 447, 913	34, 063, 345
	51·69 per cent.	41·31 per cent.

"The Muslim minorities in the remainder of British India number some 20 million dispersed amongst a total population of 188 million.

"These figures show that the setting up of a separate sovereign State of Pakistan on the lines claimed by the Muslim League would not solve the communal minority problem ; nor can we see any justification for including within a sovereign Pakistan those districts of the Punjab and of Bengal and Assam in which the population is predominantly non-Muslim. Every argument that can be used in

favour of Pakistan, can equally in our view be used in favour of the exclusion of the non-Muslim areas from Pakistan. This point would particularly affect the position of the Sikhs."

The Commission then considered the question of a smaller Pakistan by excluding non-Muslim areas. Apart from the fact that the Muslim League regarded it as quite impracticable, the Commission added :

"We ourselves are also convinced that any solution which involves a radical partition of the Punjab and Bengal, as this would do, would be contrary to the wishes and interests of a very large proportion of the inhabitants of these Provinces. Bengal and the Punjab each has its own common language and a long history and tradition. Moreover, any division of the Punjab would of necessity divide the Sikhs, leaving substantial bodies of Sikhs on both sides of the boundary. We have therefore been forced to the conclusion that neither a larger nor a smaller sovereign State of Pakistan would provide an acceptable solution for the communal problem."

The Commission then pointed out the serious consequences of the partition of India :

8.19a "Apart from the great force of the foregoing arguments, there are weighty administrative, economic and military considerations. The whole of the transportation and postal and telegraph systems of India have been established on the basis of a united India. To disintegrate them would gravely injure both parts of India. The case for a united defence is even stronger. The Indian armed forces have been built up as a whole for the defence of India as a whole, and to break them in two would inflict a deadly blow on the long traditions and high degree of efficiency of the Indian Army and would entail the gravest dangers. The Indian Navy and Indian Air Force would become much less effective. The two

sections of the suggested Pakistan contain the two most vulnerable frontiers in India and for a successful defence in depth the area of Pakistan would be insufficient.

9. "A further consideration of importance is the greater difficulty which the Indian States would find in associating themselves with a divided British India.

10. "Finally, there is the geographical fact that the two halves of the proposed Pakistan State are separated by some seven hundred miles and the communications between them both in war and peace would be dependent on the goodwill of Hindustan.

11. "We are therefore unable to advise the British Government that the power which at present resides in British hands should be handed over to two entirely separate sovereign States."

The Commission then considered the Congress scheme of Federation of India "under which Provinces would have full autonomy subject only to a minimum of Central subjects, such as Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications."

12. "Under this scheme Provinces, if they wished to take part in economic and administrative planning on a large scale, could cede to the centre optional subjects in addition to the compulsory ones mentioned above.

13. "Such a scheme would, in our view, present considerable constitutional disadvantages and anomalies. It would be very difficult to work a Central Executive and Legislature in which some Ministers, who dealt with compulsory subjects, were responsible to the whole of India while other Ministers, who dealt with optional subjects, would be responsible only to those Provinces which had elected to act together in respect of such subjects. This difficulty would be accentuated in the Central Legislature, where it would be necessary to exclude certain members from speaking and voting when subjects with which their

Provinces were not concerned were under discussion. Apart from the difficulty of working such a scheme, we do not consider that it would be fair to deny to other Provinces, which did not desire to take the optional subjects at the Centre, the right to form themselves into a group for a similar purpose. This would indeed be no more than the exercise of their autonomous powers in a particular way."

After this remarkably statesmanlike review of the proposals put forward by the Muslim League and the Congress, the Commission set forth its own suggestion which reads as follows :

15. "We recommend that the constitution should take the following basic form :

(1) There should be a Union of India, embracing both British India and the States, which should deal with the following subjects : Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Communications ; and should have the powers necessary to raise the finances required for the above subjects.

(2) The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature constituted from British-Indian and States' representatives. Any question raising a major communal issue in the Legislature should require for its decision a majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the two major communities as well as a majority of all the members present and voting.

(3) All subjects other than the Union Subjects and all residuary powers should vest in the Provinces.

(4) The States will retain all subjects and powers other than those ceded to the Union.

(5) Provinces should be free to form Groups with Executives and Legislatures, and each Group could determine the Provincial subjects to be taken in common.

(6) The constitutions of the Union and of the Groups should contain a provision whereby any Province could, by

a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly, call for a reconsideration of the terms of the constitution after an initial period of ten years and at ten-yearly intervals thereafter."

As regards setting up the constitution-making machinery the Commission rejected the selection of a Constituent Assembly based on adult franchise as it would delay the matter too long. They also decided against utilizing the recently elected Provincial Legislative Assemblies as the electing bodies, for there were two serious objections against it.

18. "First, the numerical strengths of Provincial Legislative Assemblies do not bear the same proportion to the total population in each Province. Thus, Assam, with a population of 10 millions, has a Legislative Assembly of 108 members, while Bengal, with a population six times as large, has an Assembly of only 250. Secondly, owing to the weightage given to minorities by the Communal Award, the strengths of the several communities in each Provincial Legislative Assembly are not in proportion to their numbers in the Province. Thus the number of seats reserved for Moslems in the Bengal Legislative Assembly is only 48 per cent of the total, although they form 55 per cent of the provincial population. We have come to the conclusion that the fairest and most practicable plan would be—

(a) to allot to each Province a total number of seats proportional to its population, roughly in the ratio of one to a million, as the nearest substitute for representation by adult suffrage.

(b) to divide this provincial allocation of seats between the main communities in each Province in proportion to their population.

(c) to provide that the representatives allotted to each community in a Province shall be elected by members of that community in its Legislative Assembly.

"We think that for these purposes it is sufficient to recognize only three main communities in India : General, Moslem, and Sikh."

The operative part of the Commission's Statement, may be quoted in full :

"19. (i) We therefore propose that there shall be elected by each Provincial Legislative Assembly the following numbers of representatives, each part of the Legislative Assembly (General, Moslem or Sikh) electing its own representatitves by the method of proportional representation witn single transferable vote :

TABLE OF REPRESENTATION

Section A

Province	General	Muslim	Total.
Madras	45	4	49
Bombay	19	2	21
United Provinces	47	8	55
Bihar	31	5	36
Central Provinces	16	1	17
Orissa.	9	0	9
Total	167	20	187

Section B

Province	General	Muslim	Sikh	Total.
Punjab	8	16	4	28
North-West Frontier Province	0	3	0	3
Sind	1	3	0	4
Total	9	22	4	35

Section C

Province	General	Muslim	Total
Bengal	27	33	60
Assam	7	3	10
Total	34	36	70

Total for British India	292
Maximum for Indian States	93
Total	385

(ii) It is the intention that the States would be given in the final Constituent Assembly appropriate representation which would not, on the basis of the calculations of population adopted for British India, exceed 93, but the method of selection will have to be determined by consultation. The States would in the preliminary stage be represented by a Negotiating Committee.

(iii) Representatives thus chosen shall meet at New Delhi as soon as possible.

(iv) A preliminary meeting will be held at which the general order of business will be decided, a Chairman and other officers elected, and an Advisory Committee (see paragraph 20 below) on the rights of citizens, Minorities and Tribal and Excluded Areas set up. Thereafter the Provincial representatives will divide up into three Sections shown under A, B and C, in the Table of Representation in sub-paragraph (i) of this paragraph.

(v) These sections shall proceed to settle Provincial Constitutions for the Provinces included in each Section and shall also decide whether any Group Constitution shall be set up for those Provinces and, if so, with what Provincial subjects the Group should deal. Provinces should have powar to opt out of Groups in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (viii) below.

(vi) The representatives of the Sections and the Indian States shall reassemble for the purpose of settling the Union Constitution.

(vii) In the Union Constituent Assembly resolutions varying the provisions of paragraph 15 above or raising any major communal issue shall require a majority of the repsesentatives present and voting of each of the two major communities. The Chairman of the Assembly shall decide

which, if any, resolutions raise major communal issues and shall, if so requested by a majority of the representatives of either of the major communities, consult the Federal Court before giving his decision.

(viii) As soon as the new constitutional arrangements have come into operation, it shall be open to any Province to elect to come out of any Group in which it has been placed. Such a decision shall be taken by the legislature of the Province after the first general election under the new constitution."

The Cabinet Mission proceeded to point out the important problems, both internal and external, which the Government of India will have to face in the post-war world, and therefore proposed immediately to set up an Interim Government having the support of the major political parties, in which all the portfolios, including that of War Member, will be held by Indian leaders having the full confidence of the people.

It is a sad commentary on the political acumen of the Congress leaders that the most cogent and powerful arguments against Pakistan should have been advanced, for the first time, by the Cabinet Mission whose realistic appreciation of the Indian problem offers a refreshing contrast to the emotional outbursts of both Hindu and Muslim leaders. Even after the Statement was issued, both the Congress and the Muslim League criticised it from their respective doctrinaire attitude. But so great was the wisdom of practical statesmanship displayed in the Statement that neither party was in a mood to reject it, as a whole, but only raised specific issues for discussion. The most important among these, which was ultimately responsible for the break-down of the whole plan, may be stated in some detail. The Congress Working Committee interpreted para 15 of the Mission's Statement to mean that in the first instance, the respective Provinces

shall make their choice whether or not to belong to the sections in which they are placed. The Cabinet Mission, however, pointed out that the Congress in interpreting para 15(5) ignored para 19(iv); and the Commission rightly stressed that "the scheme stands as a whole." This insistence on the original proposal of initial grouping disturbed the Sikhs who felt that they would not have sufficient safeguards against the Muslim majority in the Panjab and N.W.F.P. They rejected the Mission's plan and decided to fight. The Congress also disapproved of the compulsory grouping of Provinces, but was evidently more concerned with the exact status of the Interim Government *vis-a-vis* the Governor-General. On 25 May Azad wrote to the Viceroy suggesting that a convention might be established to recognize the responsibility of the Interim Government to the Central Legislative Assembly. In his reply dated 30 May, the Viceroy gave Azad assurances of "the greatest possible freedom in the exercise of the day to day administration of the country."[20]

IV. NEGOTIATION FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT

The composition of the Interim Government proved to be a bone of contention between the Congress and the Muslim League. The Viceroy, Lord Wavell, accepted the suggestion of Jinnah that there should be 5 each of the Congress and the League, 1 Sikh, and 1 Anglo-Indian or Indian Christian,—altogether 12—in the Executive Council. Nehru, on behalf of the Congress, rejected this scheme 'as it was even worse than the one proposed at Simla Conference', and suggested instead that there should be 5 Congress Hindus, 4 League Muslims, 1 non-League Muslim, 1 non-Congress Hindu, 1 Congress Scheduled caste, 1 Indian Christian, 1 Sikh, and 1 Congress woman, altogether 15. Wavell turned it down and suggested 6 (including one Scheduled caste)

Congress, 5 League and 2 Minorities. This was rejected by the Congress.

In view of the deadlock thus created the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy issued a Statement on 16 June, 1946, setting forth their own proposal to set up an Executive Council of fourteen persons (all of whom were mentioned by name), six belonging to the Congress including a representative of the Scheduled castes, five to the Muslim League, one Sikh, one Indian Christian and one Parsi. The list included the names of Nehru and Jinnah. "The Sikhs rejected the long-term plan and refused to agree to any Sikh representative joining the Executive Council."[21]

The paragraph 8 of the Statement ran as follows :

"In the event of the two major parties or either of them proving unwilling to join in the setting up of a Coalition Government on the above lines, it is the intention of the Viceroy to proceed with the formation of an Interim Government which will be as representative as possible of those willing to accept the statement of May 16th."[22]

But the Viceroy went out of his way to assure Jinnah that "the proportion of members community-wise would not be changed without the agreement of the two parties, and that no decision on a major communal issue could be taken in the Interim Government if the majority of either of the parties were opposed to it."[23] The Viceroy also wrote to Jinnah on 22 June, that the Congress would not be allowed to nominate a Muslim in the Interim Government.

It is difficult to account for this complete surrender of the Viceroy to Jinnah. Even one of the most appreciative associates of Lord Wavell was constrained to observe that he made these commitments to Jinnah "without sufficient and timely consideration." But taken along

with his later conduct, his present action may be looked upon as the beginning of a new policy of shift to the Muslims, which wrecked the Cabinet Mission Plan as well as his own career.

The Viceroy's correspondence with Jinnah became public, and, as could be easily anticipated, the Congress Working Committee passed a resolution on 25 June, rejecting the plan of Interim Government.

The Committee, however, decided that the Congress should join the proposed Constituent Assembly with a view to framing the Constitution of a free, united and democratic India.[24]

Immediately after the Congress decision, the Cabinet Mission told Jinnah that the scheme of 16 June had fallen through; but since both the Congress and the League had now accepted the Statement of 16 May, it was proposed to set up a Coalition Government, including both parties, as soon as possible.

The Cabinet Mission left India on 29 June, 1946. If it had not succeeded in achieving its object, its strenuous efforts extending over more than three months were not altogether barren of results. The Indian constitutional problem had been put in the form of concrete realities and a machinery had been devised to discuss them and come to a decision. More important still, the Indians now felt convinced that the Labour Government in Britain were really anxious to see India free. The question for India was no longer how to achieve freedom, but how to enjoy it without cutting each other's throat.

The All-India Congress Committee met in Bombay on July 6 and 7, and ratified by 205 votes against 51 the settlement with the British, i.e. the acceptance of the Cabinet Mission plan. Only the Socialist wing of the Congress opposed.

Unfortunately, at this critical moment, when a peaceful settlement of India's future was almost within sight,

it was upset by some indiscreet utterances of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. In 1937 his outright rejection of Jinnah's offer of Congress-League Coalition Ministry ruined the last chance of a Hindu-Muslim agreement. His observations in 1946 destroyed the last chance—though a remote one—of a free united India.

Jawaharlal Nehru, who was elected President of the Congress some time ago, took over the office from Azad at the meeting of the A.I.C.C. in Bombay (6 and 7 July). In winding up the proceedings of the Committee, Nehru made a long speech explaining the position of the Congress *vis-a-vis* the Cabinet Mission plan. He said "that as far as he could see, it was not a question of the Congress accepting any plan, long or short. It was merely a question of their agreeing to enter the Constituent Assembly, and nothing more than that. They would remain in that Assembly so long as they thought it was for India's good and they would come out when they thought it was injuring their cause. 'We are not bound by a single thing except that we have decided for the moment to go to the Constituent Assembly."[25]

Later, speaking at a press conference on 10 July, Nehru qualified his statement. He admitted that the Congress was bound by the procedure set down for election of members to the Constituent Assembly. But then he added : "What we do there we are entirely and absolutely free to determine."[26] Far more important however were his observations on paras 20 and 22 of the Cabinet Mission's plan. These paras read as follows :

20. "The Advisory Committee on the rights of citizens, Minorities, and Tribal and Excluded Areas will contain due representation of the interests affected, and their function will be to report to the Union Constituent Assembly upon the list of Fundamental Rights, clauses for protecting Minorities, and a scheme for the admi-

nistration of Tribal and Excluded areas, and to advise whether these rights should be incorporated in the Provincial, Group, or Union Constitution.

22. "It will be necessary to negotiate a treaty between the Union Constituent Assembly and the United Kingdom to provide for certain matters arising out of the transfer of power."

Referring to these Nehru observed that he would have no treaty with the British Government if they sought to impose anything upon India; as for the Minorities it was a domestic problem and "we shall no doubt succeed in solving it. We accept no outsider's interference in it, certainly not the British Government's interference, and therefore these two limiting factors to the sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly are not accepted by us."[27] These observations, at that particular moment, were very injudicious and impolitic, to say the least of it. Still more unfortunate were Nehru's observations on the question of grouping the Provinces. He hoped, he said, that there will be no grouping because some States in Groups B and C will oppose it. So far there could be no valid objection. But then Nehru added: "But I can say with every assurance and conviction that there is going to be finally no grouping there, because Assam will not tolerate it under any circumstances whatever. Thus you see this grouping business, approached from any point of view, does not get us on at all."[28] Such words, coming from the new President of the Congress, were justly calculated to rouse a genuine fear in the minds of Jinnah that the Congress might accept the Cabinet Mission plan, but was determined not to work it in the proper spirit.

"Dealing with the powers of the proposed Union Centre, Nehru said that Defence and Communications would embrace a large number of industries necessary for their support. Foreign affairs must inevitably include foreign

trade policy. It was equally inevitable that the Union must raise its finances by taxation, rather than by any system of contribution or doles from the Provinces. Further, the Centre must obviously control currency and credit; and there must be an over-all authority to settle inter-Provincial disputes and to deal with administrative or economic breakdowns."[29]

These words might be legally and constitutionally true, but if Nehru were determined to scare away Jinnah he could not have devised a better or more ingenious plan. The grouping of Provinces and a weak Centre with residuary powers to the Provinces or Provincial groups were, in the opinion of Jinnah, the only two meritorious features of the plan, which might make amends for sacrificing the idea of a sovereign Pakistan. Nehru's assertion or explanation negatived the latter and neutralised, to a very large extent, the value of the former.

In view of the importance of Nehru's statement and its tragic consequence of putting "Hindus and Muslims back in two fuming and suspicious camps," it would not be improper to refer to the views of two Englishmen, both intimate friends of Nehru, and one of whom was the author of what Nehru regarded as his best biography. Leonard Mosley says:

"And on 10 July, after he (Nehru) had been elected President, he called the Press together for a conference to discuss his policy as the new head of Congress. It was a moment in history when circumspection should have been the order of the day. There was much to be gained by silence. The fortunes of India were in the balance, and one false move could upset them. Nehru chose this moment to launch into what his biographer, Michael Brecher has described as "one of the most fiery and provocative statements in his forty years of public life."

After giving a summary of Nehru's statements, quoted

above, Mosley continues :

"Did Nehru realize what he was saying ? He was telling the world that once in power, the Congress would use its strength at the Centre to alter the Cabinet Mission Plan as it thought fit. But the Muslim League (as had Congress) had accepted the Plan as a cut and dried scheme to meet objections from both sides. It was a compromise plan which obviously could not afterwards be altered in favour of one side or another. In the circumstances, Nehru's remarks were a direct act of sabotage. Whether he meant them to be so, in the mistaken belief that Jinnah and the Muslim League were not really a force to be reckoned with or whether they were the ham-handed remarks of a politician who did not know when to keep his mouth shut will never be known."[30]

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who had just relinquished the Presidentship of the Congress in favour of Nehru referred to the latter's press conference as "one of those unfortunate events which change the course of history," and categorically states that "it was not correct to say (as Nehru did) that Congress was free to modify the (Cabinet Mission) Plan as it pleased."[31]

Every political leader, perhaps with the single exception of Jawaharlal Nehru, should have easily anticipated Jinnah's reaction to his statement. Azad sums up the whole position as follows :

'Jinnah had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan as there was no alternative. Jawaharlal's statement came to him as a bombshell.' He "issued a statement that the Muslim League had accepted the Plan as it was assured that the Congress had also accepted the scheme and that the Plan would be the basis of the future constitution of India. Now that the Congress President had declared that the Congress could change the scheme through its majority in the Constituent Assembly, this would mean

that the minorities were placed at the mercy of the majority."[32]

Even the Congress realized the folly of its President. The Working Committee which met on 8 August was faced with a dilemma. As Azad put it: "To repudiate the President's statement would weaken the organization but to give up the Cabinet Mission Plan would ruin the country. Finally, we drafted a resolution which made no reference to the Press Conference but reaffirmed the decision of the A.I.C.C."[33] accepting the scheme in its entirety, thus indirectly repudiating Nehru's statement. The British Cabinet also made a genuine effort to undo the mischief caused by Nehru's statement. On 18 July the Secretary of State in the House of Lords and Sir Stafford Cripps in the House of Commons unequivocally assured Jinnah that the Government would stick to the Cabinet Mission Plan of 16 May as it stood.

But Jinnah remained unmoved. He held "that Jawaharlal's statement represented the real mind of Congress. He argued that if Congress could change so many times, while the British were still in the country and power had not come to its hands, what assurance could the minorities have that once the British left, Congress would not again change and go back to the position taken up in Jawaharlal's statement?"[34] He was particularly afraid that the Congress by virtue of its majority in the Constituent Assembly "will wreck the basic form of the grouping of the Provinces and extend the scope, powers and subjects of the Union Centre" in violation of the paras 15 and 19 of the Statement of 16 May. This cannot be regarded as an altogether baseless fear, and seems to be the real background of the changed attitude of Jinnah and the Muslim League Council which met at Bombay on 27 July. In his opening speech Jinnah reiterated the demand for Pakistan. The Council, on 29 July, rejected the Cabinet

Mission Plan and decided to resort to 'Direct Action' for the achievement of Pakistan.

The resolution on the 'Direct Action' reads in part as follows : "Whereas the Congress is bent upon setting up Caste-Hindu Raj in India with the connivance of the British ; and whereas recent events have shown that power politics and not justice and fair play are the deciding factors in Indian affairs ;...now the time has come for the *Muslim Nation* to resort to *direct action* to achieve Pakistan to assert their just rights, to vindicate their honour and to get rid of the present British slavery and the contemplated future Caste-Hindu domination."

Then comes the operative part which reads as follows :

"This Council calls upon the Muslim nation to stand to a man behind their sole representative and authoritative organization, the All-India Muslim League, and to be ready for every sacrifice.

"This Council directs the Working Committee to prepare forthwith a programme of direct action to carry out the policy enunciated above and to organize the Muslims for the coming struggle to be launched as and when necessary.

"As a protest against and in token of their deep resentment of the attitude of the British, the Council calls upon the Mussulmans to renounce forthwith the titles conferred upon them by the alien Government."[35]

These two momentous resolutions were passed by the Council of the Muslim League without any dissent.

In the meantime the Viceroy had made one further proposal for an Interim Government which would consist of 6 (including one Scheduled caste) from the Congress, 5 from the League and 3 representatives of Minorities nominated by the Viceroy. A letter containing the above proposal was written to both Nehru and Jinnah on 22

July. But in view of the resolutions of the Council of the Muslim League on 29 July Jinnah's reaction to it was a foregone conclusion. In his reply dated 31 July Jinnah refused to accept the proposal of the Viceroy.

But, for the first time in recent history, the British Cabinet refused to allow Jinnah and his League to put a veto upon constitutional progress in India.

On 6 August the Viceroy wrote to Nehru that, "with the concurrence of His Majesty's Government he had decided to invite him to make proposals for the formation of an interim Government on the basis of the assurances contained in his letter of 30 May to Azad."

In his reply to Jinnah's letter of 31 July, the Viceroy informed him "that in view of the League resolutions of 29 July, he had decided to invite the Congress to make proposals for an interim Government and he was sure that if they made a reasonable offer of a coalition, he could rely on Jinnah for a ready response."[36]

The Congress Working Committee, meeting in Wardha on 8 August, authorized Nehru to accept the invitation to form an Interim Government. The Viceroy accordingly issued a communique on 12 August inviting the President of the Congress to form the Provisional Government. Nehru accepted the invitation and wrote to Jinnah offering five seats out of fourteen, in the Interim Government, to nominees of Jinnah. But the negotiations broke down as Jinnah did not agree to the appointment of a non-League Muslim in the Government even out of the Congress quota.

V. THE DIRECT ACTION OF THE MUSLIM LEAGUE

In pursuance of the resolution of the Muslim League Council, passed on 29 July, the Working Committee of the League called upon the Muslims throughout India to observe 16 August as 'Direct Action Day', when meetings would be held all over the country to explain the

resolution. This looked innocuous enough. But the real spirit of the 'Direct Action' was expressed by Jinnah himself immediately after the resolution was passed by the League Council. He said :

"What we have done today is the most historic act in our history. Never have we in the whole history of the League done anything except by constitutional methods and by constitutionalism. But now we are obliged and forced into this position. This day we bid goodbye to constitutional methods." "He recalled that throughout the fateful negotiations with the Cabinet Mission the other two parties, the British and the Congress, each held a pistol in their hand, the one of the authority and arms and the other of mass struggle and non-co-operation." "To day," he said, "we have also forged a pistol and are in a position to use it."[37]

Whatever Jinnah might have in view when he uttered these words, the 'Direct Action' was interpreted in the light of these remarks by the Muslim League in Bengal with the full backing and support of the Muslim League Ministry under Mr. H. S. Suhrawardy, ruling over that unfortunate Province. The 'Direct Actlon' in certain localities in Bengal was merely a camouflage for an organized anti-Hindu campaign of loot. arson and indiscriminate murder of men, women and children in broad daylight with impunity. The worst holocaust took place in Calcutta. The League Ministry had declared 16 August as a public holiday. Long processions were taken out by the Muslim League along the prominent streets of Calcutta, and suddenly the members of the procession began to attack and loot the Hindu shops. Then the horrors of Muslim goondaism in its worst form were let loose upon the Hindus in the predominantly Muslim areas in Calcutta. The Hindus were taken unawares and had the worst of it at the beginning; they were butchered

like sheep, their women were ravished, and their houses looted and occasionally burnt. It has now been proved beyond all doubt that this great killing and outrage were deliberately organized beforehand with the active support of the League Government. It was even then openly alleged that the Chief Minister, Suhrawardy, shielded the worst ruffians in Calcutta and encouraged them to do their worst without any fear. Azad writes : "I found there (Dum Dum, Calcutta) a large military contingent waiting in trucks. When I asked why they were not helping to restore order, they replied that their orders were to stand ready but not to take any action. Throughout Calcutta, the Military and the Police were standing by, but remained inactive while innocent men and women were being killed."[38]

This was indeed the strangest and the saddest part in the whole tragic episode !

The British Governor, all the while in Calcutta, sat inactive, and the Central Government did not take any effective step even though they received secret official reports that the Muslim League Government was at the back of the whole affair. This unwillingness of the British Government to maintain law and order for which they were still responsible under the existing Constitution rendered the Hindus desperate and forced them to organize themselves. Then followed what may be described as a Civll War between the Hindus and Muslims, members of each community indiscriminately killing those of the other whenever any opportunity offered itself. When it was realized by the Government that the butchery, pillage and arson were no longer one-way traffic, they cried halt and peace was restored after about a week. No regular inquiry was made, but according to a rough official estimate at the time, nearly 5,000 lives were lost, over 15,000 persons were injured, and about 100,000 were

rendered homeless.

According to Mosley, "between dawn on the morning of 16 August 1946 and dusk three days later, the people of Calcutta hacked, battered, burned, stabbed or shot 6,000 of each other to death, and raped and maimed another 20,000."[39]

The *Statesman* wrote on the Calcutta riot of 16 August: "The latest estimate of dead is 3,000, who have lain thick about the streets. The injured number many thousand and it is impossible to say how many business houses and private dwellings have been destroyed. This is not a riot. ...... For three days, the city concentrated on unrestrained civil war. Upon whom the main guilt for it rests is manifest. ... Where the primary blame lies is where we have squarely put it—upon the Provincial Muslim League Cabinet...and particularly upon the Chief Minister."[39a]

During an interview with the Viceroy Maulana Abul Kalam Azad "severely criticized the Bengal ministry (Premier Suhrawardy in particular) and alleged that, although the Government of Bengal had apprehended trouble, they had not taken sufficient precautions; that they had been much too late in enforcing Section 144 and a total curfew, and in calling out the troops. The declaration of a public holiday on 16 August had made the hooligans of Calcutta's underworld believe that they had the licence of the Government to behave as they liked."[39b]

VI. INTERIM GOVERNMENT

Far-sighted observers could realize that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to bridge the river of blood that flowed between the Hindus and the Muslims in Calcutta during August, 1946. Azad mournfully observes that "the turn that events had taken made it almost impossible to expect a peaceful solution by agreement between the Congress and the Muslim League." He justly regards

this as "one of the greatest tragedies of Indian history", and, "with the deepest regret", lays the main responsibility for this at the door of Jawaharlal Nehru, though he adds: "Jawaharlal is one of my dearest friends and his contribution to India's national life is second to none".[40] But Nehru does not seem to have fully realized the consequences of his own folly. While Calcutta was the scene of an unprecedented holocaust, Nehru was busy negotiating with the Viceroy about the Interim Government. On 17 August, i.e., the very next day after the "great killing" had begun, but not ended, nor shown any sign of abating, he submitted his proposals to the Viceroy, and after discussion for a week the personnel of the Interim Government was announced on 24 August, 1946, in the following *communique.*

"His Majesty the King has accepted the resignation of the present members of the Governor-General's Executive Council. His Majesty has been pleased to appoint the following:

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Mr. M. Asaf Ali, Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, Mr. Sarat Chandra Bose, Dr. John Matthai, Sardar Baldev Singh, Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan, Mr. Jagjivan Ram, Syed Ali Zaheer and Covesji Hormusji Bhabha.

"Two more Muslim members will be appointed later. The Interim Government will take office on September 2."[41]

In a broadcast on the same day, the Viceroy made an earnest—almost pathetic—appeal to the Muslim League to join the Government. "The door of coalition is not closed," said the Viceroy, and he gave all possible assurances to remove misgivings about the Congress tyranny, but Jinnah refused to budge an inch.

Shortly after the announcement of the Interim Government, Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, visited Calcutta. What he saw and learnt there filled him with dismay. He was convinced that if some sort of agreement between

the two major communities was not brought about soon, the Calcutta happenings would be repeated in varying degrees of recklesssness all over India. At this psychological moment Khwaja Nazimuddin, a prominent leader of the Muslim League in Bengal, suggested that if the Congress would make an unequivocal statement that Provinces could not opt out of groups except as laid down in the Statement of 16 May, there was just a chance that the Muslim League might join the Interim Government and the Constituent Assembly. Immediately after his return Wavell saw Gandhi and Nehru on 27 August and gave them an account of what happened in Calcutta. He told them that the only way to avoid similar tragedy all over India was to set up coalition Governments both in Bengal and at the Centre. He handed over to Gandhi and Nehru the draft of a formula which he thought might satisfy the Muslim League. It ran thus :

"The Congress are prepared in the interests of communal harmony to accept the intention of the Statement of May 16th, that provinces cannot exercise any option affecting their membership of the sections or of the groups if formed, until the decision contemplated in paragraph 19 (viii) of the Statement of 16th May is taken by the new Legislature after the new constitutional arrangements have come into operation and the first general elections have been held."[42]

What transpired at the meeting is not accurately known, but neither Gandhi nor Nehru was prepared to accept the formula. Menon has given a long account of the discussion. Leonard Mosley, who had access to official records not yet made public, has referred to the conversation in some detail from which the following extracts are quoted :

"Give me a simple guarantee that you accept the Cabinet Mission Plan", asked Wavell. "We have already

said that we accept it", replied Gandhi, "but we are not prepared to guarantee that we accept it in the way that the Cabinet Mission set it out. We have our own interpretations of what they propose."

Said Wavell : "Even if those interpretations differ from what the Cabinet Mission intended ?

Replied Gandhi : "But of course. In any case, what the Cabinet Mission Plan really means is not what the Cabinet Mission thinks but what the interim Government thinks it means."

Wavell : "It is a moment—possibly the last we have —to bring the League and the Congress together. And all I ask is a guarantee (that no minorities in the groups should be allowed to opt out of them before the ten-year period specified by the Cabinet Mission Plan).

Nehru : "To accept this is tantamount to asking Congress to put itself in fetters."

Wavell : If so why did you accept it (C.M Plan) at all ?

Gandhi : "What the Cabinet Mission intended and the way we interpret what they intended may not necessarily be the same."[43]

At the request of the Viceroy Nehru placed the formula before the W.C. of the Congress. They stuck to their old view but added that any dispute as to the interpretation of the clauses relating to grouping might be referred to the Federal Court and that they would abide by its decision. In his letter to the Viceroy, dated 28 August, communicating this to the Viceroy, Nehru added that the Viceroy's reference to the non-summoning of the Constituent Assembly unless the cour · suggested by him was adopted by the Congress had produced a feeling of resentment in the Work.ng Committee. The Home Government, however, did not agree with the Viceroy. They asked him not to take any steps which

were likely to result in a breach with the Congress, and to form the Interim Government with the personnel already announced. So the Interim Government was sworn in on 2 September. On the eve of the new Government's assumption of office, a murderous attack was made on Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan, one of the Ministers, and communal riots broke out in Bombay and Ahmadabad. The League had realized that violence did pay, so far at least as the Viceroy was concerned.

The firm attitude of the British Cabinet evidently made some impression on Jinnah, for on 13 October, the Muslim League agreed to join the Interim Government. On 14 October Jinnah sent the names of five nominees of the Muslim League. They were Liaquat Ali Khan, I. I. Chundrigar, Abdur Rab Nishtar, Ghazanfar Ali Khan, and Jogendra Nath Mandal. Mandal belonged to the Scheduled caste and was a Minister in the Muslim League Government of Bengal. The inclusion of a Scheduled caste member was obviously a reply to the right claimed by the Congress to nominate a Muslim.

There was, however, no Coalition Government in the real sense of the term. "The League's representatives in the Interim Government refused to accept either Nehru's leadership or the convention of collective responsibility. The Interim Government, as Liaquat Ali Khan described it, "consisted of a Congress bloc and a Muslim bloc, each functioning under a separate leadership."[44] The Muslim members were in the Government, but not of the Government, or rather, against it. The result was that there were constant wranglings within the Cabinet which presented the sad picture of one composed of an almost equal number of members belonging to two hostile groups who differed on almost every matter of importance. It seems to have been the constant endeavour of the Muslim members to discredit the Congress in every possible way. As Liaquat

Ali, the leader of the Muslim group in the Cabinet, held the Finance portfolio, he had the right to scrutinize every proposal of every department. He fully utilized this power to make it difficult for any Congress member in the Cabinet to function effectively. The proposals of taxation introduced in the Budget were inspired by a deliberate motive to damage the interest of the businessmen, most of whom were Hindus. There was almost an open rupture in the Cabinet over this, but it was somehow averted by the modification of the proposals.

Events outside also made it clear that there was no real improvement in communal feelings. About the middle of October, 1946, there was an organized attack on the Hindus of Noakhali and Tippera districts, in East Bengal, the population of which was predominantly Muslim. The attacks were "made by people armed with guns and other deadly weapons; roads had been dug up and other means of communication cut off to prevent ingress and egress; canals had been blocked and strategic points were being guarded by armed insurgents.

"Two of the Muslim League's nominees to the Interim Government were openly indulging in belligerent speeches."

One of them, Ghazanfar Ali Khan, declared on 19 October :

"We are going into the Interim Government to get a foothold to fight for our cherished goal of Pakistan, and I assure you that we shall achieve Pakistan. The disturbances which have occurred in many parts of the country after the installation of the purely Congress Government at the centre have established the fact beyond any shadow of doubt that the ten crores of Indian Muslims will not submit to any Government which does not include their true representatives. In the Interim Government all our activities shall be guided by two considerations,

that is, to convince the Congress that no Government in India can function smoothly without the co-operation of the Muslim League and that the League is the sole representative of the Indian Muslims. The Interim Government is one of the fronts of the direct action campaign and we shall most scrupulously carry out the orders of Mr. Jinnah on any front that we are called upon to serve."

In other words, even responsible leaders of the Muslim League, selected by Jinnah for administering the Interim Government, held "that the events in East Bengal were but part of the all-India battle for Pakistan."[45]

But as in the Direct Action in Calcutta, the killings soon ceased to be merely a one-way traffic. There were severe reprisals by the Hindus in Bihar, the population of which was predominantly Hindu, and to a lesser extent in Ahmadnagar and Ahmadabad. It is unnecessary to describe in detail the horrors enacted in these places, particularly in Noakhali and Bihar, as the outrages beggar all description. Murder, arson, looting, and outrages on women, specially abduction and forcible conversion of Hindu women—all on a massive scale—formed the usual pattern. One thing, however, deserves special notice. The outrages by the Hindus in Bihar, horrible though they were, were sternly repressed by the Government and the personal interference of the Viceroy and Nehru, in striking contrast to the outrages by the Muslims, first in Calcutta and then in Noakhali, which were allowed to run their own course.

The Muslim outrages in Noakhali, however, brought out the real elements in the greatness of Gandhi, the Saint. He voluntarily undertook the task of pacifying the Muslims, in his own characteristic non-violent way, and for that purpose proceeded to Noakhali and stayed there for about four months, trudging on foot from village

to village, preaching the cult of non-violence to the Hindus and Muslims, and instilling courage and confidence among the thousands of Hindus who had been forced to leave their hearth and home. It was a sight for the gods to see, and perhaps no other episode in the life of Gandhi exalts his saintly character to such a high degree and stamps his personality with those qualities which found expression in the epithet 'Mahatma' unconsciously bestowed upon him by the populace. There is ample evidence to show that Gandhi's tour had very little effect on the improvement of communal relations,[45a] but its value is to be judged not by the result, but by the spirit which prompted it. Further, it is to be remembered that it was beyond human endeavour to bring about a cordial —or even normal human—relation between the Hindus and Muslims after the Direct Action of 1946. Gandhi made a similar tour in Bihar also.

Differences between the Congress and the League came to a head over the summoning of the Constituent Assembly. The Viceroy had accepted Jinnah's offer to join the Interim Government on condition that the League should rescind the resolution of 29 July rejecting the Cabinet Mission Plan. But Jinnah showed no earnest desire either to summon a meeting of the Council of the League, or to join the Constituent Assembly. He evaded a final decision on various pretexts and urged upon the Viceroy to announce immediately the postponement of the Constituent Assembly *sine die*. But the Secretary of State stood firm and on 20 November invitations were issued for the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly to be held on 9 December. Jinnah called upon the representatives of the Muslim League not to participate in the Constituent Assembly and emphasized that the Bombay resolution of the Council of the League, passed on 29 July, still stood. Naturally the Congress leaders demanded

that the League should either accept the Cabinet Mission Plan and come into the Constituent Assembly, or quit the Interim Government.

With the prospect of a civil war throughout India the Secretary of State made one more effort to bring about an agreement between the two major parties by inviting their representatives to London. A Sikh representative was added at the suggestion of the Viceroy. Nehru, Baldev Singh, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, together with the Viceroy, arrived in London on 2 December, 1946. As could be easily anticipated the interpretation of para 19 (v and viii) of the Cabinet Mission Plan proved to be the stumbling block and no settlement could be achieved.

But though no agreement was arrived at, the British Government gave its verdict in favour of the interpretation put upon the disputed clauses by the Muslim League, after taking legal advice. But the Statement issued by the British Government on 6 December, 1946, also conceded the right of each party to refer all questions of interpretation, including that of the disputed clauses (19, v and viii), to the Federal Court, whose decision shall be final.

So far the Statement seems to be fair to both sides. But the sting was in the tail. The Statement added:

"Should a constitution come to be framed by a Constituent Assembly in which a large section of the Indian population had not been represented, His Majesty's Government could not, of course, contemplate—as the Congress have stated they would not contemplate—forcing such a constitution upon any unwilling parts of the country."[46]

This very important declaration was accompanied by an assurance to Jinnah in the presence of Nehru, that if the decision of the Federal Court was contrary to the British Government's interpretation they would have to

consider the position afresh.[47] This cut the ground from under the feet of Nehru who had agreed to abide by the decision of the Federal Court even if it went against the Congress. It is therefore no wonder that "Nehru took the line that the Statement amounted to a variation and extension of the Statement of 16 May and that he and his colleagues would have to consider the whole situation." It was undoubtedly a triumph for Jinnah. He was assured on two important points. First, that the interpretation of the disputed clauses, whatever the decision of the Court, was ultimately bound to be in his favour. Secondly, the Muslim League need only boycott the Constituent Assembly in order to render nugatory any decision that it might arrive at 'regarding the Constitution of an Indian Union.' Jinnah further strengthened his position by staying on in England where he made a number of speeches warning Englishmen that the only alternative to grant of Pakistan was a civil war in India.

VII. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The Constituent Assembly met on 9 December, 1946, but the Muslim members did not attend. Rajendra Prasad was elected President, and Nehru moved the 'Objectives Resolution.' "It envisaged the Indian Union as 'an independent Sovereign Republic,' comprising autonomous units with residuary powers, wherein the ideals of social, political and economic democracy would be guaranteed to all sections of the people and adequate safeguards would be provided for minorities and backward communities and areas."

But its discussion was postponed till 20 January, 1947, to enable the representatives of the Muslim League and the Indian States to participate in the Constituent Assembly. During the interval an emergency meeting of the A. I. C. C. was held at Delhi on 5 January. It agreed to accept the procedure contained in the Statement made

by the British Government on 6 December, 1946, but added :

"It must be clearly understood, however, that this must not involve any compulsion of a Province and the rights of the Sikhs in the Punjab should not be jeopardised. In the event of any attempt at such compulsion, a Province or a part of a Province has the right to take such action as may be deemed necessary in order to give effect to the wishes of the people concerned.[48]

The Constituent Assembly reassembled on 20 January, 1947, and had a session of six days. Nehru's resolution on 'Objectives' was passed and some important committees were appointed. On 31 January the Working Committee of the Muslim League met at Karachi and passed a lengthy resolution denouncing the composition and procedure of the Constituent Assembly as *ab initio* void, invalid and illegal, and declining to call a meeting of the Council of the League to reconsider the resolution passed on 29 July, 1946.[49] This meant in effect that the League not only rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan and boycotted the Constituent Assembly, but was also committed to the policy of 'Direct Action.' The Congress and the Minority communities therefore made a demand to the Viceroy, on 5 February, for the resignation of the League members from the Interim Government.

The Muslim League was not in a mood to oblige the Congress, and the Viceroy was sympathetic to its point of view. But on 13 February Nehru wrote a strong letter to the Viceroy reiterating his demand for the resignation of the members of the Muslim League from the Interim Government.[50] Two days later Vallabhbhai Patel stated in a press interview that otherwise the Congress would withdraw from the Interim Government.[51] Everybody could realize that either course would be followed by disastrous consequences, in the shape of communal fight,

almost leading to civil war, in which it was doubtful if the loyalty of the Indian elements in the Army and the Civil Services could be relied upon.[52]

It was at this grave crisis which faced India that the British Prime Minister Attlee rose to the height of his stature. Probably no other British Minister, certainly not Chruchill, possessed that courage, foresight, and sympathy for India which inspired Attlee. Azad, who was in close touch with the British authorities at the time, writes: "Mr. Attlee was of the view that a stage had been reached where suspense was most undesirable. It was necessary to take a clear-cut-decision and he decided that the British Government should fix a date for the withdrawal of British power from India. Lord Wavell did not agree regarding the announcement of a date. He wished to persist with the Cabinet Mission Plan, for he held that it was the only possible solution of the Indian problem. He further held that the British Government would fail in its duty if it transferred political power before the communal question had been solved. Passions had been roused to such a peak in India that responsible people were carried away. The withdrawal of British power in such an atmosphere would in his view lead to widespread riots and disturbances. He therefore advised that the *status quo* should be maintained and that every attempt should be made to compose the differences between the two major parties. It was his firm conviction that it would be dangerous and unworthy if the British withdrew without a previous understanding between Congress and the League.

"Mr. Attlee did not agree. He held that once a date-line was fixed, the responsibility would be transferred to Indian hands. Unless this was done, there would never be any solution. Mr. Attlee feared that if the *status quo* was continued, Indians would lose their faith in the

British Government. Conditions in India were such that the British could not maintain their power without an effort which the British people were not prepared to make. The only alternatives were to rule with a firm hand and suppress all disturbances, or transfer power to the Indians themselves. The Government could continue to govern, but this would require an effort which would interfere with the reconstruction of Britain.[53] The other alternative was to fix a date for the transfer of power and thus place the responsibility squarely on Indian shoulders.

"Lord Wavell was not convinced. He still argued that if communal difficulties led to violence, history would not forgive the British. The British had governed India for over a hundred years and they would be responsible if unrest, violence and disorder broke out as a result of their withdrawal. When he found that he could not convince Mr. Attlee, Lord Wavell offered his resignation."[54]

On 20 February, 1947, Attlee made a statement in the House of Commons which decided the fate of India. After a brief review of the failure to bring about an agreement among the different parties in India, Attlee observed :

"The present state of uncertainty is fraught with danger and cannot be indefinitely prolonged. His Majesty's Government wish to make it clear that it is their definite intention to take necessary steps to effect the transference of power to responsible Indian hands by a date not later than June, 1948."

Keeping in view the possibility of the Muslim League abstaining from the Constituent Assembly till the last, Attlee added that in such a contingency "His Majesty's Government will have to consider to whom the powers of the Central Government in British India should be handed over ... in the best interests of the people." In order to perform this delicate and difficult task Attlee

announced that Admiral the Viscount Mountbatten has been appointed Viceroy in succession to Lord Wavell with effect from March, 1947.[55]

This remarkable Statement finally set at rest all doubts and uncertainties about the future line of action to be adopted by the British Government in handing over the Government of India to her own people. But it "whipped up the tempo in the political field." The Muslim League now made a desperate attempt to secure control over the Provinces which it planned to be attached to Pakistan. Direct Action was started in Assam, but it was not attended with success. The Muslim League, however, established its Ministry firmly in Sindh and the Congress influence in N.W.F.P. declined to a considerable extent. In the Panjab the Muslim League, unable to remove the Coalition Ministry of the Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs under Malik Khizr Hyat Khan, followed the tactics of Direct Action. The Ministry was forced to resign and the Governor asked the League to form the Ministry. Immediately, Master Tara Singh, the Akali leader, called upon the Hindus and Sikhs to declare war. "If we can snatch the Government from the Britishers," said he, "no one can stop us from snatching the Government from the Muslims. We shall not allow the League to exist.... We shall rule over them and keep the Government fighting. I have sounded the bugle. Finish the Muslim League."[56]

Violent communal riots broke out practically all over the Panjab, forcing the Governor to take over the administration of the Province in his own hands. Street-fighting in Lahore developed into a frenzy of stabbing and killing which soon spread to other towns such as Multan, Rawalpindi, Amritsar, etc. The trouble also spread to the N.W.F.P. Shocking atrocities that outraged humanity and a heavy toll of life and property

marked the Direct Action in the Panjab as in Bengal. Nehru, who visited Rawalpindi, reported : "I have seen ghastly sights and I have heard of behaviour by human beings which would degrade brutes." According to official account 2,049 persons were killed and over 1,000 seriously injured in course of a fortnight. Mountbatten's Press Attache, visiting Rawalpindi, stated that the destruction in the Hindu and Sikh quarters was "as thorough as any produced by fire bomb raids in the war....The Muslims of the areas were quite pleased with themselves."[56a]

It was in this dismal situation that the Working Committee of the Congress took a realistic view and passed the following resolution, foreshadowing the Partition of India, on 8 March, 1947 :

"During the past seven months India has witnessed many horrors and tragedies which have been enacted in the attempt to gain political ends by brutal violence, murder and coercion. The tragic events have demonstrated that there can be no settlement of the problem in the Punjab by violence and coercion, and that no arrangement based on coercion can last. Therefore it is necessary to find a way which amounts to the least compulsion. This would necessitate division of the Punjab into two Provinces so that the predominantly Muslim part may be separated from the predominantly non-Muslim part."

The W.C. welcomed the statement of Attlee, accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan with the interpretations put upon it by the British Government, and made an appeal to the Muslim League to discuss with the Congress methods of ensuring a peaceful transfer of power. The Muslim League, however, did not make any favourable response either to the Congress appeal or to Attlee's statemet of 20 February.

The resolution of the W.C. recommending partition of

the Panjab was not agreeable to a section of the Congress. "The Congress President explained in a press interview that the Congress had only suggested a division of the Punjab as a means of putting an end to violence, and that the same remedy would hold good for Bengal if the circumstances in that province were similar."[57]

CHAPTER II.

FREEDOM AND PARTITION OF INDIA

I. THE CONGRESS LEADERS ACCEPT PARTITION

Lord Mountbatten assumed the office of Governor-General on 24 March, 1947. He invited Gandhi and had five interviews with him between 31 March and 4 April. Gandhi made a quaint proposal which is on a par with his suggestion during the Second World War that Britain, instead of fighting Hitler, should offer peaceful *Satyagraha*. He advised Mountbatten, during his very first interview, to dismiss the existing Executive Council and give Jinnah the option of forming a Government with members of his own choice who might be all Muslims. It is hardly necessary to add that the suggestion astounded the whole of India and was most unceremoniously rejected by the Congress. Gandhi thereupon not only withdrew his proposal but also withdrew himself from politics, leaving all future negotiations to the Working Committee.

Mountbatten was a practical man with realistic approach. He soon realized that in the present circumstances, the Cabinet Mission plan was unworkable and a partition of India was inevitable. This was, in a way, foreshadowed by the resolution of the Congress W. C. passed on 8 March. Nevertheless, it must have caused a great wrench of heart to the Congress leaders to give up the ideal of Indian unity,—a free India whole and entire—for which they had fought and died for more than half a century. But stern facts stared them in the face and one by one they yielded to the pressure of necessity. The first to accept definitely the idea of Partition and

the plan of Mountbatten was Sardar Patel. His experience of working with the League members in the Executive Council had convinced him that the Pakistan mentality was so strong among the Muslims that it was impossible to work with the Muslim League. At last the naked truth dawned upon him and he said that "whether we liked it or not, there were two nations in India. He was now convinced that Muslims and Hindus could not be united into one nation. There was no alternative except to recognize this fact. In this way alone could we end the quarrel between Hindus and Muslims. He further said that if two brothers cannot stay together, they divide. After separation with their respective shares they become friends. If, on the other hand, they are forced to stay together, they tend to fight every day. It was better to have one clean fight and then separate than have bickerings every day."[58] Sardar Patel also felt that the British officials lacked the will to prevent communal outbreaks, though they had the power to do so. He "came to the fateful decision that unless the country was partitioned chaos and anarchy would spread throughout the land."[59]

Jawaharlal Nehru at first reacted violently against the Partition, but was gradually reconciled to it. Azad suggests that he was influenced by Vallabhbhai Patel and Lord and Lady Mountbatten. There may be some truth in it, but as regards the reasons which finally induced him to accept it we have the testimony of Nehru himself which should outweigh everything else.

Leonard Mosley writes :

"Pandit Nehru (in 1956) told Michael Brecher, his biographer, the reasons for accepting the Partition of India :

"Well, I suppose it was the compulsion of events and the feeling that we could'nt get out of that deadlock or morass by pursuing the way we had done · it became worse and worse. Further a feeling that even if we got

freedom for India with that background, it would be a very weak India, that is a federal India with far too much power in the federating units. A larger India would have constant troubles, constant disintegrating pulls. And also the fact that we saw no other way of getting our freedom—in the near future, I mean. And so we accepted it and let us build up a strong India. And if others do not want to be in it, well, how can we and why should we force them to be in it." Mosley continues :

"But perhaps Pandit Nehru came nearer the truth in a conversation with the author in 1960 when he said :

'The truth is that we were tired men, and we were getting on in years too. Few of us could stand the prospect of going to prison again—and if we had stood out for a united India as we wished it, prison obviously awaited us. We saw the fires burning in the Punjab and heard every day of the killings. The plan for partition offered a way out and w took it.'

"He added : 'But if Gandhi had told us not to, we would have gone on fighting, and waiting. But we accepted. We expected that partition would be temporary, that Pakistan was bound to come back to us. None of us guessed how much the killing and the crisis in Kashmir would embitter relations."[60]

When we remember that Nehru looked upon Brecher as his best biographer and was very intimate with Mosley, we may reasonably put a great value upon their version of what Nehru himself said. The two statements, though somewhat different, are not self-contradictory, and perhaps both contain a great deal of truth.

The most striking change was that of Gandhi. As some obscurity and uncertainty still exist in this matter, it is better to review the facts whose authenticity cannot be questioned. Gandhi arrived in Delhi on 31 March to see Mountbatten. Azad writes in his Memoirs :

"I went to see him at once and his very first remark was, 'Partition has now become a threat. It seems Vallabhbhai and even Jawaharlal have surrendered. What will you do now? Will you stand by me or have you also changed?'

"I replied, 'I have been and am against partition. Never has my opposition to partition been so strong as today. I am however distressed to find that even Jawaharlal and Sardar Patel have accepted defeat and, in your words, surrendered their arms. My only hope now is in you. If you stand against partition, we may yet save the situation. If you however acquiesce, I am afraid India is lost.'

"Gandhiji said, 'What a question to ask? If the Congress wishes to accept partition it will be over my dead body. So long as I am alive, I will never agree to the partition of India. Nor will I, if I can help it, allow Congress to accept it.'

"Later that day Gandhiji met Lord Mountbatten. He saw him again the next day and still again on 2 April. Sardar Patel came to him soon after he returned from his first meeting with Lord Mountbatten and was closeted with him for over two hours. What happened during this meeting I do not know. But when I met Gandhiji again, I received the greatest shock of my life, for I found that he too had changed. He was still not openly in favour of partition but he no longer spoke so vehemently against it. What surprised and shocked me even more was that he began to repeat the arguments which Sardar Patel had already used. For over two hours I pleaded with him but could make no impression on him."[61]

Abul Kalam Azad was an intimate friend and a close associate of Gandhi, and his views about Gandhi must always carry great weight. Nevertheless, available documents

seem to indicate that Gandhi's conversion to the idea of Partition was neither so sudden nor so complete as the statement of Azad implies. Gandhi seems to have actively opposed the idea of Partition till the very last. He had been preaching against the Partition in his Prayer meetings[62] and the Muslim leaders made a complaint on the subject. Even so late as 4 June, 1947, Lord Mountbatten was apprehensive about Gandhi in this matter, and invited him to come round to the Viceregal Lodge just before the Prayer meeting. The net result of the interview may be judged from what Gandhi said in the Prayer meeting. "The British Government is not responsible for Partition," he said. "The Viceroy has no hand in it. In fact he is as opposed to division as Congress itself, but if both of us—Hindus and Moslems—cannot agree on anything else, then the Viceroy is left with no choice."[63]

It appears from some of his conversations that Gandhi believed that India was behind him in his opposition to Partition, but unfortunately the Congress leaders were not. The consequences of rejecting the Partition would be to entrust the administration to the hands of a new set of leaders. But Gandhi thought it would be most unwise, if not impossible, to remove the old and tried leaders. This was the burden of his speech in the A. I. C. C. on 14 June.[64]

On the other hand, one naturally wonders why Gandhi, if he felt so strongly against the Partition, did not try to force the Congress leaders into accepting his views. Fischer writes: "In the summer of 1948, I asked Nehru, Patel and others in India why Gandhi had not attempted to prevent Congress from accepting Pakistan; if nothing else had availed he might have coerced them by fasting. It was not Gandhi's way, their composite reply ran, to compel agreement even on the most crucial issue."[65] It is difficult to accept this view, for Gandhi

not unoften took to fast and enforced his views on many issues of much less importance. Besides, it should be remembered, that Nehru himself told Mosley[66] that he and others would not have accepted Partition If Gandhi had told them not to. Fischer is probably nearer the truth when he observes: "The only alternative would have been to reject Pakistan, leave the Government and stake everything on a restoration of the people's sanity and peaceful inclinations. But Gandhi saw that (Congress) leaders had no faith in this alternative. He might have induced them to vote for his view in Committee; he could not have infused them with faith in it except by proving that Hindus and Moslems could live together amicably. The burden of proof was on Gandhi. And time was running out fast."[67] In other words, Gandhi at last realized that he had been leaning throughout on the two broken reeds of Hindu-Muslim unity and mass non-violence—and that these were nothing but will-o'-the-wisp which he had been pursuing throughout his political career.

The acceptance of the Partition by Gandhi and other prominent Congress leaders like Nehru and Patel is generally regarded as inexcusable and inexplicable, and many look upon it as a sudden and unexpected decision at the last moment which plunged India into unspeakable misery. Such an opinion is due to the fact that those leaders were always guided by a false notion of Indian nationality based on Hindu-Muslim unity, and persuaded the people to ignore the reality and cherish this ideal. But those who carefully review the history of Hindu-Muslim relations from the beginning of the 19th century, Pakistan can only be regarded as the logical culmination of political development in India. It has been pointed out more than once in the three volumes of this work that there were fundamental differences between the Hindus

and Muslims of India which stood in the way of their fusing into one nation, as this term is normally understood. This was emphasized by the separate electorate, originally devised by Minto, but later accepted by the Congress. Since then the Congress had, *in practice* if not *in theory*, recognized the two-nation theory propounded by Syed Ahmad in the 19th century and Jinnah in the 20th. As far back as 1934 the Congress pledged itself to reject any scheme of solving communal problem *vis-a-vis* Indian constitution which was not agreed to by the Muslims.[68] In 1942 Gandhi wrote in the *Harijan* that if the vast majority of Muslims want to partition India they must have the partition;[69] and in 1944 he actually carried on negotiations with Jinnah on this basis.[70] In 1945 the Congress Working Committee passed a resolution that it could not think "of compelling the people in any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will."[71] The eminent Hindu leader Rajagopalachari[72] actually suggested the idea of Pakistan as the only basis for a peaceful settlement of the Hindu-Muslim problem and even Nehru cenceded the possibility of Pakistan in January, 1946.[73] Early in March, 1947, the Working Committee of the Congress itself suggested the partition of the Panjab, and (therefore also of) Bengal, on communal basis.[74]

In addition to all this Mountbatten very effectively used one strong argument in favour of the partition of India to win over the Congress leaders. In all the plans discussed so far there was one point in common, namely that there should be a weak centre, with a very limited authority, while residuary powers should be vested in the Provinces. This was a concession to the Muslims, who were apprehensive of Hindu majority in the Centre. In a country like India, with diverse languages, races and religions, and people in different stages of political and

cultural evolution and with different historical traditions, a strong central authority was needed to keep down the fissiparous tendency which has been a permanent feature of Indian politics since the beginning of recorded history. The separation of Muslim Provinces would give an opportunity to the rest of India to evolve a constitution with a strong Central Government. So Pakistan would not be an unmixed curse. What it would take away in quantity, would be compensated by the solidarity it would give to the rest. What idealism would suffer, real politics would gain. Azad observes : "Lord Mountbatten advised that it would be better to give up a few small pieces in the north-west and the north-east and then build up a strong and consolidated India. Sardar Patel was impressed by the argument that co-operation with the Muslim League would jeopardize Indian unity and strength. It seemed to me that these arguments had influenced not only Sardar Patel but Jawaharlal. The same arguments repeated by Sardar Patel and Lord Mountbatten had also weakened Gandhiji's opposition to partition."[75]

The general principles of Partition having been agreed upon, the question arose of the minorities of the Panjab and Bengal. Jinnah insisted upon the transfer of these two Provinces wholesale to Pakistan. But the Congress leaders, though agreeing to the creation of Pakistan, were adamant on the point that the non-Muslims in the Panjab and Bengal living in districts contiguous to Hindusthan and forming a majority of population in these areas, must be given the option to choose between Pakistan and Hindusthan. This would mean the creation of two separate Provinces of East Panjab and West Bengal. When Jinnah protested, it was pointed out that this was in strict accordance with the terms of the Lahore resolution of 1940 demanding Pakistan.

While this discussion was going on, a proposal was

made to the effect that Bengal should be made a sovereign and independent State. The Chief Minister of Bengal, Suhrawardy, and Sarat Chandra Bose, elder brother of Subhas Chandra Bose and leader of the left wing of the Congress party, sponsored the scheme. This, however, received little support from either the Congress or the Muslim League. On the other hand, the Congress and the Muslim League organizations in Bengal endorsed the proposal for creating a separate Province of West Bengal.[76]

II. THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Mountbatten was so deeply moved by the rapid deterioration in communal relations that he was eager to effect the transfer of power without any avoidable delay. He sent his plan to London on 2 May, 1947, and received it back on 10 May with the approval of the Cabinet in a modified form. This plan envisaged the division of India into quite a large number of auotonomous States to start with. But Nehru, to whom Mountbatten showed it confidentially in advance, was dead against such a Balkanization of India. It was at this stage that V. P. Menon, a high official in the Viceroy's Secretariat, dealing with the various reform proposals for a long time, put up a plan which he had drawn up during the regime of Wavell, but of which no notice was taken by the Secretary of State to whom it was sent. It was based on the partition of India into two States enjoying Dominion Status, the predominantly non-Muslim areas in the Panjab and Bengal being excluded from Pakistan. This plan, being approved by Nehru, was accepted by Mountbatten. Thereafter the Viceroy had consultations with Nehru and Patel on behalf of the Congress; Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan on behalf of the League; and Baldev Singh on behalf of the Sikhs. In the light of these consultations the new plan was finalized. On 18 May the Viceroy proceeded to London. The Cabinet approved the new plan and issued a Statement

the main points of which may be summarised as follows :

'The question of Partition will be settled by the following procedure :

I. BENGAL AND THE PANJAB

'The Provincial Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the Panjab (excluding the European members) should meet in two parts, one representing the Muslim majority districts and the other the rest of the Province.

'The members of the two parts of each Legislative Assembly sitting separately will be empowered to vote whether or not the Province should be partitioned. If a simple majority of either part decides in favour of partition, division will take place and arrangements will be made accordingly.

II. SINDH

'The Legislative Assembly of Sindh (excluding the European members) will, at a special meeting, take its own decision as to whether its constitution should be framed by the existing, or a new and separate Constituent Assembly.

III. N. W. F. P.

'With regard to the North-West Frontier Province it will be necessary, in view of its special position, to give it an opportunity of reconsidering its position if the whole or any part of the Panjab decides not to join the existing Constituent Assembly. A referendum will be made, in such a case, to the electors of the present Legislative Assembly to choose between the existing Constituent Assembly and a new and separate one.

IV. BRITISH BALUCHISTAN

'British Baluchistan, in view of its geographical situation, will also be given a similar opportunity of reconsidering its position.

V. ASSAM

'Though Assam is predominantly a non-Muslim Province, the district of Sylhet, which is contiguous to Bengal, is predominamtly Muslim. If it be decided to partition Bengal, a referendum will be held in Sylhet district to decide whether the district should continue to form part of the Assam Province or should be amalgamated with the new Province of East Bengal.

'In case a partition of the Panjab and Bengal be decided upon a Boundary Commission will be set up by the Governor-General to demarcate the exact boundary line.

'His Majesty's Government are willing to hand over the power even earlier than June, 1948, the date originally proposed. His Majesty's Government propose to introduce legislation during the current session of Parliament for the transfer of power in 1947 on a Dominion Status basis to one or two successor authorities according to the decisions taken under the plan. This will be without prejudice to the right of the Constituent Assemblies to decide in due dourse whether the parts of India which they represent will remain within the British Commonwealth.'[77]

Lord Mountbatten returned to India on 31 May and discussed the Statement with the Party leaders on 2 and 3 June. The leaders having accepted it the Prime Minister announced the plan in the House of Commons on 3 June, 1947. The Viceroy also spoke over the All India Radio on the evening of 3 June, and immediately after it the Statement of His Majesty's Government was broadcast and released to the Press.

Lord Mountbatten held a Press Conference on 4 June and announced that the transfer of power would be effected, not in June, 1948, as declared in the Statement of 20 February, 1947, but much earlier than that, and

probably about 15 August, 1947.

The Working Committee of the Congress met on 3 June, 1947, and approved of the new plan announced by the Viceroy. The most intriguing problem before the Committee was the future of the N. W. F. P. In spite of the opposition of the Muslim League, the Congress Government under the Khan brothers had been functioning still. The new plan would place the Khan brothers and the Khudai Khidmatgars at the mercy of the League who looked upon them as mortal enemies. When therefore even Gandhi supported the plan in the W. C., Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan "was completely stunned and for several minutes he could not utter a word. He then appealed to the Working Committee and reminded the Committee that he had always supported the Congress. If the Congress now deserted him, the reaction on the Frontier would be terrible. His enemies would laugh at him and even his friends would say that so long as the Congress needed the Frontier, they supported the Khudai Khidmatgars. When however the Congress wished to come to terms with the Muslim League, it gave up its opposition to partition wiihout even consulting the Frontier and its leaders. Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan repeatedly said that the Frontier would regard it as an act of treachery if the Congress now threw the Khudai Khidmatgars to the wolves."[78]

This statement—if it has been correctly reported by Azad—cannot be regarded as having fairly or accurately represented the actual state of things. Lord Mountbatten had declared in unequivocal language that the people of the N.W.F.P. would be given an opportunity, like the non-Muslim minorities in Bengal and the Panjab, to decide for themselves whether they would opt for Pakistan or Hindusthan. This was a fair and square proposal, and if Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan had

as much hold over the people as his statement implied there was no reason why he should have hesitated to accept it. Once having opted for Hindusthan he could have negotiated with the friendly Congress party for the future status of N.W.F.P. either as a free Pathan State or as an autonomous State under Hindusthan. If the Congress then failed to meet his reasonable demands he would have been justified in hurling the abuses which he did against the Congress. Further, it is interesting to note that even in 1944, Gandhi offered to Jinnah a separate Pakistan State including N.W.F.P.[79]

But Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan evidently knew full well that blood was thicker than water and on a straight issue of joining either Hindusthan or Pakistan, the Muslim population of N.W.F.P., in spite of their profession of loyalty to the Congress, would overwhelmingly vote for Pakistan. He was therefore unwilling to accept the proposal of plebiscite. It is consequently difficult to maintain that the Congress treatment of its Muslim followers in N.W.F.P. was more harsh or unjust than its treatment of the non-Muslim followers in Bengal and the Panjab.

Azad tells us that Gandhi was moved by the appeal of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan in the meeting of the Congress Working Committee on 3 June. Gandhi even told the Viceroy that he would not support the plan for Partition without a satisfactory assurance of fair treatment to the Khudai Khidmatgars by the Muslim League. For, how could he desert those who had always stood by the Congress in the days of difficulty and distress ?[80] It would be interesting to know whether Gandhi had expressed similar feelings in the Committee for the non-Muslim minorities of Bengal and the Panjab. They, too, had stood by the Congress in weal and woe, and in one respect deserved more pity. If the Muslims of N.W.F.P. were as devoted to the Congress ideals as they were

represented to be, they had the remedy in their own hands, for the decision would be made by plebiscite. The Hindus and Sikhs in the W. Panjab and the Hindus of E. Bengal had no such remedy. It was really these peoples whom the Congress, *with far greater justice,* might be described as having thrown to the wolves.

Lord Mountbatten had a personal discussion with Dr. Khan Saheb. The latter demanded that if there was to be plebiscite, the voters should have the right to vote for a separate independent State of their own,—Pakhtoonistan. Mountbatten pointed out that the original suggestion of Attlee Cabinet to give option to each Province to declare for Hindusthan, Pakistan, or independence, was turned down by Nehru as Balkanization of India. An exception could not now be made for a single Province, except with the consent of both the parties. But while the Congress was agreeable to Abdul Gaffar Khan's proposal, Jinnah strongly opposed it and characterized the demand for an independent Pakhtoonistan (or Pathanistan) as insidious and spurious. He, however, declared that the N.W.F.P would enjoy full autonomy in Pakistan. This did not satisfy the Khan brothers and they advised their followers to boycott the referendum when it took place. The plebiscite was in favour of joining Pakistan.

III. THE CONGRESS ACCEPTS PARTITION OF INDIA.

The Congress Working Committee met on 12 June, 1947, and prepared a draft resolution for All-India Congress Committee which met at New Delhi on 14 and 15 June, 1947, and accepted it.[81] Some extracts of this resolution are quoted below :

"The Committee welcomes the decision of the British Government to transfer power completely to the Indian people by next August.........

"In view...of the refusal of the Muslim League to

accept the Plan of May 16, and to participate in the Constituent Assembly, and further, in view of the policy of the Congress that 'it cannot think in terms of compelling the people in any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will', the A.I.C.C. accepts the proposals embodied in the announcement of June 3.

"The Congress has consistently upheld that the unity of India must be maintained. .... The picture of India we have learnt to cherish will remain in our minds and hearts. The A.I.C.C. earnestly trusts that when present passions have subsided, India's problems will be viewed in their proper perspective and the false doctrine of two nations in India will be discredited and discarded by all.

"The proposals of June 3, 1947, are likely to lead to the secession of some parts of the country from India. However much this may be regretted, the A. I. C. C. accepts this possibility, in the circumstances now prevailing."

Pandit Govind Vallabh Pant, who moved the resolution in the A. I. C. C., said that 'this was the only way to achieve freedom and liberty for the country. It would assure an Indian Union with a strong centre......... The Congress had worked hard and sacrificed everything for the sake of unity. But there was a limit beyond which it could not go. The choice today was between accepting the statement of June 3 or committing suicide.'

Pandit Pant maintained that 'it was the declared policy of the Congress not to coerce any unwilling areas to join the Union.' 'It was,' he said, 'better to accept the Statement of June 3 than fritter away their energies in trying to keep unwilling people in the Union.'

The resolution was seconded by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. He said 'that the decision of the W. C. was not the right decision, but the Congress had no alternative,

as the present state of indecision and drift could not be allowed to continue any longer, specially in view of the internal strife and disorder and the obstinacy of the Muslim League. The Congress stood by the ideal of a United India, but it was also committed to the principle of self-determination and was against coercing any unwilling areas to join the Union. He felt sure that the Partition would be short-lived and the seceding parts of India would, in the very near future, hurry back to the Indian Union.'

The Congress President then announced that notice had been given of 12 amendments, but eight of them, being of the nature of direct opposition, were out of order. In course of the discussion that followed there was strong opposition to the resolution from several members. Choitram Gidwani, the Sindh Congress leader, in a forceful speech asserted 'that the unity of India was much more precious than the advantage of a strong centre. He characterized the resolution as downright surrender to brute force and violence.'

Among the opponents the most impressive and impassioned speech was that of Purshottamdas Tandon. He said : 'Acceptance of the resolution will be an abject surrender to the British and the Muslim League. The W. C. has failed you, but you have the strength of millions behind you and you must reject this resolution. The decision of the W. C. was an admission of weakness and the result of a sense of despair. The Partition would not benefit either community—the Hindus in Pakistan and the Muslims in India would both live in fear.'

The point of view expressed in the last sentence was also stressed by Maulana Hafizur Rahman who vehemently opposed the resolution.

Dr. Kitchlew, President of the Panjab Provincial Congress Committee, opposed the resolution and characterized it as a 'surrender of nationalism in favour of communalism.'

When passions were rising high against the resolution, Gandhi intervened in the debate and spoke for about forty minutes. 'He advised the House to accept the resolution. They must remember that the W. C., as their representative, had accepted the plan, and it was the duty of the A. I. C. C. to stand by them. The acceptance of the plan did not involve the Congress Working Committee alone. There were two other parties to it, the British Government and the Muslim League. If at this stage the All-India Congress Committee rejected the Working Committee's decision, what would the world think of it? The consequences of rejection would be the finding of a new set of leaders, who could not only constitute the Congress Working Committee, but also take charge of the Government. They should not forget that peace in the country was very essential at this juncture. The Congress was opposed to Pakistan and he was one of those who had steadfastly opposed the division of India. Yet he had come before the All-India Congress Committee to urge the acceptance of the resolution on India's division. Sometimes certain decisions, however unpalatable they might be, had to be taken.'

Nehru who spoke on the second day asserted 'that the most urgent task at present was to arrest the swift drift towards anarchy and chaos by the establishment of a strong Central Government. He said that there was no question of any surrender to the Muslim League. The Congress had all along been against coercing any unit to remain under the Indian Union. It was wrong to suggest that the Congress Working Committee had taken fright and therefore surrendered, though it was correct to say that they were very much disturbed at the prevailing madness. Partition was better than murder of innocent citizens.'

Following Nehru Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel in

a vigorous speech extended his full support to the June 3 Plan. He entirely disagreed with the view of Azad that the Cabinet Mission Plan was better and said 'that, looking at the Cabinet Mission's proposals today in the light of his experience in the Interim Government during the past nine months, he was not at all sorry that the Statement of 16 May had gone. Had they accepted it, the whole of India would have gone the Pakistan way. Today they had seventy-five to eighty per cent. of India, which they could develop and make strong according to their genius. The League could develop the rest of the country. He denied that the W. C. accepted the Plan out ef fear. Any course other than the one which the W. C. had suggested would not only be injurious but would also make the Congress the laughing stock of the world. Here was a chance for India to attain her independence. Was she going to throw it away'?

Acharya Kripalani, the Congress President, in his concluding speech, also refuted the charge that the Working Committee had taken the decision out of fear. He said:

"The Hindu and Moslem communities have vied with each other in the worst orgies of violence...I have seen a well where women with their children, 107 in all, threw themselves to save their honour. In another place, a place of worship, fifty young women were killed by their menfolk for the same reason. I have seen heaps of bones in a house where 307 persons, mainly women and children, were driven, locked up and then burnt alive by the invading mob. These ghastly experiences have no doubt affected my approach to the question. Some members have accused us that we have taken this decision out of fear. I must admit the truth of this charge, but not in the sense in which it is made. The fear is not for the lives lost, or of the widows' wail, or the orphans' cry, or of the many houses burned. The

fear is that if we go on like this, retaliating and heaping indignities on each other, we shall progressively reduce ourselves to a stage of cannibalism and worse. In every fresh communal fight the most brutal and degraded acts of the previous fight become the norm."

The resolution of Pant, when put to the vote, was carried, 157 voting for it, 29 against, and 32 members remaining neutral.[82]

The Council of the All-India Muslim League met in New Delhi on 10 June, and approved of His Majesty's Government's Statement of 3 June. "The Council was of the opinion that, although it could not agree to the partition of Bengal and the Panjab, or give its consent to such partition, it had to consider His Majesty's Government's plan for the transfer of power as a whole. The resolution gave full authority to Jinnah to accept the fundamental principles of the plan as a compromise and empowered him to take all steps and decisions in that connexion."[83]

But though the two principal Parties, the Congress and the Muslim League, accepted the June 3rd Plan, the extremists of both communities sharply reacted against it. "The Working Committee of the Hindu Mahasabha met in Delhi and passed a resolution which declared : "India is one and indivisible and there will never be peace unless and until the separated areas are brought back into the Indian Union and made integral parts thereof." The Mahasabha even called for an all-India 'Anti-Pakistan Day.'[84]

Thus at last the curtain fell on the question of Indian unity. Curiously enough, very litile attention was devoted by the Congress leaders to the pitiable condition of the Hindu and Sikh minorities in Pakistan. When the point was raised, the members from Sindh, who vehemently opposed the resolution of Pant, were given all kinds

of assurances and were told in private discussion, that if they suffered in any way in Pakistan India would retaliate on the Muslims in India. Soon this kind of propaganda was used, as a regular means, to remove opposition against Partition. "It was being openly said in certain circles that the Hindus in Pakistan need have no fear as there would be 45 millions of Muslims in India and if there was any oppression of Hindus in Pakistan, the Muslims in India would have to bear the consequences."[85]

IV. INDIAN INDEPENDENCE ACT

As could be easily anticipated, East Bengal and the West Panjab, as well as Sindh, Baluchistan and N.W.F.P. opted for Pakistan, while West Bengal and the East Panjab opted for India. In Sylhet a majority of the voters —239,619 to 184,041—were in favour of separation and joining East Bengal.

On 4 July,1947, the Indian Independence Bill was introduced in the House of Commons. High tributes were paid to both Attlee and Mountbatten by members on both sides of the House. The Bill was passed without any amendment on 15 July, and by the House of Lords on the following day ; it received the Royal Assent on 18 July.

The main provisions of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, may be summarised as follows :

1. Two independent Dominions, known respectively as India and Pakistan, shall be set up as from the 15th day of August, 1947.

2. The territories of the two Dominions were defined in such terms that Pakistan was to comprise Sindh, British Baluchistan, N.W.F.P., the West Panjab and East Bengal. (The exact boundaries of the last two were determined by two Boundary Commissions, each consisting of two nominees of the Congress and two of the Muslim League,

and a Chairman, Sir Cyril Radcliffe. As the members could not agree, the Chairman gave his award).

3. "For each of the new Dominions, there shall be a Governor-General who shall be appointed by His Majesty for the purposes of the government of the Dominion :

"Provided that, unless and until provision to the contrary is made by a law of the Legislature of either of the new Dominions, the same person may be Governor-General of both the new Dominions."

4. The Legislature of each of the new Dominions shall have full power to make laws for that Dominion, and no Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom, nor any Order in Council passed after 15 August, 1947, shall have any validity in either of the two Dominions. In short, the jurisdiction of the British Parliament over India will cease from that date.

5. With effect from 15 August, 1947, His Majesty's Government will cease to have any responsibility for the government of British India ; and all treaties and agreements between His Majesty's Government and the rulers of Indian States or any authority in tribal areas shall lapse. The words "Emperor of India" shall be omitted from the Royal Style and Titles.

6. The Constituent Assembly of each Dominion shall exercise the powers of the Central Legislature and the existing Central Legislative Assembly and the Council of State would be automatically dissolved.

In accordance with the above provisions Lord Mountbatten became the Governor-General of the Dominion of India, and M.A. Jinnah, the Governor-General of the Dominion of Pakistan.

It is unnecessary to discuss the various steps that were taken to give effect to the partition of the country. This stupendous task was entrusted to a Partition Committee, later replaced by a Partition Council, with equal

number of representatives from the Congress and the Muslim League, and with Lord Mountbatten as Chairman. This Council continued even after the Dominions of India and Pakistan came into existence on 15 August, 1947. The Partition Council worked through a Steering Committee of two members and was assisted by ten expert committees of officials, covering the entire field of administration. An Arbitral Tribunal was set up for the settlement of all differences between the two Governments.

The question of the international status of the two Dominions also proved a thorny problem. "The Congress claimed that the Dominion of India would continue as the international personality of pre-partition India. The Muslim League, on the other hand, maintained that the existing Government of India would, on 15 August, disappear altogether as an entity and would be succeeded by two independent Dominions of equal international status, both of which would be eligible to the existing rights and obligations."[86]

The matter was referred to U.N.O. and in accordance with its recommendations Lord Mountbatten promulgated on 14 August, 1947, the Indian Independence (International Arrangements) Order, 1947, according to which membership of all international organizations, together with the rights and obligations attached to such membership, devolved solely upon the Dominion of India. Pakistan was left to apply for membership of such international organizations as she chose to join.

In the meanwhile the Constituent Assembly of India continued to function. As mentioned above, its first three sessions were boycotted by the members belonging to the Muslim League. "After the acceptance of partition, however, Jinnah and the League leaders agreed that Muslim League members from the non-Pakistan provinces should participate in the Constituent Assembly... When the

Constituent Assembly began its fourth session on 14 July, the Muslim League members from the non-Pakistan provinces took their seats and declared themselves to be loyal and law-abiding citizens of India."

Another important step was the solution of the problem of the Indian States. Under the Indian Independence Act the British Paramountcy was to lapse on 15 August. After protracted negotiations settlement was arrived at and the rulers of all the States geographically contiguous to India, with the exception of Hyderabad, Junagadh and one or two other States in Kathiawar with Muslim rulers, signed the Instrument of Accession and the Standstill Agreement with India, before 15 August, 1947. Thus though the two wings were lopped off, the heart of the Indian Dominion gained in strength and solidarity. The credit for thus eatablishing 'a unified political structure in the new Dominion of India' must go principally to Sardar Patel and his lieutenant, V. P. Menon, who has given a very interesting account of the integration of States. It was a great, though silent, revolution which did not attract as much notice as it deserved, being cast into shade by the still greater revolution which brought freedom to India. By the waving of a magician's wand, as it were, there tumbled down in a heap hundreds of States, big and small, some of which traced their existence to the ancient Hindu Age.

V. THE INAUGURATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

On 7 August Jinnah left India for Karachi, and the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, which met on 11 August, elected him as its President. The Assembly also conferred upon him the honorific of Quaid-e-Azam (great leader), a title which had been attached to his name by his followers for several years past. Lord Mountbatten flew to Karachi on 13 August and addressed the Constituent Assembly the next day. Pakistan officially became a Dominion on 15

August, 1947, when Jinnah was sworn in as Governor-General, and the new Pakistan Cabinet headed by Liaquat Ali Khan was also sworn in.

The Constituent Assembly of the Indian Union met in Delhi on the night of 14 August. It was a red-letter 'night' in the annals of Modern India. After the British domination for 190 years India once again became a free country. There was no doubt a tinge cf sorrow, in the minds of some, for the Hindus of East Bengal and the Hindus and Sikhs of the West Panjab who were denied enjoyment of the blessings of liberty for which they had made supreme sacrifices. But gratitude has no place in politics. No tears were shed for the lands, the sacrifice of whose children paved the way for the liberty of the rest of India. If there were any wailings of their people they were drowned by the shouts of joy which heralded the liberation of the rest of India.

In an atmosphere, tense with excitement, Nehru addressed the members. "At the stroke of the midnight hour," said he, "when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom. A moment comes, which comes but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to the new, when an age ends, and when the soul of a nation, long suppressed, finds utterance. It is fitting that at this solemn moment we take the pledge of dedication to the service of India and her people and to the still larger cause of humanity."[87]

The Constituent Assembly then appointed Lord Mountbatten the first Governor-General of the Dominion. After the meeting was over, Rajendra Prasad and Nehru went to the Government House and conveyed to Lord Mountbatten the request of the Constituent Assembly. Lord Mountbatten feelingly replied ; "I am proud of the honour and I will do my best to carry out your advice in a constitutional manner." Lord Mountbatten was sworn

in as Governor-General on the morning of the 15 August, and the new Cabinet headed by Nehru was sworn in by the Governor-General. Lord Mountbatten then drove in state to the Chamber of the Constituent Assembly. Rajendra Prasad, the President of the Assembly, read messages of congratulation from all over the world, and Lord Mountbatten read out the King's message felicitating the birth of the Dominion of India. Lord Mountbatten then addressed the Assembly. Rajendra Prasad gave a suitable reply in course of which he said that "while our achievement is in no small measure due to our own sufferings and sacrifices, it is also the result of world forces and events and, last though not the least, it is the consummation and fulfilment of the historic tradition and democratic ideals of the British race." This is a great truth, which is not always realized, nor remembered, by the Indians.

It is hardly necessary to say that August 15 was hailed with joy all over India, and no words can adequately describe the tumultuous scenes of wild rejoicings witnessed in every city and every village. Lord and Lady Mountbatten, driving in state, were greeted with resounding cheers by the enthusiastic crowds that lined the streets. This heralded a new era of goodwill between India and Britain. Stories of many hard and bitter struggles between India and Britain, and of animosities between the Indians and the British fill the pages of this work. Let it end with a note of goodwill, trust, and confidence which manifested itself on the streets of Delhi on 15 August, 1947.

How the author wishes that he could have closed this volume with a similar note in respect of the relation between India and Pakistan. But that was not to be. Instead of an era of goodwill, the independence ushered in one of communal hatred and cruelty of which there

is perhaps no parallel in the recorded history of India. It is unnecessary to recount that story of shame and barbarity as it falls beyond the period under review. It will suffice to quote a few lines written by Leonard Mosley, by way of indicating the price which India paid for her freedom :

"Both sides had signed, on 20 July, at Mountbatten's behest, a declaration that they would respect the rights of minorities. But Mountbatten was right in suspecting that they did not know what they were signing. The Sikh policy was to exterminate the Muslims in their midst. The Muslims, with their eyes on the rich Sikh farm-lands, were content to drive the Sikhs out and only massacre those who insisted on remaining. It is sad to have to admit that in their deliberate disobedience of their signed pledge they were encouraged by the British Governor of West Punjab, Sir Francis Mudie, who wrote to Mr. Jinnah on 5 September, 1947 :

'I am telling everyone that I don't care how the Sikhs get across the border ; the great thing is to get rid of them as soon as possible.'

"600,000 dead. 14,000,000 driven from their homes. 100,000 young girls kidnapped by both sides, forcibly converted or sold on the auction block."

Mosley continues :

"It need not have happened. It would not have happened had independence not been rushed through at such a desperate rate. A little patience and all the troubles might have been avoided....Jinnah was dead within a year. A little patience. A refusal to be rushed."[88]

This seems to be too optimistic a view. The question whether Mountbatten or his critics were right may be safely left to the verdict of history.

FOOTNOTES

As a general rule books are referred to by the surname of the author whose full name and the title of the book will be found in the Bibliography. Two or more books by the same author are distinguished by Arabic numerals added after the surname, and the same numeral will also be found in the Bibliography.

The following further abbreviations have been used in the footnotes in addition to those in the earlier Volumes.

Hist. Congr.	*The History of the Indian National Congress*, by Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya.
IAR	*The Indian Annual Register*.
ICND	*Landmarks in Indian Constitutional and National Development* (1600-1919), by G. N. Singh.
Muslim League	*The Muslim League*, by Lal Bahadur.
Pakistan	*The Birth of Pakistan*, by Dr. Sachin Sen.
Rebel India	*Rebel India*, Edited by Bejan Mitra and Phani Chakraborty (Calcutta Book Company), 1946.
Sources	*Sources of Indian Tradition*, published by the Columbia University (1958).

BOOK IV, CHAPTER I.

1. Cf. Vol. I, p. 505.

1a. Montagu, 156.

2. Cf. Vol. II, 282-98, and also Chapter VIII.
3. *Sedition Committee Report*, Ch. XVII.
4. For details, cf. *ICND*, 667 ff.
5. Gandhi—I, 126.
6. The account of Gandhi in South Africa is based on Louis Fischer's book, *Gandhi, His Life and Message for the World*. The passages quoted are also from this book.
7. Sitaramayya—II, 111.
8. Ibid, 101.
9. Diwakar—II, 17 ; III, 26.
10. Diwakar—I,5.
11. Cf. Vol. II, 131.
12. Ibid, 176-79.

13. Gandhi—I, 457.
14. Gandhi—II, 21.
15. Ibid, 10.
16. Ibid, 12.
17. Cf. Vol. I, 355.
18. Gandhi—I, 521-22, 526-8.
19. Ibid, 531-38.
20. Tendulkar, I. 293.
21. Gandhi—I, 562.
22. *Youug India*, (published in U.S.A.), III. 14.
23. *Mahatma Gandhi—The Man and His Mission* (Natesan Publication), p. 55.
24. Gandhi—I, 576.
25. *Report of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee* set up by the Congress in 1922.
26. *Young India* (U.S.A.), III. 151. *ICND*, 664.
27. *Young India* (U.S.A.), II. 155.
28. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 164.
29. Ibid, 163.
30. *ICND.*, 679.
31. Horniman. 89-92.
32. Chirol—II, 177-8.
33. *Report of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee*, 56-7.
34. Ibid, 57.
35. Motilal Nehru's Address as Congress President at Amritsar, 1919.

35a. Ibid. Another such Englishman was Horniman, many quotations from whose book are given later.

36. *IAR.*, 1921, p. 26
37. The passages within inverted commas in the last four paragraphs are quotations from Horniman, pp. 125-30.
38. The account of atrocities in other places that follows is based upon the Reports of the Hunter Committee and the Congress Committee and Horniman's account which is also based mainly on the former.
39. Photographs of public floggings and of public cage are given in Horniman's book, pp. 120, 154.
40. Horniman, 150-54.
41. For a detailed account of the bombing and machine-gunning, cf. Horniman, 142-49.
42. *ICND.*, p. 686, f.n., 4.
43. *IAR.*, 1921, Part III, pp. 39-41.
44. *Young India* (published in U.S.A.), III. 77.
45. This is given in *IAR*, 1921, Part I, p. 45. The date, 28 May, is

given in both *Hist. Congr.* (I. 198) and *India in 1921-22* (p. 37). J. S. Sharma gives the date as 20 May as well as 28 May (pp. 468-9).

46. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 167. *IAR*, 1921, p. 221.
47. *Hist Congr.*, Vol. I, 171.
48. Ibid, 146, 148.
49. The following account is based on the Government of India Act, 1919, and the *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, Vol. I, Part II, from which many passages have been quoted.
50. *IAR*, 1920, Part I, pp. 379, 384.
51. Cf. Vol. II, pp. 331 ff.
52. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 156 ; *Sources*, 769-70.

BOOK IV, CHAPTER II.

1. *Hist. Congr.*,1.189. According to an official report Provincial Khilafat Committees had commenced to spring up in 1919. The first of these, of which Mohammad Chotani was President, was constituted in the Bombay Presidency. At a meeting on the 11th of November it changed its title to the 'Central Khilafat Committee of India, Bombay'. At about the same time the Delhi Khilafat Committee, of which Ajmal Khan was President, decided to convene an All-India Khilafat Conference which was held at Delhi on 23 and 24 November. It was presided over on the 23rd by Fazlul Huq. "Gandhi attended the meeting on the 23rd and presided over it on the 24th." If this be true the statements in lines 8-9 should be modified accordingly.
2. *IAR.*, 1921, p. 156.
3. *Hist. Congr.*,I.191. Italics mine.
4. Ibid.
5. Pradhan, 151-2.
6. *Sources*, 770. It is interesting to note in this connection that even Dr. A. Ansari, one of the few Muslim leaders that remained in the Nationalist camp till the end, wrote : "It is difficult for any non-Indian Moslem to realise what Pan-Islamism means to Indian Moslems. ...Pan-Islamic sentiment has been one of the Indian Moslem's most sacred and exalted passions," (Introduction to the *Conflict of East and West* by Halide Edib).

7. *Sources*, 777.
8. *Hist. Congr.*, I.199. Also cf. Hasrat Mohani's Presidential Address at the Ahmadabad Session of the Muslim League, December, 1921.
9. Nair, Sankaran, 28.
9a. That the Indian Muslims tried to enlist the support of the Amir of Afghanistan and opened negotiations with him for that purpose is clear from the statement of Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, a leading Muslim politician of the time. Cf. his recently published book, *Pathway to Pakistan*, p. 42. Cf. also Ambedkar, *Pakistan*, p. 144, and the following passage in a confidential official report :

"At the end of April (1919) his (Amir Amanullah's) Foreign Minister sent confidential instructions to the Afghan envoy at Simla that endeavours should be made to obtain the allegiance of both Hindus and Muhammadans to the Amir in return for which Afghanistan would assist them in their struggle for independence."

10. Nair, Sankaran, p. 38. Cf. Montagu's statement in the House of Commons in May, 1921 (*IAR*, 1922-23, Vol. II, p. 43). Muhammad Ali denied the allegation though he admitted, "I am a Muslim first and everything else afterwards." For the whole controversy arising out of the alleged threat of Afghan invasion, cf. *IAR*, 1922, pp. 206-12. But cf. also the preceding footnote. The official report referred to in the preceding footnote contains the following : "A very violent speech was delivered by Muhammad Ali in Madras in which he openly stated that he would assist an army invading India from Afghanistan, provided that the invaders came to free the country and withdrew after accomplishing their task." The proviso is, of course, a mere eye-wash and it is difficult to believe that anyone, far less Muhammad Ali, could seriously believe it.
11. The official report, referred to above, gives a detailed account of the Pan-Islamic Movement in India which became a live force in 1911, being stimulated by the events of that year. It refers to the following specific incidents. During 1914 several Turks visited India. "During their tour in India they conveyed the impression that they were in the confidence of the Young Turk Party and that their visit to India had been undertaken with the express intention of cementing the relationship betwween the Pan-Islamic Party in India and the Young Turk Party in Constantinople. At Delhi they associated with Dr. Ansari and the Ali Brothers.". Another party had been sent in August "to stir up Indian Muslims.' Turkey also endeavoured "to spread pro-Turk and Pan-Islamic ideas in India through the press. A weekly Turkish paper, the *Jihan-i-Islam*, published in Arabic, Turkish and Urdu and edited

by an Indian Muhammadan, found its way in considerable numbers into India before the War, and the avowed object of this periodical was to promote intercourse between Muhammadans and to encourage Indians to trade with Muslim countries."

12. Some of these have been quoted above.
13. Quoted in *Pakistan*, 73. The mystic statement of Gandhi is explained by the following passage contained in an official report: "In March last (1919) an understanding was arranged between M. K. Gandhi and Maulana Abdul Bari to the effect that the Hindu politicians would espouse the cause of Turkey and the Muhammadans would refrain from slaughtering kine."
14. Ibid.
15. Nehru's statement will be quoted later.
16. The *Young India* (edited by Ganhi), 4 May, 1921 (quoted in *Pakistan*, p. 72). In reply to B. C. Pal's criticism Gandhi said: "I would rather see India perish at the hands of Afghans than purchase freedom from Afghan invasion at the cost of her honour. To have India defended by an unrepentant Government that keeps the Khilafat and the Punjab wounds still bleeding, is to sell India's honour." (*IAR*, 1922, pp. 211-12). The logic of this is not apparent to one who is not a mystic saint. Gandhi's nationalism seems to differ essentially from the modern conception of it. In an appeal to the Musalmans of India published in the *Independent*, dated Allahabad, 2nd October, 1921, after the arrest of Ali brothers (which, he said, left him 'without his arms') he observes: "The brave brothers are staunch lovers of their country but they are Musalmans first and everything else after and *it must be so with every religiously minded man*. It would be interesting to know whether Gandhi's followers, who are anxious about national integration, are prepared to subscribe to the views contained in the words italicized by me.
17. Nair, Sankaran, pp. 37-46.
18. Ambedkar, *Pakistan*, pp. 144 ff.
19. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 371, 378.

BOOK IV, CHAPTER III.

1. See pp. 57-9.
2. *IAR*. 1921, Part I, p.103.

2a. But cf. Ch. I, f.n. 45.
3. *IAR*, 1921, Part I, pp. 105 ff.
4. Ibid, 108.
5. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 198; Ram Gopal, *Lokamanya Tilak*, p. 445.
6. Bapat, *Reminiscences of Tilak*.
7. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 198.
8. *IAR*. 1921, Part I, pp. 194 ff.
9. *Nehru on Gandhi*, 12-14; Nehru, *Towards Freedom*, 52-3.
10. *IAR*. 1921, Part I, p. 116.
10a. *IAR*, 1921, Part I, p. 206. Italics mine.
11. Gandhi says with reference to his resolution on the Non-co-operation movement passed in the Special session of the Congress at Calcutta in 1920: "In my resolution non-co-operation was postulated only with a view to obtaining redress of the Punjab and the Khilafat wrongs. That, however, did not appeal to Sjt. Vijayaraghavachari.

'If non-co-operation was to be declared, why should it be with reference to particular wrongs? The absence of Swaraj was the biggest wrong that the country was labouring under; it should be against that that non-co-operation should be directed, he argued. Pandit Motilalji also wanted the demand for Swaraj to be included in the resolution. I readily accepted the suggestion and incorporated the demand for Swaraj in my resolution......" *My Experiments with Truth*, p. 610. Vijayaraghavachari, and many others, clearly perceived what Gandhi failed to see, that India's chief problem was the attainment of political independence,—everything else being merely a side-issue. Gandhi seems to have been still under the spell of loyalty to the British rule.

A somewhat different version is given by Choudhry Khaliquzzaman. Referring to the Special session of the Congress at Calcutta in 1920, and the resolution on Non-co-operation moved by Gandhi, he observes: "As soon as Gandhiji's resolution came under discussion Mr. Bipendra (sic. Bipin) Chandra Pal, under a misconception that Muslims would not accept it, proposed that along with the Khilafat the word Swaraj might also be introduced. Gandhiji was not prepared for it for he said, 'there should be no question of bargaining; if we have to express our sympathy with the Muslim cause we should do it without any thought of recompense.' The Muslims, who had attended this session in very large numbers, rushed to Maulana Shaukat Ali to ask him to beg Gandhiji not to oppose the amendment. Maulana Shaukat Ali persuaded Gandhiji after some reluctance to accept the amendment." *Pathway to Pakistan*, pp. 55-6.

This does not tally with the statement of Gandhi that the suggestion came from Vijayaraghavachari and he *readily* accepted it. We cannot, therefore, without any further evidence, accept the statement of Khaliquzzaman even though he was present in the Congress session.

11a. That on this date Gandhi did not consider the Panjab atrocities as adequate cause for N.C.O. is proved by his attitude of co-operation with the Government, as against that of C.R. Das, in the Amritsar session of the Congress held in the last week of December, 1919 (see above,p. 51).

11b. Attention may be drawn to the italicised words in Gandhi's letter to the Viceroy, quoted above in p. 75, and the last sentence in the resolution of the National Liberal Federation quoted above in p. 70, to the effect the N.C.O. would not do any good to the Turks. Mrs. Annie Besant says : "It will be remembered that Mr. Gandhi, in March, 1920, had forbidden the mixing up of non-co-operation in defence of the Khilafat with other questions ; but it was found that the Khilafat was not sufficiently attractive to "Hindus", 'so at the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee held at Benares on May 30 and 31, the Punjab atrocities and the deficiencies of the Reforms Act were added to the list of provocative causes.' *The Future of Indian Politics* (quoted by Ambedkar in *Pakistan*,p.139).

12. Report,p.8 ; cf. *Hist. Congr.*, I.198-9.

13. See pp. 71-3.

14. Karmarkar, 286.

15. Pradhan, 153.

16. *Hist. Congr.*, 1. 194. The full text of the Manifesto is quoted in pp. 193 ff.

17. Bapat, op. cit., III. 142.

17a. In view of what has been stated above regarding the gradual evolution of the idea and programme of N.C.O. it is very unlikely that a detailed programme of it could be placed before a meeting on 18 January, 1920. This is also not compatible with the resolution of the Central Khilafat Committee on 2 June (see p.72).

18. As noted above (p. 71), this is contradicted in the official history of the Congress.

19. Bapat, op. cit., I. 253.

20. For the different views quoted, cf. Bapat, op. cit., 115, 140, 514, and Preface.

20a. Introduction, *Freedom's Buttle. Gandhi's speeches*, p. ix. Quoted in Raghuvamsi, 2nd Edition, 1959, pp. 154-5.

21. *IAR.*, 1921, Part I, p. 206. Italics mine.
22. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 205. Italics mine.
23. See pp. 44-5. Annie Besant, *India Bond or Free*, p.191.
23a. *IAR.*, 1921, Part I, pp. 137-8.
23b. There are some differences in the text of the resolution as given, respectively, in A. *Hist.* Congr., I. 202 ff., and B. *Congress* in *Evolution* by D. Chakrabarty and C. Bhattacharya, pp.33 ff. A uses the word 'Muslims' instead of 'Mussalmans' used in B. In this passage A omits the words 'or indirectly' which occur in B.
23c. See preceding note. A omits the words 'House of Commons and specially in the'.
23d. A omits the words 'showed virtual support of the'.
23e. A has 'Mahatma' instead of 'Mr'. as in B.
24. This is the voting figure given in in *Hist. Congr.* , I. 202 ; but others give the figures as 1855 to 873,1866 to 884, etc.
24a. Ambedkar writes : "The Resolution of non-co-operation was carried by 1886 votes against 884. The late Mr. Tairsee once told me that a large majority of the delegates were no others than the taxi drivers of Calcutta who were paid to vote for the non-co-operation resolution." *Pakistan*, p. 141 f.n. Though the political parties were not above such tactics, it is difficult to believe that the hired taxi drivers could turn the scale so much in favour of the resolution.
24b. See above, pp. 78-9.
25. Louis Fischer-I, p.68.
26. *Nation*, 300.
27. Cf. the passage from Rajagopalachari's writings quoted above (p.81).
28. See p. 51.
29. *India in 1921-22*, p. 36.
30. Louis Fischer-I, p. 56.
30a. See p.97.
30b. The reason behind all this is perhaps the view expressed by Pattabhi Sitaramayya quoted above, in p. 66.
30c. B. R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan*, p. 144. Italics mine. The Muslim attitude in this respect may be judged from the letter of Kidwai published in the *Leader*, March, 1922. "It is a great pity that most of the Indian Muslims...have yet failed to understand the full import of the Khilafat question. It is an international question....It cannot be surprising if Mr. Gandhi and other Hindu leaders fail to understand the international significance of Islam,......(many of his Muslim followers do the same).... I cannot help reminding Mr. Gandhi that his programme of removing untouchability or picketing

liquor shops or boycotting Councils and Universities or even of wearing nothing but Khaddar cannot have the slightest effect on the Khilafat question.... As an old Indian 'Nationalist' of the 'extreme' wing I can say this without being misunderstood that the most urgent question for India to-day is the Khilafat question. That is the *danger point* and Hindus and Muslims should both unitedly attend to the solution of that question first and when a calm atmosphere is obtained Indians of different shades of political and religious views should meet in a conference to draw up a constructive and definite scheme for Swaraj."

30d A Muslim political leader says: "The Congress session in Nagpur was almost a Muslim session of the Congress for I believe the number of Muslims was so large as to give it a Muslim colour". Khaliquzzaman, p.57

31. The *Indian Struggle*, I.67. Mr. B.C. Pal was very much annoyed and took C.R. Das to task for changing his views overnight without consulting the Party or its leading members (H. Das Gupta, *Bharater Jatiya Congresss*, III. 37).

32. Ishwari Prasad, *Modern India*, 408.

33. Ibid.

34. *The Report of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee* (hereinafter referred to as the Report). For the origin and nature of this Committee, see pp.207-8. According to an official report, the reduction of excise revenue in the Panjab, Bihar and Orissa, and Bombay was, respectively, 33,10, and 6 lakhs of Rupees.

35. *IAR*. 1922,p.250.

36. report, p. 70. It serves as a typical illustration of the naivete', almost pathetic in character, which characterized Gandhi—obviously the result of judging others by his own standard.

37. *IAR*. 1924,II.205.

38. *IAR*. 1921,p.245. National Schools and Colleges were, however, established. Their number in 1921-22, according to official Report, was as follows:

Province	Number of Institutions	Number of scholars (in thousands)	
Madras	92	5	
Bombay	189	17	
Bengal	190	14	
U.P.	137	8	(Figures up to 31 July)
Panjab	69	8	
Bihar & Orissa	442	17	
C.P.	86	6	(do)
Assam	38	2	

Curiously enough, these numbers do not correspond, even roughly, with the number of scholars who had boycotted recognized institutions. Their number, in thousands, in the above Provinces was, respectively, 1,2,11,3,1,2,2,1. Altogether out of 670,000 scholars (in round number) about 23,000 withdrew, of whom more than 2,030 (excluding Bengal, for which no figure is available) returned to the institutions.

39. Muhammad Ali's speech at Madras in 1921. Montagu referred to it in the House of Commons (*IAR*. 1922-3, II. 55). Muhammad Ali, however, sang in a different tune in his speech as Congress President at Cocanada in 1923. He said that "he would resist an aggressor, be he the Muslim or non-Muslim." Was it due to the fact, stated by himself, that while his Madras speech was considered as highly treasonable by the British officials, it had not found favour with the Afghans (Congress Presidents' Addresses, II. 705-6.) On this point see above, pp. 63-6 and f. n. 10.
40. See p. 65.
41. See pp. 64-5.
42. For this episode, cf. *IAR*. 1922, pp. 223 ff.
43. Ibid, 238.
44. Ibid, 267.
45. Ibid, 270; *Hist. Congr.*, I, 217-8.
46. *India in* 1921-2 p. 87.
47. *Hist. Congr.*, I, 216.
48. Ibid, 218.
49. *The Indian Struggle*, II, 89-90.
50. *IAR*. 1922, pp. 377, 384.
51. Ibid, 307.
52. Pradhan, 183.
53. *The Indian Struggle*, II, 94 ff.
54. Ibid, 97-8.
55. *India in 1921-2*, p. 93.
56. *The Indian Struggle*, II, 99-101.
57. *India in 1921-2*, p. 94.
58. *Hist. Congr.*, I, 233-35.
58a. See pp. 180-2
59. *Young India*, October, 1919.
60. *The Indian Struggle*, II, 108.
60a. Khaliquzzaman, who was then in the same jail with Motilal Nehru, writes : "Pandit Motilal was furious when he woke me up early the next morning and expressed his deep resentment and anger at what had happened. He handed to me the *Leader* which he had in his hand and shouted, 'Look here what has happened'. He further said : 'This ends the movement; there was no need

to call off the movement because some people in a big country like India have lost their balance of mind and committed violence" (p. 63),

61. *Nehru on Gandhi*, 38-9.
62. Quoted by Pradhan, p. 196.
63. *India in 1921-2*, pp, 104-5.
64. See pp. 90-91.
65. *IAR*. 1922, pp. 340-1.
65a. Ibid, 341.
66. *IAR*, 1922, pp. 382-83.
67. See pp. 139 ff.
67a. *IAR*. 1922, pp. 321-24.
68. *IAR*. 1922-3, p. 793
69. *IAR*. 1922-3, pp. 803-806.
70. *IAR*. 1921, Part I, p. 156.
71. *IAR*. 1922, p. 190; 1922-3, p.780.
72. *IAR*. 1922, p. 192.
73. *IAR*. 1922-3, pp. 64-5.
73a. See p. 156.
74. Published in the *Leader* of Allahabad, on 9 February, 1922.
75. *Innta in 1921-2* p. 61.
76. *India : Bond or Free*, pp. 194-5. Sir Sankaran Nair also narrates the misdeeds of Gandhi's followers (*Gandhi and Anarchy*, pp. 96 ff.).
76a. See pp. 8-10.
77. Chintamani, 132.
78. *Accounts and Papers*, 1922, Vol. XVI, p. 108 (Parliamentary Papers)
79. *HCIP*. Vol. IV, p. 164.
80. *India in 1921-2*; *IAR*, 1921, p. 41.
81. Sankaran Nair, op. cit., Appendix III.
82. Ibid, Appendix V.
83. Ibid,
84. *New India*, 6 December, 1921. Report, dated Calicut, 7 September, published in the *Times of India*.
85. *Gandhi and Anarchy*, p. 40.
85a. The following passage occurs in a confidential report of the Intelligence Bureau, Government of India : "The Moplah rebellion broke out in August after Khilafat agitators, including Abul Kalam Azad and Hakim Ajmal Khan, had been making violent speeches in that area. Ever since the Majlis-ul-Ulema Conference at Erode in April, the feelings of the Moplahs had been steadily growing with respect to the Khilafate, while the non-violent Non-co-operation movement was receding more and more into the background.

A Khilafat Ulema Conference had been held at Ponnani about the middle of July at which the highly exciting speeches, followed by clear suggestions for the proclamation of a republic in the event of a hostile Britisn attitude towards Angora, provided the requisite torch to the inflammatory and fanatical Moplahs." The same Report gives an extract from the speech of one of the leaders of the Moplahs from which a few sentences are quoted as specimens : "We have extorted Swaraj from the white men.... We shall give Hindus the option of death or Islam. We have the example of the Holy Prophet that it is a good act to kill for God's work.......

"The Jews and Christians, as believers in revealed book, may be tolerated, but the idolatrous Hindus can only be allowed to live in a Muslim State on sufferances...The time for establishing the Khilafat has come."

The detailed account given above shows that these professions were carried into practice.

86. *IAR*. 1923, Supplementary, p. 194.
87. Subhas Bose, *The Indian Struggle*, II, pp, 144-5. P. C. Ray, *Life and Times of C. R. Das*, p, 204.
88. Cf. Vol. I, p. 354.
89. *IAR*. 1922, p. 755.
90. Ibid; 772.
91. *Hist. Congr.*, I, 256-7.
92. Mahadev Desai, *The Story of Bardoli*. Also cf. R. Diwakar, *Satyagraha in Action*, p. 70.
92a. See p. 122.
93. *The Indian Struggle*, II, pp. 115-7.
94. *Hist. Congr.*, I, 249.
95. *IAR*. 1924, I. 37-40.

BOOK IV, CHAPTER IV.

1. See above, p. 107.
2. *IAR*, 1924, II. 55.
3. Cf. Vol. I, pp. 373 ff.
4. See p. 114.
5. See p. 222.
6. The text of the Manifesto is given in *IAR*, 1923, Vol. II, pp. 219-20,

7. *IAR*, 1925, p. 40.
8. Rao, B. Shiva, Chapter VI; Appendix I, III.
9. *IAR*, 1925, Vol. I, p. 245.
9a. See below, pp. 255-6.
10. *IAR*, 1924, Vol. I, 6o1-o4.
11. For a comparison of the three original propositions, of Gandhi with the amended resolutions, as finally passed, see *IAR*, 1924, II. 132.
12. Ibid, I, 620-1.
13. Ibid, II. 184.
14. *The Indian Struggle*, II, 156-7.
15. Ibid, 157.
16. *IAR*, 1926, I. 17.
17. Ibid, 40, 27.
18. Ibid, 50.
19. Ibid, II, 34.
19a. It is significant that the Hindu Mahasabha was noticed for the first time in *IAR* in 1923, in connection with its annual session on 30 December, 1922 (*IAR*, 1923, p. 943).
19b. Cf. p. 271.
20. The account of Communism is mainly based on the following: M.R. Masani, *The Communist Party of India*, London, 1954. G.D. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, *Communism in India*. Bombay, 1960.
21. Annie Besant, *India Bond or Free*, 210 ; *IAR*, 1924, I. 74 ff., 703 ff.
22. See above, p. 265.
23. Cf. Vol. II, p. 252.
24. Besant, op. cit.
25. *IAR*, 1923, Supplement, p. 59. *Congress Presidential Addresses*, G. A. Natesan & Co, Madras, 1934. Second Series, p. 673.
26. *Congress Presidential Addresses*, 673-4.
27. Ibid, 699-700.
28. *IAR*, 1923, Supplement, 192.
29. *IAR*, 1924, II. 25-6.
30. For the Kohat riot, cf. *IAR*, 1924, II. 25-32, 308, 421, 434, 481, 486; *IAR*, 1925, 97-106.
31. For full text, cf. *IAR*, 1924, I. 63.
32. Ibid, II. 147-160 (a).
33. *IAR*, 1926, II. 312.
34. This is the official version. According to *IAR*, 1925 (p. 182) only 14 were killed and 7 wounded.
35. *Statutory Commission's Report*, Vol. IV, Part I, p. 106. The account of the communal riots given in this chapter is mainly based on this and the *IAR*.
36. Ibid, p. 99.

BOOK IV, CHAPTER V,

1. See pp. 227, 236-8.
2. *IAR*, 1924, Part I, pp. 265, 268.
3. See p. 235.
4. *IAR*, 1925, Vol. I, p 314.
5. See pp. 251-4.
6. *IAR*, 1925, I. 336 ff.; 1926, II. 121-35.
7. *IAR*, 1924, I. 790-94.
8. *British Rule in India Condemned by the Britishers Themselves* (published by the Indian National Party, London, 1915), p 36. This book contains a large collection of statements made by eminent Britishers regarding the deplorable condition—both political and economical—of India under British rule.
9. *IAR*, 1924, II. 8-10.
10. Ibid, 138.
11. *IAR*, 1924, I. 672.
12. Cf. Vol. II, pp, 494-5.
13. The full text is given in *IAR*, 1924, II. 289-98.
14. It is fully in keeping with the police methods described by Sir Sankaran Nair, Member of the Governor-General's Executive Council (see p. 296) and a body of Britishers who came to India in 1932 (pp. 414, 426-72).

14a. The alleged tortures include inserting pin in the flesh and nails, keeping a man hanging with heads down for days together, flogging a man till he becomes unconscious and then again as soon as he regains consciousness,etc. Ram Manohar Lohia, a political leader, has narrated his own experience (see p. 659), which was by no means unusual as similar tortures were reported by other political prisoners. Cf. also the gruesome details narrated by the India League Delegation and summarised in pp. 422-472.

15. Cf. Vol. II, p. 122.
16. *IAR*, 1926, II. 132.
17. Cf. Vol. I, pp. 353 ff.
18. Nevinson, 115-16.
19. Ibid, 116.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid, Italics mine.
22. Ibid, 117.
23. Ibid, 118.

24. Sir Walter Strickland, Bart., *British Justice and Honesty* (1913), p. 4.
25. *IAR*, 1922, 256-7.
26. Nevinson, 118.
27. Ibid, 229.
28. Ibid, 228-9.
29. Ibid, 230.
30. Ibid, 43.

BOOK IV, CHAPTER VI

1. Gwyer, 208.
2. Ibid, 210.
3. Nehru's attitude towards Jinnah, as delineated by Leonard Mosley, (cf. Book IV, Chapter VIII, f. n., 15.) is both interesting and instructive Mosley thinks that Jinnah's return to Indian politics was mainly due to an earnest appeal of Liaquat Ali Khan on behalf of the Muslim League (Mosley, pp. 66-68).
4. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 215.
5. Ibid, 220-22.
6. This has been discussed in detail in the next chapter. Only a brief reference is made here to some stirring events which added to the political tension of the time.
7. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 226-7.
8. Ibid, 223.
9. Ibid, 229.
10. Ibid 230-1.
11. See pp. 263-4.
12. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 238-41. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 350 ff.
13. Louis Fischer-II, II. 10.
14. Cf. next Chapter.

14a. See pp. 336-7.

15. Subhas Bose moved that "the Congress should aim at setting up a parallel Government in the country and, to that end, should take in hand the task of organizing the workers, peasants and youths." But this resolution was defeated (*The Indian Struggle*, II. 244).
16. *Nehru on Gandhi*, 54.

17. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 245.
18. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 363-4.
19. The eleven items of reforms include total prohibition, abolition of salt tax, reduction of land revenue, military expenditure and high salaries of officials, abolition of the C. I. D., and discharge of all political prisoners. Ibid 366.

19a. Ibid.
20. Ibid, 368-9.
21. The full text of the letter is given in *Hist. Congr.*, I. 372-6.
22. See. p. 45.
23 Ishwari Prasad, 427.
24. *Nehru on Gandhi*, 55 ; *Toward Freedom*, 156 ff.
25. For full text, cf. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 377. Italics mine.
26. According to some accounts, 75 (*Hist. Congr.*, I. 383), or 78.
27. Louis Fischer-II, II. 15-16. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 378 ff.
28. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 398 ff.
29. Ibid, 425.
30. Ibid, 413.
31. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 258, f. n., 1.
32. Legislative Assembly Debate, 14th July, 1930 (quoted in *Hist. Congr.*, I. 410).
33. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 260-61; *Hist. Congr.*, I. 41, 412, 420.
34. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 412.
35. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 262.
36. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 413.
37. Ibid, 413.
38. Ibid, 414.
39. Ibid, 415-18.
40. Ibid, 418-20.
41. Ibid, 420.
42. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 260, f. n., 2.
43. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 399-400.
44. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 263-4.
45. Shamrao Hivale, *Scholar Gipsy—A Stndy of Verrier Elwin*, pp. 15, 44, 57.
46. Miller, Webb, *I Found no Peace*, Chapters 16, 17; pp. 192-96.
47. Ibid, 197-99.
48. Ibid, 200-202.
49. Ibid, 202-6.

49a. See, p. 322.
50. Coupland, I. 117. The account of the sub-committees that follows is based upon Coupland, I. 117-20.
51. *Pakistan*, 95-6.

52. Coupland, I. 121.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. *Report of the Sapru Committee*, p. 15.
56. Coupland, I. 122.
57. *Sapru Committee Report*, 15-6.
58. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 424-5.
59. Gwyer, 232. For details of the pact of which only a summary is given below, cf. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 438-42.
60. *Nehru on Gandhi*, 66-70.
61. Cf. Subhas Bose's view on the subject (*The Indian Struggle*, II, 237-8).
62. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 381.
63. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 283-89.
64. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 456.
65. Ibid.
66. See above, p. 249. It is difficult to understand Gandhi's views in this respect. Once while a revolutionary was on trial at Nagpur Gandhi requested a prominent lawyer of this place to take up the defence and also offered to pay his fees. The lawyer said: "But Bapu, this man is accused of arrant and flagrant violence, so why ?" 'The reply in Hindi was to the effect, "Bhai, courage and determination (*himmat*) must be honoured" (*Hindusthan Standard, Puja Annual*, 1963, pp. 152-3). Yet Gandhi was deadly opposed to the resolution about Gopinath Saha which meant nothing more than this.
67. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 458.
68. Ibid, 466.
69. Ibid, 468.
70. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 299-301.
71. See above, p. 328.
72. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 480-81.
73. Ibid, 473-4. Italics mine.
74. Ibid, 472-3.
75. Ibid, 474-7, 488.
76. Ibid, 478.
77. Ibid, 479, 484.
78. For the full text, cf. Ibid, 487.
79. Ibid, 488-92.
80. Ibid, 489.
81. Ibid, 378.
82. *Hist. Congr.*. I. 495.
83. Ibid, 511-12.

84. Ibid, 512-14.
85. Ibid, p. 516 ; pp. 514-17 give the details.
86. Ibid, 518.
87. Verrier Elwin, *Truth about India, Can We get it* ?, p. 38.
88. Ibid.
89. See f. n. 87, for the name of the book.
90. Ibid, 34-5. For a fuller account of what happened in NWFP, see Verrier Elwin's Report, published by the Friends of India, 46 Lancaster Gate. London.
91. The whole of section 2 is based upon the *Delegation Report*, (mentioned in the next section), pp. 469-71.
92. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 528.
93. Ibid, 529, where further details are given.
94. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 378.
94a. The ground was that the Governor in Council was satisfied that "the amount was intended to be used for the purposes of the Gujarat Provincial Congress Committee or the Gujarat Prantik Samiti". The fund was held in the joint names of V. J. Patel and Mavlankar. The latter made a written protest denying the allegation, but in vain.
95. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 341-2.
96. *Delegation Report*, 76.
97. Referred to hereafter as 'Report'.
98. Report, 28.
99. Ibid, 29.
100. Ibid, 33.
100a. Briefly referred to above, in pp. 347-8.
101. Report, 5-6.
102. Ibid, 5, f. n. This case illustrates the worthlessness of the official statements in such matters.
103. Report, 493.
104. Ibid, 495.
105. Ibid, 496-500.
106. Italics mine.
107. The Report adds the following footnote :

    'The ordinanoes by definition made even private gatherings into public meetings. Law courts have in several instances decided that these actions for which police arrested or beat Congress men are not illegal. Chairmen and officials of municipalities in India have been penalised for hoisting the Congress flag over municipal buildings.

108. The Delegation explains it as follows : 'The Ordinances gave powers to the Executive officers to keep any person in detention

for fifteen days on mere suspicion. At the end of the period the person against whom no charge was preferred was released, but he was sometimes re-arrested in a few minutes or a few hours after release.

'In this way the period of detention could be extended at the sweet will of the Executive officers. Sometimes the released person was asked to report to the police station, usually three times a day, Cases are on record where arrests have taken place before the end of the time allowed for reporting, and where the time allowed is not even sufficient to enable the person to go from the prison to the specified police station. The aim of the procedure is to create a legal offence which was punished with imprisonment, ranging between twelve and eighteen months.'

109. The Report adds the following footnote :

"The Police everywhere appear to have made a practice of releasing women prisoners at night, often late".

110. Footnote : "This appears to be a common police story. We were told even more amusing one on the frontier, but it was too ridiculous to be even a good story, and the Inspector-General of Police whom we met afterwards denied it.

111. Footnote : "These include collected statements as well as cases mentioned to us. We have refrained from using collected reports as evidence here, though from the widespread nature of the allegations and circumstantial evidence, it stands to reason that they represent facts."

112. Footnote : "The Report is in Bengali and a copy of it is in the Assembly Library. Mr. Mitra had attempted to obtain publication of these facts in the press, but no paper would dare to print them."

113. Footnote : "The *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, an old established paper of Calcutta, was ordered to deposit Rs. 6,000 as security for publishing the news."

114. Footnote : "Intimidation of women by the military and punitive police were reported to us in a number of villages in Bengal".

115. Footnote : "We were supplied with one bucket of water for six of us per day for washing purposes"—Vidya Devi Varma, Woman ex-prisoner, Bareilly jail. Evidence, U. P. Committee Report.

116. Footnote : "U. P. Committee Report.—Hari Singh (Bareilly jail) stated : "In oil mills political prisoners were made to run like bullocks. They had to eat while they were doing work". Altar Singh of Muzaffarnagar, Bareilly jail, stated that he worked on the oil mill from 6 A. M. to 5 P. M. Had to work while suffering

from fever. Reported to Superintendent and punished for short labour."

116a. Assembly Debates, Vol, VII, no. 5.

116b. Footnote : "Most of the incidents took place while we were in India".

117. The statement of the official is quoted in the Report, p. 413.

118. *The Indian Struggle*, II.103.

119. Cf. Sapru Report, 17 ; Ambedkar-II, Chapter III ; *Hist. Congr.*, I, 494 ff.

120. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 495.

121. For the full text of the letter,cf. ibid,539-41.

122. It was released on 16 August, according to Gwyer,261. The date of announcement is given as 17 August in *Hist. Congr.* , I. 532.

123. For the full text of the Communal Award, cf. Gwyer, 261-5.

124. For the full text of the letter, cf. *Hist. Congr.* , I. 542-3.

125. For full text, cf. Gwyer, 265-6.

126. *Nehru on Gandhi*, 72-3.

127. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 361.

128. Ibid, 361-2.

129. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 538-9.

130. Speaking of Gandhi's condemnation of secrecy, K. F. Nariman observes : "By what rule of modern warfare or sport are we bound to disclose our plans and schemes to the enemy ?...Secrecy of one's plans and future action is the very essence of all modern national movements and struggles". *The Indian Struggle*, II. 367.

131. *Hist. Congr.* , I. 560-61.

132. Ibid, 562. Subhas Bose gives the following account of this Conference : "Two groups were represented at the Conference—one in favour of calling off the movement altogether and the other in favour of resuming it with full vigour. The former group had probably a majority and most of the members of this group were in favour of reviving the Swarajist policy of carrying the fight inside the Legislatures which had been abandoned at the Lahore Congress in December, 1929. Nevertheless, at the end, the Conference decided to give in to the Mahatma". *The Indian Struggle*, II. 364.

133. *Hist. Congr.* , I. 562.

134. Ibid.

135. For Nariman's comment, cf. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 367-8.

136. Jawaharlal Nehru possessed the power of independent rational thinking, as his many adverse comments on Gandhi's action would show, but he always ultimately yielded to the personal magnetism of Gandhi.

136a. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 563.

137. Ibid.
138. Nehru observed : "It seemed an extraordinarily trivial matter for such a tremendous step. It was quite impossible for me to understand his decision". *Nehru on Gandhi*, p. 84.
138a. *Hist. Congr.* , I, 565.
139. *Hist. Congr.* ,I. 381.
140. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 363.
141. Ibid, 368.
142. Referring to Gandhi's Dandi march, Pattabhi Sitaramayya observes : "It was also prophetic visualisation of what was to come to pass. Perhaps Gandhi himself had no full conception of what was to follow. He saw things as if by a flash and framed his conduct by impulse. To the righteous man, these two are the supreme guides of life, not reason nor intellect." *Hist. Congr.*, I. 378. The same writer remarks elsewhere : "Gandhi's plans have all along been revealed to him by his own instinct, not evolved by the cold, calculating logic of the mind. His inner voice is his mentor and monitor, his friend, philosopher and guide." Ibid, 371. Similar view was expressed by Jawaharlal Nehru (p. 487).
143. *Hist. Congr.* , I. 557.
144. Ibid, 547-52.
145. Ibid, 535.
146. *Nehru on Gandhi*, 78.

BOOK IV, CHAPTER VII.

1. Vol. II, pp. 265-327, 387-489.
2. This and the other incidents mentioned in this chapter are, unless otherwise stated, described on the authority of memoirs published by the revolutionaries. The accounts given by different authors sometimes differ in minor details, but their general accuracy is, in most cases, proved by official reports.
3. *Report* (see f n., 9), p, 325.
4. See p. 123.
5. It should be four; cf. Vol, II, p. 414 where the name Nirendra is wrongly printed as Jitendra.
5a. *Report*. 327.

6. Ibid, 328.
7. See p. 249.
8. For his earlier activities, cf. Vol. II, 301 ff., 455 ff.
9. This is referred to as *Report* in these footnotes.
9a. *Report*, 320.
10. See p 262.
11. According to Khaliquzzaman an Indian member of the C. I. D. "unearthed the conspirators in mere five days" (p. 78).
12. See p. 317.
13. *Da* is an abbreviation of *Dada* (elder brother).
14. Kalpana Dutt, *Chittagong Armoury Raids—Reminiscences*, p. 7.
15. The full text is given by Suprakash Ray, p. 649.
16. *Report*, 327.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. According to some accounts, eleven died in the very first volley. The youngest of the lot, nicknamed Tengra, a boy in his early teens, and younger brother of Lokenath Ball, the leader, was one of the first to be mortally wounded by a shot. His dying words to his brother were : " I am going, fight till the last."
20. *Report*, 328.
21. Ibid, 332, 336.
22. Ibid, 335.
23. Ibid, 336.
24. Cf. Vol. II, pp. 282-3.
25. *Report*, 337.
26. Ibid, 339.
27. The details of I and II are given in the *Report*, pp. 342-52. The figures refer to Bengal. A separate list is given for other Provinces in pp. 353-61, year by year. The figures given in *India in 1930* (p. 540) are somewhat different.
27a. See p. 417.
28. Ajay Kumar Ghosh, *Bhagat Singh and his Comrades*, p. 2.
29. Ibid, p. 4.
30. The Account of Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Datta given in this section and the next is based on *I.A.R.*, 1929, Vol. I, pp.78-80, and the documents and information supplied to the author by Batukeshwar Datta, who is happily still alive. The author takes this opportunity to express his obligations to Sri Datta.
30a. See p. 263.
31. The statement was supplied by Sri Datta.
32. See p. 319.
33. See pp. 383-4.

34. *India in 1933-34*,, p 48.
35. Ibid, p. 321, para 5.
36. See p. 517.
37. This is an extract from a published article, kindly supplied by Sri Datta.
38. Quoted in the *Weekly Pratap*, October, 1929, p.1. I am indebted to Sri Datta for this quotation.

BOOK IV, CHAPTER VIII

1. Chintamani and Masani, 174.
2. Gwyer, I. pp. xliii-xliv.
3. As will be shown later, Gandhi made a complete *volte face* in 1940 (p. 604), but then it was too late.
4. *Hist. Congr.*, I 579-86.
5. Ibid, 601-2.
6. *The Times of India*, 24 April, 1930 (quoted in Coupland, I. 111)
6a. Coupland, II. 121.
7. See p. 314.
8. See p. 326.
9. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 485-6. cf. p. 393.
10. Rajendra Prasad, 140.
11. Ibid, 140-41.
12. *Muslim League*, 225.
13. Coupland, II. 14.
14. Cf. the Presidential Address of Nawab Habibullah. *IAR*, 1936, I. 305.
14a. Cf. Vol. I, pp. 32 ff., 465 ff.
15. Nehru had a very poor opinion of Jinnah and the Muslim League. Leonard Mosley, to whom he seems to have unburdened his heart, observes : "His (Nehru's) contempt for Jinnah was ill-concealed (the contempt was reciprocated) and his dislike of the aims and intentions of the Muslim League was such that he seriously underestimated its strength. Of the Muslim League he once said, in a conversation with the author : 'it was an organization which was both very strong and very weak. It could always bring its followers out on the streets, always cause trouble, always threaten violence. But it had no other *raison d'etre* than a negative anti-Hindu feeling. And of Jinnah he said : ...He was a snob. ...He had no real

feelings about the Muslims. He wasn't really a Muslim at all. I know Muslims. I know the Koran. I have Muslim relatives and friends. Jinnah couldn't even recite a Muslim prayer and had certainly never read the Koran. But when he was offered the leadership of the Muslim League, he saw the opportunity and accepted it. He had been a comparative failure as a lawyer in England and this was a way out." Mosley, 26. For a somewhat different attitude, cf. Nehru-II, 339 ff. For Nehru's estimate of the League, see pp. 563-4.

16. See p. 385.
17. *Hist. Congr.*, I, 603.
18. Coupland, II. 10-11.
19. See p. 481.
20. For the spread of Communism in India, see pp. 262 ff.
21. *The Indian Struggle*, III. 16-7. The predominance of the Socialist group in the Congress is admitted by Gandhi himself in his statement of 17 September, item 3, quoted above in p. 538. Gandhi threatened to retire from the Congress "if they gained ascendancy as they may." This supports the charge that under Gandhi's leadership the Congress was losing its democratic character.
22. Ibid, 10.
23. Ibid, II. 366.
24. Ibid, 430.
25. Ibid.
26. *Hist. Congr.*, II, 11.
27. *Nehru on Gandhi*, 78.
28. Ibid, 91.
29. Ibid, 64.
30. *Hist. Congr.*, II, 30.
31. Ibid, 31.
32. Ibid, 33.
33. Ibid, 36.
34. Report of the Sapru Committee (23 ff.), which gives other details.
35. Ibid, 27-8.
36. For a detailed account of the work of the Ministries, cf. Coupland, Part II.
37. Ibid, 110.
38. Ibid, 111.

38a. Khaliquzzaman (pp. 161-2) refers to the Congress offer as a death warrant. Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi who discusses this point in detail, refers to the pithy saying of Nehru, mentioned above, as adding insult to injury (p. 89).

38b. Azad says in his Memoir (pp. 160-62) that the breakdown of the

negotiations between the Congress and the Muslim League in U.P. was due to the refusal of Nehru to take more than one minister from the League although hopes were held out that two would be taken. Azad observes that Nehru's attitude was due to fondness for abstract theory which was also responsible for his most unfortunate statement about the Constituent Assembly on 10 July 1946 (cf. pp. 770-74).

39. Nehru-II, 332.
40. Cf. Vol. I, pp. 32 ff., 465 ff.
41. Nehru-II, 331. Cf. also Mosley's observations quoted above, in f.n. 15.
41a. Ibid, 335.
41b. See pp. 581-3.
42. See p. 60.
43. Coupland, II. 181.
44. Ibid.
45. Jinnah, 295-3.
46. Coupland, II. 182.
47. Ibid, 182-3.
48. Rajendra Prasad, 154-5.
48a. Ibid, 155.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid, 146-7.
51. Coupland, II. 188.
51a. Azad, 22.
52. *Sources*, 763-8 ; *Pakistan*, 140
53. It is interesting to note that five years before Iqbal Lala Lajpat Rai suggested "the creation of Moslem Provinces in the north-east and north-west of India...to set at rest the ceaseless Hindu-Muslim bickerings and jealousies in some Provinces." *Modern Review*, 1925, Part I, p. 489.
54. Halidè Edib, a Turkish lady, visited India in 1935 and recorded her impressions in a book entitled *Inside India*, published in 1937. She gives an interesting account of her interview with Rahmat Ali long before the scheme of Pakistan was looked upon as a practicable proposal or a living political issue, even by the Muslim leaders.
54a. Coupland, Part II. 206.
55. See p. 264.
56. *Hist. Congr.*, II, 72; *Nehru on Gandhi*, p. 78.
57. *The Indian Struggle*, III, 19.
58. *Hist. Congr.*, II, 106 f. n.
59. Ibid, 106.
60. Ibid.

61. Ibid, 110-11.
62. Ibid, 113-4. The stormy scenes are described in *IAR*, 1939, I. 327-30.
63. *Hist. Congr.*, II, 32.
64. *The Indian Struggle*, III, 19-20.
65. *Hist, Congr.*, II, 115.
66. Ibid, 116-7.
67. Ibid, 118.
68. Ibid.
69. *The Indian Struggle*, III, 21, 23.
70. Ibid, 23-5.

BOOK IV, CHAPTER IX

1. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1942*, p. 628.
1a. The *Harijan*, 9 September, 1939; quoted in Coupland, II. 214.
2. The *Statesman*, 10 September, 1939; quoted in Coupland, II. 214.
2a. See above, pp. 579, 582.
3. *The Indian Struggle*, III. 28-9.
4. Coupland, II. 215. *IAR*, 1939, II. 226-8.
5. *IAR*, 1939, II. 231.
6. Coupland, II. 216.
7. Ibid, 217.
8. Ibid, 217-8. Italics mine.
9. *The Indian Struggle*, III. 32.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid, 33.
12. Ibid, 34.
13. Ibid.
14. Azad, 33.
15. Ibid, 34.
16. Coupland, II. 239-40.
17. Ibid, 240.
18. Azad, 35.
19. The letter was published in the *Harijan*, 9 September, 1939; quoted in Coupland, II. 214, f. n., 1.
20. Azad, 36.
21. Coupland, II. 242.

22. See pp. 387-88.
23. Coupland, II. 242.
24. Ibid, 243-4.
25. Coupland (II. 245) gives arguments both for and against such a view.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid, 248.
27a. Ibid, 247.
28. *The Indian Struggle*, III, 37-8.
29. Coupland, II. 258.
30. Ibid, 259-60.
31. Ibid, 260.
32. Ibid.
33. *Hist. Congr.*, 293-4.
34. Ibid, 298.
35. Coupland, II. 267.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid, 268.
38. Gwyer, II. 519.
39. Ibid.
39a. The documents are publishad in the *Foreign Relat ons of th, United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1942*, Vol. I, pp. 593 to 750.
39b. Ibid,603.
39c. Ibid, 602-4.
39d. Ibid, 605-6.
39e. For the full report, cf. Ibid, 606-7.
39f. Ibid, 608.
39g. Ibid, 612.
39h. Ibid, 615-6.
39i. Ibid, 617-8.
39j. Ibid, 619.
40. Azad, 62.
41. Coupland, Part II. 279-80.
42. Ibid, 279.
43. Ibid, 280.
44. Ibid.
45. Menon, 132.
46. Ibid, 126.
47. Ibid, 127.
48. Ibid, 128.
48a. Ibid, 129.

49. Ibid, 128-30.
50. Ibid, 130-1.
51. Ibid, 133.
52. See f.n., 39 a (hereafter referred to as *Documents*).
53. *Documents*, pp. 630-34.
54. Louis Fischer-II, 111-2.
55. Ibid.
55a. Ibid, 110.
55b. *Documents*, 640.
55c. *Hist. Congr.*, II, 326, 331.
56. Coupland, II, 288-9.
57. Ibid, 290.
58. Statement published by the Government of India on the Congress Party's Responsibility for the Disturbances in India, 1942-3. *Parliamentary Report, Accounts and Papers*, 1942-3, Vol, IX (hereafter referred to as *Statement*). It is reproduced in *IAR*, 1942, pp. 237-54.
59. Ibid.
60. Coupland, II, 291.
61. Azad, 72-3.
62. Ibid, 72.
63. *Statement* (See f. n., 58 above)
64 Azad, 73-77.
65. *Hist. Congr.*, II, 340-42.
66. *The Indian Struggle*., III, 41-3.
67. Azad, 81.
68. Ibid, 82.
69. *Hist. Congr.*, II, 342-46.
70. Coupland, II, 297-8.
71. Nehru-II, 429.
72. *Statement*.
72a. *Hist. Congr.*, II. 375.
72b. Ibid, 376.
72c. *Statement*.
73. Ibid, 373-4.
74. The account that follows is mainly based on unofficial publications mentioned in the Bibliography and the footnotes.
75. The account of Midnapore is chiefly based on *Rebel India*, Edited by Bejan Mitra and Phani Chakraborty (1946), and a Bengali book, *August Viplab*, by Tarinisankar Chakravarty (1946).
76. *Rebel India*. p. 24.
77. Ibid, 25.

78. Nehru observes : "It was extraordinary how British authority ceased to function over many areas,, both rural and urban, and it took many days and sometimes weeks for a 'reconquest', as it was often termed. This happened particularly in Bihar, in the Midnapur District of Bengal and in the south-eastern districts of the United Provinces." (Nehru-II, 431).
79. Nehru-II, 430-31. The figures quoted by Nehru are different from those given in *Hist. Congr.* (quoted above) on the authority of the statement by Home Minister.
80. *Hist. Congr.*, II. 377.
80a. Coupland, II. 302.
80b. *Rebel India*, p. 212.
81. Nehru-II, 427.
81a. According to the statement of K. C. Mahindra of the India Supply Mission in U. S. A. According to Sir G. S. Bajpai only 57 battalions were employed (*Documents*, pp. 737, 735).
82. Ibid, 427-8. Alexander, Horace, *India since Cripps*, p. 47.
83. See pp. 637-8.
84. Nehru-II, 419. The same view is emphatically asserted by Jayaprakash Narain and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. The relevant passages are quoted in pp.673, 663 and 667-8.
84a. Tendulkar (VI, 212-15) reproduces these instructions which are fairly comprehensive and cover three printed pages.
85. K. K. Datta, *Freedom Movement* in *Bihar*, Vol. III, p. 37.
86. Coupland, II, 303, f.n., 1.
87. *Statement* (see f.n. 58).
87a. For these and other statements of Gandhi, see above, p. 644.
88. Coupland, II. 303.
89. See p. 662.
90. Cf. Chapter VII.
91. See p. 384.
92. Horace, Alexander, op. cit., 49.
93. *Correspondence with Mr. Gandhi, August 1942-April 1944*, published by the Government of India (1944), p. 1.
94. K. K. Datta, op, cit., p. 444.
95. Ibid, 266-7.
96. For the text of the letter, cf. Ibid, 436 ff.; also *Rebel India*, 194.
97. K. K. Datta, op. cit., 267.
97a. Letter "To All Fighters of Freedom, *Rebel India*, 222-3.
98. K. K. Datta, op. cit., 272-3.
99. Ibid, 273-5.
100. For details, cf. ibid, 275 ff.

101. *Correspondence* (See f.n., 93), pp. 3-4. The Congress made a grievance that this letter 'condemning acts of violence' was not published by the Government in time. "If it had been published in its entirety then and there, Gandhi's condemnation of the acts of violence by people outside would have had telling and forthright effect in subduing them" (*Hist. Congr.*, II. 485).
102. Nehru-II, 427. The relevant passage has been quoted above, in p. 646.
103. Azad, 90.
104. Diwakar, 100.
104a. In a long letter addressed to the President, Indian National Congress, on 7 January, 1946, Achyut Patvardhan and Aruna Asaf Ali made an emphatic protest against such a view of "the momentous events of the past three years" (*Rebel India*, p. 206).
104b. Letter "To All Fighters of Freedom," dated 1 September, 1943 (*Rebel India*, p. 223).
105. Nehru-II, 427.
106. *Hist. Congr.*, II. 373.
107. Horace, Alexander, op. cit., p. 44.
108. *Corrspondence* (see f. n., 93), pp. 8, 9, 11.
109. Azad, 91.
110. Letter dated December, 1942 (*Rebel India*, pp. 194-5).
110a. See pp. 65-6, 96, 387-8.
111. See p. 604.
112. Coupland, II. 298. Italics mine.
113. Ibid, 289.
114. Ibid, 299. On 8 August, 1942, on the eve of his arrest Gandhi wrote to the same effect to a Muslim businessman in Bombay (ibid).
115. Khaliquzzaman, 282-3.
116. Ibid, 286,
117. Ibid, 286.
118. Ibid, 285.
119 Coupland, II. 299.
120. Ibid, 300.
121. *The Times*, 31 December, 1942 (quoted in Coupland, II. 304).
122. Menon, 113-4.
123. Ibid, 145.
124. Ibid, 154.
125. See pp. 262-5.
126. *Communism in India*, by Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller (hereafter referred to as '*Communism*'), p. 140.
127 Ibid, 145-6.

128. Masani M. R., *The Communist Party of India*, pp.51-3.
129. Ibid, 66-71; *Communism*, 179.
130. Masani, op. cit., 71-2.
131. *Communism*, 188-9.
132. The split between the CPI and the Forward Bloc was probably due to other causes also. It has been suggested that the former looked upon the latter, like all other leftist parties, as a rival and the split was part of an attempt to reduce the prestige of a rival which had to be prevented 'from seizing the opportunity to build a mass following based on a radical programme' (*Communism*, pp. 180-81).
133. Ibid, 181.
134. Ibid, 181-4.
135. Ibid, 181-2.
136. Ibid, 192-8; Masani, 79-80.
137. *Communism*, 198.
138. Masani, 82-3.
139. Ibid, 83-4.
140. *Communism*, 219. The authenticity of the letter is denied by the CPI, and there is no positive evidence of its existence. Batlivala challenged the CPI to publish the correspondence, but the challenge was not accepted.
141. Masani, 84.
142. Ibid.
143. Ibid, 85.
144. Ibid, 85-6.
145. *Correspondence* (see f. n., 93).
146. Ibid, 9.
147. Menon, 160.
148. Ibid, 160-61.
149. Cf. ibid, 161, for further details of the speech.
150. For the contradictory views of Gandhi on the subject, see pp.678-9.
151. See p. 563.
152. Menon, 163. Italics mine.
153. For details, cf. Menon, 162.
154. Ibid, 163.
155. Ibid.
155a. Ibid, 164-5.
156. Ibid. 163.
156a. Ibid, 176-9.
157. Ibid, 182-3.

BOOK IV, CHAPTER X.

This Chapter is based mainly on the following books and articles to which reference is made in the footnotes by the name of the author.

BOOKS

1. Maj-Gen., Shahnawaz Khan, *I. N. A. and its Netaji* (Delhi, 1946).
2. Hugh Toye, *The Springing Tiger* (Bombay, 1957).
3. A. C. Chatterji, *India's Struggle for Freedom.* (Calcutta, 1947).

ARTICLES

1. S. A. Ayer, The Indian Independence Movement in East Asia (*Netaji Research Bureau, Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 1, July, 1961, pp. 2-16).
2. John A. Thivy, *A Short Sketch of the Indian Independence Movement*, Hanoi, 1945 (unpublished). Reference in the footnotes is to a typed copy kindly lent by the Netaji Research Bureau, Calcutta.

FOOTNOTES

1. Subhas Chandra Bose, *Crossroads,* pp. 343-3.
2. Cf. Vol. II, pp. 454 ff.
3. Toye (p. 7) gives the number as 45,000.
4. Shahnawaj, pp. 41-44; Toye, p. 9.
5. Chatterji, p. 17.
6. Ibid, 20.
7. Ibid, 20-21.
8. Ibid, 35, 42-3.
9. Ibid, 46, 51 ff.
10. Ibid, 48-9.
11. Ibid, 50.
12. Thivy, p. 5.
13. Toye, 79.

13a. For full details, cf. Chatterji, Chapter VIII (pp. 120-29).

14. Ayer, p. 7.
15. Ibid, 8-9.
16. Toye, 95.
17. Thivy, 9.
18. Shahnawaj, 99-100; Toye, 83, 85.

19. Chatterji, 38.
20. Shahnawaj, 102.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid, 105.
23. Ibid, 106.
24. Ibid, 108, 110.
25. Ibid, 111.
26. Ibid, 112.
27. Ibid, 113; Toye, 103.
28. Shahnawaj, 116.
29. Ibid, 118.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid, 134.
32a. Chatterji, 180.
33. Shahnawaj, 151.
34. Ibid, 153-4.
35. Ibid, 154.
36. Ibid, 155.
37. Ibid, 156.
38. Ibid, 160.
38a. Toye, 102, 107. Chatterji (183) gives the date as 4 February, which seems to be wrong. Subhas Bose's Special Order of the Day, dated 1st January, 1945, and Tojo's statement, quoted at the end of the para, support the date 19th March.
39. Shahnawaj, 159.
39a. Ibid, 124.
40. Ibid, 126.
41. Ibid, 135.
42. Ibid, 137.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid, 138.
45. Ibid, 105, 135.
46. See pp. 721-2.
47. Thivy, 27.
48. Shahnawaj, 125.
49. Ibid, 161.
50. Ayer, p. 11.
51. A Committee was appointed by the Government of India "to enquire into and report to the Government of India on the circumstances concerning the departure of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose from Bangkok about the 16th August, 1945, his alleged death

as result of an aircraft accident and subsequent developments connected therewith." Shri Suresh Chandra Bose, elder brother of Subhash Chandra Bose, who was a member of this Committee, wrote a long dissentient Report and published it separately. The Chairman, Shahnawaz Khan (the Commander of the Subhas Brigade, I N. A., one of the officers tried in the Red Fort, Dehli, and then a Parliamentary Secretary) and other members of the Committee held that Netaji's death was established.

52. Toye, 170. Toye adds : "The British Prime Minister himself was compelled to recognise the new feeling : 'Today', said Mr. Attlee on March 15th, 1946, 'the national idea has spread...not least perhaps among some of those (Indian) soldiers who have done such wonderful service in the war". According to Toye, this 'political consciousness' or 'national idea' was partly responsible for "the serious naval mutinies and the unrest in the other two Services early in 1946" (Ibid, 170-1).

BOOK V, CHAPTERS I-II

1. Cf. Churchill's famous dictum of 10 November, 1942 : "I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside at the liquidation of the British Empire".
2. I am indebted to Dr. D. K. Ghosh for this information.
3. Leonard Mosley, p. 12.
4. Menon, 218-9.
5. Ibid, 219-20.
6. Ibid, 222.
7. It is unnecessary for our present purpose to discuss the trials of other men of the I. N. A. and the wisdom of the Government decision to try the I. N. A. prisoners of war. For a critical discussion of this point, cf. Philip Mason's "Foreword" to *The Springing Tiger* by Hugh Toye ; and also Leonard Mosley, p. 136.
8. Hugh Toye, op. cit. , p. ix.

8a. Menon, 223. Toye observes : "There can thus be little doubt that the Indian National Army, not in its unhappy career on the battlefield, but in its thunderous disintegration, hastened the end of British rule in India. The agitation which surrounded the trials turned the issue of independence for India into an instant, burning question once more" (p. 175).

9. Menon, 223-4.
10. Ibid, 227.
11. Ibid, 226.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid, 228-9.
14. Ibid, 234.
15. Ibid,237-8.
16. Ibid, 239-40.
17. Ibid, 240-41.
18. Gandhi's view (p. 755), based on the fact that the majority of Muslims was descended from the Hindus, is as puerile as that of Nehru, who ignored Hindu-Muslim problem because it is based on religion which can be changed (p. 564).
19. Menon, 246-7.
19a. These figures indicate the number of the paragraph in the Statement by the Cabinet Mission on 16 May, 1946.
20. Ibid, 273.
21. Ibid, 274-76.
22. Gwyer, II. 603.
23. Menon, 276-7.
24. Gwyer, II. 610-11.
25. Menon, 280.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid, 280-1.
28. Ibid, 281.
29. Ibid.
30. Mosley, 27.
31. Azad, 154-5.
32. Ibid, 155-6.
33. Ibid, 156.
34. Ibid, 157-8.
35. Gwyer, II. 621. Italics mine.
36. Menon, 289-90.
37. Ibid, 284.
38. Azed, 159.
39. Mosley, 11.
39a. Ibid, 38. Cf. in this connection the speech of Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee in the Bengal Legislative Assembly on No-Confidence motions against the Ministry on 20 September, 1946.
39b. Menon, 296.
40. Azad, 159-60.

41. Gwyer, II. 643.
42. Menon, 302.
43. Mosley, 42-3.
44. Menon, 320-1.
45. Ibid, 319; *IAR*, 1946, II. 270.
45a. For the communal relations in Noakhali after Gandhi's tour in Noakhali, cf. Pyarelal, II. Chapter III. A more deetailed account is given by N. K. Bose (*My Days with Gandhi*, pp. 210-18). Gandhi left Noakhali on 2 March, 1947. On April 2 he received the following message from his chief lieutenant at Noakhali : "There have been five cases of arson between March 23 and yesterday. Yesterday's case happened at Mohammadpur in Ramganj *Thana*. It was an attempt to burn alive three families consisting of twenty-one persons, male, female, children of the house, who for safety slept all in one room. This room was fastened from outside and this thatched hut and other huts of the house simultaneously set on fire. The inmates escaped by breaking through mat wall."

On receiving report of another similar case two days later, Gandhi sent the following reply : "Case seems to be for exodus or perishing in flames of fanaticism. Hope you will not advise my coming to advise on choice. Hold council with workers and act promptly" (Bose, 210-11). Bose has also quoted a confidentia official report about the condition of Noakhali in May, 1947 (pp. 293-304). It is clear that Gandhi's strenuous efforts failed to make any change in the heart of the Muslims.
46. Gwyer, II. 660-1.
47. Menon, 329-30.
48. Ibid, 332-3.
49. Gwyer, II. 606.
50. Menon, 337.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid, 338.
53. This, if true, is a very significant admission supporting the view mentioned above, in pp. 744-5.
54. Azad, 177-8. Azad's analysis of Attlee's attitude is supported by the speeches of the Government members in the House of Commons in course of the debate on Attlee's statement of 20 February, 1947 (Menon, 340 ff.).
55. Gwyer, II. 667-9.
56. G. D. Khosla, *Stern Reckoning*, p. 100.
56a. K. L. Panjabi, *The Indomitable Sardar*, p. 122.
57. Menon, 347.

58. Azad, 185.

59. Panjabi, op. cit., pp. 122-26. According to some it was not Mountbatten who converted Patel to the idea of Partition, but the fact was just the other way. Thus Mosley writes :

'The idea of Partition originated with Menon (1946) and was agreed to (December, 1946) by Patel who had bitter experience of working with Muslim colleagues in the Interim Government. His first move was to induce the Working Committee to pass, at the beginning of March, 1947, a resolution recommending the partition of the Punjab into two communal States, Muslim and Hindu.

'Patel wrote to a member of the Working Committee : "A strong centre with the whole of India—except E. Bengal and part of the Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan—enjoying full autonomy under the Centre will be so powerful that the remaining portions will eventually come in."

'This line of reasoning appealed to Nehru. To him Patel's resolution was a stratagem rather than an admittance of the fact of partition. It would merely show the Muslims what must be faced if they insisted upon Pakistan which would be a truncated State so painfully mutilated that it could never be viable. The resolution was deliberately taken up when Gandhi and Azad would be unable to attend the meeting.

'When Mountbatten explained the full implication of the resolution Patel feigned ignorance and allowed himself to be persuaded that by accepting the division of the Punjab he had recognized the principle of Indian partition ; and it was even more slowly and unwillingly that he appeared to accept Mountbatten's contention that this was, perhaps, the way out after all.'

Patel and Menon "had talked of the real meaning of the Resolution long before it was submitted". "In fact while ostensibly walking innocently into Mountbatten's parlour, Patel was busily spinning a web of his own". Mosley, 98 ff.

It is difficult to say how far Mosley's version is correct. For Menon's plan, see later, p. 803.

60. Mosley, 248.

61. Azad, 186-7.

62. Allan Campbell-Johnson, 97; Menon, 371.

63. Campbell-Johnson, 110.

64. N. K. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, 284, 294.

65. Fischer-II, II. 219-20

66. See p. 797.

67. Fischer-II, II. 220. Fischer's explanation receives some support in the following extract from Gandhi's written message to the prayer meeting on 15 June, i. e. the day after Gandhi had supported the resolution about Partition in the meeting of the A. I. C. C.

"One more question has been and is being asked. If you are so sure that India is going the wrong way why do you associate with the wrong-doers? Why do you not plough your lonely furrow and have faith that if you are right, your erstwhile friends and followers will seek you out? I regard this as a fair question. I must not attempt to argue against it. All I can cay is that my faith is as strong as ever. It is quite possible that my technique is faulty" (*Harijan*, 29-6-1947, p. 209).

Somewhat less mystic is the conversation that N. K. Bose had with Gandhi about two months after the A. I. C. C. meeting. Bose writes:

"I had the temerity to ask him why he had refused to give the necessary lead to the country when he felt so strongly on the question of division. As far as I can remember, for there is no record to this effect in my diary, his answer was that if every time the Congress committed a mistake, he had to step in to set it right, then India would never learn the art of democracy" (*Days with Gandhi*, p. 251). Gandhi certainly chose a very wrong moment to leave his spoilt children to learn the art of standing on their own legs without prop or support.

68. See pp. 534-5.
69. See p. 679.
70. See pp. 694-5.
71. See p. 748.
72. See p. 679.
73. See p. 750.
74. See p. 793.
75. Azad, 188.
76. For a detailed account, cf. Pyarelal, II. Chapter VIII. N. K. Bose, *My Days with Gandhi*, pp. 227 ff.
77. For the full text of the Statement, cf. Menon, 510-15; Gwyer, II. 670-75.
78. Azad, 193.
79. See p. 695.
80. Azad, 193.
81. For the account of the A. I. C. C., including the summary of the speeches, that follows, cf. *IAR*, 1947, Vol. I, pp. 122-137.
82. These are the figures given by Menon (p. 385) and also found in *IAR*, 1947, Vol. II pp. 133, 137. According to Azad, 29 voted for it and 15 against (p. 198). According to Panjabi (p 126), there were 153 votes for and 29 against with 36 abstentions. Azad's figures are obviously wrong.
83. Menon, 383.
84. Ibid, 382.
85. Azad, 198.
86. Menon, 404.
87. Ibid, 413.
88. Mosley, 244-6.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Books on general political history of India are not mentioned in the Bibliography. For this the following may be consulted :

Beveridge, H. Comprehensive History. of India. 3 Vols, 1867.

Majumdar, R. C., Raychaudhuri, H. C., and Datta Kalikinkar. An Advanced History of India, Part III.

Mill, James. History of British India. 6 Vols. Continued in 3 more Vols. by H. H. Wilson.

Thompson, Edward, and Garatt, G. T. Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India.

Cambridge History of India. Vols V and VI.

History and Culture of the Indian People, Vol. IX. Edited by R. C. Majumdar and published by the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay.

(A good bibliography is given in the last two books).

II. The bibliography is divided into the following three sections :

I. General books arranged alphabetically under the names of the authors.

II. Biographies or auto-biographies of notable persons arranged alphabetically under their names.

III. Bibliography to a few select chapters.

I. GENERAL

Agarwal Lakshmi Narayan. Indian Nationalist Movement.

Alberuni, A. H. Makers of Pakistan. Lahore, 1950.

Ambedkar, B. R.
I. Pakistan. Bombay, 1946.
II. What Congress and Gandhi have done to the Untouchables. 1946.

Alexander, Horace, India Since Cripps. New York, 1944.

Ali, Choudhary Rahmat. Pakistan, the Fatherland of the Pak Nation. 1946.

Andrews, C. F. The Renaissance in India.

Andrews, C. F., and Girija Mookerjee. The Rise and Growth of the Congress in India. London, 1938.

Bagal, J. C.
I. Bharatbarsher Svadhinata (in Bengali)
II. Jativaira ba Amader Desatmabodh (in Bengali)
III. Jatiyatar Navamantra va Hindumelar Itivritta (in Bengali).
IV. Vidroha o Vairita (in Bengali)
V. History of the Indian Association.
VI. Muktir Sandhane Bharat (3rd Edition) (in Bengali)

Bahadur, Lal. The Muslim League. Agra, 1954.

Banerjee, Anil Chandra.
I. The Cabinet Mission in India
II. Indian Constitutional Documents, 1945-6.
III. The Making of the Indian Constitution, 1939-47.

Benerjee, Nakuleswar. Psychotheraphy of Indian Riots. Calcutta, 1941

Barns, Margarita. The Indian Press. London, 1940.

Basu, B. D.
I. Rise of the Christian Power in India. Calcutta, 1931.
II. India under the British Crown.
III. Ruin of Indian Trade and Industries. Calcutta, 1935.

Besant, Annie.
I. How India Wrought for Freedom.
II. India Bond or Free ? 1926.
III. Speeches and writings (Natesan).

Blunt, Wilfred Scawen.
I. India under Ripon, A private Diary. London, 1909.
II. Ideas About India. London, 1885.

Bombay Government. Source Material for a History of the Freedom Movement in India, 2 Vols.

Bose, N. S. The Indian Awakening and Bengal. 1960.

Brailsford, H. N. Rebel Inbia. 1931.
Bryan. William Jennings. On British Rule in India. London, 1915.
Buch, M. A. I. Rise and Growth of Indian Liberalism. Baroda, 1938.
II. Rise and Growth of Indian Militant Nationalism. Baroda, 1940.
III. Rise and Growth of Indian Nationalism. Baroda, 1939.
Campbell-Johnson, Allan. Mission with Mountbatten. London, 1951.
Chakrabarty, D., and Bhattacharyya, C. Congress in Evolution. Calcutta, 1935.
Chand, Uttam. When Bose was Ziauddin. Delhi, 1946.
Chatterji, A. C. India's Struggle for Freedom. Calcutta, 1947.
Chatterji, Nandalal. India's Freedom Struggle. Allahabad, 1958.
Chaudhuri, S. B. I. Civil Disturbances during the British Rule in India (1765-1857). Calcutta, 1955.
II. Civil Rebellion in the Indian Mutinies (1857-1859). Calcutta, 1957.
Chintamani, C. Y. Indian Politics Since the Mutiny. London, 1940.
Chintamani, C. Y., and Masani, M. R. India's Constitution at Work.
Chirol, Sir Valentine. I. Indian Unrest. London, 1910.
II. India Old and New. 1921.
Choudhry, Khaliq-uzzaman. Pathway to Pakistan. Lahore, 1961.
Coatman, John. India on the Road to Self-government. 1941.
Congress Report on the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee (1922).
Cotton, Sir Henry. I. New India. London, 1885 (Reprinted, 1907).
II. India and Home Memories. London, 1911.
Coupland, Sir Reginald. The Constitutional Problem in India. Oxford. 1945.
Cross, C. M. P. Development of Self-Government in India, 1858-1914. Chicago. 1922.
Cumming, Sir John. Political India (1832-1932). London, 1932.
Curtis, Lionel. I. A Letter to the People of India. 1917.
II. Letters to the People of India on Responsible Government. 1918.
III. Papers Relating to the Application of the principle of Dyarchy to the Government of India. 1919.
Datta, Dr. Bhupendranath. I. Bharater Dvitiya Svadhinatar Sangram (In Bengali). 3rd Edition, 1949.
II. Aprakasita Rajnaitik Itihasa (in Bengali). 1953.

Datta, K. K. I. Dawn of Renascent India.
II. Freedom Movement in Bihar.

Desai, A. R. Social Background of Indian Nationalism. London, 1948.

Desai, Mahadev. The Story of Bardoli. 1929.

Digby, William. "Prosperous" British India. 1901.

Diwakar, R. R. I. Satyagraha. Illinois, 1948.
II. Satyagraha in Action. Calcutta, 1949.
III. Satyagraha, the pathway to Peace. Patna, 1950.

Durant, W. J. The Case for India.

Dutt, Kalpana. Reminiscence.

Dutt, K. N. Landmarks of the Freedom Struggle in Assam. 1958.

Dutt, Romesh (R. C.).
I. The Economic History of India under Early British Rule.
II. India in the Victorian Age.
III. Famines and Land Assessments in India.

Dutt, R. Palme. India To-day. 1947.

Edib, Halide. Inside India. London, 1937.

Elwin, Verrier. I. Truth about India : Can we get it ? Allen and Unwin, 1932.
II. In the Desolate Village of Gujarat.

Faruqi, Ziya-ul-Hasan. The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan. Bombay, 1963.

Fischer, Louis, See Section II, under Gandhi.

Frank, Reinhard, I. British Tyranny in India. Berlin, 1940.
II. Inhumanity Unlimited (India, One-sixth of Mankind in Chains). 1946.

Gandhi, M. K. I. The Story of My Experiment with Truth. 1940
II. Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule. 1909. (New Edition, 1939).
III. Satyagraha in South Africa.

Gangopadhyaya, Saumyendra.
Swadeshi Andolan O Bangla Sahitya (Bengali),

Garratt, G. T. I. Indian Commentary. London, 1928.
II. The Legacy of India (Edited by). Oxford, 1937.

Ghose, Aurobindo. The Doctrine of Passive Resistance. Arya Publishing House, Calcutta, 1948.
II. The Need in Nationalism and other Essays. 1923.
III. The Renaissance in India. Calcutta, 1947.
IV. The Spirit and Form of Indian Polity. 1947.
V. Bankim, Dayanand and Tilak. Calcutta 1947.

Ghosh, Dr. P. C. Indian National Congress. Calcutta, 1960.
Gilchrist, R. N. Indian Nationality.
Griffiths, Percival, Sir. The British Impact on India. London, 1952.
Guizonnier, Maurice, L'lnde anglaise et le Swadeshism.
Gupta, Atnlchandra Studies in Bengal Renaissance. Calcutta, 1958.
Gwyer, Sir Maurice, and Appadorai, A. Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-47. 1959.
Heber, Reginald. Narrative of a Journey from Calcutta to Bombay, 1824-25.
Holmes, T. R. A History of the Indian Mutiny.
Horniman, B. G. Amritsar and our Duty to India. 1920.
Hunter, W. W. The Indian Mussulmans. 1876.
Hutchinson, Lister. I. The Empire of the Nabobs. 1937.
II. Conspiracy at Meerut.
III. Meerut Trial, 1929-37.
Hyderabad Government. The Freedom Struggle in Hyderabad.
India Managed (being an account of atrocities committed under British aegis in 1942). 1943.
India Unreconciled (compiled by Devadas Gandhi). 1943.
Indian Annual (Half-yearly, Quarterly) Register, 1918 to 1947. Calcutta.
Indian Communist Party Document, 1930-56 (compiled by the Research Staff of the Democratic Research Service).
Indian National Party. I. India's Loyalty to England. 1915.
II. British Rule in India (Condemned by the British Themselves). 1915.
III. America on British Rule in India.
India's Claim for Home Rule. Ganesh & Co, 1917.
Indra Prakash. Hindu Mahasabha.
Karkaria. The History of Forty Years of Progress and Reform.
Kaye, Sir John. A History of the Sepoy War in India. 3 Vols.
Keith, A. B., Speeches and Documunts on Indian Policy (1750-1921).
Khan, Aga, H. H. India in Transition. 1918.
Khan, Sayyid Ahmad. The Present State of Indian Politics. Allahabad, 1888.
Kohn, Hans. A History of Nationalism in the East. 1929.
Lal, Chaman. Martyrs of India.
Latif, Syed Abdul. The Pakistan Issue. Lahore, 1943.
Lovett, V., Sir. History of the Indian Nationalist Movement. 1919

Lumby, E. W. R. The Transfer of Power n India, 1945-7. 1954.

Macdonald, J. Ramsay. The Awakening of India.

Majumdar, B. B. History of Political Thought from Rammohun to Dayananda (1821-1884). Calcutta, 1934.

Majumdar, R. C. I. The Sepoy Mutiny and the Revolt of 1857. 2nd Edition, 1963.
II. Glimpses of Bengal in the Nineteenth Century.
III. (Edited by) History and Culture of the Indian People, Vol. IX. Bombay, 1963.

Majumdar, Subodh Chandra. Philosophy of Congress Leftism.

Malleson, G. B. I. History of the Indian Mutiny, 3 Vols.
II. The Indian Mutiny.

Mary, Countess of Minto. India, Minto and Morley, 1905-10. London, 1934

Masani, M. R. The Communist Party of India. London, 1954.

Mazumdar, A. C. Indian National Evolution. Madras. 1917.

Meherally, Yusuf. The Price of Liberty. Bombay, 1942.

Mehta, Asok, and Patwardhan, Achyut. The Communal Triangle in India. 1942.

Menon, V. P. I. The Transfer of Power in India. Orient Longmans, 1957.
II. Integration of the Indian States. Princeton, 1956.

Miller, Webb I found no Peace—The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent. New York, 1936.

Mitra, Bejan and Chakravarty Phani. Rebel India. Orient Book Company. 1946.

Mosley, Leonard. Last Days of the British Raj.

Mukherjee Haridas and Mukherjee Uma.
I. Sri Aurobindo's Political Thought. 1958.
II. Bipin Chandra Pal and India's Struggle for Swaraj. 1958.
III. The Growth of Nationalism in India. 1957.
IV. The Origin of the National Education Movement. 1957.
V. India's Fight for Freedom or the Swadeshi Movement. 1958.
VI. Jatiya Andolane Satis Chandra Mukhopahyaya (in Bengali).
VII. Swadeshi Andolan O Banglar Navayug (in Bengali).

Mukherjee, P. (Edited by). All About Partition. Calcutta, 1906.

Mukherji, Dhangopal. Disillusioned India. New York, 1930.

Mukherji, Hirendranath. India Struggles for Freedom.

Mukherji, P. Indian Constitutional Documents.

Mukhopadhyaya, Prabhat Kumar.
Bharate Jatiya Andolan (Bengali)

Nariman, K Y. Whither Congress. Bombay, 1933.

Natarajan, J. History of Indian Journalism.

Natarajan, S. A Century of Social Reform in India. 1959.

Natesan, G.
I. Congress Presidential Speechea.
II. Friends of India Series.
III. Eminent Mussalmans . Madras, 1926.
IV. Swadeshi Movement (Views of Representative Indians and Anglo-Indians). 1908.

Nehru, Jawaharlal. See Section II.

Nevinson, H. W. The New Spirit in India. London, 1908.

Noman, Mohammed.
I. Rise and Growth of the All-India Muslim League. Allahabad, 1941.
II. Muslim India. 1942.

O'Donnell, C. J.
I. The Causes of Present Discontents in India.
II. The Failure of Lord Curzon.

O'Malley, L.S.S. (Ed.). Modern India and the West. Oxford, 1941.

Osborn, Lt. Colonel, Arthur. Must England lose India ?

Overstreet, Gene D., and Windmiller, Marshall. Communism in India. Bombay, 1960.

Pal, Bipin Chandra.
I. Memoirs of My Life and Times. 2 Vols. 1932 and 1951.
II. Brahmo Samaj and the Battle of Swaraj in India. 1926.
III. Indian Nationalism.
IV. Nationality and Empire. 1916.
V. The New Spirit.

Pole, D. Graham. India in Transition. London, 1932.

Pradhan, R. G. India's Struggle for Swaraj. Natesan, 1930.

Prasad, Dr. Amba. The Indian Revolt of 1942. 1954.

Prasad Rajendra.
I. India Divided.
II. Satyagraha in Champaran.

Qureshi, I. H. History of the Muslim Community in India. New York, 1961.

Raghuvamsi, V. P. S. Indian Nationalist Movement and Thought. 1951.

Rai, Lajpat.
I. The Arya Samaj. 1915.
II. Unhappy India. 1928.
III. Young India. 1917.
IV. The Story of My Deportation.

VII. England's Debt to India.
VI. The Political Future of India.
VII. India's Will to Freedom. 1921.

Ram Gopal. Indian Muslims. 1959.

Rao, B. Shiva, and Pole, D. Graham. The Problem of India. 1926.

Rao, Raja and Iqbal. Changing India. A Collection of Writings. 1939.

Reddy, M. Muni. The Student Movement in India. 1947.

Report of the. 1. Delegation sent to India by the India League, London, in 1932, entitled 'Condition of India'.
II. Sapru Committee.
III. Sedition (Rowlatt) Committee.
IV. Indian Round Table Conferences.

Reynolds, Reginald. The White Sahibs in India. London, 1937.

Roy, Prtihwis Chandra. The Case against the Break-up of Bengal. 1905.

Sahai, Govind. '42 Rebellion. 1947.

Sarkar, Indira. Social Thought in Bengal, 1757-1947. 1949.

Sastri, Sivanath. History of the Brahmo Samaj. 1911-2.

Sastri, V. S. The Indian National Congress. Madras, 1911.

Savarkar, V. D. Hindu Sanghatan, its Ideology and Immediate Programme. Bombay, 1940.

Sen, Amit. Notes on the Bengal Renaissance. 1946.

Sen, Dr. Sachin. Birth of Pakistan. Calcutta, 1955.

Sen, Surendranath. Eighteen Fifty-seven. 1957 (Govt. Publication).

Sharma, J. S. Indian National Congress. A Descriptive Bibliography of India's Struggle for Freedom. 1959.

Singh, G. N. Landmarks in Indian Constitutional and National Development (1600-1919).

Singh Randhir. The Ghadar Heroes. 1945.

Sitaramayya, Pattabhi.
I. The History of the Indian National Congress.
II. Gandhi and Gandhism.

Sources of Indian Tradition. Columbia University Press, New York, 1958.

Spear, Percival. India, A Modern History. Ann Arbour, 1961.

Spear, T. G. P. The Nabobs. London, 1932.

Strickland, Sir Walter, Bart. British Justice and Honesty. 1913.

Sunderland, J. T. India in Bondage—Her Right to Freedom. 1929.

Symonds, R. A. The Making of Pakistan. London, 1950.

Topa, Ishwarnath. The Growth and Development of Nationalist Thought in India. 1930.

Uttar Pradesh Government.
Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh.
Vidyarthi, R. S. British Savagery in India. Agra, 1946.
Williams, Rushbrook. India in 1917-18, 1918-9, etc.
Wint, G. The British in Asia. London, 1955.
Young India. Published Monthly by the India Home Rule League (in U. S. A.). 1918-20.
Zacharias, H. C. E. Renascent India. London, 1933.
Zetland, Lord (Ronaldshay).
Steps Towards Indian Home Rule.

II. BIOGRAPHICAL

Ahmed Khan, Sir Syed, by General Graham. Edinburgh, 1885.
Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam.
India Wins Freedom, An Autobiographical Narrative 1959.
Benerji, Surendranath. A Nation in Making (Autobiography). 1925.
Bose, Jogesh C., B°.
Jnan Chandra Roy, The Gospel of B°.
Speeches and Writings of, (Natesan).
The Trumpet Voices of India, Speeches in England.
Besant, Annie Autobiography. London, 1920.
B°. by Sri Prakash. Bombay, 1954.
Speeches and Writings, by Theosophical Society.
Bhagat Singh Thakur, Gopal. B°.
Ajay Kumar Ghosh. B° and his Comrades.
Bose Rajnarain. Atmacharit (Autobiography in Bengali).
Bose Subhaschandra.
A. Autobiographical
The Indian Struggle, 3 Volumes.
An Indian Pilgrim. Calcutta, 1948.
The Mission of Life. Calcutta, 1953.
Crossroads. Calcutta. 1962.
B. Works by others
Hemendra Nath Das Gupta. Subhas.
A. C. Chatterji. India's Struggle for Freedom.
Dilip Kumar Roy., The Subhas I knew.
Hugh Toye. The Springing Tiger. London, 1959.
J. G. Ohsawa. The Two Great Indians in Japan.

Calcutta, 1954. (Lives of Subhas and Rash Bihari Bose).
Shri Ram Sharma (Ed). Netaji, His Life and Work.
S. A. Ayer. Unto Him A Witness.
Shahnawaz Khan. I. N. A. and its Netaji.
Uttamchand. When Bose was Ziauddin.

C. Speeches and Writings.

Edited by Jagat S. Bright, 1947.
By Azad Publications, Bangalore.
Famous Speeches and Letters of, Edited by Ganpat Rai, 1946.

D. Miscellaneous.

Report of the Netaji Enquiry Committee.
Dissentient Note by S. C. Bose.

Curzon, Lord. Lovat Fraser, India under Curzon and After, 1911.
Earl Ronaldshay, The Life of C°.
Sir Thomas Raleigh. C° in India (Selections from Speeches).

Das, C. R. The Life and Times of, by P. C. Ray. London, 1927.
D°, by Rajen Sen. Calcutta, 1927.

Dayanand Saraswati, by Harbilas Sarda.

Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand.
The Story of my Experiment with Truth (Autobiography). 1940.
Bose, Nirmal Kumar. Studies in Gandhism. Calcutta, 1962.
Do. Selections from Gandhi.
Do. My Days with Gandhi. Calcutta, 1953.
Bryant, J F. Gandhi and the Indianisation of the Empire. 1924.
Datta, K. K. Writings and Speeches of G° relating to Bihar.
Duncan, Donald. Selected Writings of Mahatma G°. Boston, 1951.
Fischer, Louis.
I. G°, his Life and Message for the World. New York, 1954.
II. The Life of G°. Bombay, 1959.
III. The Essential Gandhi. London, 1963.

Hiren Mukerjee, Gandhi—A Study. Calcutta, 1958. (It gives a select and critical bibliography at the end).
Nair, C. Sankaran, G° and Anarchy. 1922.
Nehru on Gandhi (Selections from Writings and Speeches). John Day Company, New York.
Pyarelal, Mahatma G°, the Last Phase. 1956.
Sitaramayya, Pattabhi, G° and Gandhism.
Tendulkar, D. G. , Life of Mahatma Gandhi (Complete Biography in eight Volumes). Bombay, 1952.
Speeches and Writings of (Natesan).

There is a vast literature on Gandhi which has been compiled by Jagdish Sharma.

Ghose, Arabinda — Sri Aurobindo on Himself.
(This was later incorporated in a bigger book, Sri Aurobindo on Himself and on the Mother. Published by Pondicherry Ashram).
Upendra Chandra Bhattacharyya, Bharatpurush Sri Arabinda (in Bengali).
Haridas and Uma Mukherji, Sri Aurobindo's Political Thought. 1958.
Karan Singh, Prophet of Indian Nationalism. 1963.
Speeches. Arya Publishing House. 1948.

Ghose, Matilal. — by Paramananda Dutta.
Ghose Sisirkumar. — by Anath Nath Bose.
Gokhale, G. K. — by T. V. Parvate.
G°, by T. K. Shahani. Bombay, 1929.
G°, His Life and Speeches, by J. S. Hoyland. Calcutta, 1930.
Speeches of G°, by Natesan. 1920.

Har Dayal, — Forty-four Months in Germany and Turkey.
Hardinge, Lord, of Penshurst.
My Indian Years. 1948.
Hare, David, — by Pearychand Mitra.
Hume, A. O., — by Sir William Wedderburn, 1913.
Jinnah, M. A. — Saiyed, M. H., J°. Lahore, 1943.
Bolitho, Hector. J°, Creator of Pakistan. London, 1954.
Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, Speeches and Writings of J°.
Ilahi Bakhsh. With the Qaed-i-Azam during the Last Days.

Krishnavarman, Shyamji, by Harbilas Sarda.
Life and Times of K°, by Indulal K. Yajnik.

Mahendra Pratap, Raja. My Life Story of fifty-five Years. Dehradun, 1947.
Mehta, Sir Pheroze Shah, by H. P. Modi. Bombay, 1921.
Speeches and Writings of, by C. Y. Chintamani.
Montagu, E. S. An Indian Diary. 1930.
Morley, John, Viscount. Recollections. 1917.
Mukhopadhyaya, Satischandra.
Mukherji, Haridas and Uma, Jatiya Andolane S°.
Naoroji, Dadabhai, by R. P. Masani.
Narayan, Jayaprakash, Towards Struggle (Ed. by Yusuf Meharally).
Nehru, Pandit Jawaharlal.
I. Autobiography.
II. Discovery of India.
III. Nehru on Gandhi (see Gandhi).
IV. Mahatma Gandhi. 1949
V. Bunch of Letters.
VI. Toward Freedom ; the autobiography of N°, 1941.
Buck, Pearl, N°. 1936,
Brailsford, H. N., Panditji. Tribune, 1948.
Roy Manabendranath, N°.
Karaka, D. F. Nehru : the Lotus Eater from Kashmir. 1953.
D' Souza, Austin, A. Paradox of N°. 1952.
Frank Moraes. N°.
Brecher, Michael. N°., A Political Biography.
Jagdish Sharma. N°, A Descriptive Bibliography (A comprehensive account of the writings about Nehru).
Pal, Bipin Chandra. Memoirs of My Life and Times. 2 Vol.
Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai,
N. D. Parikh, P°. Ahmadabad, 1953.
P. D. Saggi. Life and Work of P°.
Kewal L. Panjabi, The Indomitable Sardar. 1962.
Phadke, Vasudeo Balvant.
V. S. Joshi, Life of P°.
Prasad, Rajendra. Autobiography. Bombay. 1957.
Kewal L. Panjabi, P°.
Ranade, Mahadev Gobinda.
D. G. Karve, R° the Prophet of Liberated India.
A. B. Kolaskar, A Collection of Essays and Speeches.
Kellock, R°
Roy, Rammohan Sophia Dobson Collet, The Life and Letters of R°.

1900. (Edited by Dilip Kumar Biswas and Prabhat Chandra Ganguli. 1962.)
Mary Carpenter. Last Days in England of R°. London, 1866.
Nagendranath Chatterji, Biography of R° (in Bengali).
Ramananda Chatterji, R° and Modern India. 1918.
Commemoration Volume of R° Centenary Celebrations.
Amal Home. R° : The Man and His Work. R° Centenary Publicity Booklet.
Brajendra Nath Seal. R° The Universal Man.
Brajendranath Bandyopadhyaya. R° (in Bengali).
Iqubal Singh. R° The First Phase.
The English Works of R° have been published by (1) J. C. Ghosh, (2) Panini Office, Allahabad,. (3) Brahma Samaj, Calcutta (in progress). Selection from official records have been published by R. P. Chanda and J. K.Majumdar.

Sen, Keshab Chandra. Life and Teachings of, by '. C. Mozoomdar.
S°, by Gaurgovinda Roy.

Savarkar, V. D. The Story of My Transportation for Life. 1950.
Dhananjay Keer. S° and His Times.

Spratt, Philip. Blowing up of India (Reminiscences and Reflections of a former Comintern Agent). Calcutta, 1953.

Tagore. Dwarakanath, Memoirs of, by Kishorichand Mitra. Calcutta, 1870.

Telang, K.T. The Man and his Times, by V. N. Naik.

Tilak, Bal Gangadhar. N.C. Kelkar, Life and Times of (in Marathi). Translated by D. V. Divekar.
Biography of T° by 1. D. V. Athalye. 1921.
2. V. G. Bhat. 1956.
3. D. P. Karmarkar (T°. A Study). 1956.
4. D. V. Tahmankar. 1956.
5. Ram Gopal. 1956.
6. T. V. Parvate.
Reminiscences of T°, Edited by S. V. Bapat.
Writings and Speeches, with an Appreciation by Aurobindo Ghose. Ganesh Co. Madras, 1919.

Upadhyaya, Brahmabandhab.
Mukherji, Haridas and Uma, U O Bharatiya Jatiyatabad. (in Bengali). 1961.

Vivekananda, Swami
Life of, Published by Advaita Ashram. Mayavati.
By Swami Nikhilananda, New York.
V°, Patriot-Prophet, by Bhupendranath Datta. Calcutta. 1954.
V° in America, New Discoveries, by Marie Louise Burke. Calcutta, 1958.
V°'s Rousing Call to Hindu Nation (Collection of classified Passages) by E. Ranade. Calcutta, 1963.
Centenary Memorial Volume. Calcutta, 1963.
Complete Works of V°, Published by Advaita Ashram and Udbodhan Office, Calcutta.

III. BIBLIOGRAPHY TO SELECT TOPICS

Volume I, Book I, Chapter VII. The Outbreak of 1857-8.

Cf. Section I. entries under Holmes; Kaye ; Majumdar, R. C. ; Malleson ; Sen Surendranath ; Chaudhuri, S. B.
There is a vast literature on the subject for which the readers may consult the bibliographies in the books of Majumdar. R. C., and Sen, Surendranath.

Voulme II, Book III, Chapters I and II. The Partition of Bengal and the Swadeshi Movement.

Cf. Section I, entries under Guizonnier ; Mukherjee Haridas and Uma ; Mukherjee P ; Nevinson ; and Roy, Prithwis Chandra ; and Section II, under Banerji, Surendranath; Morley.

Volume I, Book II, Chapter V ; Volume II, Book III, Chapters VI, and VIII ; Volume III, Book IV, Chapter VII. Militant Nationalism or Revolutionary Movement.

Report of the Rowlatt or Sedition Committee.
Note on "Terrorism in India" submitted by the Secretary of State to the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, 1933-4. Joint Committee Report, Vol. II, Appendix A. Memorandum on Terrorism.
Joshi, V. S. Life of Vasudeo Balvant Phadke.
There is a large number of Bengali books on the subject of which a few are mentioned below :

I. GENERAL

Suprakash Roy.	Bharater Vaiplavik Sangramer Itihas
Nalini Kishore Guha.	Banglay Viplabavad
Hemendranath Das Gupta.	Bharater Viplaba-kahini
Bhupendranath Datta	I. Aprakasita Rajnaitik Itihas
	II. Bharater Dvitiya Svadhinata Sangram.
Hemchandra Qanungo.	Banglay Viplaba-pracheshta.

II. REMINISCENCES

Sachindranath Sanyal	Bandi-jivan. 2 Vols.
Manindranarayan Roy	Kakori Shadayantra.
Upendranath Bandyopadhyaya	Nirbasiter Atmakatha.
Jadugopal Mukhopadhyaya	Viplabi Jibaner Smriti

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE (1919 to 1947)

Figures within bracket at the end refer to the page in the text.

1919

February, 24	The *Satyagraha* Pledge signed (14).
March, 18	The Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Acts, based on Rowlatt Bills, Passed (2).
,, 30	*Hartal* at Delhi (15-18).
April, 6	All-India *hartal* (16).
,, 10	Arrest of Gandhi and riots (22).
,, 13	Massacre at Jallianwala Bagh (26).
,, 15-20	Martial Law in the Panjab (29).
,, 18	Gandhi suspends *Satyagraha* (42).
June, 18	Text of the Reform Bill issued.
July, 21	Gandhi abandons *Satyagraha* (42).
November, 23-4	All-India Khilafat Conference at Delhi, Presided over by Gandhi, threatens Non-co-operation (56).
December, 23	The Government of India Act receives the Royal assent.
	Royal Amnesty to Political prisoners announced by a Royal Proclamation.
,, 27	Amritsar Session of the Congress (50).
,, 30	Moderate Conference in Calcutta (50)

1920

January, 19	Khilafat Deputation to the Viceroy (56).
March, 10	Gandhi issues a manifesto suggesting Non-violent Non-co-operation (NCO) to the Khilafatits (57).
,, 17	Indian Khilafat Deputation to Lloyd George (57).
,, 19	Day of National mourning observed by the Khilafatists.

April, 17	Khilafat Conference at Madras approves of Gandhi's idea of NCO (67).
May, 12	All-India Khilafat Committee Meeting at Bombay. Gandhi urges NCO (67)
„ 15	Peace Terms to Turkey announced.
„ 28	Central Khilafat Committee adopts NCO.
„ 28	Report of the Hunter Committee published and Governmet dicision announced.
„ 30	All-India Congress Committee (A.I.C.C) meeting at Banaras decides to hold a Special session of the Congress in Calcutta to consider adoption of NCO.
June, 1-2	Muslim Conference at Allahabad resolves to adopt NCO—Gandhi offers cooperation (71-2).
August, 1	All-India strike organized by the Khilafatists by way of inaugurating NCO. Gandhi returns his war-medals to the Viceroy (75).
August	*Hijrat* or mass-migration of the Muslims to Afghanistan.
September, 4	Adoption of NCO by the Congress at its Special session in Calcutta.
December, 26-31	The Nagpur session of the Congress accepts NCO.
	1921
May, 29	The apology of the Ali brothers to the Viceroy (117)
August	Moplah Outbreak.
November, 1	Ali brothers sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment.
„ 17	Prince of Wales landed at Bombay; riots in Bombay and all-India *hartal*.

December	Arrest of C. R. Das, Motilal Nehru, Lajpat Rai and other leaders and about 25,000 Congress workers.
„ 24	Prince of Wales arrives in Calcutta.
„ 27-8	Congress session at Ahmadabad.

1922

February, 1	Gandhi communicated to the Viceroy the decision of Bardoloi to embark on Mass Civil Disobedience (151).
„ 5	Mob violence at Chauri Chaura (156, 180).
„ 11-12	Working Committee (W.C.) of the Congress suspends Mass Civil Disobedience.
„ 24-5	A.I.C.C. endorses the decision of the W. C.
March, 18	Gandhi sentenced to six years' simple imprisonment.
August, 2	The "steel frame" speech of Lloyd George (227).
Decembe, 26-31	Congress session at Gaya rejects the Council entry resolution.

1923

January, 1	Resignation of the Congress President, C. R. Das.
September, 15-19	Special session of the Congress at Delhi approves of the Swarajya Party's programme of Council entry.
December, 16-7	Hindu-Muslim Pact by the Swarajya Party in Calcutta.
December, 28	The Congress session at Cocanada begins.

1924	
January, 30	The first meeting of the Second Legislative Assembly; attended by the Swarajya Party.
February, 5	Gandhi released unconditionally on grounds of ill health (p. 235, where the date is wrongly printed as February, 4).
,, 8	Motilal Nehru moves his famous resolution on the constitutional changes in the Central Legislative Assembly.
,, 18	The motion carried in the Assembly (236)
May, 22	Gandhi's statement re Council entry. Rejoinder of C.R. Das and Motilal Nehru.
June, 27	A.I.C.C. meeting at Ahmadabad. Fight between Gandhi and the Swarajists over the new constitution of the Congress (246).
October, 25	Bengal Ordinance promulgated by the Governor-General.
November, 21-22	All-Parties' Conference at Bombay.
,, 23	Pact between Gandhi and the Swarajya Party.
1925	
March, 29	C. R. Das issues a manifesto condemning violence—pourparlers with the Government.
June, 16	Death of C. R. Das.
August, 22	Vithalbhai Patel elected President of the Central Legislative Assembly.
December, 26-28	Kanpur session of the Congress—the members of the Swarajya Party directed to walk out of the Legislatures (which they did in March, 1926).
1926	
April, 3	Conference of all political parties except the Congress.

September	Split in the Swarajya Party. Secession of the Responsivists and Independent Congressmen who form a Coalition Party (258).
1927	
November, 8	Appointment of Simon Commission.
December, 26-28	Madras session of the Congress declares independence as India's goal and takes steps to summon an All-Parties' Conference to draw up a constitution for India.
1928	
February, 3	Arrival of Simon Commission. All-India *hartal*.
,, 16	The Central Legislative Assembly passes the resolution to boycott the Simon Commission.
August, 28-31	All-Parties' Conference at Lakhnau accepted the recommendations of the Committee, appointed by it under the Chairmanship of Motilal Nehru, to draw up the Constitution for India.
December, 22	All-Parties' Convention in Calcutta (313-4).
,, 29-31	Congress session in Calcutta accepts the Constitution drafted by the Nehru Committee. Gandhi promises Swaraj within one year.
1929	
January, 1	All-Parties' Conference of the Muslims at Delhi (314).

April, 8	Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Datta throw bombs in the Assembly Hall at Delhi.
July, 10	Lahore Conspiracy Case
,, 12	The accused under-trial prisoners resort to hunger-strike
September, 13	Death of Jatin Das as a result of hunger-strike in Lahore jail.
October, 31	Viceroy's Declaration on Dominion Status and the summoning of a Round Table Conference (R.T.C.) (322).
December, 23	Gandhi and others meet the Viceroy and reject the invitation to R. T. C.
,, 29	Lahore session of the Congress begins. It declares complete independence as the goal, resolves to boycott the Legislatures, and approves of Civil Disobedience.

1930

January, 1	The session of the Congress ends. Jawaharlal Nehru, as President of the Congress, hoists the tri-colour flag of Indian independence on the bank of the Ravi at Lahore.
,, 26	The Independence Day observed.
March, 12	Civil Disobedience inaugurated by Gandhi's march to Dandi for making salt.
April, 5	Gandhi arrives at Dandi with his party.
,, 18	Chittagong Armoury Raid.
June, 7	Report of the Simon Commission issued.

November. 12	Inauguration of the First R. T. C.
1931	
January, 19	The First R. T. C. adjourned.
,, 26	Gandhi and the members of the W. C. released.
February, 6	Death of Pandit Motilal Nehru.
February, 17 to March, 4	Gandhi-Irwin talks.
March. 5	Gandhi-Irwin Pact.
,, 23	Bhagat Singh and his two comrades hanged.
,, 29	Karachi session of the Congress approves of the Gandhi-Irwin Pact. Hostile demonstration against Gandhi (384).
April, 1-2	The Congress W. C. elects Gandhi as the sole representative to the R. T. C.
August, 29	Gandhi leaves India to attend R. T. C.
September, 7	Second R. T. C. begins.
,, 12	Gandhi arrives in London.
December, 11	Second R. T. C. closes.
,, 28	Gandhi lands at Bombay.
,, 29	Viceroy turns down Gandhi's request for an interview.
1932	
January, 1	The Congress W. C. revives Civil Disobedience.
,, 4	Gandhi arrested. Government issues four new Ordinances.
August, 17	Announcement of the Communal Award made by Ramsay Macdonald.

September, 20	Gandhi begins 'fast unto death' as a protest against Communal Award.
" 25	Poona Pact.
November, 17	Third R. T. C. begins.
December, 24	Third R. T. C. ends.
1933	
May, 8	Gaadhi begins his 21 days' purificatory fast.
	Suspension of Civil Disobedience Movement.
	Gandhi released from prison.
August, 1	Beginning of Individual Civil Disobedience.
	Gandhi arrested and imprisoned for one year.
,, 17	Gandhi begins fast for not being granted facilities to carry on the Harijan upliftment work.
,, 23	Gandhi released.
1934	
May, 20	Civil Disobedience Movement officially terminated by the Congress.
October, 26-8	Congress session at Worli, Bombay, after three and a half years.
1935	
August, 4	New Government of India Act receives Royal assent.
December, 28	Golden Jubilee of the Congress celebrated all over India.
1936	
April, 14	The Congress session at Lakhnau.
December, 27-9	The Congress session at Faizpur.

1937

July, 7	Congressmen permitted to take office and form Ministry (560-61).

1938

February, 19	Congress session at Haripura (No session in 1937).

1939

March, 10-12	Congress session at Tripuri.
April, 29	Subhas Bose resigns the Presidentship of the Congress.
September, 3	Outbreak of the Second World War.
„ 15	Congress W. C. asks Britain to declare her War-aims.
October, 10	A. I. C. C. endorses the above.
„ 17	Viceroy declares War-aims of Britain (598).
„ 22	W. C. asks Congress Ministries to resign.
„ 26	Secretary of State offers to expand the Governor-General's Fxecutive Council.
October, 27 to November, 15	All the Congress Ministries resign.

1940

March, 19	Congress session at Ramgarh.
„ 22	Muslim League session at Lahore demands Pakistan.
April-May	German Blitzkrieg—Collapse of Norway, Denmark, Holland and Belgium.
May, 10	Churchill replaces Chamberlainas Prime Minister in Britain.

May, 28 to June, 3	The British forces evacuate Dunkirk.
June	Germany overruns France.
,, 11	Italy joins the Allies.
,, 17-20	Session of the Congress Working Committee. Gandhi released from his responsibility of guiding the policy of the Congress (602).
July, 2	Subhas Bose arrested.
August, 8	Viceroy's new offer—Expansion of his Executive Council, setting up War Council and Constituent Assembly (605).
October, 17	Individual *Satyagraha* started.
November, 17	Representative *Satyagraha*.
December, 17	*Satyagraha* suspended.
1941	
January, 5	Resumption of *Satyagraha*.
,, 17	Subhas Bose escapes from his home detention in Calcutta.
March, 28	Subhas Bose arrives in Berlin.
June, 22	Germany declares war against Russia.
July, 22	Enlarged Executive Council of the Governor-General announced.
September, 9	Churchill's declaration that the Atlantic Charter was not applicable to India.
December, 7	Japan joins the War against the Allies.
,, 23-30	W. C. relieves Gandhi of the responsibility of leading the *Satyagraha* movement (613), and lays down the future policy and programme of the Congress.

1942

February, 15	Fall of Singapore.
March, 7	Fall of Rangoon.
„ 11	Churchill announces Cripps Mission.
„ 23	Sir Stafford Cripps reaches Delhi.
„ 28-30	Conference of Indians in South-East Asia at Tokyo, organized by Rash Bihari Bose, invites Subhas Bose.
April, 12	Cripps, unsuccessful, leaves India.
„ 29	Evacuation of Burma.
June, 15-23	Congference of Indians at Bangkok.
July, 14	'Quit India' Resolution passed by W. C.
August, 8	'Quit India' Resolution passed by A. I. C. C. Arrest of Gandhi and other leaders, followed by violent outbreaks all over India.

1943

February, 8	Subhas Bose left Germany in a U. Boat.
June, 13	Subhas Bose arrives at Tokyo.
July, 2	Subhas Bose arrives at Singapore.
„ 4	Subhas Bose takes over the leadership of the Indian Independence Movement from Rash Bihari Bose.
September	No. 1 Regiment of I.N.A. raised in Malay.
October, 21	Provisional Government of Free India established at Singapore.
November, 6	Greater East Asia Conference at Tokyo where Tojo, the Japanese Premier, announced that Andaman and Nicobar Islands would be

	handed over to the Provisional Government of Subhas Bose.
November, 9	The first batch of I. N. A. leaves for War Front.
December, 31	Subhas Bose visits the Free Indian Territories of Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

1944

January, 4	Subhas Bose arrives atRangoon.
February, 4	I. N. A. commences fight.
March, 19	I. N. A. crosses over to Indian territory.
July, 26	The Japanese army and the I N. A retreat.
" 27	Gandhi offers terms to Viceroy who rejects them.
September, 9-27	Gandhi's unsuccessful negotiations with Jinnah.

1945

March, 23	Wavell reaches London to consult the Cabinet.
June, 4	Wavell returns to India.
,, 25	Simla Conference opens.
July, 14	Simla Conference closes.
August, 24	Wavell goes to London.
September, 15	Surrender of Japan.
,, 16	Wavell returns to India.
,, 19	Wavell announces British Policy.
December	Election to the Central Legislative Assembly.

1946

January, 5	British Parliamentary Delegation arrives in India.

January, 18	Wavell's announcement of New Executive Council and a Constitution-making Body.
February, 18	Mutiny of Naval Ratings.
,, 19	Announcement of Cabinet Mission.
March, 24	Cabinet Mission arrives at Delhi.
May, 16	Cabinet Mission issues a Statement.
June, 16	Cabinet Mission's statement on Interim Government.
,, 29	Cabinet Mission leaves India.
July, 7	Jawaharlal Nehru becomes President of the Congress.
,, 10	Nehru's Press Conference, which finally alienated Jinnah.
,, 22	Viceroy's proposals for Interim Government.
,, 29	Muslim League rejects Cabinet Mission Plan and adopts the policy of 'Direct Action'.
,, 31	Jinnah rejects Viceroy's proposals.
August, 8	Congress accepts Viceroy's invitation to join Interim Government.
,, 16	'Direct Action' of the Muslim League. Calcutta Killing.
September, 2	Interim Government of Nehru sworn in.
October	Severe communal riots in Noakhali and Bihar.
October, 14	Muslim League joins the Interim Government.
December, 2	Congress and League leaders arrive at London.
,, 6	Statement of policy by the British Government (787).
,, 9	The Constituent Assembly meets.

1947

January, 5	A. I. C. C. accepts the British statement of 6 December.
,, 31	Muslim League rejects the statement.
February, 20	The historic statement of Attlee, the British Premier, granting freedom to India (791).
March, 8	The Congress W.C. passes a resolution for dividing the Panjab on communal basis, thereby foreshadowing the Partition of India (793).
,, 23	Wavell leaves India.
,, 24	The new Viceroy Mountbatten assumes charge.
May, 18	Mountbatten proceeds to London. The Cabinet approves of his plan on the basis of the Partition of India.
June, 2-3	The Indian leaders approve of the Plan.
,, 3	Announcement in India and Britain of the final decision of the British Government regarding the transfer of power (804).
,, 3	The Congress W. C. approves of the Plan (806).
,, 4	Mountbatten's announcement that the transfer of power would be effected probably about 15 August.
,, 10	The Council of the Muslim League accepts the Plan.
,, 14-15	The A. I. C. C. session at Delhi accepts the Plan, recommended by all the important leaders, including

	Gandhi, Azad, Nehru, Patel, Kripalani, and Pant (808).
July, 18	The India Independence Bill receives the Royal Assent.
August, 15	India becomes free as a Dominion of the British Commonwealth. Creation of the new State of Pakistan with the same status.

SUCCESSION OF GOVERNORS-GENERAL (19C0-47)

Name	Date of the assumption of office.
Lord Curzon	6 January, 1899
Lord Minto	19 November, 1905
Lord Hardinge	23 November, 1910
Lord Chelmsford	5 April, 1916
Lord Reading	2 April, 1921
Lord Irwin	3 April, 1926
Lord Willingdon	17 April, 1931.
Lord Linlithgow	18 April, 1936
Lord Wavell	20 October, 1943
Lord Mountbatten	24 March, 1947

INDEX

Index

ERRATA

Page	Line	For	Read
6	4	the	he
13	5	rext	next
31	13	Deveton	Doveton
53	18	Geoorge	George
67	9	1923	1920
83	15	Gandih	Gandhi
126	8	systen	system
143	11	prescription	proscription
144	9	lon	long
155	7	neeting	meeting
196	28	evample	example
203	26	gangwa ybetween	gangway between
238	1	shcn	such
245	16	4 February	5 February
250	10	Copinath	Gopinath
275	13	Ae	As
276	Add between lines 10 and 11		2. Communal Riots
280	24	faulr	fault
328	35	cansed	caused
336	12	aud	and
350	15	Cnngress	Congress
414	11	rhe	the
437	11	theae	these
463	11	beed	been
470	9	Magistrade	Magistrate
481	11	F. K. Nariman	K. F. Nariman
484	28	F. K. Nariman	K. F. Nariman
494	30	inprisonment	imprisonment
525	20	192S	1928
526	13	und	and
544	12	Bnngal	Bengal

Page	Line	For	Read
568	28	Leaaue	League
569	3	Proxinces	Provinces
603	32	len	led
603	34	Eurove	Europe
607	7	Cougress	Congress
644	25	Such	such
650	13	Telephoae	Telephone
657	29	rnachine	machine
661	30	aecret	secret
721	11	1924	1944
765	26	powar	power
777	22	Actlon	Action
800	4	lf	if
805	21	dourse	course
812	13	ef	of